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THE  SALT  II  TREATY 


HEARINGS 

BBFORB  THE 

COMMITTEE  ON  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 
UNITED  STATES  SENATE 

NINETY-SIXTH  CONGRESS 

FIRST  SESSION 
ON 

EX.  Y,  96-1 

THE  TREATY  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 
AND  THE  UNION  OF  SOVIET  SOCIALIST  REPUBLICS  ON  THE 
LIMITATION  OF  STRATEGIC  OFFENSIVE  ARMS  AND  THE  PRO- 
TOCOL THERETO,  TOGETHER  REFERRED  TO  AS  THE  SALT 
II  TREATY,  BOTH  SIGNED  AT  VIENNA,  AUSTRIA,  ON  JUNE  18, 
1979,  AND  RELATED  DOCUMENTS 


SEPTEMBER  6,  7,  10,  11,  AND  12,  1979 


PART  4 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations 


THE  SALT  II  TREATY 


HEARINGS 

before:  thb 

COMMITTEE  ON  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 
UNITED  STATES  SENATE 

NINETY-SIXTH  CONGKESS 

FIRST  SESSION 
ON 

EX.  Y,  96-1 

THE  TREATY  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 
AND  THE  UNION  OF  SOVIET  SOCIALIST  REPUBLICS  ON  THB 
LIMITATION  OF  STRATEGIC  OFFENSIVE  ARMS  AND  THE  PRO- 
TOCOL THERETO,  TOGETHER  REFERRED  TO  AS  THE  SALT 
II  TREATY,  BOTH  SIGNED  AT  VIENNA,  AUSTRIA,  ON  JUNE  18, 
1979,  AND  RELATED  DOCUMENTS 


SEPTEMBER  6,  7,  10,  11,  AND  12,  1979 


PART  4 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations 


y4'f  76/z:^f2/shlf 


U.S.   GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
<8-260O  WASHINGTON    ;   1979 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 

Washington,  D.C.  20402 

Stock  No.  052-070-05135-3 


COMMITTEE  ON  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 
FRANK  CHURCH,  Idaho.  Chairman 


CLAIBORNE  PELL,  Rhode  Island 
GEORGE  McGOVERN,  South  Dakota 
JOSEPH  R.  BIDEN,  Jr.,  Delaware 
JOHN  GLENN,  Ohio 
RICHARD  (DICK)  STONE,  Florida 
PAUL  S.  SARBANES,  Maryland 
EDMUND  S.  MUSKIE,  Maine 
EDWARD  ZORINSKY,  Nebraska 


JACOB  K.  JAVITS,  New  York 
CHARLES  H.  PERCY,  Illinois 
HOWARD  H.  BAKER,  Jr.,  Tennessee 
JESSE  HELMS,  North  Carolina 
S.  I.  HAYAKAWA,  California 
RICHARD  G.  LUGAR,  Indiana 


WiLUAM  B.  Bader,  Staff  Director 
Albert  A.  Lakeland,  Jr.,  Minority  Staff  Director 


(U) 


CONTENTS 


Hearing  days:  ^^^ 

September  6,  1979 1 

September  7,  1979 149 

September  10,  1979 275 

September  11,  1979 397 

September  12,  1979 435 

Statement  of: 

Baugher,  Peter  Vincent,  past  chairman  and  present  member,  national 

governing  board,  Ripon  Society,  Washington,  D.C 166 

Brennan,  Donald,  director,  national  security  studies,  Hudson  Institute 363 

Carey,  John,  past  national  commander.  The  American  Legion,  Washington, 

D.C 157 

Corterier,  Peter,  Grermany,  Rapporteur,  Political  Committee,  North  Atlan- 
tic Assembly 312 

de  Vries,  Klaas  G.,  Netherlands,  Rapporteur,  Military  Committee,  North 

Atlantic  Assembly  318 

Earle,  Hon.  Ralph,  II,  Chairman  of  the  U.S.  SALT  delegation 435 

Hoffmann,  Prof.  Stanley,  Harvard  University,  Cambridge,  Mass 277 

Karber,  Phillip  A.,  vice  president,  BDM  Corp 253 

King,  Mrs.  Coretta  Scott,  member,  Americans  for  SALT 87 

Kirkland,  Lane,  secretary-treasurer,  AFL-CIO,  Washington,  D.C 191 

Krol,  John  Cardinal,  Archdiocese  of  Philadelphia,  on  behalf  of  the  U.S. 

Catholic  Conference,  Washington,  D.C 116 

Lodal,  Jan,  executive  vice  president,  American  Management  Systems 398 

May,  Michael,  associate  director,  Lawrence-Livermore  Laboratory,  Liver- 
more,  Calif 406 

Mclntyre,  Hon.  Thomas  J.,  Jr.,  president,  Americans  for  SALT 84 

Moorer,  Adm.  Thomas  (retired),  cochairman.  Coalition  for  Peace  Through 

Strength,  Washington,  D.C 39 

Nitze,  Hon.  Paul,  former  Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense  and  former  Secre- 
tary of  the  Navy 402 

Panofsky,  Dr.  Wolfgang,  director,  Stanford  Linear  Accelerator  Center 351 

Perry,  Hon.  William  J.,  Under  Secretary  for  Research  and  Engineering, 

Department  of  Defense 438 

Randall,  Dr.  Claire,  general  secretary.  National  Council  of  Churches 131 

Rostow,  Eugene,  chairman,  executive  committee.  Committee  on  the  Pres- 
ent Danger,  Washington,  D.C 1 

Schlafly,  Phyllis,  American  Conservative  Union 202 

Schmidt,  Robert  D.,  president,  American  Committee  on  East-West  Accord, 

Washington,  D.C 149 

Scoville,  Herbert  J.,  Jr.,  member,  governing  board.  New  Directions,  Wash- 
ington, D.C 176 

Teller,  Dr.  Edward,  Hoover  Institution  on  War,  Revolution  and  Peace 231 

Thyness,  Paul,  Norway,  president.  North  Atlantic  Assembly 298 

Vorspan,  Albert,  vice  president.  Union  of  American  Hebrew  Congrega- 
tions    139 

Wall,  Patrick,  United  Kingdom,  Chairman,  Military  Committee,  North 

Atlantic  Assembly  307 

Warnke,  Hon.  Paul,  former  Director,  Arms  Control  and  Disarmament 

Agency  and  former  Chief,  SALT  negotiations  345 

Winn,  Brig.  Gen.  David  W.  (retired),  policy  board.  Institute  of  American 

Relations,  Washington,  D.C 79 

Yost,  Ambassador  Charles  W.,  cochairman  of  Americans  for  SALT 90 


(ffl) 


IV 

Insertions  for  the  record:  ^^^ 
Letter  from  Professor  Rostow  to  Senator  Church,  dated  September  27, 1979, 

in  regards  to  amendments,  reservations  and  understandings 15 

Foreign  Relations  Committee  staff  memorandum  of  June  25,  1979  on  SALT 

II  legal  and  procedural  issues 18 

Prepared  statement  of  Prof.  Eugene  V.  Rostow 31 

Prepared  statement  of  Adm.  Thomas  H.  Moorer,  USN,  Retired  60 

Prepared  statement  of  Hon.  Thomas  J.  Mclntyre,  Jr 86 

Prepared  statement  of  Ambassador  Charles  W.  Yost  92 

Prepared  statement  of  John  Cardinal  Krol 127 

Prepared  statement  of  Dr.  Claire  Randall 136 

Prepared  statement  of  Albert  Vorspan 143 

Prepared  statement  of  Robert  D.  Schmidt 153 

Prepared  statement  of  John  Carey 160 

Prepared  statement  of  Peter  V.  Baugher 170 

Prepared  statement  of  Herbert  J.  Scoville,  Jr 178 

Prepared  statement  of  the  AFL-CIO  executive  council 193 

Prepared  statement  of  Phyllis  Schlafly 219 

Prepared  statement  of  Charles  L.  Teevan 228 

Prepared  statement  of  Dr.  Edward  Teller 239 

Prepared  statement  of  Phillip  A.  Karber 264 

Prepared  statement  of  Prof.  George  F.  Kennan 276 

Prepared  statement  of  Prof.  Stanley  Hoffmann 289 

Prepared  statement  of  Paul  Thyness 302 

Prepared  statement  of  Patrick  Wall 309 

Prepared  statement  of  Peter  Corterier  314 

Prepared  statement  of  Klaas  G.  de  Vries 321 

Prepared  statement  of  Ambassador  Paul  C.  Warnke 349 

Prepared  statement  of  Dr.  Wolfgang  Panofsky 357 

Prepared  statement  of  Donald  Brennan 369 

Passage  from  General  Rowny's  prepared  statement  of  July   12,   1979, 

supplied  by  Donald  Brennan 380 

Ambassador  Warnke 's  responses  to  additional  questions  submitted  for  the 

record • 385 

Dr.    Panofsky's    responses    to    additional    questions    submitted    for    the 

record 387 

Mr.  Brennan's  answers  to  additional  questions  submitted  for  the  record  ...  393 

Prepared  statement  of  Hon.  Paul  H.  Nitze 403 

Prepared  statement  of  Michael  M.  May  411 

Letter  from  Senator  Church  to  Secretary  Vance,  dated  July  16,  1979, 
regarding  Soviet  views  concerning  multiple  protective  structure  basing 

for  M-X  missile,  and  his  response  thereto 433 

Production  rate  of  ALCM's,  supplied  by  DOD 454 

Protocol  limitations  on  GLCM's  and  ALCM's,  supplied  by  DOD 455 

Prepared  statement  of  Hon.  William  J.  Perry 474 

Ambassador  Earle's  and  Dr.  Perry's  responses  to  additional  questions 

submitted  for  the  record 480 

Appendix: 

Comparison  of  the  Russian  and  English  texts  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty 487 

Ambassador  U.  Alexis  Johnson's  responses  to  additional  questions  for  the 

record  of  July  16,  1979,  part  2 491 

Additional  comments  submitted  for  the  record  by  General  Rowny 492 

Additional  statements  received  for  the  record: 

Statements  of  Dr.  Wes  Schwemmer  Cady,  Katherine  Eaton,  and  Dr.  J. 
David  Edwards,  on  behalf  of  the  American  Association  of  University 

Women,  Washington,  D.C  494 

Statement  of  Raymond  Nathan,  director,  American  Ethical  Union,  Wash- 
ington, D.C  497 

Statement  of  Walter  Hoffmann,  chairman,  Campaign  for  U.N.  Reform, 

Wayne,  N.J 497 

Statement  of  Glenn  E.  Watts,  president.  Communications  Workers  of 

America,  Washington,  D.C 502 

Statement  of  Edward  F.  Snyder,  executive  secretary  of  the  Friends  Com- 
mittee on  National  Legislation,  Washington,  D.C 503 

Statement  of  Stephen  E.  Seadler,  president.  Ideological  Defense  Center, 

New  York,  N.Y 504 

Statement  of  Bishop  Thomas  J.  Gumbleton,  president.  Pax  Christi  USA, 

Chicago,  111  509 


Page 
Statement  of  Dr.  Alan  Geyer,  representing  the  Council  of  Bishops  and  the 
Board  of  Church  and  Society  of  the  United  Methodist  Church,  Washing- 
ton, D.C 512 

Statement  of  Col.  Phelps  Jones,  U.S.A.  (retired),  director,  National  Security 
and  Foreign  Affairs,  Veterans  of  Foreign  Wars  of  the  United  States, 

Washington,  D.C 516 

Statement  of  The  Woman's  National  Democratic  Club,  Political  Action 

Committee,  Washington,  D.C 520 

Statement  of  Lester  H.  Ahlswede,  representing  Citizen-Taxpayers,  Silver 

Spring,  Md 520 

Statement  of  Benjamin  M.  Becker,  Highland  Park,  111 523 

Statement  of  Roger  A.  Singerling,  Hackettstown,  N.J 525 

Statement  of  Joseph  E.  Tracey,  Jr.,  Wheaton,  Md 526 


SALT  II  TREATY 


THURSDAY,  SEPTEMBER  6,  1979 

United  States  Senate, 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations, 

Washington,  D.C. 

The  committee  met,  at  10:03  a.m.,  pursuant  to  notice,  in  room 
318,  Russell  Senate  Office  Building,  Hon.  Joseph  Biden  presiding. 

Present:  Senators  Church,  Biden,  Stone,  Zorinsky,  Javits,  and 
Hayakawa. 

Also  present:  Senator  Cranston. 

Senator  Biden.  The  hearing  will  come  to  order,  please. 

opening  statement 

This  morning  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  begins  its 
final  series  of  hearings  on  the  SALT  II  Treaty.  Today  and  tomor- 
row spokesmen  for  public  groups  will  be  testifying  on  this  agree- 
ment. Unfortunately,  we  will  not  be  able  to  hear  from  all  such 
groups  who  have  requested  an  opportunity  to  testify,  but  we  have 
asked  for  written  statements  from  those  not  scheduled  to  appear 
before  this  committee. 

This  morning  we  will  hear  from  three  groups  critical  of  the 
SALT  II  agreement,  the  Committee  on  the  Present  Danger,  the 
Coalition  for  Peace  Through  Strength,  and  the  Institute  of  Ameri- 
can Relations. 

First,  we  will  hear  from  Eugene  Rostow,  speaking  as  chairman  of 
the  executive  committee  of  the  Committee  on  the  Present  Danger. 
After  questioning  from  the  committee,  we  will  hear  from  Adm. 
Thomas  Moorer  on  behalf  of  the  Coalition  for  Peace  Through 
Strength.  I  understand  that  accompanying  Admiral  Moorer  to  re- 
spond to  questions  is  Lt.  Gen.  Daniel  Graham,  former  head  of  the 
Defense  Intelligence  Agency. 

Finally,  we  will  hear  from  retired  Gen.  David  W.  Winn  and  Dr. 
Victor  Fediay,  who  will  speak  on  behalf  of  the  Institute  of  Ameri- 
can Relations. 

Professor  Rostow,  would  you  please  proceed? 

STATEMENT  OF  EUGENE  ROSTOW,  CHAIRMAN,  EXECUTIVE 
COMMITTEE,  COMMITTEE  ON  THE  PRESENT  DANGER,  WASH- 
INGTON,  D.C 

Mr.  Rostow.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

First,  I  want  to  express  my  own  thanks  and  that  of  the  Commit- 
tee on  the  Present  Danger  for  your  invitation  to  appear  today  to 
testify  on  the  ratification  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty.  I  am  appearing  on 


'  See  page  31  for  Mr.  Rostow's  prepared  statement. 

(1) 


behalf  of  the  Committee  on  the  Present  Danger,  as  you  said.  You 
have  the  two  formal  statements  we  have  issued,  as  well  as  related 
materials,  and  the  statement  prepared  for  these  hearings. 

The  conclusions  in  our  July  19  statement  prepared  for  the  hear- 
ing before  your  subcommittee.  Senator  Biden,  states:  We  believe,  a 
positive  and  affirmative  program  for  putting  SALT  II  and  the 
SALT  negotiating  process  into  the  context  of  our  foreign  and  de- 
fense policy  as  a  whole.  I  emphasize  that  these  conclusions  are  the 
basis  for  our  approach,  and  we  have  repeated  them  in  the  begin- 
ning of  the  statement  prepared  for  my  submission  this  morning. 

I  thought  that  my  brief  opening  remarks  today  would  be  most 
useful  to  you  if  I  supplemented  our  earlier  work  on  this  subject  by 
commenting  on  some  of  the  key  issues  which  have  emerged  in  the 
hearings  so  far. 

The  strongest  argument  for  SALT  II  which  has  thus  far  been  put 
forward  by  the  administration  was  summed  up  by  a  distinguished 
Senator  in  these  terms,  "To  reject  SALT  II  would  be  to  go  over  the 
abyss."  The  variations  on  this  theme  are  infinite.  Some  years  ago  I 
counted  a  couple  of  hundred  remarks  of  this  tenor  and  then  gave 
up  counting.  President  Carter  has  said  that  those  who  oppose  the 
treaty  as  it  stands  are  warmongers  and  opponents  of  detente.  Sec- 
retary of  State  Vance  is  reported  by  the  press  to  have  said  that  he 
would  resign  rather  than  preside  over  the  end  of  detente  and  the 
revival  of  the  cold  war.  , 

The  notion  that  the  cold  war  is  over,  the  notion  that  Soviet- 
American  relations  have  improved  in  recent  years  is,  in  our  opin- 
ion, a  dangerous  symptom  of  autointoxication.  The  cold  war  is 
worse  today  than  it  has  ever  been,  featured  by  Soviet  threats  and 
thrusts  far  more  sophisticated  in  character  and  on  a  far  greater 
scale  than  those  of  the  simple  days  of  the  Berlin  airlift  and  the 
attack  on  Greece.  But,  as  things  get  worse,  many  Americans  tell 
each  other  that  they  are  getting  better.  o  *  t  m  tt 

SALT  II  is  a  case  in  point.  If  ratified  in  its  present  form,  SALT  II 
would  be  an  act  of  submission  on  our  part,  legitimizing  Soviet 
superiority  and  military  superiority  in  all  spheres.  It  would  be  a 
great  Soviet  victory  in  the  cold  war  and  would  be  so  perceived 
everywhere  in  the  world.  But  we  keep  repeating  to  ourselves  that 
SALT  II  would  be  a  step  toward  stability,  detente,  and  peace. 

This  statement  is  made  so  often  that  we  accept  it  as  self-evident. 
But  it  is  not  self-evident.  The  SALT  I  package  was  ratified  in  1972 
on  the  basis  of  the  same  litany  of  arguments  which  have  been 
offered  to  the  Senate  and  the  American  people  this  year,  offered 
under  very  different  political  and  military  circumstances,  but  of- 
fered nonetheless. 

The  period  since  1972  has  been  the  worst  period  of  the  cold  war. 
It  has  been  the  period  in  which  the  agreements  made  for  peace  in 
Indochina  were  openly  violated.  The  promises  made  to  President 
Nixon  in  May  1972,  with  respect  to  peace  in  the  Middle  East  were 
openly  violated.  It  has  been  the  period  of  the  Soviet  campaign  in 
Africa  and  Asia  and  even  of  Soviet  attempts  to  penetrate  the 
Caribbean,  as  we  have  noticed  suddenly  in  the  last  few  days. 

In  view  of  the  betrayal  of  every  promise  and  every  expectation 
on  the  basis  of  which  SALT  I  was  ratified,  how  can  these  argu- 
ments be  put  forward  and  how  can  they  retain  their  plausibility? 


The  fact  that  they  do  recalls  President  Kennedy's  celebrated  quip 
that  if  you  are  cheated  once,  it  is  their  fault,  but  if  you  are  cheated 
a  second  time,  it  is  your  own. 

Many  of  those  who  believe  that  rejecting  SALT  II,  as  it  stands, 
would  be  "going  over  the  abyss"  attribute  nearly  magic  influence 
to  arms  limitation  agreements.  Nothing  in  the  history  of  such 
agreements  gives  the  slightest  encouragement  for  such  beliefs. 

The  Treaty  of  Versailles  was  the  most  important  of  modern  arms 
limitation  agreements.  It  set  limits  on  German  armaments  and  it 
prescribed  the  demilitarization  of  the  Rhineland,  which  was  also 
guaranteed  by  the  Locarno  Treaty.  If  Britain  had  been  willing  to 
join  France  in  enforcing  that  treaty,  World  War  II  would  never 
have  taken  place.  But  when  the  treaty  was  violated — secretly  at 
first,  then  openly  when  Hitler  introduced  conscription  in  1935  and 
marched  into  the  Rhineland  in  1936 — Great  Britain  and  France  did 
nothing  but  wring  their  hands  and  try  to  persuade  Hitler  to  sign 
new  treaties  limiting  arms. 

The  second  most  important  arms  limitation  agreement  of  modern 
times  was  the  Washington  Naval  Treaty  of  1922  and  its  successors 
of  the  early  1930's.  Our  experience  under  that  treaty,  too,  was 
hardly  more  inspiring  than  the  record  of  Versailles. 

I  could  mention  other  instances,  even  more  depressing:  the  agree- 
ments for  demilitarized  zones  in  Korea  and  Vietnam,  for  example; 
the  Laos  accord  of  1962,  or  the  arrangement  to  keep  the  PLO  out  of 
southern  Lebanon. 

The  argument  that  to  reject  SALT  would  be  to  go  over  the  abyss 
has  another  dimension,  the  notion  that  such  action  on  our  part 
would  make  the  Soviet  Union  more  aggressive  than  it  is.  The  claim 
betrays  a  misunderstanding  of  the  nature  of  the  Soviet  Union  and 
of  the  serious  and  devoted  men  who  govern  it.  They  are  already 
behaving  as  badly  from  our  point  of  view  as  they  dare.  They  take 
every  opportunity  to  expand,  and  they  manufacture  several.  There 
is  no  use  getting  excited  about  it.  That  is  the  nature  of  their  policy. 
As  a  distinguished  professor  at  Princeton  has  said,  they  are  still  in 
the  mood  of  imperialism  of  the  eighteenth  century  which  we  in  the 
west  have  long  since  given  up. 

There  is  only  one  argument  which  can  deter  Soviet  expansion 
and  that  is  the  calm  confrontation  of  unacceptable  risks.  This 
factor  prevailed  in  a  dozen  crises  since  1945,  from  the  Berlin  block- 
ade to  the  Cuban  missile  crisis  of  1962.  It  is  the  visible  erosion  of 
that  conviction  since  1972  or  so  which  has  invited  a  series  of  Soviet 
thrusts  on  every  continent  and  every  ocean.  In  recent  years,  the 
pace  of  Soviet  expansion  has  increased  as  a  result  of  the  shock  of 
Vietnam  and  Watergate  to  American  public  opinion  and  the  per- 
ception in  the  Soviet  Union  of  President  Carter  as  a  weak  Presi- 
dent. 

The  claim  that  it  would  cost  us  more  money  to  refuse  ratification 
of  SALT  at  the  present  time  or  to  ratify  it  only  on  the  conditions 
that  we  have  outlined  here  is  equally  specious.  Administration 
spokesmen  have  taken  many  different  positions  on  this  question. 
Paul  Warnke  has  said  that  it  would  cost  more  money  if  we  ratified 
SALT,  but  that  the  increase  could  not  be  ratified.  Secretary  of 
Defense  Brown  has  testified  that  it  would  cost  perhaps  between  $1 
billion  and  $2  billion  a  year  for  4  or  5  years.  Now  he  offers  higher 


estimates.  Mr.  Gelb  has  recently  written  that  saving  money  is  the 
main  argument  for  ratifying  SALT.  The  fact  is  that  in  an  area  of 
complex  and  rapidly  changing  technology,  none  of  these  estimates 
is  of  much  consequence. 

Ambassador  Harriman  has  offered  a  variant  of  the  abyss  argu- 
ment. Not  to  accept  SALT,  he  said,  would  lead  to  the  election  of  a 
hardliner  to  succeed  Mr.  Brezhnev.  The  notion  that  Mr.  Brezhnev 
is  a  moderate  in  any  sense  that  we  can  recognize  is  denied  by 
anything  he  has  said  and  done  since  he  became  a  public  figure.  He 
is  the  author  of  the  Brezhnev  doctrine.  He  claims  the  right  to 
intervene  in  any  country  at  any  time  in  behalf  either  of  a  socialist 
government  or  of  a  progressive  movement,  that  is  to  say,  a  move- 
ment he  regards  as  progressive.  He  is  the  author  of  the  attacks  on 
°the  Middle  East  in  1967  and  1973,  and  of  the  attack  on  Czechoslo- 
vakia in  1968.  To  call  Brezhnev  a  moderate  is  an  abuse  of  the 
English  language. 

Of  course,  there  are  differences  within  the  Kremlm,  and  there 
probably  are  groups  and  sects  within  the  Kremlin,  but  according  to 
any  information  we  have  or  have  seen,  they  do  not  concern  Soviet- 
American  relations,  nor  is  there  any  evidence  that  any  Soviet 
leader  accepts  our  definition  of  detente.  Of  course  they  all  want  to 
see  SALT  II  ratified.  They  made  enormous  progress  under  SALT  I, 
and  they  expect  to  make  even  more  under  SALT  II.  Furthermore, 
if  we  ever  do  wake  up  and  decide  to  restore  the  military  balance, 
they  would  surely  lose  as  a  consequence,  because  their  economy  is 
so  much  smaller  and  weaker  than  our  own.  But  these  are  hardly 
reasons  to  take  the  treaty  as  it  stands. 

The  second  best  argument  offered  by  the  administration  for  the 
treaty  is  that  it  would  not  do  much  harm  and  should  therefore  be 
ratified  to  demonstrate  to  our  friends  and  our  adversaries  that  we 
really  do  have  a  government.  It  is  an  argument  which  appeals  very 
strongly  to  all  Americans.  For  the  best  of  reasons,  we  tend  to  rally 
to  the  flag  when  it  is  under  fire,  and  President  Carter  is  surely 

under  fire. 

The  fatal  flaw  in  this  argument,  however,  is  that  the  treaty  is 
not  harmless.  It  would  do  a  great  deal  of  harm.  It  would  lock  us 
into  a  position  of  strategic  inferiority  which  would  also  be  unstable 
and  unverifiable,  the  perfect  recipe  for  Soviet  nuclear  blackmail 
during  the  period  of  our  greatest  relative  weakness  in  the  early 
and  middle  1980's. 

Moreover,  it  would  prevent  us  from  redressing  the  military  bal- 
ance during  that  period.  No  spokesman  for  the  administration  has 
as  yet  seriously  addressed  the  principal  issues  raised  in  this  con- 
nection by  its  critics.  All  studies  of  the  problem  agree  that  if 
present  trends  continue  just  a  few  years  longer,  the  Soviet  Union 
will  have  significant  nuclear  superiority  in  the  early  1980's,  the 
capacity,  that  is,  to  make  a  pre-emptive  first  strike  by  destroying 
our  ICBM's,  our  planes  on  the  ground,  and  our  submarines  in  port 
with  a  fraction  of  their  nuclear  force,  holding  enough  accurate 
missiles  in  reserve  to  neutralize  the  whole  of  our  own  nuclear 

This  possibility  has  been  on  everybody's  mind  as  a  nightmare  for 
years.  The  prospect  that  these  risks  will  materialize  has  become 
very  much  worse  because  President  Carter  has  canceled,  postponed. 


or  stretched  out  the  programs  initiated  by  his  predecessors  to  deal 
with  them.  The  answer  of  the  administration  to  this  analysis  is 
that  we  could  use  our  submarines  in  response  to  any  such  threat 
and  we  could  therefore  deter  it. 

Some  have  even  come  so  far  £is  to  argue — Secretary  Vance  did 
so — that  we  might  launch  our  ICBM's  on  warning  within  a  few 
moments  of  receiving  a  radar  signal  that  such  an  attack  was  on  its 
way.  Then,  finally  they  say  that  when  the  M-X  missile  becomes 
available  in  significant  quantities  in  1989,  it  will  provide  an  answer 
to  the  vulnerability  of  our  ICBM  force.  But  what  are  we  supposed 
to  do  in  the  meantime,  between  now  and  1989,  or  between  the 
period  in  the  early  1980's  when  this  possibility  becomes  a  somber 
prospect? 

The  administration  answers  this  question  by  ignoring  it. 

Under  these  circumstances,  we  should  be  vulnerable  to  nuclear 
war  or  nuclear  blackmail.  We  should  face  a  condition  of  diplomatic 
impotence  and  be  totally  unable  to  use  our  conventional  forces. 
That  is  the  linkage  between  the  nuclear  balance  and  the  whole  of 
the  rest  of  our  foreign  policy,  which  can  never  be  escaped. 

What  would  we  do  if  there  were  a  Macedonian  uprising  in 
Greece,  for  example,  supported  from  Bulgaria?  If  Iceland  or 
Norway  were  pushed  somehow  out  of  NATO?  If  we  were  told  by 
the  Soviet  Union  to  get  our  fleet  and  our  forces  out  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean? Under  such  circumstances,  would  either  the  Soviet  Union 
or  our  allies  believe  in  the  possibility  of  reprisal  from  submarines 
which  in  turn  would  be  suicidal  for  us?  That  was  the  argument, 
you  will  recall,  that  General  DeGaulle  made  some  years  ago  about 
the  credibility  of  our  nuclear  weapons,  and  it  is  an  argument  which 
is  becoming  more  and  more  visible  in  the  minds  of  our  allies  as 
well  as  in  the  minds  of  the  Soviets. 

The  only  answer  thus  far  from  President  Carter  and  his  aides 
has  been  a  reiteration  of  their  blind  faith  in  the  doctrine  of  mutual 
assured  destruction,  the  McNamara  doctrine,  by  which  we  have 
lived  for  more  than  a  decade.  It  is  the  heart  and  nearly  the  whole 
of  the  administration  case  for  SALT  II. 

As  former  Secretary  of  State  Kissinger  emphasized  in  Brussels 
last  Saturday,  that  argument  is  losing  its  intellectual  and  political 
plausibility.  We  simply  must  move  and  move  rapidly  to  counter- 
force  strategies. 

But  the  treaty  would  prevent  us  from  undertaking  the  most 
feasible  and  perhaps  the  only  credible  and  practical  counterforce 
program  that  could  preserve  our  second  strike  capability  during 
the  early  and  middle  1980's:  to  reopen  the  Minuteman  III  produc- 
tion lines  which  the  President  has  recently  closed,  to  make  a  great 
many  Minuteman  Ill's;  and  to  deploy  them  in  multiple  vertical 
protected  shelters,  the  so-called  shell  game. 

The  Soviets  take  the  view  that  any  such  approach  on  our  part  is 
prohibited  by  article  IV  of  the  treaty  and  by  the  provisions  of  the 
treaty  banning  deliberate  concealment.  They  say  that  each  shelter 
would  be  considered  a  fixed  launcher,  whether  or  not  it  contained  a 
missile,  and  in  any  event  it  would  be  a  form  of  concealment  in 
their  view  which  the  treaty  prohibits. 

On  either  theory  it  would  be  banned.  It  may  be  an  impracticable 
approach  for  another  reason  under  the  treaty,  because  the  number 


required  would  be  too  great  for  the  quotas  of  the  treaty.  That  is, 
Minuteman  III  is  much  smaller  than  many  of  the  Soviet  weapons, 
and  it  carries  only  three  warheads. 

The  administration  has  not,  to  my  knowledge  or  to  the  knowl- 
edge of  any  of  my  colleagues  who  have  followed  these  things  close- 
ly, addressed  the  issue  of  a  possible  quick  fix  approach.  Indeed,  the 
administration  seems  to  assume  that  any  program  for  protecting 
our  fixed  ICBM's  and  other  ground-based  launchers  in  the  early 
eighties  is  impossible. 

There  are  many  other  features  of  this  treaty  which  are  far  from 
harmless.  The  provisions  with  respect  to  heavy  missiles,  for  exam- 
ple; or  the  Backfire  bomber;  or  the  common  understanding  in 
paragraph  8  of  article  IV  which  deals  with  the  relationship  of  the 
SS-16  intercontinental  missile,  and  the  SS-20  missile;  or  the  cruise 
missile  problem,  too,  which  has  been  much  discussed. 

Here  we  find  the  answer  offered  by  the  administration  in  these 
hearings  to  be  either  nonexistent,  or  unresponsive  and  unsatisfac- 
tory. This  is  true  as  well  of  what  the  administration  has  said  on 
verification.  The  administration  has  concentrated  on  the  possibili- 
ties of  verifying  the  testing  of  new  weapons,  but  has  not  answered 
the  questions  which  we  and  others  have  raised  about  the  possibility 
of  counting  missiles  in  warehouses  and  the  absence  of  any  re- 
straints or  any  possible  monitoring  of  restraints  on  the  manufac- 
ture of  missiles  rather  than  the  deployment  of  launchers. 

Our  committee  has  recommended  that  the  Senate  should  not 
give  its  consent  to  the  ratification  of  SALT  II  unless  the  most 
important  deficiencies  of  the  treaty  are  modified  by  amendment 
and  the  President  and  the  Congress  are  firmly  committed  to  a 
specific  program  that  would  achieve  and  maintain  essential  equiv- 
alt^nce  and  adequate  deterrence.  Among  the  deficiencies  of  the 
treaty  requiring  amendment  I  should  list  first  our  right  to  deploy 
ICBM's  in  modes  and  in  numbers  we  deem  necessary  to  insure  the 
survival  against  surprise  attack;  the  equal  right  of  the  two  sides  to 
use  heavy  missiles;  the  inclusion  of  the  Soviet  Backfire  and  the  SS- 
20  within  the  numerical  limits  of  the  treaty;  and  provision  for  the 
adoption  of  programs  which  would  reverse  the  present  ominous 
situation  of  Soviet  strategic  superiority  in  Europe,  including 
change  in  the  provisions  regarding  the  range  of  land-  and  sea-based 
cruise  missiles  and  a  clarification  of  the  transfer  of  technology 
issue  causing  so  much  concern  to  our  allies. 

In  closing,  Mr.  Chairman,  let  me  stress  that  the  responsibility  of 
the  Senate  in  voting  on  SALT  II  is  unique  in  our  history.  Every 
American  shares  the  goal  of  achieving  true  detente  with  the  Soviet 
Union,  which  can  only  be  defined,  in  my  opinion,  as  a  policy  of 
scrupulous  and  reciprocal  respect  for  the  rules  of  the  charter  of  the 
United  Nations  regarding  the  international  use  of  force.  True  de- 
tente in  this  sense  is  a  central  objective  of  the  Committee  on  the 
Present  Danger  and,  I  am  sure,  of  the  American  people.  Every 
President  and  Congress  since  1945  have  gone  to  great  lengths  to 
reach  that  goal,  but  President  Carter's  quest  for  detente  with  the 
Soviet  Union  has  been  based  on  the  misconception  that  acts  of 
unilateral  disarmament  on  our  part  and  other  unilateral  conces- 
sions will  induce  the  Soviet  Union  to  follow  suit. 


As  a  result,  President  Carter  has  sacrificed  our  defenses  and 
weakened  our  alliances  and  abdicated  his  responsibility  for  the 
security  of  the  Nation.  Under  our  Constitution,  that  responsibility 
therefore  falls  on  the  Senate  with  respect  to  this  treaty  and  ulti- 
mately on  the  whole  Congress  and  the  people.  We  have  not  faced 
decisions  of  such  moment  since  the  Presidency  of  James  Buchanan. 

President  Carter  likes  to  compare  the  debate  over  SALT  II  with 
the  controversy  over  the  League  of  Nations  in  1919,  but  the  anal- 
ogy is  misleading.  If  you  go  back  and  look  at  it,  the  League  vote 
was  not  the  result  of  the  blind  opposition  of  a  small  group  of 
willfuU  men  who  prevented  the  ratification  of  the  treaty.  It  was 
President  Wilson  himself  who  urged  the  Democrats  who  followed 
his  lead  on  this  matter,  and  there  were  23  of  them,  to  vote  against 
the  treaty,  with  the  reservations  which  had  been  negotiated  by 
Senator  Henry  Cabot  Lodge  of  Massachusetts  as  the  leader.  If  only 
seven  more  Democrats  had  refused  to  follow  the  President's  lead 
and  had  voted  their  convictions,  the  course  of  history  might  well 
have  been  very  different. 

In  the  second  place.  President  Wilson  was  proposing  full  and 
responsible  American  participation  in  world  politics.  The  position 
today  is  just  the  opposite.  President  Carter  is  conducting  a  policy  of 
retreat  to  isolationism,  and  unless  that  policy  is  promptly  reversed, 
it  will  soon  be  beyond  our  power  to  do  so. 

The  coming  decade  will  be  as  difficult  and  as  dangerous  as  any 
we  have  faced  in  our  past.  We  have  a  very  short  time  in  which  to 
protect  our  future  through  allied  diplomacy  and  deterrence  rather 
than  through  war.  A  two-ocean  navy  cannot  be  restored  in  a  day  or 
a  year,  nor  can  the  other  programs  we  require  to  achieve  effective 
deterrence  at  every  relevant  level.  It  will  be  a  ticklish  time,  calling 
for  cool  nerves  and  a  firm  grasp  of  the  problem. 

The  Soviet  Union  will  not  view  an  American  awakening  with 
equanimity.  It  can  be  expected  to  take  full  advantage  of  positions 
of  relative  superiority  and  the  presence  in  office  of  a  President 
whom  it  perceives  as  weak. 

The  time  to  begin  is  now,  and  the  place  to  begin  is  here.  Normal- 
ly, we  look  to  our  President  to  take  the  lead  in  decisions  of  this 
order.  It  is  now  clear  that  President  Carter  is  firmly  committed  to 
another  view.  What  is  at  stake,  Mr.  Chairman,  is  not  the  balance 
of  power  alone,  but  the  future  of  liberty.  Democracy  cannot  survive 
in  the  world  unless  America  plays  its  full  part  in  assuring  its 
future. 

Forty  years  ago,  as  the  doubts  and  vacillations  of  the  thirties 
were  being  swept  away  by  events,  a  speaker  rose  to  his  feet  in  the 
House  of  Commons  to  address  the  great  issue  of  the  looming  war. 
Leopold  Amery,  one  of  Churchill's  companions  in  the  political  wil- 
derness, shouted  a  remark  from  his  seat  before  the  speaker  began: 
"Speak  for  England,"  he  said.  In  that  spirit,  I  say  to  you,  speak  and 
vote  for  America. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Senator  Biden.  Professor,  I  am  not  sure  where  to  begin. 

First  of  all,  I  think  your  characterizations  of  President  Carter 
retreating  to  isolationism  and  abdicating  his  responsibility  are  a 
little  bit,  to  say  the  least,  exaggerated.  If  we  are  in  all  the  trouble 


8 

we  are  in,  is  because  of  the  President,  it  is  amazing  to  think  he  was 
deft  enough  to  do  it  all  within  2  ¥2  years. 

It  reminds  me  a  little  bit  of  Henry  Kissinger's  testimony.  He 
came  up  here  and  told  us  all  about  what  was  wrong.  Somehow  I 
just  had  the  impression  that  he  had  been  around  when  all  this  was 
taking  place. 

ARMS   UMITATION   NOT   A   WISE   WAY   TO   PROCEED 

It  seems  as  though  you  have  made  a  very  strong  case  for  the 
position  that  arms  limitation  treaties,  regardless  of  the  form,  are 
essentially  useless  documents.  Isn't  it  really  your  position  and  the 
position  of  the  committee  that  arms  limitation  under  any  circum- 
stances is  not  a  wise  way  to  go? 

You  give  us  the  Treaty  of  Locarno.  You  go  back  and  talk  about 
naval  agreements.  You  offer  through  a  historical  analysis  of  how 
every  treaty  related  to  arms  limitation  really  was  a  useless  docu- 
ment. Isn't  that  what  you  are  saying? 

Mr.  RosTOw.  No.  The  Committee  has  said  that  it  is  m  favor  of 
fair  and  verifiable  and  balanced  arms  limitation  agreements. 

Senator  Biden.  But  do  you  really  mean  that? 

Mr.  RosTOW.  Yes,  we  really  mean  it.  I  have  pointed  out  that 
there  was  one  very  famous  arms  limitation  agreement,  which  has 
worked  very  well,  that  is  the  agreement  with  Great  Britain  about 
the  demilitarization  of  the  Great  Lakes,  which  was  made  back  at 
the  time  of  the  War  of  1812,  just  after  that  war.  It  has  lasted  for  a 

long  time.  t    i  •   1    t 

Senator  Biden.  I  think  I  am  getting  the  picture.  I  think  I  am 

beginning  to  understand. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  The  point  is,  if  you  have  arms  limitation  treaty 
arrangements  between  people  who  fundamentally  agree  with  each 
other,  they  can  be  very  useful,  or  if  you  have  arms  limitation 
agreements  between  people  who  do  not  at  all  agree  with  each 
other,  or  who  agree  with  each  other  about  the  meaning  of  the 
terms,  they  could  be  useful. 

Senator  Biden,  you  suggested  that  I  couldn't  possibly  mean  what 
I  said,  that  I  was  attacking  the  President  unfairly.  I  should  like  to 
respond  to  that  if  I  may  for  a  moment. 

Senator  Biden.  Please  try  to  do  it  as  briefly  as  I  did,  because  I 
have  other  questions. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  I  had  only  15  minutes  in  which  to  open  this  morn- 
ing. 

Senator  Biden.  Right,  I  only  have  10  minutes. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  I  wanted  to  focus  on  the  issues  that  have  emerged 
in  this  debate  over  the  ratification  of  the  treaty.  In  a  great  many 
other  statements  over  the  years,  I  have  severely  criticized  the 
administrations  of  President  Nixon  and  President  Ford  with  great 
impartiality  for  various  things  which  they  did  and  did  not  do.  I 
think  the  responsibility,  for  example,  for  initiating  the  notion  that 
detente  had  replaced  the  cold  war  goes  to  President  Nixon,  who 
claimed  much  too  much  for  his  policy  of  rapprochement  in  negotia- 
tions with  the  Soviet  Union.  But  remember.  Senator  Biden,  my 
primary  responsibility  in  life  is  that  of  a  professor,  and  our  respon- 
sibility, I  believe  profoundly,  is  to  call  the  shots  as  we  see  them. 


I  do  think  that  the  President's  foreign  policy,  and  particularly 
his  action  in  canceling  and  postponing  the  B-1  bomber  and  the 
neutron  enhanced  radiation  warhead,  his  treatment  of  the  M-X 
Minuteman  III,  the  Trident,  and  all  the  rest  of  that  sad  story  is 
very  costly  and  has  been  a  very  damaging  series  of  moves. 

REOPEN   MINUTEMAN   III   PRODUCTION   UNES 

Senator  Biden.  Professor,  you  stated  that  the  United  States 
should  reopen  the  Minuteman  III  production  line  and  deploy  the 
Minuteman  in  multiple  vertical  shelters,  but  the  Defense  Depart- 
ment says  if  the  Minuteman  III  were  modified  and  made  mobile,  it 
would  be  ready  only  a  year  ahead  of  the  M-X.  It  would  also  have 
considerably  less  capability  than  the  M-X,  because  it  would  not  be 
capable  of  handling  10  MIRVed  vehicles.  So  it  really  would  not 
change  our  strategic  position  in  the  early  1980's. 

Do  you  agree  with  that  or  not? 

Mr.  RosTOw.  Certainly  if  the  M-X  could  be  produced  earlier  I 
would  not  be  in  the  slightest  bit  interested  in  reopening  the  Min- 
uteman production  lines.  I  am  trying  to  fill  this  gap  with  the 
Minuteman,  but  my  understanding  was  that  it  would  not  take  so 
long  to  resume  the  production  of  Minuteman  III  as  it  would  take 
now  to  perfect  the  M-X,  which  has  been  delayed  for  so  long,  but 
the  fundamental  point  is  whether  under  a  forced  draft  we  could 
move  ahead  quickly  either  with  the  M-X  or  the  Minuteman  III. 

I  should,  of  course,  be  in  favor  of  the  one  the  experts  thought 
was  most  effective. 

Senator  Biden.  The  experts  tell  us  that  is  the  M-X. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  The  basic  point  is,  the  treaty  would  prevent  either 
solution. 

Senator  Biden.  How  can  you  say  that?  Why  would  the  treaty 
prevent  either  solution?  I  just  came  back  after  6  days  in  Moscow. 
We  raised  the  M-X  question  with  the  Soviets.  We  told  them  we 
would  be  going  forward  with  the  M-X.  They  are  fully  aware  of  its 
going  forward.  Nobody  in  the  whole  world  has  any  real  doubt  about 
what  the  intentions  are.  There  was  no  indication  that  there  was,  as 
you  have  indicated,  a  firm  position  taken  that  that  would  absolute- 
ly violate  the  SALT  agreement.  I  don't  know  where  you  get  your 
information.  I  have  not  been  able  to  find  any  of  that  information.  I 
have  not  been  able  to  find  any  information  that  any  of  our  allies — 
any  of  our  allies,  any  of  them,  including  the  military  people  with 
whom  I  met,  from  General  Rogers  to  the  German  Command — 
doubt  that  we  are  going  ahead. 

I  don't  know  where  you  get  your  information.  I  don't  know 
where  it  comes  from.  You  make  these  bald  assertions.  Quite  frank- 
ly, I  find  no  s)mipathy  for  them.  Please  tell  me  what  we  can't  do.  I 
have  asked  you  this  question  before.  What  can  we  not  do  that  you 
feel  needs  to  be  done  if  this  SALT  Treaty  goes  forward  and  is 
ratified? 

Mr.  RosTOW.  Well,  I  just  testified,  and  I  put  into  my  prepared 
statement.  Senator  Biden,  that  the  Russian  view  of  the  matter  is, 
and  I  have  in  front  of  me  a  State  Department  paper  prepared  for 
Senator  Stennis  and  the  Armed  Services  Committee  confirming 
that 

Senator  Biden.  Please  read  it  to  me.  It  would  be  helpful. 


10 


Mr.  RosTOW.  Yes. 


MPS  System  in  Relation  to  The  Treaty  Discussion.  This  issue  was  raised  by  the 
Soviet  delegation  in  Geneva  in  July  1978,  referring  to  newspaper  accounts  concern- 
ing the  multiple  aim  point  system  using  vertical  shelters.  The  Soviets  stated  that  it 
appeared  such  a  deployment  would  violate  both  the  ban  on  construction  of  new 
fixed  ICBM  silo  launchers  and  the  ban  on  deliberate  concealment  measures. 

The  United  States  delegation  replied  that  no  decision  had  been  made  regarding  a 
basing  mode,  but  that  whatever  mode  the  United  States  adopted  would  be  one  that 
violated  neither  of  the  provisions  cited  by  the  Soviets. 

They  further  stated  that: 

A  draft  agreement  expressly  provided  for  the  deployment  after  protocol  expiration 
of  an  ICBM  system  in  which  missiles  and  their  launchers  are  moved  from  point  to 
point.  The  subject  matter  was  not  addressed  again  by  the  delegations. 

Senator  Biden.  Right.  That  was  1978,  a  year  ago.  Since  then  we 
have  signed  a  treaty.  Didn't  you  say  that  was  July  1978? 

Mr.  RosTOW.  Yes;  that  is  what  it  says. 

Senator  Biden.  All  right.  That  was  1  year  ago.  In  the  meantime 
there  was  a  great  deal  of  negotiation  and  the  treaty  was  signed. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  It  says  this  issue  was  never  raised  again. 

Senator  Biden.  But  it  was  raised  by  us  publicly.  It  was  raised  by 
us  throughout  the  world.  We  made  what  we  are  going  to  do  clear. 
There  has  been  no  response  to  it,  indicating  the  Soviets  objection. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  Do  you  think  that  constitutes  Soviet  acceptance? 

Senator  Biden.  I  don't  think  the  Soviets  have  to  accept  it.  We  go 
forward  with  what  we  tell  the  world  we  are  going  to  do,  and  what 
we  tell  them  we  are  going  to  do  prior  to  the  treaty's  ratification. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  Then  they  will  say  we  violated  the  treaty, 

Senator  Biden.  If  they  then  say  we  have  violated  the  treaty  and 
they  want  to  pull  out,  then  they  can  pull  out.  We  have  stated  our 
position.  If  in  fact  they  respond  by  not  saying  anything  and  do  not 
physically  or  verbally  respond  to  it,  and  we  are  able  to  go  forward, 
then  they  have  acquiesced. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  But  Senator  Biden,  how  do  you  reconcile  these  fixed 
shelters  with  the  definition  of  the  launcher  in  article  IV? 

Senator  Biden.  Actually  the  way  I  reconcile  it  is  that  our  De- 
fense Department  tells  us  we  should  not  go  the  way  you  suggest 
anyway.  We  should  go  the  M-X  route. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  Well,  very  well,  but  on  the  M-X  route,  which  mode 
of  deployment  has  the  administration  adopted  as  of  August  1? 

Senator  Biden.  They  have  not  adopted  one. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Biden.  But  the  point  is,  we  will  adopt  whatever  our 
military  indicates  to  us  is  the  best  mode  to  adopt. 

Mr.  RosTOw.  Within  the  limitations  of  the  treaty. 

Senator  Biden.  And  all  of  them  are  within  the  limitations  of  the 

treaty. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  Well,  Senator,  I  am  sorry,  but  I  cant  agree  with 
you.  I  think  that  the  Soviet  analysis  of  the  treaty  is  correct.  To  get 
into  a  position  under  a  treaty  before  it  is  ratified  in  which  you 
have  a  dispute  with  the  Soviet  Union  as  to  its  meaning  on  an 
absolutely  fundamental  point  is  in  my  opinion  a  most  unwise  pro- 
cedure. It  may  be,  as  you  say,  that  this  would  put  the  onus  of 
abrogating  the  treaty  on  the  other  fellow,  but  that  is  not  the  object 
of  going  into  a  treaty. 


11 

The  object  of  going  into  a  treaty  of  arms  limitation  is  to  clarify 
things  as  much  as  possible  and  to  help  build  mutual  good  faith  and 
trust. 

Senator  Biden.  Precisely.  We  would  clarify  that. 

My  time  is  up.  I  will  come  back  to  that  if  there  is  time. 

Senator  Javits? 

Senator  Javits.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

RIGHT  TO  DEPLOY   ICBM's   IN   NUMBERS   WE   DEEM   NECESSARY 

Professor  Rostow,  I  notice  in  your  statement  you  say  something 
which  I  would  like  to  read  into  the  record.  You  give  your  conclu- 
sions, and  the  second  conclusion  reads: 

That  the  Senate  withhold  its  consent  to  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  the  Presi- 
dent has  submitted  unless  and  until  it  is  modified  to  meet  its  demonstrated  deficien- 
cies and  the  President  and  the  Congress  are  firmly  committed  to  a  specific  program 
that  will  achieve  and  maintain  essential  equivalence  and  adequate  deterrence. 

I  then  look  further  in  your  statement  in  which  you  say  that: 

The  Senate  should  not  give  its  consent  to  the  ratification  of  SALT  II  unless  the 
most  important  deficiencies  of  the  treaty  are  modified  by  amendment:  "Among  the 
deficiencies  of  the  treaty  requiring  amendment,  I  should  list  first  our  right  to  deploy 
ICBM's  in  modes  and  numbers  we  deem  necessary  to  ensure  survival  against  sur- 
prise attack." 

Now,  isn't  it  a  fact  that  if  we  ask  for  that,  the  Russians  will  too? 
This  is  not  a  one-party  game.  In  other  words,  they  will  ask  for  the 
right  to  deploy  whatever  ICBM  basing  mode  and  numbers  they 
please.  Mr.  Rostow,  is  that  a  treaty,  or  are  you  engaging  in  a 
charade  with  us? 

You  know  very  well,  as  well  as  I  do,  that  there  is  no  treaty  the 
minute  they  deploy  as  many  as  they  want  and  we  deploy  as  many 
as  we  want.  What  are  we  talking  about? 

Mr.  Rostow.  I  am  not  talking  about  a  charade.  I  am  not  very 
good  at  charades.  Senator  Javits.  I  am  talking  about  a  negotiation 
to  adjust  the  modes  and  numbers  provided  for  in  the  treaty  so  that 
we  can  deal  with  the  problem  of  the  vulnerability  of  the  ICBM's 
which  has  been  so  much  discussed.  I  want  to  solve  that  problem 
through  agreement  with  the  Russians.  You  ask  whether  the  Soviets 
won't  ask  for  equal  priviledges,  of  course.  But  they  are  already 
deploying  variable  range  mobile  SS-20  missiles  which  are  MIRVed, 
and  can  reach  the  United  States,  but  are  not  covered  by  the  treaty. 
The  Soviet  Union  now  has  the  capacity  through  its  SS-20's  in 
Europe  to  reach  the  United  States  by  a  simple  device,  well,  by  two 
simple  devices,  either  by  adding  an  extra  booster  to  the  SS-20  and 
making  it  into  an  SS-16,  or  by  substituting  a  single  warhead  on  the 
SS-20. 

Now,  we  raise  the  question  here  as  well  in  paragraph  3,  to  clarify 
those  points,  of  including  the  Soviet  Backfire  and  the  SS-20  within 
the  numerical  limits  of  the  treaty  for  that  reason.  We  are  trying 
simply  to  point  out  consequences  of  this  treaty  as  we  analyze  it 
which  would  make  it  a  much  fairer,  more  equal,  more  balanced, 
and  more  livable  treaty.  This  is  not  a  charade  at  all.  This  is  dealing 
with  the  most  vital  subject  of  our  national  security,  the  question  of 
whether  the  strategic  balance  on  which  the  possibility  of  diplomat- 
ic influence  and  the  use  of  conventional  force  depends  is  going  to 
be  tipped  adversely  to  our  interests. 


1+8-260    0-79    Pt.4    -    2 


12 

Senator  Javits.  Professor,  I  asked  you  directly  this:  if  we  want  to 
build  all  the  ICBM's  that  we  choose  to  build  under  a  treaty,  don't 
you  expect  the  Russians  to  get  the  same  right?  Would  you  say  yes 
or  no  to  that? 

Mr.  RosTOw.  Senator  Javits,  I  cannot  say  yes  or  no  to  that 
because  that  is  not  what  I  said.  I  didn't  say  that  we  want  to  deploy 
all  the  ICBM's  we  want.  We  want  to  deploy  ICBM's  in  modes  and 
numbers  we  deem  necessary  to  insure  their  survival,  and  we  are 
talking  about  negotiating  an  agreement  with  the  Russians  on  that 
point. 

Senator  Javits.  And  that  is  not  equivalent  to  all  we  want  as  you 
define  it? 

Mr.  RosTOw.  No,  I  am  talking  about  negotiation.  There  is  no 
limit  on  ICBM  production  in  the  treaty.  We  are  talking  about  using 
them  and  being  very  direct  with  the  Soviet  Union.  I  am  talking 
about  amendments,  not  unilateral  declarations. 

SIMPLY   AGAINST   THE   TREATY 

Senator  Javits.  My  dear  friend,  you  are  talking  about  no  treaty. 
What  I  am  trying  to  get  you  to  say,  because  that  is  what  you  do 
say,  whether  you  are  trying  to  avoid  it  or  not,  is,  you  are  simply 
against  the  treaty.  You  want  no  treaty.  Why  do  you  give  us  this 
nonsense  about  renegotiation  of  a  treaty  with  amendments  when 
you  know  that  you  are  taking  the  whole  heart  out  of  the  treaty 
when  there  is  no  limit  on  us  and  no  limit  on  them?  We  are  just 
playing  with  words. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  Well,  I  haven't  characterized  the  administration  in 
that  way,  but  yes,  I  think  it  is  a  fair  characterization. 

Senator  Javits.  I  am  not  saying  it  is  the  administration.  I  am 
saying  it  is  you,  not  the  administration. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  Well,  there  can  be  two  opinions  about  that.  I  am 
talking  here,  or  was  trying  to  talk  here.  Senator  Javits,  about 
renegotiating  this  treaty.  The  treaty  is  not  the  essential  point.  The 
essential  point,  as  we  tried  to  make  clear  in  our  statement  is  to 
have  a  foreign  policy  and  a  defense  policy  that  would  secure  the 
interests  of  the  Nation. 

A  fair  and  balanced  and  verifiable  treaty  might  do  that,  but  we 
do  not  think  that  this  treaty  is  fair,  balanced,  and  verifiable,  and 
we  think  it  would  be  a  profound  mistake  for  the  Senate  to  approve 
its  ratification,  to  consent  to  its  ratification  in  its  present  form. 

Now,  you  can  characterize  that  position  as  anything  you  like,  of 
course,  but  we  have  tried  to  make  it  clear  in  a  succession  of 
statements  going  back  to  1976  exactly  what  we  are  saying  and  why. 

ARMAMENTS   TREATY   BETWEEN   NATIONS   THAT   AGREE 

Senator  Javits.  I  have  already  given  my  view  as  to  what  you  are 
trying  to  do  to  this  treaty.  I  wish  that  your  organization,  like  other 
organizations,  would  simply  be  frank  about  it  and  say  you  are 
against  it,  and  you  believe  that  the  only  eventuality  is  for  us  to 
make  the  maximum  degree  of  preparation  as  rapidly  as  we  can. 
You  gave  your  own  analogy,  and  please  correct  me  if  I  am  wrong, 
the  only  treaty  that  you  believe  can  be  an  effective  treaty  to  limit 


13 

armaments  is  between  people  who  essentially  agree  with  each 
other.  That  excludes  all  treaties  with  the  Russians. 

So,  should  we  just  forget  it  and  arm  to  the  teeth  and  expect  the 
atomic  war  which  is  sure  to  come,  as  all  of  history  has  shown  since 
man  began? 

Mr.  RosTOW.  Senator  Javits,  in  my  reading  of  history  war  comes 
when  people  feel  they  are  losing  control  of  the  situation  and  when 
one  side  becomes  very  much  stronger  than  the  other.  Then  they 
strike  out  in  desperation.  The  point  was  never  better  put  than  by 
Thucydides  about  the  causes  of  the  Peloponnesian  War,  which 
destroyed  Greek  civilization.  He  said,  there  were  all  sorts  of  epi- 
sodes preceding  that  war,  but  the  real  cause  of  the  war  was  the  rise 
in  the  power  of  Athens  and  the  fear  which  this  caused  in  Sparta. 

Now,  it  is  that  fear  which  we  are  trying  to  overcome  by  urging 
preparations  for  deterrent  strength  that  would  prevent  war.  The 
Romans  used  to  say,  if  you  want  peace,  prepare  for  war,  and  we 
say  that  in  dealing  with  the  Russians,  there  is  no  use  getting 
excited  about  it.  The  only  way  to  deter  them  is  to  present,  very 
calmly,  unacceptable  risks.  That  is  what  we  did  in  the  Cuban 
missile  crisis  in  1962.  That  is  what  we  did  in  Berlin  in  1948,  and  in 
Greece,  and  in  Turkey,  and  in  a  dozen  other  crises  of  the  period. 
We  stood  firm.  We  used  conventional  forces,  and  in  the  end,  we 
prevailed. 

Now,  the  risk  of  war  in  my  opinion  is  just  the  reverse  of  what 
you  say.  I  don't  think  that  a  SALT  II  Treaty  would  advance  the 
cause  of  peace  any  more  than  the  SALT  I  Interim  Agreement  did. 
The  SALT  I  Interim  Agreement  was  signed,  and  I  think  it  was  very 
reasonable  to  sign  it  under  the  expectations  of  that  period.  I  sup- 
ported it.  I  support  it  now.  But  we  have  to  recognize  that  all  the 
expectations  on  the  basis  of  which  we  signed  that  treaty  have  been 
betrayed. 

That  is  to  say,  we  were  promised  peace  in  Indochina  and  peace  in 
the  Middle  East,  instead  of  which  we  got  the  reverse. 

Senator  Javits.  All  right.  I  see  that  my  time  is  up.  We  can  get 
back  to  this. 

Senator  Biden.  I  will  yield  to  you  my  time  to  keep  up  this  line  of 
questioning. 

Senator  Javits.  Thank  you. 

LEGAUTY   OF  ATTACKING   RESERVATIONS 

I  am  not  yet  myself  committed  to  this  treaty,  but  the  administra- 
tion, I  think,  has  put  it  to  us  on  the  basis  that  we  do  not  lose  the 
opportunity  to  go  forward,  but  we  put  a  cap  at  least  on  where  we 
both  are.  I  don't  see  that  you  have  answered  that  at  all,  and  1  will 
tell  you  why,  if  I  may. 

I  do  not  think  that  we  are  defining  terms  in  the  same  way.  Let 
me  give  you  a  practical  example.  I  notice  in  your  testimony  which 
you  made  when  you  appeared  before  us  in  July,  you  were  asked  by 
Senator  Biden,  "The  vertical  shelter  game  can  be  done,  assuming 
that  we  pass  a  reservation  interpreting  the  verification  provision  so 
as  to  allow  the  vertical  shelter  game."  At  that  point  you  interrupt- 
ed: "Mr.  RosTOW.  Mr.  Chairman,  a  reservation  has  the  same  legal 
effect  as  a  letter  from  my  mother." 

Now,  do  you  still  maintain  that  position? 


14 

Mr.  RosTOW.  Yes. 

Senator  Javits.  Why? 

Mr.  RosTOW.  In  the  context  of  this  kind  of  a  treaty;  that  is,  as 
compared  with  a  tax  treaty  or  a  multilateral  treaty,  a  reservation 
would  have  the  most  ambiguous  and  uncertain  effect  on  the  other 
side.  The  Russians  have  said  very  openly  that  they  would  regard 
such  a  reservation  as  a  unilateral,  domestic  matter  and  would  not 
treat  it  as  significant. 

Senator  Javits.  Let  me  interrupt  you.  I  would  like  to  give  you  an 
historical  analogy.  When  the  Russians  signed  the  Non-Proliferation 
Treaty,  they  announced  publicly  that  they  would  not  consider  a 
unified  Europe  to  be  a  nuclear  power  even  though  France  and 
Britain  were  both  nuclear  powers  and  would  be  part  of  it.  We 
announced  exactly  the  contrary  at  exactly  the  same  time.  That  did 
not  invalidate  the  Non-Proliferation  Treaty,  did  it?  We  both  are 
going  to  wait  for  the  eventuality,  and  if  either  of  us  wanted  to  pull 
out,  we  could. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  My  clear  recollection  is  that  we  told  the  Russians 
that  if  they  said  that  a  united  Europe  could  not  become  a  nuclear 
power  by  virtue  of  the  doctrine  of  succession  in  international  law, 
that  the  treaty  was  abrogated.  That  is  the  background  of  the 
unilateral  interpretations  controversy  over  the   1972  agreement. 

Now,  it  is  not  my  recollection  that  the  Russians  ever  made  any 
public  announcement.  I  may  be  wrong — indeed,  I  often  am — but 
my  recollection  is  that  the  Russians  kept  quiet  on  the  issue  after 
both  Rusk  and  Rogers  testified. 

Senator  Javits.  Well,  there  is  no  use  in  our  arguing  that,  be- 
cause that  will  just  have  to  be  corrected  from  the  record,  but  my 
recollection  is  exactly  the  contrary. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  Very  well. 

INSISTENCE   ON   AMENDMENT   TERMINOLOGY 

Senator  Javits.  Now,  the  reservation  proposition  is  a  declaration 
which  is  put  into  the  instrument  of  ratification  so  that  when  we 
ratify,  we  ratify  with  that  reservation,  and  when  they  ratify  they 
ratify  with  that  reservation  in  it.  I  don't  understand  why  you  want 
the  amendment  business,  except  that  you  know  as  well  as  I  do  that 
now  the  Russians  have  to  face  the  proposition  on  amendments. 
Brezhnev  and  Gromyko  have  said:  "If  you  call  it  an  amendment, 
forget  it,  we  can't  take  it,  there  is  no  treaty,"  so  we  are  going  to 
call  it  a  reservation.  What  is  the  difference?  Do  you  just  want  to 
call  it  an  amendment  to  torpedo  the  treaty?  Is  that  why  you  insist 
on  it? 

Mr.  RosTOW.  After  my  exchange  with  Senator  Biden,  which  you 
just  quoted,  I  checked  with  my  colleagues,  with  professors  of  inter- 
national law  at  the  Yale  Law  School.  They  agree  with  me  that  a 
reservation  under  these  circumstances  would  not  be  binding  on  the 
other  party  unless  it  were  accepted,  that  silence  would  not  be 
acceptance,  and  therefore  the  reservation  could  not  be  regarded  as 
more  than  a  unilateral  statement  for  this  kind  of  treaty. 

There  is  no  possibility  that  these  issues  would  go  to  the  courts.  In 
one  of  the  leading  American  cases  on  the  distinction  between  reser- 
vations and  amendments,  the  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Second 


15 

Circuit  in  New  York  threw  out  a  reservation  for  a  treaty  on  the 
ground  that  it  was  not  germane  to  the  subject  matter. 

CIRCUMSTANCES   MAKING   RESERVATION   INOPERATIVE 

Senator  Javits.  Well,  I  think  you  are  qualifying  it.  Now  I  am  a 
lawyer,  too,  and  I  don't  know  what  circumstances  you  are  talking 
about.  What  are  they?  What  are  the  particular  circumstances  that 
make  a  reservation  inoperative  under  this  matter? 

General  Winn.  Mind  you,  they  have  been  included  in  the  resolu- 
tion of  ratification  which  the  President  must  do.  He  has  no  choice, 
and  therefore  they  will  be  part  of  the  ratification  papers  of  both 
parties.  I  just  do  not  understand  that  particular  effort  to  attack 
this  matter. 

UNILATERAL   MATTER   NOT   BINDING   SOVIETS 

Mr.  RosTOW.  The  Russians  have  already  said  that  this  is  a  uni- 
lateral matter  and  it  would  not  bind  them. 

Senator  Javits.  Professor  Rostow,  if  this  treaty  is  ended  because 
we  don't  agree  on  an  interpretation,  doesn't  that  suit  you  fine?  You 
wouldn't  be  complaining  about  it.  You  would  love  it.  You  are 
against  the  treaty.  Why  are  you  debating  with  us  as  to  what  we 
want  to  put  in  if  we  are  for  it?  You  are  against  it.  So  if  it  blows  up, 
you  are  delighted.  You  think  it  is  good  for  the  country. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  Senator  Javits,  first  of  all,  I  have  spent  a  large  part 
of  my  life  trying  to  make  agreements  with  the  Russians.  I  was  the 
lend  lease  desk  officer  in  the  State  Department  during  the  war, 
and  developed  the  plan  for  the  first  reconstruction  loans  to  the 
Russians.  Second,  as  you  know  very  well,  I  am  a  professor.  I  cannot 
resist  the  lure  of  an  issue. 

Senator  Javits.  Right,  and  I  don't  think  you  can  resist  the  lure 
of  your  own  thinking  either,  whatever  may  be  the  realities  of  the 
situation. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  Well,  that  is  a  sin  from  which  we  all  suffer.  Sena- 
tor. [General  laughter.] 

Senator  Javits.  Would  you  be  good  enough  to  submit  a  memo- 
randum to  us,  a  legal  memorandum  by  you  and  your  associates  as 
to  why  you  believe  that  a  reservation  in  this  treaty  has  the  same 
legal  effect  as  a  letter  from  my  mother? 

Mr.  RosTOW.  All  right,  I  shall  be  glad  to  do  that.  I  shall  be  happy 
to  submit  a  legal  memorandum  to  you.  Senator. 

[The  following  information  was  subsequently  received  for  the 
record:] 

Yale  Universit\-,  Law  School, 
New  Haven,  Conn.,  September  27,  1979. 

Senator  Frank  Church, 

Chairman,  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations, 

U.S.  Senate,  Washington,  D.C. 

Dear  Mr.  Chairman:  On  September  6th,  I  was  asked  by  Senator  Biden,  the 
Acting  Chairman,  and  by  Senator  Javits  to  comment  on  the  staff  analysis  of  the 
comparative  legal  status  of  "amendments",  "reservations",  and  "understandings" 
with  which  the  Senate  might  decide  to  qualify  its  consent  to  the  ratification  of 
SALT  n.  The  staff  analysis  appears  in  two  memoranda  sent  to  me  by  Frederick  S. 
Tipson,  Esq.,  on  September  14th.  Mr.  Tipson's  letter  and  its  enclosures  arrived  here 
on  September  24th.  Mr.  Tipson  also  called  my  attention  to  the  Administration 
position  on  these  questions  contained  in  an  exchange  between  you  and  Secretary 


16 

Vance  at  p.  182  of  Part  1  of  your  Hearings  on  the  SALT  II  Treaty,  and  in  answers  to 
questions  on  the  subject  at  pp.  606-607  of  the  same  volume. 

I  have  consulted  my  colleagues  Professors  Myres  S.  McDougal,  Robert  H.  Bork, 
Joseph  W.  Bishop,  Leon  Lipson,  and  W.  Michael  Reisman  on  this  issue,  and  I  am 
authorized  to  say  that  they  join  me  in  this  letter. 

Both  our  own  usage  and  international  practice  have  employed  a  number  of  words 
to  identify  conditions  imposed  on  the  ratification  of  treaties,  as  the  undated  memo- 
randum of  Mssrs.  Glennon  and  Tipson  points  out:  amendments,  reservations,  unilat- 
eral or  common  understandings,  declarations,  explanations,  clarifications  and  so  on. 
Some  may  deal  only  with  domestic  legal  or  political  problems,  or  indeed  with 
problems  not  germane  to  the  subject  matter  of  the  treaty.  For  example,  if  the 
Senate  should  condition  its  consent  to  the  ratification  of  SALT  II  on  an  increase  in 
our  own  defense  budget  of  3%,  5%,  or  10%,  that  condition— however  it  is  labelled— 
would  not  concern  the  Soviet  Union,  and  obviously  would  not  require  its  agreement. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  issues  listed  in  my  testimony  on  September  6th  as 
problems  which  should  be  clarified  by  the  Senate  before  ratification  do  concern  the 
substance  of  the  Treaty.  They  are  matters  on  which  the  utmost  precision  is  desir- 
able in  the  interest  of  the  great  national  objectives  sought  through  the  negotiation 
of  SALT  IL  ^   ^. 

The  heart  of  our  disagreement  with  those  who  would  deal  with  questions  of  this 
order  through  "reservations"  or  "understandings"  rather  than  "amendments"  ap- 
pears on  p.  8  of  the  Glennon-Tipson  memorandum,  where  the  authors  say  that  if 
"reservations"  or  "understandings"  adopted  by  the  Senate  as  conditions  to  its  con- 
sent to  ratification  are  included  in  the  instrument  of  ratification,  and  if  the  Soviet 
Union  "proceeds  with  the  exchange  of  instruments  of  ratification,  its  silence  consti- 
tutes assent  to  the  treaties  as  modified  by  the  United  States."  We  believe  it  is 
impossible  to  state  the  idea  as  a  universal  rule  in  this  absolute  form.  Neither 
international  law  nor  political  prudence  justify  placing  so  heavy  a  burden  on  the 
interpretation  of  Soviet  silence. 

The  supposed  rule  of  assent  through  silence  urged  in  the  Glennon-Tipson  memo- 
randum does  not  correspond  to  the  rule  stated  in  Sections  124  and  126  of  the 
American  Law  Institute  Restatement  of  the  Foreign  Relations  Law  of  the  United 
States  and  in  many  other  authoritative  comments  on  International  law.  There  is  no 
assurance  that  the  construction  favored  by  your  advisers  is  widely  accepted  for  the 
modification  of  bilateral  treaties.  Even  more  important,  there  is  every  indication 
that  the  Soviet  Union  does  not  accept  such  a  rule,  but  continues  to  rely  on -more 
formal  distinctions  among  amendments,  reservations,  and  other  forms  of  treaty 
modification.  .       ,, 

Soviet  spokesmen  say  repeatedly  that  they  do  not  care  what  reservations  we 
adopt,  since  "reservations"  are  entirely  internal  in  their  effect.  SALT  II  concerns 
matters  of  the  highest  possible  importance  to  the  security  of  the  United  States  and 
of  many  other  nations.  International  law  on  this  subject,  never  clear  cut,  is  now  in 
flux,  in  large  part  because  of  the  influence  of  certain  obscure,  potentially  inconsist- 
ent, and  controversial  provisions  of  the  Vienna  Convention  on  the  Law  of  Treaties. 

To  assume  that  the  future  of  SALT  II  would  be  governed  by  so  simplistic  a  rule  as 
that  stated  in  the  Glennon-Tipson  memorandum  would  be  risky  at  best,  and,  on 
matters  essential  to  the  security  of  the  United  States,  foolhardy. 

Traditionally,  both  international  law  and  our  own  practice  used  different  words  to 
identify  somewhat  different  procedures  for  altering  a  Treaty  during  the  ratification 
process.  "Amendment"  was  the  least  ambiguous  word  customarily  used.  When  the 
Senate  consented  to  ratification  with  an  amendment,  it  was  understood  that  the 
President  would  submit  the  proposed  change  in  the  text  of  the  Treaty  to  the  other 
party  or  parties,  and  obtain  his  or  their  consent  to  the  amendment  prior  to  ratifica- 
tion. "Reservation",  on  the  other  hand,  was  a  more  ambiguous  word  used  in  a 
variety  of  contexts.  Section  124  of  the  Restatement  defines  the  word  "reservation" 
as  "a  formal  declaration  made  by  a  signatory  before  it  becomes  bound  by  an 
international  agreement  that  the  agreement  will  not  be  binding  upon  it  except  upon 
terms  that  it  regards  as  changing  the  effect  of  the  agreement  under  international 
law."  International  and  American  usage  is,  however,  less  strict  than  the  Restate- 
ment definition.  Often,  the  word  "reservation"  denotes  unconditional  consent  by  the 
Senate  to  ratification,  subject  to  a  proviso  which  could  have  different  consequences 
in  different  settings.  It  is  most  often  used  in  connection  with  multilateral  treaties. 
"Understanding"  and  "interpretation"  have  been  used  in  even  more  fluid  ways. 
Since  the  Glennon-Tipson  memorandum  seems  to  rely  heavily  on  a  paragraph  of 
Article  20  of  the  Vienna  Convention,  it  should  be  noted  that  in  this  regard  the 
Convention  is  having  a  regressive  effect  on  international  law.  It  seems  to  lump  all 
forms  of  treaty  emendation  and  alteration  together  as  "Reservations".  Thus  it 
multiplies  doubts  and  ambiguities,  and  reduces  clarity.  Some  experts  believe  that 


17 

the  provisions  of  the  convention  on  reservations  apply  only  to  multilateral  treaties. 
Others  believe  the  purpose  of  the  Convention  is  to  deal  with  the  problem  universal- 
ly. But  all  must  concede  that  the  purport  and  scope  of  the  provisions  are  uncertain. 

(The  text  of  Articles  19  and  20  of  the  Vienna  Convention  appears  in  an  Appendix 
to  this  letter.) 

In  their  language  and  range  of  reference,  Sections  2-4  of  Article  20  seem  to  refer 
only  to  multilateral  treaties.  And  the  Commentary  of  the  International  Law  Com- 
mission on  the  Draft  which  became  the  Vienna  Convention  is  clearly  of  the  view 
that  the  Convention  would  apply  only  to  multilateral  treaties,  on  the  ground  that  "a 
reservation  to  a  bilateral  treaty  presents  no  problem,  because  it  amounts  to  a  new 
proposal  reopening  the  negotiations  between  the  two  states  concerning  the  terms  of 
the  treaty.  If  they  arrive  at  an  agreement  whether  adopting  or  rejecting  the  reser- 
vation— the  treaty  will  be  concluded.  If  not,  it  will  fall  to  the  ground." 

If  however,  these  provisions  of  the  Vienna  Convention  should  be  interpreted  to 
apply  to  bilateral  treaties  like  SALT  II,  would  Section  2  govern?  Section  5?  If  they 
do  not  apply,  under  what  circumstances  should  agreement  to  a  reservation  be 
inferred  from  silence  during  the  ratification  process,  even  after  twelve  months? 
Customary  international  law  is  full  of  episodes  of  controversy,  doubt  and  confusion. 

In  view  of  the  unsettled  character  of  international  law  on  the  subject  at  this  time, 
we  believe  that  if  the  Senate  wishes  to  condition  its  consent  to  the  ratification  of 
SALT  II  on  certain  modifications,  clarifications,  or  interpretations  of  the  text  before 
it,  it  should  proceed  only  upon  the  express  condition  that  the  Soviet  Union  formally 
and  explicitly  agree  to  each  of  our  proposals  for  change  in  its  instrument  of 
ratification. 

It  is,  however,  clear  both  in  Secretary  Vance's  comments  to  you  at  p.  182  of  the 
Hearings  and  from  the  State  Department's  statements  on  pp.  606-607  that  the 
Administration  is  rel3ring  heavily  on  Soviet  "silence"  as  an  important  part  of  the 
cement  of  this  Treaty,  and  on  our  capacity  to  denounce  the  Treaty  as  the  sanction 
behind  our  views.  But  where  is  the  evidence  that  the  Soviet  Union  accepts  "silence" 
as  a  modality  for  binding  itself  to  solemn  international  agreements?  Whatever 
evidence  we  have  seen  goes  the  other  way. 

The  melancholy  history  of  the  "unilateral  interpretations"  of  the  Interim  Agree- 
ment on  the  Limitation  of  Strategic  Offensive  Arms  put  forward  by  Administration 
spokesman  in  1972  is  enough  to  warn  against  reliance  on  such  a  procedure.  In  that 
case  the  Soviet  Union  remained  silent  while  we  expounded  our  interpretations  of 
the  Agreement.  They  then  violated  the  agreement  as  we  interpreted  it.  Despite  our 
repeated  statements  to  the  contrary,  we  did  not  denounce  the  Agreement.  Too  much 
was  deemed  to  be  at  stake  to  make  such  a  course  advisable.  Furthermore,  our 
capacity  to  denounce  such  a  Treaty  at  will  was  thought  to  be  at  least  doubtful,  in 
the  absence  of  a  violation  of  an  unambiguous  and  major  term  of  the  Treaty  by  the 
other  party.  Gray  v.  United  States,  21  Ct.  CI.  340  (1886). 

It  is  clear  from  the  debate  that  many  people  prefer  to  label  Senate  conditions  to 
its  consent  as  "reservations"  rather  than  "amendments",  despite  the  uncertainties 
such  a  course  would  generate,  because  they  are  afraid  that  the  Soviet  Union  would 
simply  refuse  to  negotiate  any  further  in  order  to  resolve  questions  which  might  be 
raised  by  the  Senate.  It  is  almost  inconceivable  that  the  United  States  Senate  would 
adopt  such  a  posture  after  mature  reflection.  As  President  Kennedy  once  said,  "the 
United  States  should  never  negotiate  out  of  fear,  and  should  never  be  afraid  to 
negotiate."  Surely  we  should  never  knuckle  under  to  a  position  of  "Take  it  or  leave 
it",  or  any  other  form  of  ultimatum. 

"The  Senate  should  reach  its  conclusions  about  SALT  II  in  terms  of  its  analysis  of 
the  Treaty's  impact  on  our  foreign  and  defense  policies  as  a  whole.  If  it  finds  there 
are  certain  issues  on  which  it  would  be  desirable  to  alter  the  text,  or  to  obtain 
clarification  from  the  Soviet  Union,  it  should  proceed  to  state  those  points  in  a  form 
that  would  require  the  unequivocal  and  explicit  concurrence  of  the  Soviet  Union. 
The  notion  that  we  should  hesitate  to  raise  fundamental  questions  for  further 
discussion  with  any  nation  out  of  fear  is  repugnant  to  our  nature  and  to  our  history. 
If  the  Soviet  Union  were  as  arbitrary  and  unreasonable  as  some  spokesmen  for  the 
Administration  seem  to  think,  no  agreement  with  it  would  be  worth  having. 
Yours  sincerely, 

Eugene  V.  Rostow. 

The  signatories  to  this  letter,  all  members  of  the  Yale  Law  School  faculty,  are: 

Myres  S.  McDougal. 
Robert  H.  Bork. 
Joseph  W.  Bishop. 
Leon  Lipson. 
William  M.  Reisman. 
Eugene  V.  Rostow. 


18 

Appendix— Vienna  CkJNVENTiON  on  the  Law  of  Treaties 

ARTICLE    19 — formulation   OF   RESERVATIONS 

A  State  may,  when  signing,  ratifying,  accepting,  approving  or  acceding  to  a 
treaty,  formulate  a  reservation  unless: 

(a)  The  reservation  is  prohibited  by  the  treaty; 

(b)  The  treaty  provides  that  only  specified  reservations,  which  do  not  include 
the  reservation  in  question,  may  be  made;  or 

(c)  In  cases  not  falling  under  sub-paragraphs  (a)  and  (b),  the  reservation  is 
incompatible  with  the  object  and  purpose  of  the  treaty. 

ARTICLE   20 — ACCEPTANCE   OF   AND   OBJECTION   TO   RESERVATIONS 

1.  A  reservation  expressly  authorized  by  a  treaty  does  not  require  any  subsequent 
acceptance  by  the  other  contracting  States  unless  the  treaty  so  provides. 

2.  When  it  appears  from  the  limited  number  of  the  negotiating  States  and  the 
object  and  purpose  of  a  treaty  that  the  application  of  the  treaty  in  its  entirety 
between  all  the  parties  is  an  essential  condition  of  the  consent  of  each  one  to  be 
bound  by  the  treaty,  a  reservation  requires  acceptance  by  all  the  parties. 

3.  When  a  treaty  is  a  constituent  instrument  of  an  international  organization  and 
unless  it  otherwise  provides,  a  reservation  requires  the  acceptance  of  the  competent 
organ  of  that  organization. 

4.  In  cases  not  falling  under  the  preceding  paragraphs  and  unless  the  treaty 
otherwise  provides: 

(a)  Acceptance  by  another  contracting  State  of  a  reservation  constitutes  the 
reserving  State  a  party  to  the  treaty  in  relation  to  that  other  State  if  or  when 
the  treaty  is  in  force  for  those  States; 

(b)  An  objection  by  another  contracting  State  to  a  reservation  does  not  pre- 
clude the  entry  into  force  of  the  treaty  as  between  the  objecting  and  reserving 
States  unless  a  contrary  intention  is  definitely  expressed  by  the  objecting  State; 

(c)  An  act  expressing  a  State's  consent  to  be  bound  by  the  treaty  and  contain- 
ing a  reservation  is  effective  as  soon  as  at  least  one  other  contracting  State  has 
accepted  the  reservation. 

5.  For  the  purposes  of  paragraphs  2  and  4  and  unless  the  treaty  otherwise 
provides,  a  reservation  is  considered  to  have  been  accepted  by  a  State  if  it  shall 
have  raised  no  objection  to  the  reservation  by  the  end  of  a  period  of  twelve  months 
after  it  was  notified  of  the  reservation  or  by  the  date  on  which  it  expressed  its 
consent  to  be  bound  by  the  treaty,  whichever  is  later. 

Foreign  Relations  Committee  Staff  Memorandum  of  June  25,  1979  Referred 

TO  IN  Mr.  Rostow's  Letter 

Memorandum  to:  Members,  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations. 
From:  Michael  J.  Glennon  and  Frederick  S.  Tipson. 
Subject:  SALT  II— Legal  and  Procedural  Issues. 

This  is  a  preliminary  summary  of  legal  and  procedural  issues  relating  to  the 
SALT  II  Treaty.  It  attempts  to  clarify  certain  basic  questions  regarding  Senate 
consideration  of  the  treaty  and  identifies  other  issues  for  more  detailed  considera- 
tion in  subsequent  memoranda.  Still  other  issues  will  undoubtedly  arise  in  the 
course  of  the  debate  and  we  will  respond  to  particular  inquiries  as  quickly  as 
possible. 

The  following  subjects  are  addressed: 

1.  The  Treaty  and  Associated  Documents. 

2.  Consideration  by  the  Senate. 

3.  Presidential  Alternatives  after  Senate  Action. 

4.  Soviet  Ratification  and  Modification. 

I.   THE   treaty   and   RELATED   DOCUMENTS:   LEGAL   STATUS   AND   ANALYSIS 

President  Carter  signed  the  SALT  II  Treaty  in  Vienna  on  June  18.  As  a  signatory, 
the  United  States  is  not  legally  bound  to  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  but  under 
international  law  it  is  generally  accepted  that  a  treaty  signatory  undertakes  in  good 
faith  a)  to  proceed  with  the  process  of  ratification  in  accordance  with  its  own 
constitutional  law,  and  b)  to  refrain  from  acts  which  would  defeat  the  object  and 
purpose  of  the  treaty  during  a  reasonable  interim  period. 

The  President  has  asked  for  Senate  advice  and  consent  only  to  the  Treaty  and 
Protocol,  presented  as  a  single  document.  The  Protocol  is  regarded  as  an  "integral 
part"  of  the  treaty  itself  and  is  distinguished  by  its  earlier  expiration  date:  1981 
rather  than  1985.  (The  1972  SALT  Interim  Agreement  contained  a  Protocol  on 


19 

submarine-launched  ballistic  missiles,  and  the  1972  ABM  Treaty  was  amended  with 
a  Protocol  in  1974.) 

The  President's  formal  letter  of  transmittal  contains,  in  addition  to  the  Secretary 
of  State's  report  on  the  purpose  and  provisions  of  the  agreement,  the  following 
documents: 

1.  Agreed  Statements  and  Common  Understandings,  relating  to  particular  articles 
in  both  the  Treaty  and  the  Protocol; 

2.  A  Memorandum  of  Understanding  by  the  two  sides  certifying  the  figures  on 
their  present  numbers  of  strategic  offensive  systems,  in  accordance  with  article  17(3) 
of  the  Treaty; 

3.  A  Joint  Statement  of  Principles  agreed  upon  by  Presidents  Carter  and  Brezhnev 
representing  their  general  objectives  with  respect  to  further  SALT  negotiations; 

4.  A  memorandum  from  the  Secretary  of  State  communicating  the  exchange  of 
statements  on  the  Soviet  "Backfire"  bomber  which  took  place  at  the  Vienna  summit 
meeting  in  June. 

These  four  documents,  according  to  the  President's  letter  of  transmittal,  have 
been  transmitted  "for  the  information  of  the  Senate,"  not  for  its  advice  and  consent. 
Under  Senate  precedent,  such  instruments  are  not  susceptible  of  amendment  in  the 
strict  sense.'  However,  the  Senate  could  "reach"  such  documents  by  conditioning  its 
advice  and  consent  in  one  of  several  ways.  First,  it  could  amend  the  Treaty  to 
incorporate  the  terms  of  a  collateral  agreement  (or  an  amended  version  thereof^ 
within  the  text  of  the  Treaty  itself — as  it  did  in  the  case  of  the  Carter-Torrijos 
"Joint  Statement"  regarding  the  Panama  Canal  Neutrality  Treaty.  Second,  it  could 
insist  in  a  reservation  that  the  terms  of  a  collateral  agreement  be  modified  in 
accordance  with  its  instructions  prior  to  ratification.  Third,  it  could  announce  in  a 
reservation  or  understanding  that  it  regards  the  provisions  of  a  collateral  agree- 
ment or  assurance  as  equal  in  status  to  the  Treaty  itself  and  consents  to  ratification 
subject  to  that  understanding.  All  such  conditions,  of  course,  would  have  to  be 
accepted  by  the  Soviet  Union  prior  to  the  exchange  of  the  instruments  of  ratifica- 
tion. 

In  the  absence  of  explicit  conditions  attached  by  the  Senate,  the  status  and  effect 
of  collateral  or  derivative  agreements  would  be  governed  by  international  legal 
principles  of  treaty  interpretation.  Thus,  the  Treaty  would  be  interpreted  in  light  of 
the  negotiating  context  including  those  agreements  made  or  assurances  offered  in 
connection  with  its  conclusion.  Subsequent  agreements  between  the  parties  regard- 
ing the  interpretation  or  application  of  treaty  provisions  would  also  be  taken  into 
account. 

1.  The  Agreed  Statements  and  Common  Understandings  comprise,  in  effect,  a  set 
of  supplementary  agreements  designed  to  elaborate  the  meaning  of  particular  arti- 
cles in  both  the  Treaty  and  the  Protocol.  Earlier  in  the  negotiations,  "Agreed 
Statements"  were  considered  to  have  a  somewhat  higher  standing  than  "Common 
Understandings,"  but  the  Administration  no  longer  suggests  that  there  is  any  legal 
or  political  basis  for  distinguishing  between  them.  Similar  terms  were  used  in 
connection  with  the  SALT  I  agreements,  but  unlike  SALT  I,  there  are  no  "unilater- 
al statements"  by  either  side  and  all  Agreed  Statements  and  Common  Understand- 
ings have  been  signed  by  both  sides. 

2.  The  Memorandum  of  Understanding  on  the  Establishment  of  a  Data  Base  on 
the  Numbers  of  Strategic  Offensive  Arms  relates  to  Article  17(3)  of  the  Treaty.  By 
the  terms  of  that  article,  the  Parties  agree  to  maintain  such  a  data  base  on  an 
ongoing  basis  through  the  Standing  Consultative  Commission.  The  "M.O.U."  itself 
contains  figures  on  strategic  arms  as  of  November  1,  1978.  In  accordance  with  an 
earlier  understanding,  these  figures  were  updated  as  of  the  date  of  treaty  signature 
(June  18,  1979),  and  these  updated  figures  are  contained  in  accompanying  submis- 
sions of  each  side. 

3.  The  Joint  Statement  of  Principles  and  Basic  Guidelines  for  Subsequent  Negotia- 
tions on  the  Limitation  of  Strategic  Arms,  though  agreed  to  by  both  sides,  is  not  by 
its  nature  a  binding  legal  agreement.  It  represents  a  set  of  general  common  objec- 
tives rather  than  specific  undertakings.  A  comparable  joint  statement  of  principles 


'  The  chair  noted  on  March  24,  1922,  during  the  consideration  of  a  treaty  with  the  British 
Empire,  France  and  Japan  concerning  their  insular  possessions  in  the  Pacific  Ocean,  that  a 
declaration  of  the  signatories  as  to  their  understanding  and  intent  made  at  the  time  the  treaty 
was  signed  was  not  a  part  of  the  treaty  and  not  subject  to  amendment.  Cong.  Rec,  March  24, 
1922  at  p.  4496.  Similarly,  the  chair  (Vice  President  Mondale,  presiding),  in  response  to  a 
parliamentary  inquiry  by  Sen.  Allen  at  the  outset  of  the  debate  on  the  Panama  Canal  Treaties, 
stated  that  only  "the  body  of  the  treaty,  including  all  of  the  articles,  annexes  thereto,  protocols 
to  it,  et  cetera,  is  before  the  Senate  for  consideration  and  therefore  amendable."  Cong.  Rec,  Feb. 
8,  1978  at  p.  SiSOO.  "Other  documents,"  the  chair  stated,  "would  not  be  subject  to  amendments." 
Id. 


20 

for  the  SALT  II  negotiations  was  issued  at  the  Washington  summit  meeting  of  June 
21,  1973. 

4.  The  section  of  the  President's  submission  to  the  Senate  headed  "Soviet  Backfire 
Statement"  comprises,  in  effect,  a  memorandum  of  the  Secretary  of  State  certifying 
the  exchange  of  statements  (written  and  oral)  regarding  Soviet  production  and 
deployment  of  the  Backfire  (TU-22M)  bomber  which  took  place  at  the  summit 
meeting  in  June.  The  form  of  the  exchange  apparently  was  negotiated  in  advance, 
with  the  U.S.  signature  of  the  Treaty  conditioned  upon  Soviet  acceptance  of  the 
restrictions  contained  in  their  written  statement  on  the  Backfire.  The  nature  of  this 
agreement  raises  a  number  of  legal  questions.  Because  of  the  special  role  of  the 
Secretary  of  State  in  negotiating  and  communicating  this  exchange,  it  will  be 
important  to  clarify  his  own  expectations  regarding  the  Backfire  statements. 

Unilateral  written  or  oral  declarations  can  provide  the  basis  for  binding  commit- 
ments under  international  law  and  diplomatic  practice,  especially  if  the  State 
making  them  expects  another  State  to  rely  upon  them.  In  this  case,  U.S.  reliance 
upon  the  Soviet  assurances  is  made  explicit.  However,  it  is  not  clear  whether  the 
Soviets  would  regard  the  violation  of  this  understanding  as  equivalent  to  a  violation 
of  the  Treaty  itself.  It  is  also  not  clear  whether  the  Soviet  undertakings  are  limited 
to  the  period  of  the  Treaty  only— i.e.,  whether  their  effective  date  and  termination 
date  are  identical  to  those  of  the  Treaty. 

Finally,  the  Secretary  of  State's  Report  to  the  President  refers  to  President 
Carter's  affirmation  "that  the  United  States  has  the  right  to  an  aircraft  comparable 
to  Backfire"  (p.  35),  but  this  affirmation  does  not  appear  in  the  Secretary's  memo- 
randum recording  the  exchange  of  statements  in  Vienna  (p.  73).  In  view  of  the 
careful  orchestration  of  these  statements,  it  is  not  evident  why  it  was  not  included. 
Therefore,  it  is  not  apparent  whether  U.S.  development  and  deployment  of  a  compa- 
rable bomber  would  be  subject  to  the  same  restrictions  on  capability  and  production 
rate  as  the  Backfire. 

II.    SENATE   CONSIDERATION    OF   THE   TREATY 

Upon  transmittal  to  the  Senate,  the  Treaty  will  be  routinely  referred  to  the 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  which  has  exclusive  jurisdiction  over  all  treaties 
under  Rule  25. Ij  of  the  Standing  Rules  of  the  Senate.  While  another  Committee 
may  hold  hearings  on  certain  aspects  of  the  agreement,  treaties  are  never  referred, 
jointly  or  sequentially,  to  any  Committee  other  than  Foreign  Relations. 

A.  Consideration  by  the  committee 

Committee  rules  make  no  special  provision  for  the  handling  of  treaties.  Thus, 
unless  the  Committee  determines  otherwise,  the  same  procedure  followed  during  the 
consideration  of  other  measures  will  be  followed  in  considering  the  SALT  II  Treaty. 

The  Committee  will  have  before  it  two  items:  the  text  of  the  Treaty  (including  the 
Protocol  and  perhaps  other  documents  considered  part  of  the  Treaty),  and  the 
Resolution  of  Ratification.  The  latter  can  be  introduced  beforehand  or  reported  as 
an  original   resolution;  the  procedural  difference   is  described   in  part  B  below. 

The  Senate  may  grant  its  advice  and  consent  conditionally,  and  if  the  Committee 
wishes  to  recommend  that  it  do  so,  two  kinds  of  conditions  are  available.  The  first  is 
an  amendment  to  the  text  of  the  Treaty  itself.  The  second  is  an  amendment  to  the 
Resolution  of  Ratification.  Amendments  to  the  Resolution  are  typically  designated 
reservations,  understandings,  interpretations,  declarations,  and  statements.  These 
are  also  discussed  in  more  detail  below.  If  it  approves  the  Treaty,  the  Committee 
will  thus  report  two  instruments  to  the  Senate:  (1)  the  Treaty  itself,  with  or  without 
amendments;  and  (2)  the  Resolution  of  Ratification,  with  or  without  amendments-^ 

Treaties  are  placed  on  the  executive  calendar  of  the  Senate  in  the  order  reported 
and  are  taken  up  in  that  order.  A  motion  to  proceed  to  the  consideration  of 
executive  business  is  in  order  at  any  time  and  is  not  debatable  unless  any  other 
treaty  is  already  on  the  executive  calendar,  in  which  case  a  motion  to  proceed  to 
consideration  of  the  SALT  Treaty  would  be  debatable. 


^  During  consideration  of  the  Panama  Canal  Treaties,  the  Carter-Tornjos  Joint  Statement  was 
incorporated  in  the  Neutrality  Treaty  in  the  form  of  two  "leadership  amendments.  The 
Committee  had  declined  to  adopt  these  amendments  formally  so  as  to  allow  other  Senators  the 
opportunity  to  join  in  their  co-sponsorship;  instead,  it  voted  to  recommend  to  the  Senate  that  it 
incorporate  the  amendments.  The  procedural  effect  was  minimal;  the  amendments  were  as  a 
result  noor  amendments,  rather  than  Committee  amendments.  Thus,  they  were  not  moved  by 
the  Floor  Manager  and  did  not  have   priority  over  other  amendments  (see  part   B  below). 


21 

B.  Senate  floor  action 

I.  Types  of  conditions 
As  discussed  above,  two  types  of  conditions  may  be  imposed  by  the  Senate  upon 
its  consent:  amendments  to  the  text  of  the  Treaty  itself,  and  amendments  to  the 
Resolution  of  Ratification. 

a.  Textual  amendments. — An  amendment  to  the  text  of  a  treaty  is  in  one  sense 
similar  to  an  amendment  to  a  bill — it  may  strike  out  certain  language  in  the  treaty 
and  insert  other  language  in  lieu  thereof;  it  may  do  the  same  with  respect  to 
numbers  appearing  in  the  treaty;  or,  it  may  add  new  articles  or  sections,  or  delete 
entire  articles  or  sections.  On  the  other  hand,  unlike  a  bill  a  treaty  is  not  directly 
modified  by  the  Senate;  rather,  the  Senate  gives  its  consent  upon  the  condition  that 
an  amendment  be  made,  and  the  treaty  is  actually  amended  by  the  President,  who 
does  so  upon  bringing  the  treaty  into  force. 

b.  Amendments  to  the  Resolution  of  Ratification. — Amendments  to  the  Resolution 
of  Ratification  may  be  designated  as  follows: 

i.  "Reservation". — A  reservation  modifies  or  limits  the  substantive  effect  of  one  or 
more  of  the  treaty  provisions.  It  in  effect  adds  something  of  substance  to  the  treaty 
or  takes  something  of  substance  from  it,  and  gives  notice  that  the  United  States  will 
not,  in  that  respect,  give  effect  to  the  treaty  except  in  accordance  with  the  reserva- 
tion. 

The  text  of  a  treaty  thus  need  not  be  amended  explicitly  in  order  to  effect  a 
change  in  its  substance.  An  implicit  but  equally  effective  amendment  may  be 
achieved  through  a  reservation  or  even  an  understanding  (see  below).  The  Senate 
may  provide  by  reservation,  for  example,  that  a  certain  provision  will  be  without 
force  and  effect;  such  a  reservation  would  be  the  functional  legal  equivalent  of  an 
amendment  to  the  text  of  the  treaty  which  strikes  out  the  provision  line  by  line. 

ii.  "Understanding". — An  understanding  is  a  statement  which  is  not  intended  to 
modify  or  limit  any  of  the  provisions  of  the  treaty.  Rather,  it  is  intended  to  clarify 
or  explain  a  treaty  provision  or  to  deal  with  some  other  matter  incidental  to  the 
operation  of  the  treaty  in  a  manner  other  than  in  a  substantive  reservation.  Some- 
times an  understanding  is  no  more  than  a  statement  of  policies  or  principles  or  an 
indication  of  general  procedures  for  carrying  out  provisions  of  the  treaty.  An  under- 
standing may  relate  to  the  rights  and  obligations  of  either  party;  like  a  reservation, 
it  need  not  be  limited  to  the  rights  and  obligations  of  the  party  entering  the 
understanding.  Understandings  are  also  on  occasion  called  "interpretations".  As 
noted  above,  however,  their  practical  effect  may  be  the  same  as  a  reservation. 

iii.  "Declarations"  and  other  statements.  These  are  used  most  often  when  it  is 
considered  essential  or  desirable  to  give  notice  of  certain  matters  of  policy  or 
principle,  without  an  intention  of  derogating  from  the  substantive  rights  or  obliga- 
tions stipulated  in  the  treaty.  "Explanations",  "clarifications",  and  "recommenda- 
tions" are  other  designations  which  occasionally  have  been  used. 

2.  Procedure 

Rule  37  of  the  Standing  Rules  of  the  Senate  (attached)  governs  the  consideration 
of  treaties.  The  procedure  to  be  followed  in  the  Senate,  and  options  available  to  it  if 
it  wishes  the  Treaty  modified,  are  as  follows: 

The  Senate  will  first  consider  the  Treaty  as  in  "Committee  of  the  Whole."  (The 
Committee  of  the  Whole  procedure  may  be  avoided  only  by  unanimous  consent  or 
by  suspension  of  the  rules.)  At  this  stage,  the  Senate  will  go  through  the  Treaty 
article  by  article,  at  which  time  amendments  to  each  article  may  be  offered;  there  is 
no  vote  on  each  article  as  such.  Amendments  recommended  by  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations  will  be  considered  first,  after  which  other  amendments  may  be 
offered.  The  Treaty  is  amendable  in  two  degrees  (i.e.,  amendments  to  amendments) 
and  all  votes  are  by  a  majority  of  those  present. 

Only  actual  amendments  to  the  text  of  the  Treaty  will  be  in  order  during  the 
Committee  of  the  Whole  proceeding.  Amendments  to  the  Resolution  of  Ratifica- 
tion— i.e.,  reservations,  understandings,  etc. — are  therefore  not  in  order  at  this 
stage.  Articles  of  the  Treaty  are  considered  in  numerical  order,  with  consideration 
of  the  Protocol  following  considering  of  the  Treaty.  Amendments  may  not  be  offered 
to  Articles  that  have  not  yet  been  taken  up,  but  may  be  offered  to  Articles  previous- 
ly considered  once  the  entire  treaty  has  been  considered  in  the  Committee  of  the 
Whole  proceeding. 

After  the  Senate  has  considered  each  article  of  the  Treaty  for  possible  amend- 
ment, it  will,  in  effect,  "dissolve  itself  from  the  Committee  of  the  Whole  and  then 
vote  a  second  time  on  each  of  the  amendments  (if  any)  passed  earlier.  (The  Senate 
may  accept  all  the  amendments  by  a  single  vote  only  with  unanimous  consent.) 
Entirely  new  amendments  may  also  be  offered  at  this  stage. 


22 

Following  a  wait  of  one  day,  the  Resolution  of  Ratification  is  taken  up,  which  will 
automatically  incorporate  any  amendments  to  the  text  of  the  Treaty.  At  that  point, 
amendments  to  the  Resolution  of  Ratification  itself  are  in  order.  Amendments  to 
the  Resolution  must  be  approved  by  a  simple  majority.  Like  amendments  to  the  text 
of  the  Treaty,  they  are  amendable  in  only  one  degree.  The  vote  on  advice  and 
consent,  which  requires  the  approval  of  two-thirds  of  those  present  and  voting, 
occurs  after  the  Senate  has  concluded  consideration  of  the  Resolution  of  Ratifica- 
tion. All  votes  on  amendments,  reservations,  understandings,  etc.,  require  only  a 
majority  vote  for  approval. 

Several  additional  procedural  matters  should  be  noted  at  this  point. 

Cloture.— The  cloture  and  germaneness  provisions  of  Senate  Rule  22  (attached) 
apply  to  the  consideration  of  treaties.  Thus,  in  the  absence  of  cloture,  an  amend- 
ment to  a  Treaty  article  need  not  be  germane  to  that  article.  Cloture,  if  invoked, 
would  pertain  to  all  aspects  of  the  process:  the  Committee  of  the  Whole  and  action 
on  both  the  Treaty  and  the  Resolution  of  Ratification.  The  rule  of  germaneness 

would  then  apply.  ..    .  ,      ,       j    . 

Closed  sessions.— A  motion  to  consider  the  Treaty  in  secret  (  with  closed  doors  ) 
may  be  made  at  any  time  by  any  Senator  and  requires  only  a  second.  In  accordance 
with  Senate  rule  35  (attached),  no  vote  is  taken  on  such  a  motion;  in  contrast,  a 
motion  to  return  to  open  session,  while  non-debatable,  requires  a  majority  vote. 

Recommittal.— The  concept  of  "recommittal"  has  been  used,  somewhat  loosely,  in 
reference  to  two  quite  different  procedural  steps:  returning  the  Treaty  to  the  Com- 
mittee on  Foreign  Relations  for  reconsideration  (possibly  with  instructions),  and 
returning  it  to  the  President  for  renegotiation  with  the  Soviets.  The  former  repre- 
sents a  simple  "motion  to  recommit"  and  is  in  order  at  any  time  prior  to  the  final 
vote  on  the  Resolution  of  Ratification.  The  latter  is  more  complex:  a  treaty  may  be 
returned  to  the  President  only  through  the  adoption  of  an  order  by  unanimous 
consent,  or  a  resolution  by  simple  majority.  However,  such  a  resolution  would 
normally  be  referred  to  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations. 

III.    PRESIDENTIAL   ALTERNATIVES   AFTER   SENATE   ACTION 

Senate  action  on  the  SALT  II  Treaty  could  take  any  one  of  a  number  of  courses, 
each  of  which  presents  the  President  with  various  alternatives. 

A.  Senate  consent  without  conditions 

The  Senate  may  grant  its  consent  without  imposing  any  conditions,  as  is  done 
with  the  great  majority  of  treaties.  If  so,  the  President  may  then  proceed  immedi- 
ately to  ratify  the  Treaty.  Contrary  to  popular  impression,  the  Senate  does  not 
"ratify"  treaties  as  such— it  gives  its  "consent"  to  ratification  by  the  President. 
Senate  consent  constitutes  authorization,  rather  than  a  directive,  to  bring  the  treaty 
into  force.  The  President  may,  moreover,  withdraw  a  treaty  for  which  he  has 
requested  Senate  consent  at  any  time  prior  to  the  final  vote  on  advice  and  consent. 
Ratification  occurs  upon  the  exchange  of  "instruments  of  ratification'  with  the 
other  signatory;  these  are  documents  indicating  each  state's  intent  to  be  bound  and 
containing  any  conditions  either  state  may  impose.  In  the  case  of  bilateral  treaties. 
United  States  practice  has  been  to  execute  a  "Protocol  of  Exchange"  as  well,  which 
is  a  document  signed  by  both  states  indicating  that  each  has  examined  the  instru- 
ments of  a  ratification  tendered  by  the  other  and  that  each  accepts  the  conditions,  if 
any,  imposed  by  the  other. 

B.  Senate  consent  with  conditions 

In  the  event  that  the  Senate  conditions  its  advice  and  consent  upon  the  accept- 
ance of  certain  amendments,  reservations,  or  understandings,  the  President  has 

several  options:  ,,,.       ..         .c     4.u     rr      + 

1.  Consider  the  conditions  unacceptable  and  decline  to  ratify  the   Ireaty; 

2.  Reopen  negotiations  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  seek  their  acceptance  of  the 
conditions; 

3.  Submit  a  new  Treaty  to  the  Senate;  or 

4.  Resubmit  the  original  Treaty. 

Several  additional  issues  arise  in  connection  with  the  various  conditions  which 
the  Senate  may  impose  upon  its  consent:  xu    o      i  *• 

Presidential  objection  to  the  resolution.— Frior  to  the  final  vote  on  the  Resolution 
of  Ratification,  the  President  may  decide  that  amendments  or  other  conditions 
already  attached  to  the  Resolution  make  it  unacceptable  to  him.  He  may  then 
request  those  siding  with  him  to  vote  against  the  Resolution,  rather  than  to  risk 
Senate  advice  and  consent  with  unacceptable  conditions.  (This  situation  occurred 
when  the  Versailles  Treaty  failed  to  receive  a  two-thirds  vote  because  of  President 
Wilson's  opposition  to  Senate  approval  with  the  so-called  "Lodge  Reservations.  ) 


23 

Requirement  of  Presidential  transmittal. — With  the  possible  exceptions  of  a  condi- 
tion relating  solely  to  a  matter  of  domestic  concern  (e.g.,  that  a  given  treaty  will  be 
non-self-executing)  and  a  statement  not  germane  to  the  treaty,  the  President  is 
required  to  include  each  Senate-added  condition  in  the  instrument  of  ratification 
given  the  other  signatory.  "That  such  conditions  must  be  so  included,"  the  Commit- 
tee said  in  its  report  on  the  Panama  Canal  Treaties,  "is  as  much  a  part  of  custom- 
ary constitutional  law  in  this  country  as  the  right  of  the  Senate  to  grant  conditional 
consent."  Ex.  Kept.  No.  95-12,  Feb.  3,  1978  at  p.  11. 

Acceptance  of  United  States  conditions  by  the  Soviet  Union. — Instruments  of  ratifi- 
cation are  not  exchanged  until  the  views  of  the  other  government  concerning 
United  States  conditions  have  been  obtained.  If  the  Soviet  Union  proceeds  with  the 
exchange  of  instruments  of  ratification,  its  silence  constitutes  assent  to  the  treaties 
as  modified  by  the  United  States.  If  the  Soviet  Union  objects  to  any  such  condition, 
however,  the  treaty  may  not,  in  accordance  with  traditional  United  States  practice, 
be  brought  into  force  by  the  President.  The  United  States  practice  of  executing  a 
"Protocol  of  Exchange"  incorporating  any  conditions  attached  prior  to  final  ratifica- 
tion makes  certain  that  Soviet  acceptance  or  rejection  of  Senate  conditions  will  be 
clear. 

Right  of  rejection  by  the  Soviet  Union. — Any  condition  imposed  by  the  United 
States  upon  its  consent  to  a  treaty  gives  rise  to  a  right  of  rejection  by  the  Soviet 
Union  which  has  agreed  tentatively  only  to  the  version  it  signed.  A  condition  is  thus 
analogous  to  a  counteroffer  in  the  law  of  contracts.  It  may,  if  the  "offeree"  so 
chooses,  require  that  negotiations  be  reopened,  be  rejected  outright,  or,  if  the  offeree 
accepts  it,  bring  a  legally  different  agreement  into  effect. 

Significance  of  the  label. — From  a  strictly  legal  standpoint  the  particular  label 
attached  to  a  condition  is  not  determinative.  Whether  called  an  "amendment," 
"reservation,"  "understanding,"  "declaration,"  or  something  else,  any  condition  im- 
posed by  the  United  States  upon  its  consent  to  be  bound  may  be  rejected  by  the 
Soviet  Union  as  incompatible  with  the  original  agreement.  Alternatively,  once 
accepted,  every  condition  becomes  binding  along  with  the  provisions  of  the  treaty 
itself.  The  significance  of  a  label,  as  distinguished  from  the  substance  of  the  condi- 
tion, is  therefore  more  "political"  than  legal.  While  a  condition  designated  an 
"understanding"  or  an  "interpretation"  would  be  no  less  effective  legally  in  condi- 
tioning United  States  ratification  than  the  same  condition  labeled  a  "reservation," 
or  even  one  cast  in  terms  of  an  amendment  to  the  Treaty  text,  it  might  be  regarded 
by  the  Soviets  as  less  offensive  politically  and  thus  be  more  easily  accepted  by  them. 
Practically  speaking,  therefore,  it  is  the  Soviet  leadership  which  will  judge  the 
acceptability  of  any  condition  attached  to  the  Treaty,  which  may  be  influenced  by 
its  designation  (see  part  IV  below.) 

C.  Senate  inaction 

The  Senate  may  simply  decline  to  act  on  the  Treaty,  as  it  has  in  the  case  of  a 
number  of  other  treaties.  In  such  event,  a  treaty  simply  remains  on  the  Senate's 
Executive  Calendar  unless  and  until  withdrawn  by  the  President  or  returned  to  him 
by  the  Senate. 

D.  Senate  rejection 

The  Senate  may  decline  to  approve  the  Treaty  by  failing  to  accord  it  the  requisite 
two-thirds  vote  of  approval.  This  has  occurred  only  11  times  in  our  history,  the  most 
recent  occasion  being  in  1960.^  Where  a  final  vote  on  the  resolution  of  ratification 
fails  to  achieve  the  requisite  two-thirds,  the  Senate  customarily  adopts  a  resolution 
returning  the  treaty  to  the  President. 

The  Treaty  may,  of  course,  be  resubmitted  thereafter  by  the  President.  Two 
additional  options  have  lately  received  some  attention  in  the  press.  One  would  be  to 
resubmit  the  SALT  agreement  for  approval  by  joint  resolution — i.e.,  as  a  so-called 
Congressional-Executive  agreement.  The  SALT  I  Interim  Agreement  on  offensive 
weapons  was  handled  this  way  from  the  outset  and  might  be  cited  as  a  precedent. 
However,  the  Senate  may  take  a  dim  view  of  this  approach. 

The  other  option  occasionally  mentioned  would  be  for  the  President  to  issue  a 
unilateral  statement  announcing  the  intention  of  the  United  States  to  adhere  to  the 
provisions  of  the  defeated  Treaty.  Prior  to  the  October  1977  expiration  of  the  SALT 
I  Interim  Agreement  on  offensive  arms,  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
each  declared  its  intent  to  observe  the  limitations  of  the  agreement  as  long  as  the 
other  did  so.  While  the  Administration  did  not  claim  that  such  parallel  declarations 
constituted  commitments  "binding"  the  United  States,  and  some  Senators  defended 
the  President's  action  as  within  his  Constitutional  power,  others  criticized  the 


'  The  Dispute  Settlement  Protocol  to  the  1958  Conventions  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea. 


24 

approach  as  a  circumvention  of  appropriate  constitutional  procedures,  and  a  viola- 
tion of  section  33  of  the  Arms  Control  and  Disarmament  Act.^ 

Concern  about  such  an  approach  to  SALT  II  has  centered  not  only  on  Presidential 
declarations  following  rejection  of  the  treaty,  but  also  on  any  attempt  by  the 
Administration  to  extend  the  limitations  of  the  Protocol  beyond  its  expiration  date 
at  the  end  of  1981.  The  Administration  has  conceded  on  several  occasions  (most 
recently  during  testimony  before  the  Committee  on  the  treaty  termination  issue) 
that  treaties  and  treaty  provisions  may  not  be  formally  extended  or  amended  by 
executive  agreement  or  parallel  declarations.'  This  issue  will  be  considered  in  a 
later  memorandum. 

IV.    SOVIET   TREATY   RATIFICATION   AND   MODIFICATION 

It  is  not  clear  whether  the  Soviets  will  proceed  to  ratify  the  SALT  II  Treaty  in 
advance  of  Senate  consideration.  Treaties  are  ratified  for  the  Soviet  Union  by  the 
Presidium  of  the  Supreme  Soviet,  the  country's  parliament.  While  this  procedure  is 
generally  deemed  to  be  merely  a  formality,  it  is  probably  the  stage  at  which  the 
Soviets  would  attach  conditions  of  their  own  in  response  to  conditions  that  might  be 
imposed  by  the  Senate.  In  the  case  of  the  SALT  I  Agreements,  the  Presidium  did 
not  act  until  the  Senate  (on  the  ABM  Treaty)  and  the  Senate  and  House  (on  the 
Interim  Agreement)  had  approved  them. 

With  the  possible  exception  of  a  matter  of  purely  domestic  concern  or  a  statement 
not  germane  to  the  treaty,  if  the  Soviet  Union  ratifies  the  SALT  II  Treaty  subject  to 
a  condition,  the  text  of  the  condition  must  be  communicated  to  the  President  of  the 
Senate  to  obtain  Senate  approval  for  the  acceptance  thereof  (if  the  President  wishes 
to  accept  the  reservation  or  amendment).  If,  prior  to  receipt  of  notification  concern- 
ing the  condition,  the  Senate  has  already  given  its  consent  to  ratification  of  the 
SALT  II  Treaty,  the  express  consent  of  the  Senate  to  acceptance  of  the  condition 
must  be  obtained  before  proceeding  to  exchange  the  instruments  of  ratification.  If 
the  Senate  still  has  the  Treaty  under  consideration  at  the  time  the  notification  is 
given,  the  Senate's  consent  to  acceptance  of  the  reservation  may  be  either  express 
or  implied;  that  is,  if  the  Senate,  with  knowledge  of  the  reservation,  advises  and 
consents  to  United  States  ratification  without  reference  to  a  Soviet  reservation  of 
which  it  is  aware,  Senate  approval  may  be  inferred.  (See  page  23  for  discussion  of 
the  procedure  for  Soviet  acceptance  of  Senate  conditions.) 

Senator  Biden.  After  Senator  Stone  asks  his  questions,  I  will 
read  you  our  legal  memorandum  relating  to  reservations. 
Senator  Stone? 
Senator  Stone.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

USE   OF   MPS   FOR   EXISTING   LAND-BASED   MISSILES 

Professor  Rostow,  regardless  of  the  niceties  of  the  form  in  which 
a  modification  of  this  SALT  II  Treaty  ought  to  take  and  which  we 
will  explore,  the  substantive  issue  here  is,  should  we  modify  the 
treaty  to  specifically  permit  the  use  of  multiple  protective  shelters 
for  our  existing  land-based  missiles?  Is  it  correct  that  your  position 
is  that  we  need  to  do  that  because  of  the  vulnerability  of  our  land- 
based  missiles  to  first  strike  by  the  Soviet  Union  during  the  life  of 
this  treaty? 

Mr.  RosTOW.  Yes,  sir. 

DETERRENCE   OF   SOVIET   FIRST   STRIKE 

Senator  Stone.  People  say,  why  should  we  spend  all  of  this 
money  to  protect  these  existing  missiles.  Really,  don't  we  have 


*  Section  33  provides  that  "no  action  shall  be  taken  under  this  or  any  other  law  that  will 
obligate  the  United  States  to  disarm  or  to  reduce  or  to  limit  the  Armed  Forces  or  armaments  of 
the  United  States,  except  pursuant  to  the  treaty-making  power  of  the  President  under  the 
Constitution  or  unless  authorized  by  further  affirmative  legislation  by  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States." 

=  See,  e.g.,  the  testimony  of  the  Justice  Department  spokesman  on  page  220  of  the  Committee's 
"Treaty  Termination"  hearings. 


25 

enough  other  missiles  apart  from  those  that  could  be  destroyed  in  a 
first  strike  to  deter  the  Soviets  from  even  contemplating  a  first 
strike?  What  is  your  answer  to  that? 

Mr.  RoSTOW.  My  answer  to  that  is  this:  It  is  a  question  of 
numbers.  The  threat  to  blow  up  Soviet  cities  and  population  had  a 
certain  credibility  during  the  period  of  our  nuclear  monopoly,  and 
then  of  our  very  great  nuclear  superiority,  but  as  former  Secretary 
Kissinger  has  emphasized,  both  in  his  statement  here  and  in  his 
statement  in  Brussels  last  week,  as  Soviet  nuclear  parity  was  ap- 
proached, and  then  as  Soviet  nuclear  superiority  is  threatened, 
that  possibility  of  retaliation  in  that  way  steadily  loses  its  credibil- 
ity. 

I  have  never  been  much  impressed  with  the  possibility  that  an 
American  President  would  actually  do  it,  but  I  think  he  certainly 
would  not  do  it,  and  no  one  would  believe  that  he  would  do  it, 
knowing  that  the  Soviet  Union  had  enough  accurate  missiles  in 
reserve  to  blow  up  our  own  cities.  That  would  be  suicidal  and 
irrational  and  no  one  would  believe  it  would  be  done.  The  threat  to 
do  it  would  have  no  deterrent  effect,  and  if  we  ever  allowed  such  a 
situation  to  develop,  we  should  be  impotent. 

REASON   FOR   DEPLOYMENT   OF   MOBILE   MISSILES 

Senator  Stone.  Is  that  the  reason  why  the  administration  is 
proposing  to  build  and  deploy  mobile  missiles,  the  M-X  missile? 

Mr.  RosTOW.  Yes. 

Senator  Stone.  Precisely  what  you  just  said? 

Mr.  RosTOw.  That  is  exactly  right. 

Senator  Stone.  And  is  what  you  are  saying  that  that  same 
doctrine  must  be  extended  to  the  period  of  our  vulnerability  in  the 
early  and  mid-1980's? 

Mr.  RosTow.  That  is  correct. 

PROVOKE   SOVIETS   TO   GO   FOR   MULTIPLE   PROTECTIVE   SHELTERS 

Senator  Stone.  Suppose  we  did  it.  Suppose  we  did  take  for  our- 
selves the  legal  right  to  deploy  our  existing  land-based  missiles  in 
multiple  protective  shelters  or  in  a  multiple  mode  during  the  eight- 
ies? It  is  then  said  by  opponents  of  this  option  that  we  would 
provoke  the  Soviets  into  doing  likewise  and  more  so,  and  that  that 
would  lessen  our  security  and  increase  our  risk.  What  is  your 
answer  to  that? 

In  other  words,  they  will  go  for  the  multiple  protective  shelter. 
They  will  hide  even  more  effectively  in  their  closed  society  than  we 
will  hide,  and  we  will  therefore  be  more  at  risk  than  before.  What 
about  that? 

Mr.  RosTOW.  As  I  brought  out  in  my  colloquy  with  Senator 
Javits,  the  Soviets  are  now  deploying  mobile  MIRVed  SS-20's 
which  are  causing  great  alarm  in  Europe  and  which  can  readily  be 
converted  into  missiles  that  can  reach  the  United  States  as  well. 
Mobile  missiles  are  very  difficult  for  us  to  target  and  very  difficult 
for  us  to  knock  out.  When  you  add  this  capacity  to  the  Soviet 
stockpile  of  extra  missiles  stored  in  unknown  sites,  in  effect,  they 
are  already  doing  the  equivalent  of  what  we  are  proposing. 


26 

Now,  it  may  be,  as  many  people  have  contended,  that  the  devel- 
opment of  technology,  nuclear  technology,  has  made  security 
through  verifiable  arms  control  methods  nearly  impossible,  and 
that  soon,  hopefully  as  soon  as  possible,  the  Soviet  Union  the 
United  States,  and  other  nations  which  have  become  nuclear 
powers  will  recognize  the  folly  of  the  entire  development  and  go 
back  to  the  ideas  of  the  Baruch  plan  which  we  proposed  immediate- 
ly after  the  war,  a  very  wise  proposal  of  which  I  am  very  proud. 

We,  while  holding  a  nuclear  monopoly,  proposed  to  international- 
ize nuclear  weapons  and  nuclear  science.  They  are  becoming  very 
complicated.  They  are  becoming  very  dangerous,  and  they  are  pro- 
liferating all  over  the  place.  I  have  always  favored  and  will  always 
favor  such  an  approach  as  soon  as  the  Soviet  Union  is  ready  to 
accept  it. 

Senator  Stone.  Professor  Rostow,  may  I  say  that  I  completely 
agree  with  protecting  our  land-based  missiles  with  multiple  protec- 
tive shelters  of  one  kind  or  another  during  the  period  of  our 
vulnerability.  I  agree  with  that,  but  I  want  to  address  these  argu- 
ments that  have  been  raised  so  that  whatever  form  it  takes,  the 
committee,  the  Senate,  and  the  country  will  feel,  as  you  do  and  as  I 
do,  that  we  ought  to  do  this. 

CHANGE   FROM    MAD   STRATEGY   TO   COUNTERFORCE 

You  are  saying  that  we  should  convert  our  strategy  from  a 
mutual  assured  destruction  strategy  in  which  our  missiles  kill 
people  and  their  missiles  kill  people  to  where,  since  their  missiles 
can  now  in  the  next  year  or  two  destroy  our  missiles,  then  our 
missiles  should  be  able  to  destroy  their  missiles  as  opposed  to 
people.  That  is  counterforce  strategy,  right? 

Mr.  RosTOW.  Right. 

Senator  Stone.  So  I  return  to  this  issue  which  I  just  raised  with 
you.  If  they  can  go  mobile  more  effectively  than  we  can,  how  can 
they  by  putting  in  the  MPS  have  a  good  counterforce?  Will  it  be 
sufficiently  a  counterforce  if  we  protect  our  current  land-based 
missiles  to  give  us  a  credible  counterforce  at  all,  or  have  we  gotten 
so  far  behind  that  we  don't  even  get  that  with  the  multiple  protec- 
tive shelter? 

Mr.  Rostow.  I  am  not  now,  nor  have  I  ever  been  an  expert  on 
arms,  and  I  do  not  pretend  to  be,  but  my  experience  has  been  on 
this  side  of  the  river  in  the  State  Department,  and  I  am  concerned 
with  the  political  effect  of  these  weapons,  but  the  people  I  know 
best  who  are  experts  on  arms  tell  me  that  they  believe  that  for  this 
transition  period  this  is  the  most  feasible  and  quickest  way  to 
assure  our  ICBM's  against  the  possibility  of  destruction,  which 
could  be  the  basis  of  nuclear  coercion  and  nuclear  threat. 

Their  arguments  seem  to  be  reasonable,  as  a  practical  matter. 

EQUAL   CREDIBILITY   IN   OUR   STRATEGIC   POSTURE 

Senator  Stone.  Professor,  is  what  you  are  arguing  for  equal 
credibility  in  our  strategic  posture  as  compared  to  the  Soviets' 
credibility  as  to  their  strategic  posture?  You  are  not  arguing  for 
firing  any  of  these  things? 

Mr.  Rostow.  No,  I  am  arguing  for  a  stalemate. 


27 

Senator  Stone.  You  are  arguing  for  a  proper  stalemate  or  for 
what  they  call  these  days  a  rough  equivalency,  but  in  this  case  a 
rough  equivalency  of  counterforce  credibility. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  That  is  absolutely  correct.  We  are  arguing  for  a 
stalemate,  for  the  nonuse  of  these  weapons,  to  guarantee  against 
their  either  being  used  or  being  brandished. 

Senator  Stone.  During  the  life  of  this  treaty? 

Mr.  RosTOW.  During  the  life  of  this  treaty,  and  above  all  during 
the  period  of  the  early  1980's  when,  as  a  result  of  a  series  of 
decisions  made  by  President  Carter  we  face  what  everyone  seems 
to  agree  are  very  grave  risks.  How  do  we  deal  with  those  risks  in 
this  period,  and  how  do  we  deal  with  these  risks  in  the  long  run? 

BASIC   FIREPOWER   WOULD   BE   CREDIBLE   DETERRENT 

Senator  Stone.  Doesn't  that  also  provide  somewhat  of  an  answer 
to  the  question  I  raised  about  the  capability  of  the  Soviets  to  deploy 
mobile  missiles  during  the  period,  and  that  is  that  during  this 
period,  the  basic  firepower  would  be  a  credible  deterrent  because  of 
the  number  of  mobile  missiles  that  the  Soviets  could  deploy  during 
the  period,  during  the  treaty  period? 

Mr.  RosTOW.  Absolutely. 

Senator  Stone.  Thank  you.  I  see  that  my  time  is  up. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Senator  Biden.  Professor,  I  have  several  questions.  First,  I  have  a 
question  from  Senator  Percy,  who  cannot  be  here  this  morning.  He 
would  like  me  to  ask  it  of  you  and  of  Admiral  Moorer  when  he 
testifies. 

television   coverage   of  the   salt   DEBATE 

His  question  is  whether  or  not  the  groups  which  you  gentlemen 
represent,  in  this  case  the  Committee  on  the  Present  Danger,  favor 
television  coverage  of  the  SALT  debate.  That  is  the  question.  Does 
your  group  favor  television  coverage  of  the  SALT  debate  on  the 
floor  of  the  Senate? 

Mr.  RosTOW.  The  group  has  taken  no  position  on  the  question, 
and  therefore  I  cannot  speak  for  the  executive  committee  of  the 
Committee  on  the  Present  Danger,  but  personally  I  do  favor  such 
coverage. 

Senator  Biden.  Thank  you. 

BINDING   EFFECT   OF   SENATE   RESERVATIONS   ON   U.S.S.R 

Now,  with  regard  to  the  binding  effect  of  Senate  reservations  on 
the  U.S.S.R.,  let  me  read  to  you  from  a  memorandum,  and  then  we 
can  exchange  memoranda. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  I  shall  be  grateful  for  a  copy  of  it. 

Senator  Biden.  It  says: 

Under  U.S.  treaty  practice,  all  reservations  which  the  Senate  attaches  to  a  resolu- 
tion of  ratification  are  included  in  instruments  of  ratification  which  are  exchanged 
with  the  Soviet  Union  and  are  signed  by  the  Soviet  Union.  It  is  this  exchange  under 
article  XIV  of  the  treaty  which  brings  the  treaty  into  force.  The  protocol  of  ex- 
change itself  reads  that  the  treaty  will  be  carried  out  by  both  parties  in  accordance 
with  the  reservation  or  other  conditions  contained  therein. 

Therefore,  in  agreeing  to  go  forward  with  the  exchange,  the  Soviets  must  accept 
the  conditions  contained  in  the  protocol  of  exchange.  They  can,  of  course,  refuse  to 


H8-260    0-79    Pt.U    -    3 


28 

go  forward  with  the  exchange,  if  they  do  not  like  one  or  more  of  the  conditions 
contained  in  the  instrument,  but  if  they  do  go  forward,  they  are  clearly  bound  and 
clearly  bound  in  law. 

Now,  I  would  be  anxious  to  hear  what  your  friends  at  Yale  will 

say. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  I  shall  be  very  grateful  for  a  copy  of  this  document. 

Senator  Biden.  We  will  give  you  a  copy. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  I  can  say  now  with  great  respect  that  that  is  a  good 
recitation  of  black  letter  law  on  the  subject,  but  it  does  not  meet  a 
very  important  qualification  which  has  developed  in  a  good  many 
cases,  which  is  that  the  courts  have  sometimes  said  that  the  reser- 
vation is  incompatible  with  the  treaty  and  outside  the  power  of  the 
treaty-making  process,  and  therefore  can  be  disregarded. 

That  kind  of  control  would  not  be  available,  of  course,  in  this 
sort  of  treaty. 

SOVIET  CONVERTING  OF  SS-20  TO  SS-16 

Senator  Biden.  I  will  not  debate  with  you  now,  sir.  You  are 
concerned  that  the  SS-20  will  be  converted  in  effect  to  an  SS-16 
and  be  able  with  a  single  warhead  to  strike  the  United  States.  The 
Soviets  have  approximately  100  SS-20's  deployed.  One  thing  I  do 
agree  with  you  about,  after  extensive  discussions  over  the  last  6 
months  with  European  political  and  military  leaders,  is  that  they 
are  concerned  about  the  SS-20.  But  I  don't  understand  why  in  the 
world  the  Soviets  would  ever  consider  converting  the  SS-20,  either 
through  adding  the  extra  stage  or  lightening  the  payload  by  substi- 
tuting one  warhead  for  three  when  to  do  so  would  give  them  only  a 
relatively  few  extra  ICBM  warheads,  while  denuding  their  theater 

capability. 

It  seems  that  you  double-count  that  SS-20  argument.  You  use  it 
in  the  theater  to  whip  that  one  up,  and  then  you  also  use  it  as  it 
relates  to  central  systems,  the  same  with  the  Backfire  bomber. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  Isn't  that  true  of  Backfire? 

Senator  Biden.  Yes,  as  I  said,  as  you  do  with  Backfire. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  I  can't  help  it  that  the  wretched  things  have  multi- 
ple purposes. 

Senator  Biden.  Yes,  but  you  can  only  use  them  one  way.  You 
can't  use  the  same  missile  two  ways.  Once  it  is  used  it  is  used. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  I  agree  with  you  completely  you  can't  shoot  them 

twice. 

Senator  Biden.  Right.  I  am  glad  we  have  agreed  on  something. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  We  have  agreed  on  many  things.  Senator  Biden. 

Senator  Biden.  I  want  the  record  to  show  we  agree  on  very  little. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  All  right.  . 

Senator  Biden.  That  is  important  to  me,  as  it  probably  is  to  you. 
[General  laughter.] 

PROGRAMS   united  STATES   NEEDS  THAT  TREATY   PROHIBITS 

Senator  Biden.  You  mentioned  one  possible  basing  mode  of  the 
M-X  being  inconsistent  with  the  treaty. 

Is  there  anything  else  that  the  United  States  must  do  in  your 
opinion  to  insure  its  security  but  cannot  do  because  of  the  treaty? 
You  have  mentioned  the  M-X.  Is  there  anything  else? 


29 

Mr.  RosTOW.  Well,  I  mentioned  the  multiple  basing  mode.  It  is 
the  verification  problem  under  this  treaty  which  presents  a  very, 
very  difficult  problem  for  me,  rather  than  the  question  of  what  we 
should  do  to  rebuild  our  strength. 

Senator  Biden.  But  on  that  one  point,  before  we  get  to  verifica- 
tion, is  there  anything  that  we  can't  do  if  this  treaty  is  passed 
which  your  Committee  has  recommended? 

Mr.  RosTOW.  Well,  I  would  say  certainly  the  rapid  deployment  of 
an  alternate  basing  mode  is  the  first  item  we  have  mentioned.  I 
have  mentioned  also  the  range  on  cruise  missiles  which  is  mattter 
of  great  importance. 

Senator  Biden.  The  range  on  ground-launched,  on  sea-launched 
cruise  missiles,  but  is  that  range  affected  after  the  expiration  of 
the  protocol?  Once  the  protocol  expires  on  December  31,  1981,  is 
there  anything  we  cannot  do  with  regard  to  cruise  missiles  that 
you  would  like  done? 

Mr.  RosTOW.  Well,  about  the  protocol,  we  had  a  very  unfortunate 
experience  with  the  expiration  of  the  Interim  Agreement  which  the 
President  has  perpetuated  by  Executive  agreement.  Now,  therefore, 
the  expiration  of  the  protocol  date  and  the  effectiveness  of  that 
against  the  possibility  of  similar  action  on  the  part  of  the  President 
of  that  period  is  a  matter  of  some  concern. 

Senator  Biden.  You  would  agree,  though,  that  the  U.S.  Senate 
can  bind  this  President  or  any  future  President  of  the  United 
States  on  that  issue,  wouldn't  you? 

Mr.  RosTOW.  Well,  the  whole  U.S.  Congress  did  in  the  ACDA 
statute.  In  section  33,  it  said  that  no  limitation  on  our  arms  shall 
be  effective  unless  accomplished  by  treaty  or  statute.  The  President 
has  perpetuated  the  Interim  Agreement  by  Executive  agreement. 

Senator  Biden.  Don't  you  agree  that  if  the  U.S.  Senate  passes  a 
resolution  specifying  that  under  no  circumstances  can  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  continue  the  protocol  beyond  December 
31,  1981,  that  he  would  be  bound  by  that? 

Mr.  RosTOW.  Yes;  but  I  think  he  is  equally  bound  by  section  33  of 
the  ACDA  statute,  and  it  has  not  proved  effective. 

ABIUTY  TO   deploy   GLCM   AND  SLCM   AFTER   EXPIRATION   OF 

PROTOCOL 

Senator  Biden.  Do  you  have  any  doubt  about  the  ability  to 
deploy  ground-launched  and  sea-launched  cruise  missiles  after  the 
expiration  of  the  protocol?  Is  there  anything  in  the  treaty  that 
would  prevent  us  from  deploying  the  type  of  ground-  or  sea- 
launched  cruise  missiles  that  we  would  need,   in  your  opinion? 

Mr.  RosTOW.  Well,  not  for  ourselves,  I  suppose.  I  am  not  quite 
certain,  but  the  transfer  of  technology  point  might  affect  the  use  of 
such  instruments  by  our  allies. 

Senator  Biden.  I  specifically  went  to  Moscow  with  six  of  my 
colleagues  for  that  very  purpose,  and  met  with  their  military  com- 
mand, with  the  members  of  the  Supreme  Soviet,  and  with  Mr. 
Kosygin  for  3  hours,  and  made  it  very  clear  that  certain  things 
were  going  to  be  done  by  the  Senate.  I  will  read  from  my  prepared 
text  and  tell  you  what  their  response  was: 

In  my  view  and  on  the  basis  of  my  work  as  Chairman  of  the  European  Affairs 
Subcommittee,  there  must  be  a  clarification  of  Article  XII  of  the  treaty, 


30 
the  one  to  which  you  referred,  non-transfer. 

This  provision  concerns  the  issue  of  non-circumvention.  Here  I  want  all  concerned 
to  be  put  on  notice,  our  allies,  the  American  people,  you  in  the  Soviet  Union,  that 
nothing,  absolutely  nothing  in  that  treaty  or  protocol  can  or  will  inhibit  existmg 
patterns  of  collaboration  between  the  United  States  and  its  allies. 

I  then  went  on  to  specify  that  with  regard  to  the  protocol: 

Finally,  I  know  you  will  see  a  condition  of  the  treaty  that  makes  clear  that  the 
protocol  means  what  it  says,  that  is,  that  it  ends  in  1981,  period,  and  that  there  is  no 
possibility  of  continuing  that  protocol  beyond  that  date,  and  at  that  time  the 
ground-launched  and  sea-launched  cruise  missile  will  be  deployed. 

I  can  tell  you  that  the  Soviet  reaction  at  all  levels  was  that  this 
was  our  right  under  the  treaty,  that  there  is  nothing  that  prevents 
that.  They  did  say  they  hoped  we  would  continue  to  discuss  that 
with  them  but  they  understood  full  well  that  was  our  right.  It 
seems  to  me  you  raise  an  awful  lot  of  red  herrings. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  But,  Senator,  with  great  respect,  I  don't  think  you 
have  answered  my  question.  Of  course,  you  are  under  no  obligation 
to  do  so,  as  I  am,  but  still,  you  have  not  answered  my  question 
about  what  happened  to  section  33  of  ACDA. 

Senator  Biden.  There  was  no  formal  extension. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  Oh,  please,  sir.  The  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  made  simultaneous  and  identical  announcements  that  they 
were  unilaterally  extending  the  agreement.  Are  you  suggesting 
that  there  was  no  prior  agreement  to  do  that? 

Senator  Biden.  I  am  suggesting  that  if  the  U.S.  Senate  specifical- 
ly tells  this  President  or  whomever  will  be  President  in  the  year 
1981  that  he  cannot,  absent  affirmative  action  by  U.S.  Senate, 
extend,  then  he  cannot  extend  the  protocol. 

Now,  obviously,  any  President  at  any  time  can  refuse  to  take 
action. 

A  President  can  engage  in  inaction. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  But  with  regard  to  section  33,  it  was  not  a  question 
of  inaction.  It  was  a  question  of  action. 

Senator  Biden.  What  I  am  saying  is  that  can  be  specifically 
handled  by  a  specific  reservation  by  the  U.S.  Senate  on  that  specif- 

ic  issue. 
Mr.  RosTOW.  But  doesn't  section  33  of  the  ACDA  statute  do  so 

already? 

Senator  Biden.  The  answer  is,  I  don't  know. 

Mr.  RosTOW.  All  right. 

Senator  Biden.  My  time  is  up  once  again.  If  there  are  no  further 
questions,  we  thank  you  very  much,  Professor.  We  appreciate  your 

testimony. 
Senator  Zorinsky,  do  you  have  any  questions  of  this  witness.'' 
Senator  Zorinsky.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman.  I  do  have  one 

question. 

BETRAYAL  OF   PROMISES   AND   EXPECTATION    IN   SALT   I 

Mr.  Rostow,  in  your  testimony  you  allege  the  Soviet  betrayal  of 
every  promise  and  expectation  on  the  basis  of  which  the  SALT  I 
package  was  approved.  Would  you  enumerate  what  these  promises 
and  expectations  were  and  who  made  them? 

Mr.  Rostow.  Yes.  In  the  agreement  of  May  1972,  between  Presi- 
dent Nixon  and  Mr.  Brezhnev,  cooperation  was  assured  to  put  out 


31 

fires  all  around  the  world,  to  work  together  specifically  in  the 
Middle  East  to  assure  agreement  in  conformity  with  Security  Coun- 
cil Resolution  242,  to  cooperate  in  ending  the  war  in  Indochina  on 
favorable  terms,  and  to  give  warning  when  certain  kinds  of  events 
occurred  or  were  threatened.  Instead  of  cooperating  to  end  the 
conflict  in  the  Middle  East,  the  Soviet  Union  had  agreed  with 
President  Sadat  the  month  before  President  Nixon  came  to  Moscow 
in  May  1972,  that  is,  in  April  1972,  to  cooperate  with  President 
Sadat  in  launching  a  war  in  1973  and  to  send  all  the  necessary 
equipment,  experts,  and  so  forth  for  that  purpose. 

So  far  as  Indochina  is  concerned,  of  course,  the  Soviets  cooperat- 
ed in  obtaining  the  agreements  of  January  and  of  March  1973, 
which  from  our  point  of  view  were  satisfactory  and  reaffirmed  the 
Laos  Agreement  of  1962,  but  they  cooperated  with  the  North  Viet- 
namese in  breaking  those  agreements  and  every  aspect  of  those 
agreements,  and  in  denying  their  essential  purpose. 

Those  are  the  two  chief  items  I  recall,  and  I  think  they  are 
sufficient  to  indicate  that  the  agreements  were  not  made  in  all 
sincerity  and  were  not  carried  out. 

Senator  Zorinsky.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Rostow. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman.  That  is  all  I  have. 

Senator  Biden.  Thank  you  very  much.  Professor. 

Mr.  Rostow.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

[Mr.  Rostow's  prepared  statement  follows:] 

Prepared  Statement  of  Professor  Eugene  V.  Rostow 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman,  for  your  invitation  to  testify  on  the  ratification  of  the 
SALT  II  Treaty.  I  am  here  in  behalf  of  the  Committee  on  the  Present  Danger,  a 
nonprofit,  nonpartisan  citizens'  committee  which  began  to  function  on  11  November 
1976.  Our  position  on  SALT  II  has  been  stated  on  two  occasions.  In  July,  1977,  our 
Executive  Committee  issued  a  pamphlet  called  "Where  We  Stand  on  Salt,"  which 
was  later  approved  by  the  Board  of  Directors.  And  in  July  of  this  year,  the  Execu- 
tive Committee  adopted  a  statement  which  was  submitted  to  your  Subcommittee  on 
Europe  on  19  July  1979.  Both  those  documents,  together  with  related  materials,  are 
before  you.  They  are  the  basis  of  what  I  shall  say. 

Our  conclusions  on  the  Treaty  as  it  stands  are  summed  up  on  pp.  2-3  of  our  19 
July  statement.  They  constitute,  we  believe,  a  positive  and  affirmative  seven-point 
program  for  action,  which  puts  the  SALT  Treaty  and  the  SALT  negotiating  process 
into  the  context  of  our  foreign  and  defense  policy  as  a  whole. 

Permit  me  to  recall  those  conclusions  for  ready  reference: 

"In  view  of  the  gravity  of  the  issues  raised  by  the  Treaty  now  before  you,  and  all 
that  has  happened  since  the  SALT  I  package  was  approved  in  1972,  we  recommend: 
(1)  That  the  Senate  advise  the  President  and  the  nation  of  the  need  to  seek  a  more 
positive,  forward  looking,  and  effective  foreign  and  defense  policy,  and  state  the 
goals  and  principles  on  which  that  policy  should  be  based;  and  (2)  that  the  Senate 
withhold  its  consent  to  the  ratification  of  the  Treaty  the  President  has  submitted 
unless  and  until  it  is  modified  to  meet  its  demonstrated  deficiencies,  and  the 
President  and  the  Congress  are  firmly  committed  to  a  specific  program  that  will 
achieve  and  maintain  essential  equivalence  and  adequate  deterrence. 

"The  Committee  on  the  Present  Danger  is  the  first  to  recognize  that  withholding 
the  Senate's  consent  for  the  SALT  II  Treaty  now  before  you  is  not  in  itself  a  foreign 
and  defense  policy.  We  have  concluded,  however,  that  the  action  I  have  just  outlined 
is  a  necessary  condition  for  developing  a  sound  and  prudent  policy.  And  it  is  the 
only  available  way  to  convince  the  President  that  the  SALT  II  Treaty  he  signed  in 
Vienna  fails  both  as  a  means  for  protecting  our  national  security,  and  as  an  arms 
limitation  measure. 

"It  is  our  conviction  that  what  the  country  needs  above  all  else  is  to  turn  a  sharp 
corner  in  our  foreign  and  defense  policy.  To  recall  the  language  of  President 
Carter's  speech  of  July  15th,  we  believe  the  nation  should  start  on  a  new  course, 
based  on  a  clear  recognition  of  the  truth.  Such  a  course,  in  our  view,  should  include 
these  elements:  (1)  To  shake  off  our  post-Vietnam  depression  about  foreign  affairs 
and  the  yearning  for  isolation  which  is  implicit  in  it;  (2)  to  reach  a  bipartisan 


32 

consensus  on  what  our  national  interests  in  this  turbulent  world  really  are;  (3)  to 
rebuild  conventional  and  nuclear  force  deterrence  so  that  we  can  protect  those 
interests  by  political  means  or  by  the  use  of  conventional  forces  if  we  have  to;  (4)  to 
cooperate  closely  and  continuously  with  our  allies  and  other  nations  whose  interests 
in  a  peaceful  and  stable  world  political  order  and  economic  system  are  parallel  to 
our  own;  and  (5)  on  that  basis  to  continue  negotiating  with  the  Soviet  Union  about 
the  limitation  of  nuclear  arms,  including  both  intercontinental  and  intermediate 
range  nuclear  weapons  like  those  threatening  Europe  and  other  areas  of  great 
importance  to  us. 

There  is  still  time  for  that  great  task  to  be  accomplished  in  peace.  As  a  group, 
the  NATO  allies,  Japan,  China  and  other  like-minded  nations  have  more  than 
enough  power  and  potential  power  to  contain  the  Soviet  drive  for  domination.  But 
that  power  is  dispersed  and  inchoate.  It  is  not  being  mobilized  ir/o  forms  which  can 
become  political  power— naval  squadrons  and  armored  divisions;  planes,  reserves 
and  research  formations.  The  potential  power  of  the  nations  which  favor  a  peaceful 
world  order  cannot  be  brought  to  bear  on  world  politics  unless  the  energy,  optimism 
and  intelligence  of  the  American  people  are  liberated  and  harnessed  once  again  in 
considered  programs  designed  to  restore  the  peace  and  prosperity  of  the  nation.  In 
the  bipolar  world  of  nuclear  weapons  and  nuclear  blackmail,  no  coalition  to  guard 
the  peace  can  act  without  the  protection  of  the  American  nuclear  umbrella  and 
confidence  that  our  nation  is  willing  and  able  to  meet  its  commitments." 

II 

I  thought  I  could  be  most  useful  to  you  today  if  this  opening  statement  supple- 
mented our  earlier  statements  by  commenting  on  some  of  the  key  issues  which  have 
emerged  in  the  SALT  hearings  so  far.  President  Carter's  case  for  SALT  rests  on 
something  more  than  complacency  about  our  ovm  strength  and  an  underestimation 
of  Soviet  power  and  Soviet  intentions. 

The  strongest  argument  for  SALT  II  thus  far  put  forward  by  the  Carter  Admmis- 
tration  is  an  argument  of  political  myth.  It  was  summed  up  by  a  distinguished 
Senator  in  these  terms:  "To  reject  SALT  II  would  be  to  go  over  the  abyss." 

The  variations  on  this  theme  are  infinite.  One  hears  it  said  everywhere  that  to 
reject  SALT,  or  to  ratify  it  with  amendments  or  on  conditions,  would  be  to  "end" 
detente  and  revive  the  "Cold  War."  The  President  has  said  that  those  who  oppose 
the  Treaty  as  it  stands  are  war-mongers  and  opponents  of  "detente."  The  Secretary 
of  State  is  reported  to  have  said  that  he  would  resign  rather  than  preside  over  the 
end  of  "detente"  and  the  revival  of  the  "Cold  War."  Some  years  ago,  I  counted  a 
couple  of  hundred  remarks  of  this  tenor,  and  then  stopped  counting. 

The  notion  that  Soviet-American  relations  have  improved  in  recent  years,  that 
the  Cold  War  is  over,  and  that  negotiation  has  been  substituted  for  confrontation  is 
a  dangerous  symptom  of  auto-intoxication.  The  Cold  War  is  not  over.  On  the 
contrary,  it  is  worse  than  ever,  featured  by  Soviet  threats  and  thrusts  on  a  far 
greater  scale  than  those  of  the  simple  days  of  the  Berlin  airlift  and  the  crisis  in 
Greece.  But  as  things  get  worse,  many  Americans  insist  on  telling  each  other  that 
they  are  getting  better.  SALT  II  is  a  case  in  point.  If  ratified  in  its  present  form,  it 
would  be  an  act  of  submission  on  our  part,  legitimizing  Soviet  superiority— a  great 
Soviet  victory  in  the  Cold  War,  and  so  perceived  everywhere  in  the  world.  But  this 
Administration  keeps  repeating  that  SALT  II  would  be  a  step  towards  stability, 
detente,  and  peace.  .  j     ^  n. 

This  Delphic  assertion  is  made  so  often  that  we  tend  to  accept  it  as  self-evident.  It 
implies  that  the  Russians  would  behave  even  worse  than  they  are  behaving  now  if 
SALT  II  is  not  ratified  in  its  present  form;  that  it  would  cost  us  more  to  keep  up 
with  them  in  such  an  event;  and  that  the  process  of  negotiating  with  the  Soviet 
Union  about  nuclear  weapons  somehow  contributes  to  peace  and  stability.  In  1972, 
the  SALT  I  package  was  ratified  under  different  geo-political  circumstances,  but  on 
the  basis  of  this  same  litany  of  arguments.  The  period  since  1972  has  been  the  worst 
and  most  disastrous  period  of  the  Cold  War,  featured  by  Soviet  deception  of  the 
United  States  in  Indochina  and  the  Middle  East;  the  Soviet  campaign  in  Africa  and 
Southern  Asia;  and  an  extraordinary  Soviet  military  buildup,  far  greater  than  that 
of  the  United  States  and  its  Allies.  In  view  of  the  betrayal  of  every  promise  and 
expectation  on  the  basis  of  which  the  SALT  I  package  was  approved,  it  is  difficult  to 
understand  why  these  arguments  are  still  so  popular.  But  they  are.  As  President 
Kennedy  once  remarked,  "If  you  are  cheated  once,  it  is  their  fault.  But  if  you  are 
cheated  a  second  time,  it  is  your  own." 

The  contention  that  the  failure  to  ratify  SALT  II  in  its  present  form  would  be 
"going  over  the  abyss"  is  not  really  an  argument,  but  an  appeal  to  fear  which 
attributes  nearly  magic  influence  to  arms  limitation  agreements.  Those  who  are 
swayed  by  this  appeal  are  hypnotized  by  the  SALT  negotiating  process  as  MacDon- 


33 

aid,  Baldwin,  and  Chamberlain  were  hypnotized  by  the  chimera  of  disarmament 
forty-five  years  ago. 

Nothing  in  the  history  of  arms  limitation  agreements  gives  the  slightest  encour- 
agement for  such  beliefs.  The  Treaty  of  Versailles  was  the  most  important  of 
modern  arms  limitation  agreements.  It  prescribed  strict  limits  on  German  arma- 
ments and  the  demilitarization  of  the  Rhineland.  If  Britain  had  been  willing  to  join 
France  in  enforcing  that  Treaty,  the  Second  World  War  could  never  have  taken 
place.  But  when  the  Versailles  limits  on  arms  were  violated,  secretly  at  first,  and 
then  openly;  when  Hitler  introduced  conscription  in  1935  and  marched  into  the 
Rhineland  in  1936,  Britain  and  France  did  nothing  except  wring  their  hands  and  try 
to  persuade  Hitler  to  sign  new  treaties  limiting  armaments.  We  can  see  parallels  to 
this  behavior  nearly  every  week  in  our  reaction  to  Soviet  behavior  raising  serious 
questions  about  whether  they  are  violating  the  Test  Ban  Treaty,  the  SALT  I 
agreements,  or  the  agreement  of  1962  about  the  Soviet  presence  in  Cuba. 

The  second  most  important  arms  limitation  agreement  of  modern  times  was  the 
Washington  Naval  Treaty  of  1922.  Our  exp)erience  under  that  agreement  and  its 
successors  is  hardly  more  inspiring  than  the  record  of  Versailles.  Lulled  by  the 
delusive  security  of  the  Treaty,  we,  the  British,  and  the  French  persistently  kept 
our  navies  relatively  low,  while  Japan  and  later  Germany  built  to  the  limits  of  the 
Treaty  and  beyond. 

There  is  another  aspect  of  the  Administration's  argument  that  to  reject  SALT  II 
would  be  "to  go  over  the  abyss":  the  notion  that  such  action  on  our  part  would 
make  Soviet  policy  even  more  aggressive  than  it  is.  The  claim  betrays  a  misunder- 
standing of  the  nature  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  of  the  serious  and  devoted  men  who 
govern  it.  The  Soviet  Union  is  already  behaving  as  badly  as  it  dares.  It  is  moving  as 
rapidly  as  it  deems  prudent  toward  the  strategic  and  political  goals  of  its  policy.  It 
takes  advantage  of  every  opportunity  to  expand  its  sphere  of  influence.  There  is  no 
use  getting  excited  about  this  fact.  It  is  simply  a  fact.  As  Professor  Bernard  Lewis 
has  remarked,  the  Soviet  leaders  are  still  in  the  imperial  mood  of  the  seventeenth 
and  eighteenth  centuries,  which  the  West  has  long  since  abandoned  with  relief.  In 
the  interests  of  our  own  survival,  we  have  to  persuade  the  Soviet  Union  that  this 
ruthless  and  cynical  process  must  stop  before  it  results  inevitably  in  war. 

There  is  only  one  argument  that  can  deter  expansion — the  conviction  on  their 
part  that  a  given  action  would  expose  them  to  unacceptable  risk.  That  is  the  factor 
which  made  our  diplomacy  persuasive  and  effective  in  a  dozen  crises  since  1945, 
from  the  Berlin  Blockade  to  the  Cuban  Missile  Crisis  of  1962.  It  is  the  visible  erosion 
of  that  conviction  since  1972  which  has  invited  a  series  of  Soviet  thrusts  on  every 
continent.  In  recent  years,  the  Soviet  Union  has  increased  the  pace  of  its  expansion 
because  of  the  impact  of  Vietnam  and  Watergate  on  American  policy,  and  now 
because  it  perceives  President  Carter  as  weak.  As  a  result,  the  Soviet  Union  is 
moving  forward  with  incredible  boldness  in  several  areas  of  the  world,  including 
even  the  Caribbean. 

Some  who  accept  this  view  of  Soviet  policy  argue  for  SALT  II  nonetheless  on  the 
ground  that  under  SALT  II  it  would  be  easier  for  us  to  verify  Soviet  behavior,  and 
confine  the  Soviet  impulse  to  expand.  I  shall  comment  later  on  the  verification 
controversy  as  such.  Suffice  it  to  remark  at  this  point  that  there  is  no  reason  to 
suppose  that  we  should  have  any  more  confidence  in  our  knowledge  of  Soviet 
activities  under  SALT  II  than  we  have  had  under  SALT  I.  Since  our  intelligence 
estimators  have  recently  confessed  to  being  in  error  by  a  factor  of  100  percent,  that 
is  not  a  comforting  thought. 

The  claim  that  the  ratification  of  SALT  II  would  save  us  money  is  equally 
specious.  Short  of  general  mobilization,  it  is  hardly  feasible  for  the  Soviet  Union  to 
spend  more  on  military  hardware  than  it  has  been  spending  for  the  last  fifteen 
years  or  so.  I  have  heard  General  Jones  say  that  the  task  of  restoring  the  military 
balance  between  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  will  cost  the  same  with  or 
without  SALT  II — an  estimate  which  may  be  erroneous  in  a  perverse  way,  because 
some  programs — M-X,  for  example — may  cost  a  good  deal  more  than  otherwise  if 
SALT  should  be  ratified,  in  order  to  meet  its  verification  standards.  Administration 
spokesmen  have  offered  a  variety  of  opinions  on  the  cost  consequences  of  not 
ratifying  SALT.  Paul  Warnke  has  said  that  the  rejection  of  SALT  would  be  costly, 
but  that  its  cost  could  not  be  quantified.  Leslie  Gelb  has  written  recently  that 
saving  money  is  the  chief  reason  for  ratifying  SALT.  Others  have  said  quite  differ- 
ent things  on  the  subject.  The  fact  is  that  in  an  area  of  complex  and  rapidly 
changing  technology,  none  of  these  estimates  are  of  much  consequence. 

Averell  Harriman  and  George  W.  Ball  have  offered  a  variant  of  the  "abyss" 
argument  which  brings  out  its  basic  weakness.  Not  to  accept  SALT  II,  they  have 
told  you,  would  help  lead  to  the  election  of  a  "hard-liner"  to  succeed  Brezhnev.  The 
notion  that  Brezhnev  is  a  "moderate"  in  any  sense  we  can  recognize,  or  that  he 


34 

believes  in  our  concept  of  detente,  is  denied  by  everj^hing  he  has  said  and  done  in 
all  the  years  of  his  high  office.  Brezhnev  was  the  architect  of  the  attack  on  Czecho- 
slovakia in  1968,  and  on  our  whole  Middle  East  position  in  1967  and  1973.  He  is  the 
man  who  broke  his  solemn  agreements  with  us  about  Indo-China  and  the  Middle 
East.  In  the  name  of  the  Brezhnev  Doctrine,  he  claims  the  right  to  use  force 
internationally  in  order  to  protect  or  promote  regimes  or  revolutions  he  regards  as 
socialist  or  progressive.  To  call  him  a  "moderate"  is  an  abuse  of  the  English 
language. 

There  are  of  course  differences  within  the  Kremlin  and  no  doubt  there  are 
groupings  among  its  members.  But  there  is  no  serious  evidence  that  any  of  these 
differences  concern  Soviet-American  relations.  Of  course  all  the  Soviet  leaders  want 
SALT  II  ratified.  They  have  never  made  so  much  progress  as  they  did  under  SALT 
I,  and  they  expect  SALT  II  to  be  at  least  as  productive  for  them.  And  they  know 
that  if  the  United  States  ever  does  wake  up,  and  decide  to  restore  the  military 
balance,  both  in  strategic  and  in  conventional  forces,  they  would  lose  ignominiously. 
Their  economy  is  only  half  as  large  as  ours.  But  these  are  hardly  reasons  for  us  to 
take  the  Treaty  as  it  is. 

There  is  thus  nothing  in  the  contention  that  to  reject  SALT  would  be  "to  go  over 
the  abyss."  The  leaders  of  the  Soviet  Union  are  patient  realists.  They  will  negotiate 
with  us  so  long  as  it  is  in  their  interest  to  do  so.  And  it  will  be  in  our  mutual 
interest  to  negotiate  about  strategic  weapons  only  when  we  have  fully  restored 
essential  equivalence  and  adequate  deterrence  at  every  level  relevant  to  our  inter- 
ests. 

Ill 

President  Carter's  second  best  argument  for  his  Treaty  is  that  it  wouldn't  do 
much  harm,  would  not  prevent  us  from  restoring  the  military  balance,  and  should 
therefore  be  ratified  to  demonstrate  to  our  friends  and  adversaries  that  we  really  do 
have  a  government.  This  argument  appeals  strongly  to  all  Americans.  For  the  best 
of  reasons,  we  tend  to  rally  to  the  flag  when  it  is  under  fire.  Foreigners  have  their 
own  view  of  our  government,  based  on  their  daily  experience  on  a  dozen  issues.  In 
my  talks  with  the  leaders  of  friendly  foreign  governments  in  recent  years,  it  became 
clear  that  what  they  want  from  us  is  a  policy  of  vigorous  and  imaginative  resistance 
to  the  process  of  Soviet  expansion.  I  am  confident  that  the  program  our  Commiteee 
has  outlined  would  be  well  received  by  friendly  nations,  and  fully  respected  by  our 
adversaries  abroad. 

There  is,  however,  a  fatal  flaw  in  the  argument  which  would  wrap  SALT  II  in  the 
flag  of  patriotism.  The  SALT  II  Treaty  is  not  harmless;  it  would  do  a  great  deal  of 
harm;  it  would  make  it  far  more  difficult  for  us  to  redress  the  military  balance;  and 
no  spokesman  for  the  Administration  has  as  yet  seriously  addressed  the  principal 
issues  raised  in  this  connection  by  its  critics. 

All  studies  of  the  nuclear  balance  agree  that  if  present  trends  continue  just  a  few 
years  longer,  the  Soviet  Union  will  have  significant  nuclear  superiority  in  the  early 
1980's  authorized  by  the  SALT  II  Treaty — the  capacity,  that  is,  to  make  a  preemp- 
tive first  strike  by  destroying  our  ICBM's,  our  planes  on  the  ground,  and  our 
submarines  in  port  with  a  fraction  of  their  nuclear  force,  leaving  enough  accurate 
missiles  in  reserve  to  neutralize  our  own  nuclear  arsenal.  If  we  should  ever  allow 
such  a  position  to  develop,  the  military  doctrine  of  Mutual  Assured  Destruction  on 
which  we  have  relied  since  Secretary  McNamara's  time  would  become  obsolete,  and 
our  submarines  and  other  less  accurate  missile  launchers  would  be  ineffective. 
Facing  such  threats,  we  should  be  unable  to  use  conventional  forces,  and  our 
diplomacy  would  be  without  influence. 

Slowly  and  reluctantly,  the  Administration  has  conceded  that  at  a  given  point 
fairly  soon  our  ICBM's  and  other  ground  based-launchers  will  become  vulnerable  to 
a  Soviet  first-strike  attack.  Some  Administration  spokesmen  say  that  such  a  devel- 
opment would  not  mean  the  end  of  the  world,  because  we  could  always  strike  back 
from  our  submarines,  or,  in  an  argument  of  desperation,  even  launch  our  ICBM's  on 
warning.  It  is  hard  to  believe,  but  Secretary  of  State  Vance  himself  has  expressed 
this  bizarre  view.  Others  say  that  our  allies  must  realize  that  there  are  limits  to  our 
nuclear  umbrella:  that  is,  in  plain  words,  that  the  American  nuclear  guarantee 
would  be  worthless.  The  official  Administration  doctrine  is  that  the  concerns  of 
SALT  critics  about  our  vulnerability  to  a  preemptive  first  strike  are  valid,  but  that 
they  will  be  cured  by  the  M-X  missile,  long  delayed  by  President  Carter.  A  decision 
on  its  mode  of  deplojTnent  was  supposed  to  have  been  made  by  August  1,  but  has 
not  yet  been  announced. 

But  the  M-X  missile  cannot  be  ready,  the  Administration  says,  before  1989  at  the 
earliest,  even  if  President  Carter  finally  solves  the  problem  of  reconciling  its  mode 
of  deployment  with  the  SALT  II  Treaty. 


35 

What  are  we  supposed  to  do  in  the  meantime — that  is,  during  the  period  of  the 
1980's  when  everybody  agrees  we  shall  be  in  a  position  of  maximum  exposure  to 
nuclear  war  or  nuclear  blackmail?  If  the  Soviet  Union  gains  sufficient  superiority  in 
the  early  1980's  to  threaten  our  land-based  missile  launchers  with  one-third  or  one- 
fifth  of  their  force,  would  it  be  rational  or  even  conceivable  for  an  American 
President  to  use  our  submarine-launched  missiles  to  destroy  Soviet  cities,  knowing 
that  the  Soviets  had  enough  missiles  in  reserve  to  blow  up  a  very  large  fraction  of 
our  population  in  reprisal?  Calculations  of  these  gruesome  scenarios  are  affected  of 
course  by  Soviet  active  and  passive  air  defense  programs  and  absence  of  such 
programs  on  our  part.  Such  calculations  are  currently  most  unfavorable  to  the 
United  States.  In  effect,  they  would  reverse  the  position  of  the  two  nations  at  the 
time  of  the  Cuban  Missile  Crisis.  Under  those  circumstances,  would  the  Soviet 
government  believe  in  the  possibility  of  American  retaliation  to  a  first  strike,  and 
be  deterred  by  it?  Such  retaliation  would  be  suicidal  for  us.  No  one  could  believe  in 
so  irrational  a  policy. 

This  is  the  key  question  to  consider  in  evaluating  the  nuclear  balance  and  its 
bearing  on  the  political  influence  of  both  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United  States.  I 
have  been  unable  to  find  an  answer  on  the  part  of  any  proponent  of  the  Treaty 
beyond  a  blind  reiteration  of  faith  in  the  continued  vitality  of  the  McNamara 
Doctrine  of  Mutual  Assured  Destruction.  This  is  indeed  the  heart  and  nearly  the 
whole  of  President  Carter's  case  for  SALT  II.  As  former  Secretary  Kissinger  empha- 
sized in  Brussels  last  Saturday,  this  position  will  soon  be  intellectually  and  political- 
ly untenable.  We  simply  must  move  to  counterforce  strategies  or  abandon  the 
notion  of  nuclear  deterrence  altogether. 

But  the  Treaty  would  prevent  us  from  undertaking  the  most  feasible,  perhaps  the 
only  credible  counterforce  program  that  could  preserve  our  second-strike  capability 
during  the  early  and  middle  1980's:  to  reopen  the  Minuteman  III  production  lines, 
which  President  Carter  has  recently  closed,  and  deploy  Minuteman  Ills  in  multiple 
vertical  protected  shelters.  Such  shelters  would  be  considered  "fixed  launchers" 
under  Article  IV  of  the  Treaty,  and  would  be  prohibited.  And  the  number  of 
Minuteman  Ills  required  for  such  a  program  would  exceed  the  quotas  established  by 
the  Treaty,  since  Minuteman  III  carries  only  three  warheads.  Here  again,  the 
Administration  has  simply  not  addressed  the  issue.  It  is  still  struggling  with  its 
attempt  to  reconcile  the  M-X  missile  with  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty — a  problem 
that  doesn't  seem  to  worry  the  Soviet  Union,  which  continues  to  develop  and  deploy 
large  numbers  of  mobile  intermediate  range  missile  launchers  that  can  be  converted 
into  intercontinental  missiles  by  the  addition  of  an  extra  stage. 

There  are  many  other  aspects  of  SALT  II  which  are  far  from  harmless — aspects 
which  have  been  repeatedly  called  to  the  attention  of  the  Administration,  and 
ignored  or  evaded  in  these  hearings.  The  strange  provision  of  the  Treaty  allowing 
the  Soviet  Union  more  than  300  heavy  missiles,  while  we  can  have  none,  has  been 
much  discussed,  but  it  has  not  been  explained.  These  heavy  missiles  of  enormous 
throw  weight  are  designed  primarily  as  first-strike  weapons  against  hardened  tar- 
gets. The  essence  of  the  Soviet  Union's  capacity  for  a  credible  first  strike  is  the  fact 
that  if  present  trends  continue  they  will  be  able  to  destroy  a  large  part  of  our  land- 
based  missile  force  with  one-third  or  one-fifth  of  their  missiles.  It  is  quite  true  that 
another  combination  of  weapons  might  also  threaten  our  land-based  missiles  and 
submarines  in  port.  But  there  is  all  the  difference  in  the  world  between  a  strike 
which  would  require  one-fifth  of  the  Soviet  force  and  one  requiring  four-fifths  of 
that  force.  In  the  strange  calculus  of  nuclear  terror,  the  difference  is  decisive.  It  is 
what  is  left  after  the  first  strike  that  counts  both  politically  and  militarily. 

Similarly,  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  regarding  the  Soviet  Backfire  bomber  have 
been  vehemently  discussed,  but  the  Administration's  answer  is  totally  unconvincing. 
There  is  no  doubt  now  that  the  Backfire  is  capable  of  reaching  targets  throughout 
the  United  States  from  the  Soviet  Union,  and  that  it  can  be  refuelled  in  the  air  and 
land  in  Cuba.  Why  is  it  not  counted  among  the  launchers  covered  by  the  Treaty, 
like  our  B-52's  or  B-l's?  We  have  to  count  even  mothballed  B-52's,  cannibalized  for 
spare  parts.  The  Administration  does  not  answer  the  question,  but  asks  us  to  be 
content  with  Mr.  Brezhnev's  assurance  that  the  Soviet  Union  will  make  no  more 
than  30  Backfires  a  year.  Why  30  a  year  is  to  be  considered  de  minimis  in  a  Treaty 
which  purports  to  limit  launchers  to  some  2,000  on  each  side  isn't  immediately 
apparent,  even  if  there  were  any  way  we  could  monitor  these  limits.  How  much 
damage  could  30,  60,  or  90  Backfires  do  from  Cuban  bases? 

Further,  the  restrictions  of  the  Treaty  and  its  protocol  on  the  development  of 
cruise  missiles,  especially  of  land-  and  sea-based  cruise  missiles,  and  the  ambiquities 
of  the  Treaty  about  our  capacity  to  transfer  cruise  missile  technology  to  our  Allies, 
are  both  dangerous  to  our  security  and  without  any  justification.  Here  again,  the 
testimony  offered  by  the  Administration  is  both  unresponsive  and  unconvincing. 


36 

As  for  the  verification  provisions  of  the  Treaty,  I  can  find  no  answer  in  the 
testimony  thus  far  available  to  the  facts  pointed  out  on  pp.  17-18  of  our  July  19 
statement.  My  distinguished  colleague  Paul  H.  Nitze  testified  on  this  aspect  of  the 
problem  on  July  30  before  the  Select  Committee  on  Intelligence  of  the  Senate.  I 
have  included  a  copy  of  his  Prepared  Statement  in  my  submission,  and  call  it 
particularly  to  your  attention. 

IV 

The  Executive  Committee  of  the  Committee  on  the  Present  Danger  has  recom- 
mended that  the  Senate  should  not  give  its  consent  to  the  ratification  of  SALT  II 
unless  the  most  important  deficiencies  of  the  Treaty  are  modified  by  amendment, 
and  the  President  and  the  Congress  are  firmly  committed  to  a  specific  program  that 
would  achieve  and  maintain  essential  equivalence  and  adequate  deterrence.  Among 
the  deficiencies  of  the  Treaty  requiring  amendment,  I  should  list  first  our  right  to 
deploy  ICBM's  in  modes  and  numbers  we  deem  necessary  to  ensure  their  survival 
against  surprise  attack;  (2)  the  equal  right  of  the  two  sides  to  use  heavy  missiles;  (3) 
the  inclusion  of  the  Soviet  Backfire  and  the  SS-20  within  the  numerical  limits  of 
the  Treaty;  (4)  provision  for  the  adoption  of  programs  which  would  reverse  the 
present  ominous  situation  of  Soviet  strategic  superiority  in  Europe,  including 
changes  in  the  provisions  regarding  the  range  of  land-  and  sea-based  cruise  missiles 
and  the  transfer-of-technology  which  is  causing  so  much  concern  to  our  Allies. 

There  are  other  deficiencies  and  ambiguities  noted  in  our  earlier  statements,  and 
in  the  studies  of  my  distinguished  colleagues  who  have  written,  spoken,  and  testified 
on  these  matters  during  the  last  few  years.  And  there  are  many  which  have  come  to 
the  surface  in  your  hearings  and  those  of  other  committees  of  the  Senate.  These  too 
should  be  given  serious  consideration  before  the  Treaty  is  ratified. 


In  closing,  permit  me  to  stress  the  extraordinary  responsibility  of  the  Senate  in 
voting  in  SALT  II.  The  arguments  put  forward  for  the  SALT  I  package  were  the 
same  as  those  advanced  for  SALT  II  today.  Under  the  political  and  military  circum- 
stances of  1972,  they  were  plausible  arguments.  But  there  is  no  rational  way  to 
accept  them  as  the  basis  for  policy  in  1979.  It  is  simply  too  late  to  entertain  such 
views.  Too  much  has  happened  to  contradict  them. 

Therefore,  the  burden  of  responsibility  on  the  Senate  with  respect  to  the  Treaty  is 
unique  in  our  history. 

Every  American  shares  the  goal  of  achieving  true  detente  with  the  Soviet  iJnion, 
which  can  only  be  defined,  in  my  opinion,  as  a  policy  of  scrupulous  and  recipr':'cal 
respect  for  the  rules  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations  regarding  the  internation- 
al use  of  force.  True  detente  is  a  central  objective  of  the  Committee  on  the  Present 
Danger,  and,  I  am  sure,  of  the  American  people.  Every  President  and  Congress  since 
1945  have  gone  to  great  lengths  to  reach  that  goal.  But  President  Carter's  quest  for 
detente  with  the  Soviet  Union  has  been  based  on  the  misconception  that  acts  of 
unilateral  disarmament  on  our  part,  and  other  unilateral  concessions,  will  induce 
the  Soviet  Union  to  follow  suit.  As  a  result,  President  Carter  has  sacrificed  our 
defenses  and  our  alliances,  and  abdicated  his  responsibility  for  the  security  of  the 
nation.  Under  our  Constitution,  that  responsibility  therefore  falls  on  the  Senate 
with  respect  to  this  Treaty,  and  ultimately  on  the  whole  Congress  and  the  people. 
We  have  not  faced  decisions  of  such  moment  since  the  Presidency  of  James  Bu- 
chanan. 

President  Carter  sometimes  compares  the  controversy  over  the  ratification  of 
SALT  II  to  the  battle  over  our  entry  into  the  League  of  Nations  after  the  First 
World  War.  The  analogy  is  misleading. 

In  the  first  place,  despite  the  pervasiveness  of  the  political  legend,  it  cannot  be 
said  that  "a  small  group  of  willful  men"  blocked  the  ratification  either  of  the 
Covenant  of  the  League  or  of  the  Security  Treaty  with  France  which  had  been 
promised  to  France  in  order  to  induce  its  acceptance  of  the  League,  and  was 
therefore  brigaded  with  the  League  Covenant.  President  Wilson  gave  up  and  indeed 
strongly  opposed  the  Treaties  when  he  realized  that  he  would  have  to  compromise 
with  the  Senate  to  obtain  ratification.  In  the  end,  and  at  President  Wilson's  urgent 
request,  twenty-three  loyal  Democratic  Senators  voted  against  ratifying  the  League 
Covenant  with  the  reservations  negotiated  by  Senator  Lodge.  History  might  well 
have  been  different  if  seven  members  of  the  Senate  had  voted  then  for  their 
convictions.  The  Treaty  with  France  never  came  to  a  vote.  President  Wilson  was 
always  the  kind  of  man  who  refused  half  or  two-thirds  of  a  loaf  when  he  couldn't 
get  the  whole  thing.  And  at  the  time  of  the  fight  in  1919,  he  was  seriously  ill  as 
well. 


37 

Secondly,  President  Wilson  was  proposing  full  and  responsible  American  partici- 
pation in  world  politics,  which  some  members  of  the  Senate  were  resisting.  The 
position  today  is  just  the  opposite.  For  nearly  three  years.  President  Carter  has  been 
conducting  a  retreat  to  weakness  and  isolation.  Unless  that  policy  is  promptly 
reversed,  it  will  soon  be  beyond  our  power  to  do  so.  We  should  then  be  squeezed  into 
a  position  of  passive  dependence  on  the  Soviet  Union.  The  program  the  Committee 
on  the  Present  Danger  is  recommending  to  you  today,  on  the  contrary,  is  one 
through  which  we  could  remain  what  we  have  been  and  are,  the  bastion  of  democra- 
cy, and  a  responsible  member  of  the  society  of  nations,  capable  with  our  allies  and 
associates  of  maintaining  the  balance  of  world  power  on  which  the  future  of  human 
freedom  depends. 

It  is  therefore  not  hyperbole  to  say  that  the  state  of  the  union  for  the  next  decade 
at  least,  and  perhaps  for  much  longer,  will  be  determined  by  the  outcome  of  your 
vote  on  the  Treaty. 

Your  vote  on  SALT  is  important  because  the  Treaty  is  important,  and  in  our 
judgment  dangerous  to  the  security  of  the  nation.  It  would  lock  us  into  a  position  of 
strategic  inferiority  which  would  also  be  unstable  and  unverifiable — a  perfect  recipe 
for  Soviet  nuclear  blackmail  during  the  period  of  our  greatest  relative  weakness  in 
the  early  and  middle  1980's.  President  Carter  found  that  possibility  staring  him  in 
the  face  when  he  took  office  in  1977.  He  made  the  situation  worse  by  cancelling  or 
postponing  the  programs  which  his  predecessors  had  initiated  to  prevent  the  prob- 
lem from  arising:  B-1,  the  enhanced  radiation  warhead,  M-X,  and  the  rest  of  the 
sad  story. 

Your  vote  on  SALT  II  is  important  for  another  reason.  It  is  the  only  chance  you 
are  likely  to  have  to  pass  judgment  on  President  Carter's  foreign  and  defense  policy 
as  a  system:  his  abandonment  of  the  United  Nations  Charter  as  the  lodestar  of  our 
policy,  and  many  other  contradictions,  paradoxes,  and  retreats. 

These  aspects  of  President  Carter's  foreign  policy  are  not  extrinsic  to  the  merits 
of  the  SALT  Treaty.  They  are  what  the  Treaty  is  all  about.  SALT  II  is  not 
concerned  with  a  remote  and  upleasant  subject  of  interest  only  to  experts.  It  is  not 
limited  to  assuring  the  immunity  of  the  United  States  from  nuclear  attack.  The 
United  States  has  vital  security  interests  beyond  Fortress  America.  There  is  no 
escaping  the  "linkage"  between  SALT  II  and  the  rest  of  our  foreign  and  defense 
policy.  The  state  of  the  nuclear  balance  between  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United 
States  is  the  fulcrum  on  which  the  entire  process  of  world  politics  is  poised.  The 
visible  and  unquestioned  availability  of  usable  force  has  always  been  the  key  to 
effective  diplomacy.  This  maxim  has  never  been  more  obviously  true.  Unless  we 
restore  and  maintain  our  clear  second  strike  strategic  nuclear  capability,  and  our 
naval  and  other  conventional  forces,  the  American  nuclear  umbrella  will  lose  all 
credibility,  our  political  influence  will  continue  to  decline,  and  we  shall  be  unable  to 
use  either  conventional  or  nuclear  forces  anywhere  in  the  world  if  such  action  on 
our  part  should  be  required.  The  pattern  of  our  diplomatic  impotence  during  the 
last  few  years  will  become  our  normal  condition,  until  it  is  succeeded  by  something 
infinitely  worse. 

Many  have  compared  the  policies  of  the  Carter  Administration  revealed  in  its 
defense  of  SALT  II  to  the  posture  of  the  ostrich  taken  by  Great  Britain  and  to  a 
lesser  extent  by  France  during  the  Thirties,  when  they  failed  to  act  together  in  time 
to  prevent  the  Second  World  War.  The  comparison  is  fair.  In  the  Thirties,  British 
policy  was  determined  by  wishful  thinking  and  a  nearly  suicidal  paralysis  of  will. 
Thus  far,  these  two  attitudes  have  dominated  the  foreign  policy  of  the  Carter 
Administration.  But  there  is  one  fundamental  difference  between  the  dilemma  faced 
by  the  United  States  today  and  that  of  Britain  and  France  a  generation  ago.  Even 
in  the  darkest  days  of  the  Second  World  War,  Britain  and  France  could  always  hope 
that  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  would  somehow  be  drawn  into  the  fray, 
so  that  victory  would  become  possible.  There  are  no  great  powers  in  that  position 
now,  no  nations  in  the  wings  who  might  help  to  turn  the  tide  if  we  persist  in  our 
folly  as  Britain  and  France  did  during  the  Thirties,  until  it  was  too  late  to  do 
anything  but  fight.  If  we  allow  the  Soviet  rush  for  dominance  to  continue  un- 
checked; if  we  allow  Europe  to  be  enveloped  and  reduced,  through  the  Middle  East 
or  the  Northern  seas  or  both,  Japan,  China,  and  many  other  countries  would  fall 
under  Soviet  control.  We  should  then  be  truly  isolated,  living  in  a  state  of  siege,  and 
confronting  the  pressures  of  a  hostile  Soviet  foreign  policy  backed  by  an  overwhelm- 
ing array  of  force.  Under  such  circumstances,  if  history  is  a  guide,  an  episode  trivial 
in  itself^the  murder  of  an  Archduke  or  the  sinking  of  another  Lusitania — would 
prove  again  to  the  flash  point  of  war.  This  is  the  nightmare  probability  at  stake  in 
your  vote  on  SALT  II. 

Some  will  say  that  I  am  too  gloomy  about  the  way  things  are  going.  The  Russians 
are  not  ten  feet  tall,  we  are  frequently  reminded.  But  for  decades  now  the  Soviet 


38 

Union  has  been  keeping  the  living  standard  of  its  people  low  in  order  to  support  an 
arms  buildup  and  a  foreign  policy  geared  to  indefinite  expansion.  This  has  hardly 
been  done  in  a  fit  of  absent-mindedness.  You  have  only  to  compare  the  map  today 
with  the  map  in  1945  or  1972  to  realize  what  extraordinary  gains  the  Soviet  Union 
has  made  in  its  quest  for  geopolitical  mastery.  One  after  another,  the  old  naval 
bases  of  the  nineteenth  century  imperial  system  are  being  taken  over  by  the  Soviet 
Union.  This  process  has  to  be  faced  and  evaluated,  not  denied  or  ignored. 

Let  me  appeal  directly  to  those  among  you  who  believe  that  the  Soviet  Union  is  a 
conservative,  peaceful  power,  that  the  Cold  War  is  over,  and  that  active  military 
and  political  efforts  on  our  part  are  not  needed  to  preserve  the  world  balance  of 
power  and  restore  the  vitality  of  the  United  Nations  Charter.  In  Cromwell's  famous 
words,  "Consider  that  ye  may  be  wrong."  If  our  analysis  is  correct,  isn't  it  better 
and  more  prudent  to  take  precautions  now  than  to  be  sorry  later?  If  President 
Carter  is  wrong,  we  shall  face,  over  and  over  again,  the  choice  of  surrender  or  war 
against  bitter  odds,  alone  and  unprepared. 

President  Carter's  case  for  SALT  II  is  the  same  mixture  of  incompatible  themes, 
myths,  and  moods  one  finds  in  reviewing  the  history  of  the  years  before  the  Second 
World  War.  The  finest  study  of  Pearl  Harbor,  that  of  Roberta  Wohlstetter,  com- 
ments that  in  going  over  the  record  one  is  faced  time  and  time  again  on  the 
American  side  "by  the  paradox  of  pessimistic  realism  coupled  with  loose  optimism 
in  practice."  If  you  read  what  President  Carter  has  said  on  these  problems,  you  can 
see  exactly  what  Mrs.  Wohlstetter  meant.  On  several  occasions,  President  Carter 
has  described  the  Soviet  arms  buildup  as  offensive  in  character,  and  incompatible 
with  any  theory  of  defense.  But  he  has  also  characterized  the  Soviet  position  as 
defensive  in  nature,  based  on  exaggerated  anxieties  about  the  risks  the  Soviet 
Union  faces.  Clearly,  both  the  President's  policies  and  his  actions  are  based  on  the 
second  hypothesis,  that  of  an  essentially  harmless,  conservative,  and  defensive 
Soviet  Union.  How  he  reconciles  this  view  with  his  daily  diplomatic  and  intelligence 
reports  is  a  mystery  beyond  my  understanding.  It  is  true  that  the  President  is  prone 
to  boast  that  our  military  power  is  greater  than  that  of  any  other  nation,  despite 
the  statistics,  and  what  Secretary  of  Defense  Brown  says.  We  are  left  with  the 
disquieting  thought  that  President  Carter's  defense  budgets  and  policies  are  based 
on  jejime  complacency  and  on  the  assumption  that  the  Soviets  have  feet  of  clay. 

The  coming  decade  will  be  as  difficult  and  dangerous  as  any  we  have  faced  in  the 
past.  We  have  a  very  short  time  in  which  to  protect  our  future  through  allied 
di  ilomacy  and  deterrence  rather  than  through  war.  A  two-ocean  Navy  cannot  be 
restored  in  a  day  or  a  year.  Nor  can  the  other  programs  we  require  to  achieve 
effective  deterrence  at  every  level.  It  will  be  a  ticklish  time,  calling  for  cool  nerves 
and  a  firm  grasp  of  the  problem.  The  Soviet  Union  will  not  view  an  American 
awakening  with  equanimity.  It  can  be  expected  to  take  full  advantage  of  positions  of 
relative  superiority,  and  the  presence  in  office  of  a  President  whom  it  perceives  as 
weak. 

The  time  to  begin  is  now.  And  the  place  to  begin  is  here.  Normally,  we  look  to  our 
President  to  take  the  lead  in  decisions  of  this  order.  It  is  now  clear  that  President 
Carter  is  firmly  committed  to  another  view. 

What  is  at  stake,  Mr.  Chairman,  is  not  the  balance  of  power  alone,  but  the  future 
of  liberty.  Democracy  cannot  survive  unless  America  plays  its  full  part  in  assuring 
its  future. 

The  tide  has  been  running  against  us  now  for  nearly  a  decade.  The  leaders  of  the 
Soviet  Union  are  pursuing  a  program  of  break-neck  expansion,  and  treating  our 
interests  everywhere  with  open  contempt. 

Forty  years  ago,  as  the  doubts  and  vacillations  of  the  Thirties  were  being  swept 
away  by  events,  a  speaker  rose  to  his  feet  in  the  House  of  Commons  to  address  the 
great  issue  of  the  looming  War.  Leopold  Amery,  one  of  Churchill's  companions  in 
the  political  wilderness,  shouted  a  remark  from  his  seat  before  the  speaker  began. 
"Speak  for  England,"  he  said.  In  that  spirit,  I  say  to  you,  "Speak  and  vote  for 
America." 

Senator  Biden.  Our  next  witness  is  Adm.  Thomas  Moorer,  co- 
chairman  of  the  CoaUtion  for  Peace  Through  Strength.  Admiral 
Moorer  is  accompanied  by  Lt.  Gen.  Daniel  Graham,  cochairman  of 
the  Coalition  for  Peace  Through  Strength. 

Gentlemen,  thank  you  for  coming.  Admiral,  please  proceed  in 
any  way  that  is  most  comfortable. 


39 

STATEMENT  OF  ADM.  THOMAS  MOORER  (RETIRED),  COCHAIR- 
MAN,  COALITION  FOR  PEACE  THROUGH  STRENGTH,  WASH- 
INGTON, D.C.,  ACCOMPANIED  BY  LT.  GEN.  DANIEL  GRAHAM 
(RETIRED),  COCHAIRMAN,  COALITION  FOR  PEACE  THROUGH 
STRENGTH » 

Admiral  Moorer.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  Chairman  and  members  of  the  committee,  I  am  honored  to 
have  the  opportunity  to  testify  again  before  this  committee  on  the 
SALT  II  Treaty.  Today  I  am  testifying  as  chairman  of  the  executive 
committee  of  the  Coalition  for  Peace  Through  Strength. 

The  Coalition  for  Peace  Through  Strength  is  a  bipartisan  alli- 
ance of  105  national  organizations,  204  Members  of  Congress  and 
other  pro  defense  leaders  across  America.  The  American  Security 
Council,  which  I  serve  as  a  member  of  the  board  of  directors,  is  the 
program  secretariat  for  the  coalition. 

The  purpose  of  the  coalition  is  to  work  for  the  adoption  of  a 
national  strategy  of  peace  through  strength.  The  perception  of 
weakness  on  our  part  in  1941  prompted  the  Japanese  to  attack 
Pearl  Harbor.  Mr.  Chairman,  at  the  end  of  World  War  II,  I  was  a 
member  of  the  strategic  bombing  survey  sent  to  Japan  to  investi- 
gate the  Japanese  decisionmaking  process  that  led  to  the  attack  on 
Pearl  Harbor,  as  well  as  other  matters. 

Since  I  was  at  Pearl  Harbor  when  the  Japanese  attacked,  I  was 
charged  with  investigating  this  particular  question.  Why  did  the 
Japanese  attack  Pearl  Harbor?  I  discussed  this  matter  with  the 
Prime  Minister,  with  all  the  military  leaders,  the  seniors  in  the 
Japanese  Government,  and  all  without  exception  said  the  same 
thing.  They  said  that  the  Congress  had  refused  to  pass  the  draft 
initially,  and  then  they  passed  it  only  by  one  vote.  They  had 
refused  to  fortify  Wake  and  Guam  Islands,  and  that  the  U.S.  Army 
was  in  Louisiana  training  with  wooden  guns,  all  of  which  was  a 
fact,  and  consequently  they  did  not  think  that  we  had  the  military 
capability  or  the  will  or  determination  to  oppose  them. 

So,  they  decided  to  attack  Pearl  Harbor. 

My  point  is,  if  the  relative  balance  as  perceived  by  the  potential 
enemy  gets  to  a  point  where  they  think  they  can  attack  and 
succeed,  then  the  country  is  in  danger. 

Senator  Biden.  Do  you  think  it  has  reached  that  point.  Admiral? 

Admiral  Moorer.  I  think  we  are  just  at  that  point,  yes,  sir. 

It  is  our  belief  that  if  the  U.S.  Senate  consents  to  the  SALT  II 
Treaty,  as  now  configured,  it  would  make  the  adoption  of  such  a 
strategy  most  unlikely. 

We  did  prepare  a  detailed  study  entitled  "An  Analysis  of  SALT 
II."  Copies  are  available  to  you,  and  I  urge  every  member  of  the 
committee  to  study  the  report.  However,  since  this  is  a  78-page 
document  and  thus  too  long  for  me  to  cover  in  the  time  alloted 
today,  I  will  ask  permission  at  this  time  simply  to  read  a  3-page 
joint  statement  signed  by  1,678  general  and  flag  officers  from  all  of 
the  armed  services.  A  list  of  the  names  of  these  officers  is  being 
provided  to  the  members  of  the  committee.  I  have  the  list  right 
here,  sir. 

Senator  Biden.  Are  they  all  retired,  Admiral? 


'  See  page  60  for  Admiral  Moorer's  prepared  statement. 


40 

Admiral  Moorer.  Yes,  they  are  all  retired.  As  you  know,  active 
duty  military  leaders  are  not  permitted  to  flatly  oppose  SALT  II. 
This  is  why  we  at  the  Coalition  for  Peace  Through  Strength  have 
sought  out  the  views  of  retired  military  leaders  who  are  now  free 
to  speak  out. 

From  my  conversations  with  active  and  retired  military  leaders, 
I  believe  that  the  overwhelming  majority  oppose  SALT  II  as  writ- 
ten. This  has  been  confirmed  by  the  fact  that  only  four  of  the 
retired  officers  contacted  so  far  have  declined  to  join  in  the  state- 
ment because  they  support  SALT  II  as  written.  Another  33  de- 
clined for  such  reasons  as  that  they  were  undecided,  ill,  or  thought 
that  the  statement  should  be  written  differently. 

We  are  continuing  to  circulate  the  statement  and  will  later  give 
each  Senator  a  copy  of  the  statement  with  a  list  of  all  the  signers 
at  that  time. 

With  your  permission,  sir,  I  will  now  read  the  letter  that  we 
have  written  to  the  chairman  of  this  committee: 

Hon.  Frank  Church, 

Chairman,  U.S.  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations. 

Dear  Senator  Church:  We,  the  undersigned  retired  and  reserve  general  and  flag 
officers  of  all  U.S.  Military  Services  respectfully  request  you  to  oppose  ratification  of 
SALT  II. 

We  are  in  full  agreement  with  most  of  our  fellow  Ar^ericans  in  preferring  inter- 
national cooperation  and  equitable  arms  limitation  agreements  to  hostility  and 
competition.  But  we  cannot  agree  that  we  can  wish  this  congenial  state  of  affairs 
into  being  by  blinding  ourselves  Lo  the  stark  realities  of  our  strategic  situation  and 
our  closely  related  conventional  situation.  In  our  view,  SALT  II  as  now  written 
epitomizes  the  refusal  of  some  Americans  to  face  the  facts.  The  facts  which  must  be 
faced  are  these: 

Ten  years  of  U.S.  restraint  in  the  strategic  nuclf  ar  field  rooted  in  our  faith  in  the 
SALT  process  has  not  been  reciprocated  by  the  Soviet  Union.  Rather,  the  Soviets 
have  pursued  an  unprecedented  buildup  of  nuclear  offensive  and  defensive  capabili- 
ty which,  as^  Secretary  of  Defense  Brown  points  out,  is  aimed  at  a  war-winning 
capability.  In  this  pursuit,  the  Soviets  have  stretched  to  the  limit  or  broken  when 
they  felt  it  desirable  solemn  agreements  such  as  weapons  test  restraints  aimed  at 
slowing  down  nuclear  expansion.  This  leaves  them  now  with  a  technical  base  that 
we  cannot  match. 

The  concept  of  mutual  assured  destruction  which  has  shaped  U.S.  policy  since  the 
1960's  was  never  accepted  by  the  Soviets  and  has  been  completely  negated  by  their 
massive  strategic  defensive  effort,  including  civil  defense.  The  aggressiveness  of 
Soviet  behavior  throughout  the  world  has  increased  ominously  as  the  military 
balance  has  tilted  in  favor  of  the  U.S.S.R.  This  behavior  is  part  of  an  overall  grand 
design  of  which  SALT  negotiations  are  an  integral  part. 

Angola,  Mozambique,  Ethiopia,  South  Yemen,  Iran,  and  now  combat  troops  and 
fighter  pilots  in  our  own  back  yard,  Cuba,  are  examples  of  what  I  am  talking  about. 
Certainly  I  commend  the  chairman  of  this  committee.  Chairman  Church,  for  taking 
a  strong  position  in  opposition  to  this  action  by  the  Soviets  here  on  our  side  of  the 
globe.  U.S.  intelligence  capabilities  to  verify  Soviet  compliance  with  arms  control 
agreements  have  been  seriously  eroded  through  compromise  of  satellite  reconnais- 
sance systems  and  loss  of  key  monitoring  facilities. 

It  seems  to  us,  Mr.  Chairman  and  Members  of  the  Committee,  that  there  is  little 
disagreement  inside  or  outside  government  that  these  are  the  facts,  yet  the  Senate 
has  been  asked  to  ratify  a  treaty  which  apparently  ignores  these  facts.  We  are  told 
by  defenders  of  SALT  II  that  while  this  treaty  does  little  to  slow  down  the  Soviet 
military  surge,  it  is  necessary  to  ratify  it  to  preserve  the  process. 

The  proponents  insist  that  SALT  III  and  SALT  IV  will  cure  the  inequities  of 
SALT  I  and  SALT  II,  and  in  my  view  this  ignores  Soviet  behavior  since  SALT  I.  The 
Soviets  have  become  harder,  not  easier  to  deal  with,  and  as  they  gain  confidence 
from  obvious  superioiity,  I  predict  they  will  become  even  harder.  The  proponents  of 
SALT  II  insist  that  we  will  improve  our  security  through  ratification  because  the 
situations  would  be  worse  without  SALT  II.  We  find  it  hard  to  believe  (hat  the 
Soviets  could  significantly  accelerate  their  current  arms  buildup  in  light  of  the  fact 
that  they  are  already  spending  15  percent  of  their  gross  national  product  on  arms, 


41 

and  we  find  it  even  harder  to  believe  that  ratification  of  SALT  II  would  be  followed 
by  vigorous  U.S.  efforts  to  close  the  widening  gap  between  U.S.  and  Soviet  military 
capabilities. 

It  is  almost  certain  that  Senate  ratification  of  this  treaty  would  commit  the 
United  States  to  another  seven  years  of  pursuing  peace  through  trust  of  the  Soviets 
and  adherence  to  the  obviously  bankrupt  doctrine  of  mutual  assured  destruction. 
This  means  further  decline  of  our  capability  to  declare  war  or  to  defend  ourselves. 

We  respectfully  submit  that  the  arms  control  process  has  become  dominated  by 
persistent  U.S.  refusal  to  face  the  reality  of  a  failure  of  the  twin  policies  of  detente 
and  disarmament. 

SALT  II  doesn't  even  limit  arms.  SALT  II  is  only  a  set  of  rules  for  building  arms 
and  some  of  these  rules  are  nonenforceable.  The  image  of  limitation  is  provided  by 
alleged  equal  numbers  of  launchers  and  aircraft,  not  to  the  real  destructive  ele- 
ments of  nuclear  force — missiles  and  explosive  power — where  the  Soviets  have  been 
allowed  a  heavy  advantage.  To  make  matters  worse,  the  "equal"  numbers  are 
contrived  by  failing  to  count  Soviet  delivery  systems  such  as  the  Backfire,  the  most 
advanced  strategic  bomber  in  the  operational  inventory  of  either  side,  or  the  SS-20. 

We  also  find  the  treaty  as  written  unverifiable  and  attempts  to  finesse  this  issue 
by  redefining  terms  most  disturbing.  SALT  II  is  much  more  complex  than  SALT  I 
and  covers  qualitative  as  well  as  quantitative  aspects  of  nuclear  armaments  enor- 
mously more  difficult  to  monitor.  Given  the  compromise  of  our  key  verification 
satellite  systems  and  the  loss  of  vital  monitoring  stations  in  Iran,  we  cannot  ensure 
against  Soviet  circumvention  of  the  treaty  provisions. 

State  Department  documents  describing  SALT  II  now  redefine  verification.  Where 
adequate  verification  once  required  an  assurance  from  U.S.  intelligence  that  at- 
tempts by  the  Soviets  to  circumvent  would  be  detected,  it  now  requires  only  that  we 
can  detect  cheating  on  such  a  large  scale  that  it  alters  the  strategic  balance  in  time 
to  assure  an  appropriate  U.S.  response. 

This  new  definition  completely  finesses  the  problem  of  adequacy  of  our  intelli- 
gence capability  since  it  is  totally  dependent  upon  one's  view  of  what  constitutes  a 
strategic  balance  and  an  appropriate  response.  For  those  who  find  the  actual  bal- 
ance of  strategic  capabilities  irrelevant  and  believe  that  a  single  U.S.  Poseidon 
submarine  is  an  adequate  deterrent,  regardless  of  the  size  of  the  Soviet  forces,  SALT 
II  can  be  considered  adequately  verifiable  with  no  U.S.  intelligence  capability  at  all. 

We  agree  with  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  Dr.  Brown,  that  the  Soviets  are  building 
forces  capable  of  fighting  and  winning  a  nuclear  war  with  the  United  States  and  its 
allies,  but  we  strongly  disagree  with  his  view  that  this  aim  can  be  thwarted  by 
ratifying  SALT  II.  Soviet  participation  in  SALT,  or  any  other  arms  control  treaties, 
is  primarily  designed  to  further  this  goal  and  to  elicit  U.S.  acquiescence  and  even 
cooperation  in  creating  the  necessary  imbalance  of  power  required  by  that  goal. 

I  should  point  out  at  this  time,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  like  you,  I  also  have  been 
traveling.  I  spent  the  last  weekend  in  Brussels  at  the  NATO  meeting  commemorat- 
ing the  30th  anniversary  of  NATO.  This  meeting  was  attended  by  very  influential 
legislative  leaders  in  Europe  as  well  as  Senators  Roth,  Morgan,  and  Garn,  and 
Representatives  Zablocki,  Beard,  and  others.  I  can  say  that  you  and  I  obviously  do 
not  talk  to  the  same  people,  because  the  facts  are  that  whereas  the  leaders  in 
NATO  have  supported  SALT  II,  there  is  considerable  concern  within  the  rank  and 
file  of  the  leadership  of  NATO,  and  I  can  tell  you  why. 

They  see  this  imbalance  that  has  developed  with  our  strategic  forces.  No  longer 
do  they  believe  that  the  United  States  in  case  NATO  is  attacked  by  Russia  will  be 
willing  to  generate  or  initiate  a  major  nuclear  exchange  between  the  United  States 
and  Russia  because  Europe  was  attacked  by  the  Russians. 

Consequently,  I  think  this  makes  the  restraints  of  the  protocol  very  important, 
because  the  NATO  nations  at  this  time  should  begin  immediately  acquiring  a 
capability  to  respond  to  a  Soviet  nuclear  attack  on  NATO  by  an  attack  from  Europe 
on  Russia. 

I  talked  to  Lord  Chalfonte,  who  is  the  publisher  of  the  London 
Times,  and  in  fact  he  mentioned  this.  He  noted  that  Pravda  had 
recently  said  words  to  the  effect  that  the  Americans  have  the 
rather  forlorn  idea  that  the  protocol  will  cease  in  1981,  but  they 
say  it  is  not  the  case,  it  will  be  extended.  This  is  the  Russians 
talking  in  Pravda. 

I  think  that  this  point  was  discussed  by  you  and  by  the  previous 
witness  here  with  respect  to  what  happened  with  the  SALT  I 
interim  agreement.  It  was  extended.  Now,  I  am  not  a  lawyer  and 


42 

cannot  debate  with  you  about  what  it  means  for  Senate  passage 
and  resolution,  but  I  am  just  saying  that  there  are  many  people 
who  fear  that  the  protocol  will  be  extended. 

Mr.  Chairman,  in  sum,  we  urge  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  to  consider  the 
grave  consequences  of  ratifying  a  treaty  which  will  commit  this  country  to  the 
continuation  of  disarmament  policies  and  philosophy  which,  however  promising 
when  adopted,  have  imperiled  the  security  of  the  United  States  and  its  allies  and 
encourage  ever  more  aggressive  Soviet  behavior.  The  SALT  process  is  not  so  sacro- 
sanct that  we  must  accept  a  lopsided  and  unverifiable  agreement  simply  to  show 
progress.  We  who  know  war  cherish  peace.  We  are  not  warmongers,  as  all  who 
oppose  SALT  II  have  been  dubbed  by  some. 

As  military  professiuiials,  and  with  all  due  resp)ect  for  our  more  circumscribed 
colleagues  still  bound  by  their  active  service,  we  strongly  urge  you  to  reject  SALT  II 
as  currently  written  as  being  injurious  to  the  security  interests  of  the  United  States 
and  its  allies. 

That  is  signed  by  me  with  grave  concern. 
Senator  Biden.  Thank  you  very  much,  Admiral. 

CONCERN   OF   NATO   ALLIES   ON   PROTOCOL   EXTENSION   AND 

NONCIRCUMVENTION 

I  would  like  to  proceed  with  two  lines  of  questioning,  one  con- 
cerns the  attitude  of  our  NATO  allies.  I  am  not  quite  sure  that  we 
disagree.  You  say  that  our  allies  express  grave  concern,  and  then 
you  point  out  what  that  concern  is.  The  concern  really  relates  to 
the  extension  of  the  protocol  and  the  noncircumvention  provision, 
doesn't  it? 

Admiral  Moorer.  Yes. 

Senator  Biden.  Did  anyone  suggest  to  you  that  the  central  ele- 
ments of  the  treaty  concerned  them,  and  that  the  United  States 
should  not  ratify  the  treaty? 

Admiral  Moorer.  They  did  that  by  inference,  in  the  sense  that 
they  feel  that  the  treaty  as  now  constructed  further  enhances  their 
insecurity.  They  have  what  I  would  call  a  crisis  of  confidence. 

Senator  Biden.  Sure.  Doesn't  that  crisis  of  confidence  relate  to 
the  theater  nuclear  force  relationship  between  NATO  and  the 
Soviet  Union  and  not  to  the  central  systems?  You  have  already 
said  to  us  that  you  believe  it  was  amplified  in  what  they  said  that 
they  do  not  believe  that  the  United  States  would  engage  its  central 
systems? 

Admiral  Moorer.  So  say  them. 

Senator  Biden.  Yes.  If  that  is  the  case,  isn't  really  their  concern 
the  theater? 

Admiral  Moorer.  Of  course,  and  I  think  that  the  protocol  inhib- 
its, in  my  view,  the  development  in  the  theater  of  the  kind  of 
capability  that  they  have. 

Senator  Biden.  How  did  it  do  that.  Admiral?  How  does  it  inhibit? 

Admiral  Moorer.  Well,  as  I  see  it,  it  restricts  the  range. 

Senator  Biden.  It  restricts  the  deployment. 

Admiral  Moorer.  Yes.  In  other  words,  the  protocol  as  I  read  it 
restricts  the  United  States  and  has  no  impact  on  the  Soviets. 

DEPLOYMENT   OF   CRUISE   MISSILE   AFTER   DECEMBER    1981 

Senator  Biden.  Isn't  it  true  that  we  can  continue  research  and 
development,  we  can  do  all  we  are  capable  of  doing  short  of  deploy- 
ing, and  we  are  not  capable  of  deploying  until  December  1981 


43 

anyway.  Isn't  that  true?  I  mean,  even  if  we  wanted  to  deploy  the 
ground-launched  and  sea-launched  cruise  missile  tomorrow,  we 
don't  have  that  capability,  do  we,  to  deploy? 

Admiral  Moorer.  Well,  I  think  it  depends  entirely  on  what  we 
feel  is  urgent.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  when  we  built  the  Polaris 
submarines  under  a  posture  of  urgency,  we  turned  them  out  at  one 
a  minute.  If  this  becomes  an  overriding  objective,  if  you  view  what 
happened  in  World  War  II,  certainly  we  can  deploy  the  missiles 
before  1981. 

Senator  Biden.  I  see,  and  is  it  your  firm  belief  that  a  significant 
portion  of  our  NATO  allies  wish  us  to  reject  the  treaty? 

Admiral  Moorer.  I  think  they  certainly  wish  it  to  be  significant- 
ly modified. 

CHANGES   NATO   WANTS   AMENDED   OR   CHANGED 

Senator  Biden.  Is  there  anjrthing  beyond  those  two  provisions 
that  they  believe  has  to  be  amended  or  changed?  Do  you  hear 
anybody  suggest  that  unless  we  include  the  Backfire  bomber,  we 
should  reject  the  treaty?  Have  you  heard  anybody  say  that? 

Admiral  Moorer.  Yes. 

Senator  Biden.  You  did? 

Admiral  Moorer.  Yes.  They  feel  that  the  Backfire  bomber  and 
SS-20  should  be  part  of  the  overall  package  and  is  not  counted. 

Senator  Biden.  They  think  they  should  be  counted  as  part  of  the 
central  systems? 

Admiral  Moorer.  Yes;  because  this  in  effect,  withdrawing  them 
from  the  Soviet  numbers,  changes  the  relative  balance  between  the 
weapons  systems,  the  central  system. 

Senator  Biden.  How  does  it  do  that? 

Admiral  Moorer.  It  degrades  the  U.S.  willingness  as  part  of  this 
crisis  of  confidence  that  you  and  I  just  mentioned. 

including  backfire  in  central  systems 

Senator  Biden.  I  see.  I  thought  their  concern  was  that  they  be 
able  to  move  forward  with  TNF  modernization,  introduce  the  long- 
range  Pershing,  have  access  to  cruise  technology,  and  deploy  their 
ground-launched  or  sea-launched  cruise,  and  that  that  was  the  only 
prospect  that  would  have  any  impact  in  countering  the  Soviet 
theater  systems,  the  theater  systems  being  the  Backfire  bomber 
and  the  SS-20. 

Now,  I  am  at  a  loss  to  understand  the  argument  you  have  just 
put  forward,  that  by  including  them  in  the  central  systems,  we 
would  in  any  way  alleviate  their  concern.  I  don't  understand  that. 
They  are  still  sitting  there.  They  are  still  there  directed  toward  the 
theater,  not  toward  the  United  States. 

By  the  way,  I  spoke  to  military  people  in  NATO,  and  they  know 
what  the  Backfire  bomber  is  for.  Not  a  military  man  in  Europe 
whom  I  have  run  across  doesn't  know  what  the  Backfire  bomber  is 
intended  for. 

It  is  not  intended  for  intercontinental  use.  It  is  intended  for 
them,  and  they  know  it,  so  they  are  very  worried.  How  does  includ- 
ing it  in  the  central  systems  affect  that  at  all? 


48-260    0-79    Pt . 4 


44 

Admiral  Moorer.  Well,  Senator  Biden,  I  don't  know  how  much 
experience  you  have  had  in  military  planning,  but  when  you  begin 
to  plan  any  kind  of  military  strategy  on  the  basis  of  predicting 
what  the  intentions  of  the  other  sides  are,  you  are  in  deep  trouble. 
You  have  to  look  at  the  capabilities  of  the  other  side  and  not  the 
intentions. 

Senator  Biden.  Precisely.  The  capability  of  those  aircraft  and 
what  they  are  designed  for.  I  don't  know  of  any  military  men  in 
Europe  who  believe  the  primary  capability  and  design  purpose  of 
these  aircraft  is  for  anything  but  the  theater;  do  you? 

Admiral  Moorer.  Instead  of  the  word  "primary"  I  think  it  is 
probably  true  that  they  are  primarily  devoted  to  European  targets, 
but  they  have  an  easy  capability  for  reaching  the  United  States, 
and  we  have  no  air  defense  worthy  of  the  name,  as  you  well  know. 

Senator  Biden.  You  know,  we  can  do  all  kinds  of  things  with  any 
kind  of  weapon,  but  it  seems  to  me  that  you  have  to  look  at  the 
purpose,  the  primary  purpose  for  which  they  are  constructed.  Obvi- 
ously, you  can  do  anything  with  almost  any  weapon.  I  have  not  run 
across  anybody  in  Europe,  any  military  people  who  have  any  doubt 
about  the  Backfire  bomber  being  a  theater  weapon. 

I  see  that  the  General  is  shaking  his  head  no.  General,  do  you 
know  of  any  military  men  in  Europe  who  say  that  is  not  the 
purpose? 

General  Graham.  I  know  a  lot  of  military  men  in  Europe  who 
would  say:  "Good  for  you.  United  States,"  sarcastically.  You  don't 
count  the  Backfire  bomber  because  you  hope  they  are  going  to  use 
them  on  us.  I  don't  think  that  causes  much  confidence,  and  when 
you  come  around  to  say  what  it  was  built  for,  the  Backfire  bomber 
is  the  best  bomber  the  Soviets  have  ever  built  for  attack  on  the 
United  States.  We  are  counting  50-  to  60-year-old  prop  jobs  in  the 
SALT  Treaty,  and  the  Soviets  are  going  to  have  400  of  these  new 
jobs,  and  we  are  not  counting  them  because  some  believe,  and 
apparently  you  believe,  that  they  were  not  built  for  attack  on  the 
United  States. 

I  don't  know  how  you  possibly  can  come  to  that  conclusion. 

PRIMARY  purpose  OF  BACKFIRE  BOMBER 

Senator  Biden.  General,  let  me  ask  you  the  question  again,  if  I 
could.  Are  there  military  people  in  Europe  that  you  know  who 
believe  that  the  primary  purpose  for  which  the  Backfire  bomber  is 
being  built  is  for  use  against  the  United  States,  or  do  they  believe 
that  the  primary  purpose  of  the  bomber  is  for  use  in  the  theater? 

General  Graham.  Military  men  both  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic 
and  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic  look  at  weapons  systems  in 
terms,  as  the  Admiral  said,  of  their  capability.  They  know  that  it  is 
capable  both  of  attacking  peripherally  and  attacking  the  United 
States.  Every  bomber  in  anybody's  inventory  is  better  for  attacking 
closer  targets  than  farther  targets. 

Senator  Biden.  Now  you  are  begging  the  question,  sir.  Let  me 
ask  it  in  another  way.  What  do  the  military  men  in  Europe  whom 
you  know  believe  is  the  mission  for  which  the  Backfire  is  presently 
tasked?  What  do  you  think? 

General  Graham.  I  don't  know  of  anybody  who  says  they  know 
what  the  mission  of  the  Backfire  is  on  this  side  of  the  water  or  over 


45 

there.  It  is,  of  course,  a  bigger  threat  to  anything  to  which  it  is 
closer,  and  that  is  Europe,  Japan,  and  China.  It  is  a  lesser  threat  if 
it  has  a  distance  to  go,  but  so  are  the  Soviet  bombers  that  we  are 
counting  in  SALT,  and  this  is  a  better  bomber  than  any  of  them. 

Senator  Biden.  So  the  SS-18,  because  it  has  less  distance  to  go  to 
get  to  Bonn,  is  also  more  of  a  threat  to  Europe  than  here. 

General  Graham.  No,  sir.  There  is  a  difference  between  aircraft 
and  missiles. 

Senator  Biden.  Well,  tell  me  the  difference  in  terms  of  the  ra- 
tionale that  you  just  put  forward.  You  said  any  target  ^hat  is  closer 
is  obviously  more  vulnerable.  Isn't  Bonn  therefore  more  vulnerable 
to  the  SS-18  than  we  are? 

General  Graham.  Yes,  sir;  but  you  can  get  to  Bonn  without 
refueling  the  Backfire,  and  you  have  to  refuel  the  Backfire  to  go  to 
some  farther  distant  target,  so  there  is  a  great  deal  of  difference 
how  you  look  at  a  missile  and  how  you  look  at  an  aircraft. 

Senator  Biden.  My  time  is  up.  Ihank  you,  gentlemen. 

Senator  Javits? 

Senator  Javits.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Gentlemen,  two  questions  occur  to  me,  and  I  would  like  to  ask 
them  of  you.  I  apologize  for  having  to  run  over  to  the  floor  of  the 
Senate  while  you  were  reading  your  statement,  but  I  gather  you 
read  the  letter  of  your  organization  into  the  record.  Is  that  correct? 

Admiral  Moorer.  Yes,  sir.  It  is  in  the  record. 

SALT   I   effect   on    U.S.   ARMAMENT   BUILDUP 

Senator  Javits.  I  notice  you  make  the  point  which  is  probably 
summed  up  in  these  words:  "The  Soviets  have  become  harder  not 
easier  to  deal  with  after  SALT  I."  Would  you  say  that  there  was 
anything  in  the  SALT  I  Treaty  which  prevented  us  from  taking  the 
same  steps  forward  in  armaments  that  the  Soviets  did  during  that 
time? 

Admiral  Moorer.  No,  sir,  Senator  Javits,  and  as  I  have  said 
many  times,  as  you  recall  I  am  sure,  when  I  as  Chairman  of  the 
Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  discussed  the  content  of  the  SALT  I  Interim 
Agreement  on  offensive  systems,  I  had  telephone  calls  between 
Washington  and  Moscow  on  this  matter  as  they  were  coming  down 
to  the  fine  wire  to  sign  the  treaty.  We  came  up  with  what  we 
called  conditions,  if  you  will,  or  assurances  that  we  felt  were  neces- 
sary in  order  to  make  SALT  I  viable. 

The  administration,  the  Secretary  of  State,  the  Secretary  of  De- 
fense, if  you  read  the  testimony,  strongly  supported  the  assurances 
that  were  requested  by  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff.  That  is  a  mattter 
of  record,  but  subsequent  to  that  time,  the  B-1  bomber  has  been 
canceled,  and  many  other  of  the  actions  with  respect  to  the  cruise 
missile,  for  instance — now,  we  have  agreed  to  place  a  restraint  on 
the  cruise  missile  range  for  land-based  and  sea-based  missiles,  and 
overall  the  general  thrust  of  what  we  have  been  talking  about  has 
been  slowed  down. 

I  agree  with  you  that  we  were  not  restricted  from  doing  any  of 
those  things,  but  I  believe  you  will  agree  that  SALT  I  created  a 
kinc!  of  euphoria  in  the  Congress  and  in  the  eye  of  the  public,  and 
consequently  people  more  or  less  kind  of  sat  back  in  their  chairs 


46 

and  the  progressive  buildup  of  the  Soviets  continued  while  ours 
went  down. 

DIFFERENCE   IN   TIME   PERIODS   FOLLOWING   SALT   I   AND   SALT   II 

Senator  Javits.  I  think  that  is  a  very  fair  statement,  Admiral. 

Let  me  refer  to  another  sentence  in  the  letter  which  reads  as 

follows: 

And  we  find  it  even  harder  to  believe  that  ratification  of  SALT  II  would  be 
followed  by  vigorous  U.S.  efforts  to  close  the  widening  gaps  betwen  U.S.  and  Soviet 
military  capabilities. 

I  ask  you  this  question.  Is  there  any  difference  between  this 
period  which  will  follow  a  SALT  II  ratification  if  we  do  ratify  and 
the  period  which  followed  SALT  I?  In  other  words,  will  we  still  be 
in  the  same  position  where  we  could,  if  we  wanted,  build  up  to  the 
Soviets  or  get  way  ahead  of  them?  What  is  there  in  this  treaty,  in 
your  judgment,  aside  from  the  euphoria  which  you  feel  will  contin- 
ue, which  will  block  us  from  taking  the  action  we  should  have 
taken,  assuming  your  argument  after  SALT  I?  What  is  there  in 
this  treaty  that  will  prevent  us  from  moving  forward  if  we  wish  to 
with  the  same  vigor  and  the  same  strength  that  you  prescribed 
after  SALT  I? 

Admiral  Moorer.  You  are  really  asking  me  two  questions.  First, 
what  is  different  about  the  time  today  and  the  time  back  in  1972?  I 
think  there  is  a  radical  difference.  I  think  that  the  rapid  buildup 
by  the  Soviets  in  all  phases  of  military  equipment,  missiles,  and 
conventional  forces,  and  so  on,  has  put  them  in  a  far  stronger 
position.  That  is  the  first  point.  I  think  in  1972  they  would  not 
have  dared  to  put  troops  and  fighter  pilots  in  Cuba.  I  think  they 
are  just  thumbing  their  nose  at  us. 

I  think  they  know  that  they  can  move  ahead  and  we  are  not 
going  to  do  anything  about  it,  so  there  is  a  major  difference  be- 
tween 1972  and  1979. 

Now,  so  far  as  the  specific  treaty  is  concerned,  what  can't  we  do? 
I  have  already  mentioned  what  I  think  are  the  unnecessary  re- 
straints imposed  on  the  United  States  by  the  protocol  which  im- 
posed no  restraints  on  the  Soviets,  and  in  my  view  will  slow  down  a 
buildup  of  the  NATO  countries  which  is  mandatory. 

Second,  you  have  such  things  in  the  treaty  as  article  IX,  I  believe 
it  is  that  article,  which  restricts  us  from  putting  ballistic  missiles 
on  ships.  Now,  if  we  are  a  maritime  power  and  the  Soviets  are  a 
land  power,  why  did  we  agree  to  accept  a  disadvantage  which  I  do 
not  think  is  necessary?  The  Soviets  were  the  ones  who  suggested 
this.  Obviously,  they  have  IVz  times  the  land  area  that  we  do.  I 
think  there  is  another  aspect  of  this  about  which  people  do  not  talk 
very  much,  Senator  Javits,  but  if  you  will  look  at  a  map,  you  will 
see  that  our  ballistic  missiles  are  west  of  the  population  centers  of 
the  United  States,  namely,  the  Chicago-Boston-Washington  trian- 
gle, and  if  the  Soviets  would  undertake  a  counterforce  attack  on 
our  land-based  missiles,  the  fallout  would  come  right  across  the 
most  densely  populated  area  of  our  country. 

Conversely,  the  Soviet  missiles  are  on  the  east  side  of  Soviet 
Russia,  and  if  we  were  to  attack  them,  as  we  well  know,  the  fallout 
would  go  over  Japan  and  China. 


47 

So,  I  think  that  we  should  not  just  agree  to  remove  an  option 
which  could  possibly  remove  the  target  from  the  center  of  the 
United  States. 

FEASIBILITY   OF   BALLISTIC   MISSILES   ON   SHIPS 

Senator  Javits.  Have  ballistic  missiles  on  ships  ever  been  consid- 
ered by  you  as  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  as  a  feasible  proposi- 
tion? 

Admiral  Moorer.  Yes,  sir,  many  times.  This  was  at  a  time,  of 
course,  when  we  were  beginning  to  get  seriously  concerned  about 
the  accelerated  Soviet  buildup  that  was  taking  place  subsequent  to 
the  Cuban  missile  crisis  in  1962.  This  was  looked  on  very  seriously 
in  the  Pentagon  as  an  alternative  means  of  rapidly  increasing  our 
missile  capability. 

Senator  Javits.  We  will  inquire  into  that.  Admiral.  So  far  as  I 
know,  it  is  the  first  time  this  has  been  raised.  We  will  inquire  into 
it. 

Admiral  Moorer.  But  the  treaty  does  prohibit  this. 

Senator  Javits.  Yes,  I  see  that.  We  will  include  article  IX  in  the 
record  at  this  point,  and  we  will  investigate  it. 

[The  information  referred  to  follows:] 

Article  IX — Special  Prohibitions  on  Weapon  Systems 

This  Article  prohibits  or  restricts  certain  types  of  weapon  systems. 

Subparagraph  1(a)  prohibits  the  development,  testing,  and  deployment  of  ballistic 
missiles  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers  for  installation  on  water- 
borne  vehicle  other  than  submarines,  and  of  launchers  of  such  missiles.  This  provi- 
sion prohibits  the  development  of  a  long-range  ballistic  missile  system  for  surface 
ships.  The  United  States  has  no  plans  for  such  a  system.  An  Associated  Common 
Understanding  declares  that  this  prohibition  does  not  affect  current  practices  for 
transporting  ballistic  missiles,  such  as  would  be  used  in  supplying  missiles  to 
operating  bases. 

Subparagraph  (b)  of  paragraph  1  of  Article  IX  prohibits  the  development,  testing, 
and  deployment  of  fixed  ballistic  or  cruise  missile  launchers  for  emplacement  on  the 
seabed  or  on  the  beds  of  internal  waters,  or  mobile  launchers  of  such  missiles  which 
move  only  in  contact  with  the  beds  of  such  waters,  as  well  as  missiles  for  such 
launchers.  The  effect  of  this  provision  is:  (a)  to  extend  the  prohibitions  of  the  Seabed 
Arms  Control  Treaty '  to  the  entire  territorial  waters  and  internal  waters  of  the 
Parties;  and  (b)  to  extend  its  obligations  to  include  development  and  testing  in 
addition  to  deployment.  The  Seabed  Arms  Control  Treaty  essentially  prohibits  Par- 
ties from  emplacing  nuclear  weapons  or  other  weapons  of  mass  destruction  as  well 
as  structures,  launching  installations  or  any  other  facilities  specifically  designed  for 
storing,  testing  or  using  such  weapons,  on  the  seabed  and  the  ocean  floor  (or  its 
subsoil)  beyond  a  12-mile  coEistal  "seabed  zone"  measured  from  the  baseline  of  the 
territorial  sea.  An  associated  Agreed  Statement  makes  clear  that  the  obligation 
contained  in  this  subparagraph  applies,  inter  alia,  to  all  areas  covered  by  the 
Seabed  Arms  Control  Treaty. 

The  prohibition  on  mobile  launchers  which  can  move  only  in  contact  with  the 
seabed  does  not  include  launchers  on  submarines,  as  submarines  need  not  be  in 
contact  with  the  seabed  in  order  to  move. 

Subparagraph  1(c)  of  Article  IX  prohibits  the  development,  testing  and  deploy- 
ment of  systems  for  placing  into  earth  orbit  nuclear  weapons  or  any  other  kind  of 
weapons  of  mass  destruction,  including  fractional  orbital  missiles.  This  subpara- 
graph expands  the  obligations  of  the  Outer  Space  Treaty,^  in  that  the  Outer  Space 


'  The  Treaty  on  the  Prohibition  of  the  Emplacement  of  Nuclear  Weapons  and  Other  Weapons 
of  Mass  Destruction  •  the  Seabed  and  the  Ocean  Floor  a. id  in  the  Subsoil  Thereof,  signed  at 
Washington,  London  ani.  Moscow  Feb.  11,  1971,  23  UST  701,  TIAS  7337.  The  United  States  and 
Soviet  Union  are  both  Parties  to  this  Treaty. 

^  Treaty  on  Principles  Governing  the  Activities  of  States  in  the  Exploration  and  Use  of  Outer 
Space,  Including  the  Moon  and  Other  Celestial  Bodies,  signed  at  Washington,  London  and 
Moscow  Jan.  27,  1967,  18  UST  2410,  TIAS  6347.  The  United  States  and  Soviet  Union  are  both 
Parties  to  this  Treaty. 


48 

Treaty  prohibits  only  the  actual  placement  in  space  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction, 
and  does  not  cover  fractional  orbital  missiles. 

An  associated  Common  Understanding  states  that  the  prohibition  on  fractional 
orbital  missiles  does  not  require  dismantling  or  destruction  of  existing  launchers  of 
either  Party.  However,  under  the  Second  Common  Understanding  to  paragraph  2  of 
Article  VII  the  Soviets  have  agreed  to  dismantle  or  destroy  twelve  SS-9  launchers 
at  the  Tyura-Tam  test  range  which  have  been  used  to  test  a  fractional  orbital 
bombardment  system  (FOBS)  several  times  in  the  past.  Moreover,  any  fractional 
orbit  missiles  in  existence  must  be  dismantled  or  destroyed  pursuant  to  the  obliga- 
tion of  paragraph  4  of  Article  XI,  and  such  missiles  cannot  be  developed  in  the 
future. 

Subparagraph  (d)  of  paragraph  1  prohibits  the  development,  testing,  and  deploy- 
ment of  mobile  launchers  of  heavy  ICBMs.  This  obligation  complements  what  is  in 
effect  a  ban  on  additional  fixed  launchers  of  modern  heavy  ICBMs  contained  in 
Article  IV.  Heavy  ICBMs  are  defined  in  paragraph  7  of  Article  II. 

Subparagraphs  (e)  and  (f)  prohibit  heavy  SLBMs  and  their  launchers  and  heavy 
ASBMs.  These  subparagraphs  in  effect  define  heavy  SLBMs  and  heavy  ASBMs  in 
language  parallel  to  that  for  the  definition  of  heavy  ICBMs  in  paragraph  7  of 
Article  II.  A  heavy  SLBM  or  ASBM  is  one  with  a  launch-weight  or  throw-weight 
heavier  than  that  of  the  Soviet  SS-19  ICBM.  The  First  and  Second  Agreed  State- 
ments defining  launch-weight  and  throw-weight  and  the  Common  Understanding 
concerning  "other  appropriate  devices"  for  SLBMs  and  ASBMs  also  parallel  those 
under  paragraph  7  of  Article  II.  The  mutual  understanding  of  the  Parties  on  the 
terminology  related  to  the  definition  of  throw-weight  set  forth  in  the  plenary 
statements  by  both  Parties  on  October  29,  1976  (stated  above),  applies  here  as  well. 

The  second  paragraph  of  this  Article  prohibits  the  flight-testmg  and  deployment 
on  heavy  bombers  of  long-range  cruise  missiles  equipped  with  multiple  independent- 
ly targetable  warheads.  An  Agreed  Statement  to  paragraph  2  defines  "independent- 
ly targetable"  warheads  of  cruise  missiles.  This  definition  is  similar  to  that  of 
MIRVs,  which  are  defined  under  paragraph  5  of  Article  II.  This  definition  does  not 
include  cruise  missiles  equipped  with  "cluster  warheads";  nor  does  it  include  a 
recoverable,  single-warhead  cruise  missile  which  can  attack  independent  targets  on 
separate  flights. 

Admiral  Moorer.  I  am  just  saying  that  we  should  not  voluntar- 
ily accept  the  restraint  that  the  Soviets  are  not  going  to  use 

an3rway.  *  i    •     i 

Senator  Javits.  Well,  I  know,  but  it  takes  two  to  tango.  Admiral. 

We  are  not  going  to  have  everything  our  way,  if  we  have  a  treaty. 

If  we  are  not  going  to  have  a  treaty,  we  and  they  will  each  go  our 

own  way.  That  was  my  argument  with  Professor  Rostow,  and  that, 

of  course,  is  another  very  different  matter. 
Admiral  Moorer.  Yes,  sir,  but  I  think  you  can  carry  that  only  so 

far,  or  you  will  wind  up  as  the  low  man  on  the  totem  pole. 

EFFECT   ON   NO   ARMAMENTS   PROGRAM   OF   SALT   IS   DEFEATED 

Senator  Javits.  But  that  depends  on  the  will  of  the  United 
States.  That  is  what  I  am  trying  to  get  from  you.  I  am  asking  you 
this  question.  Suppose  we  do  not  enter  into  this  treaty  and  we  are 
still  in  a  state  of  euphoria.  Are  we  then  worse  off  or  better  off.  In 
other  words,  we  remain  in  the  same  state  of  euphoria  then,  but  do 
not  make  the  treaty.  You  gentlemen  will  have  been  successful  in 
defeating  the  treaty,  but  if  you  are  not  successful  in  an  armament 
program,  then  what? 

Admiral  Moorer.  Well,  in  the  first  place,  I  think  I  emphasize 
two  or  three  times  that  we  are  not  opposed  to  arms  limitations.  I 
have  never  known  a  military  man  who  was.  Second,  what  we  are 
opposing  is  the  contents  of  this  particular  document.  We  are  not 
opposing  disarmament.  . 

Senator  Javits.  If  I  may  have  just  2  more  minutes.  Admiral,  let 
me  say  that  we  are  now  in  a  very  particular  situation.  You  have  no 


49 

guarantee  whatever,  believe  me,  that  if  we  reject  this  treaty  the 
Congress  is  going  to  vote  all  the  things  you  want  or  that  you  think 
we  ought  to  have.  I  should  not  say  "things  you  want;"  you  are  not 
capricious.  You  are  one  of  our  military  leaders. 

Admiral  Moorer.  I  am  a  retired  man. 

Senator  Javits.  That  is  all  right,  but  I  have  known  you  for  years, 
and  I  still  honor  you.  I  would  not  take  away  one  whit  from  you. 
You  cannot  assure  us  of  that  at  all.  If  we  reject  the  treaty  and  are 
still  euphoric,  aren't  we  then  much  worse  off? 

Admiral  Moorer.  Senator  Javits,  I  think  that  the  treaty  can  be 
put  in  such  a  form  that  it  would  be  a  far  more  balanced  and 
equitable  treaty,  and  we  have  discussed  some  of  the  points  here. 

Senator  Javits.  Well,  Admiral,  then  you  are  superimposing  your 
judgment  on  that  of  the  President,  the  negotiators,  and  the  Joint 
Chiefs  of  Staff,  and  saying  that  we  can  negotiate  a  better  deal  if  we 
turn  this  down.  Now,  that  is  a  big  question,  a  very  big  one.  You 
can't  guarantee  that. 

Admiral  Moorer.  Of  course  not,  but  I  feel  it  would  be  better  to 
try  than  to  accept  this  treaty  verbatim  as  written. 

Senator  Javits.  By  turning  it  down,  whatever  may  be  the  conse- 
quences? 

Admiral  Moorer.  I  think  it  should  be  negotiated  further. 

Senator  Javits.  I  know,  but  that  is  turning  it  down.  Sir,  great 
nations  cannot  bluff.  The  Senate  is  going  to  vote  on  this  treaty,  and 
it  is  going  to  turn  it  down  if  you  win.  Then  where  does  that  leave 
us?  In  my  opinion,  it  threatens  to  leave  us  with  the  same  euphoria, 
with  no  treaty,  with  an  exacerbated  situation  in  the  world,  and 
with  far  more  scared  European  powers  than  they  are  today. 

Admiral  Moorer.  Sir,  I  think  you  also  have  to  ask  the  question 
of  where  does  it  leave  us  if  we  sign  it.  That  is  what  concerns  me. 
You  can  say  that  it  is  a  matter  of  opinion,  but  I  think  the  facts 
speak  for  themselves.  I  think  the  Soviets  have  reached  a  point  now 
that  they  really  do  not  care  what  we  think.  Otherwise,  thej' 
wouldn't  be  down  in  Cuba  today. 

Senator  Javits.  Well,  we  will  see  about  Cuba,  sir.  You  are  too 
much  of  a  professional  to  jump  at  first  assumptions.  I  do  not  know 
what  Cuba  amounts  to,  but  believe  me,  we  will  dig  into  it  carefully. 
There  is  indirect  linkage  for  me  between  Cuba  and  SALT,  and  I 
believe  there  is  for  everybody  else.  There  is  no  use  in  kidding 
ourselves  about  that.  However,  we  are  not  at  the  bottom  of  that 
story  yet. 

AGREEMENT   TO   SALT   I   TIED  TO   ADMINISTRATION   PRESSURE 

You  say  at  the  end  of  your  letter.  Admiral:  "As  military  profes- 
sionals, and  with  all  due  respect  for  our  more  circumscribed  col- 
leagues still  bound  by  their  active  service."  Admiral,  did  you  agree 
to  SALT  I  because  the  administration  wanted  you  to  or  because 
you  were  convinced  it  was  the  right  thing  to  do?  In  other  words, 
are  you  attributing  a  standard  to  the  present  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff 
which  is  lower  than  yours? 

Admiral  Moorer.  No,  sir,  certainly  not,  but  I  can  tell  you  this. 
Based  on  years  and  years  of  experience  in  our  system  of  govern- 
ment, we  are  the  only  nation  to  my  knowledge  that  requires  a  man 
in  uniform  to  testify  before  the  legislative  branch  of  the  Govern- 


50 

ment.  I  do  know  from  my  experience  that  it  makes  no  difference, 
and  I  am  not  getting  political  on  this  at  all,  it  makes  no  difference 
whether  it  is  a  Republican  or  a  Democratic  administration.  There 
are  pressures  brought  to  bear  on  the  military  people  which  I  think 
are  probably  proper  in  an  executive  pyramid,  but  they  do  not  have 
an  opportunity  to  speak  as  I  am  speaking  to  you  today. 

This  is  an  absolute  fact  in  our  system.  Now,  I  do  not  oppose  that. 
I  think  in  an  executive  branch,  whether  it  is  in  the  executive 
branch  of  the  U.S.  Government  or  in  the  structure  of  General 
Motors,  that  the  chairman  of  the  board,  or  the  President,  or  who- 
ever happens  to  be  the  chief  executive  officer,  in  all  honesty  and 
fairness  should  ask  his  assistants,  his  vice  presidents,  or  his  joint 
chiefs  of  staff  what  they  think  about  this  issue. 

Then,  he  might  say,  I  hear  you  but  I  am  going  to  do  it  another 
way.  I  have  done  that  many  times  myself  with  my  own  staff.  I  am 
sure  you  have,  too.  Senator  Javits,  but  once  the  chief  executive 
makes  the  decision,  then  the  staff  is  obligated  to  do  everything  it 
can  to  support  that  decision.  These  people  have  two  options,  to 
either  support  or  to  resign.  That  is  the  way  the  system  works.  I  do 
not  think  it  should  be  changed  or  that  it  can  be  changed. 

RELIABILITY   OF  JCS   TESTIMONY 

Senator  Javits.  Admiral,  you  would  have  us  believe,  and  perhaps 
this  is  the  most  portentious  part  of  your  testimony,  that  in  order  to 
get  the  truth  out  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  we  have  to  wait  until 
they  retire,  and  they  are  then  no  longer  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff? 

Admiral  Moorer.  No;  I  did  not  say  that  at  all,  and  I  hope  you 
are  not  suggesting  that  I  am  accusing  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  of 

lying. 

Senator  Javits.  No;  I  did  not  mean  to  do  that  at  all.  You  are 
absolutely  right  to  object,  and  I  apologize,  but  in  order  to  get  what 
they  really  think,  you  tell  us  we  will  have  to  wait  until  they  resign 
and  they  are  no  longer  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff;  therefore  we  cannot 
rely  upon  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff.  That  is  probably  the  most 
serious  thing  that  has  been  evidenced  in  this  whole  hearing. 

Senator  Biden.  Or  the  political  leadership  you  pointed  out  of  the 

Western  World.  n  c^    rr     i. 

Senator  Javits.  Let's  talk  about  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  the 
professionals,  and  you  were  one  of  them.  Did  you  want  us  to  rely 
on  you  when  you  were  Chairman? 

Admiral  Moorer.  Certainly. 

Senator  Javits.  You  did?  Well,  why  do  you  not  want  us  to  rely 
on  the  present  Joint  Chiefs? 

Admiral  Moorer.  I  did  not  say  that.  I  said  you  must  take  the 
lead  of  the  Chief  Executive,  and  all  the  people  who  work  for  him 
are  required  to  support  him.  That  is  what  I  said.  That  is  what  they 

all  do.  .  u  .  T 

Senator  Javits.  Well,  sir,  this  is  where  you  are  an  expert,  but  1 
must  say  in  my  opinion  you  leave  our  country  in  an  extremely 
exposed  and  vulnerable  position  to  tell  us  that  we  can't  really 
know  what  they  think.  They  will  somehow  rationalize  or  conform 
to  the  Chief  Executive  when  they  are  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff.  You 
have  to  face  that.  Admiral.  There  is  no  way  of  ducking  it.  That  is 
what  you  are  telling  us,  in  my  opinion. 


51 

Admiral  Moorer.  Senator  Javits,  let  me  say  that  the  Joint 
Chiefs  of  Staff  sent  several  memoranda  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
on  SALT  II  and  they  expressed  essentially  the  same  concerns  that  I 
have  expressed  today.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  I  think  some  members  of 
this  committee  remarked  at  the  time  the  Joint  Chiefs  were  sitting 
right  here  that  what  you  are  doing  is  damning  the  treaty  with 
fai!.t  praise.  If  you  are  fair  about  it,  if  you  read  what  they  said,  I 
don't  think  that  they  just  can't  wait  until  this  treaty  is  signed. 

Senator  Javits.  Sir,  I  am  sorry.  They  are  men  of  authority  and 
decision.  I  am  not  a  professional,  but  I  have  served,  too.  I  know 
that  military  people  know  how  to  decide  and  how  to  give  an  order, 
whatever  may  be  their  reservations,  and  they  have  stated  them. 
They  have  been  given  an  order.  They  have  said,  we  are  for  this,  so 
ratify  it.  I  will  say  that  you  worry  me  very  much  about  many, 
many  things,  and  not  just  this  particular  treaty,  but  major  deci- 
sions which  involve  the  very  existence  of  our  country, 

QUESTION   OF   VERIFICATION 

Senator  Biden.  Let  me  follow  on  that  one  point.  You  mentioned 
the  question  of  verification,  General,  and  Admiral.  I  sit  on  the 
Intelligence  Committee.  I  have  for  a  year  now  heard  the  testimony 
of  the  very  men  who  are  the  experts  both  in  the  military  and 
outside  of  the  military.  I  have  heard  Admiral  Inman,  who  is  an 
incredibly  qualified  fellow.  I  have  heard  the  heads  of  our  intelli- 
gence community  come  before  us  and  say  that  we  can  verify  this 
treaty.  I  have  only  one  source  for  classified  information.  I  cannot 
even  go  to  you  any  longer.  You  don't  have  the  access. 

The  very  eminent  retired  generals  and  admirals  whom  you  have 
listed  do  not  have  the  access  to  up-to-date  information  which  the 
people  who  are  now  charged  by  our  Government  with  our  security 
have.  They  have  said  to  us  that  this  treaty  is  verifiable.  Barry 
Goldwater  says  this  treaty  is  verifiable,  after  listening  to  them.  We 
all  must  rely  at  some  point  on  experts.  We  are  not  talking  about 
political  questions  in  terms  of  verification.  We  are  asking  them, 
can  you  see  X,  Y,  and  Z,  and  the  experts  say,  yes,  we  can.  You  are 
telling  us  in  your  statement,  and  all  of  these  retired  people  appar- 
ently agree,  that  it  is  not  verifiable.  You  go  on  to  tell  us  that  the 
rank  and  file  of  the  military  in  Europe  have  much  deeper  reserva- 
tions about  the  treaty  than  the  present  military  leadership.  You  go 
on  to  say  that  the  political  leadership  is  strongly  for  SALT,  but 
underneath  there  is  really  no  support. 

It  seems  to  me  that  you  have  made  the  most  damning  indictment 
of  political  and  military  leadership  and  expertise  not  only  in  this 
country  but  in  the  entire  alliance  that  I  have  ever  heard.  You  are 
right  that  I  don't  have  the  experience  with  strategic  planning  that 
you  do.  I  am  a  36-year-old  U.S.  Senator,  not  a  retired  Admiral  with 
a  very  distinguished  career.  But  because  of  what  I  am,  I  look  to  the 
people  who  supposedly  know,  the  leadership  in  the  military,  the 
leadership  in  the  intelligence  community,  the  leadership  in  the 
alliance,  and  uniformly  they  tell  me,  with  reservations  that  have 
been  expressed,  that  we  should  ratify  this  treaty.  And  you  are 
sajdng  to  us  that  retired  people  know  better,  that  we  should  listen 
to  them,  and  you,  and  not  to  this  leadership.  And  you  imply  that 
they  are  really  not  telling  us  what  they  think. 


52 

If  that  is  true,  you  don't  leave  us  much  to  rely  on,  not  just  in  this 
treaty,  but  in   anything  relating  to  our  military  establishment. 

Admiral  Moorer.  Senator  Biden,  I  don't  wish  to  leave  it  in  those 
terms.  It  is  true,  as  I  said  before,  that  we  do  have  a  different 
system  which  was  established  by  the  Congress  in  the  Defense  Reor- 
ganization Act  of  1958  as  well  as  the  National  Security  Act  of  1927, 
I  believe.  You  might  want  to  take  a  look  at  that.  But  when  you  get 
to  technical  matters,  in  terms  of  the  capability  of  the  intelligence 
system  or  the  capability  of  our  own  equipment,  of  course,  you  get 
the  greatest  detail  in  this,  but  when  you  get  into  a  flat  question  of, 
do  you  approve  of  the  Vietnam  conflict,  which  I  did  not,  and  I  said 
so  many  times,  nevertheless,  we  also  talk  all  the  time  about  civil- 
ian control.  I'll  bet  I  have  heard  that  term  a  thousand  times,  the 
term  "civilian  control."  We  do  have  civilian  control  in  this  country. 
I  have  never  known  a  military  man  who  does  not  support  the 
Constitution,  but  I  think  there  are  pressures  put  on  military  people 
to  go  along  with  the  administration's  policy,  and  that  is  just  a  fact. 

I  think  if  you  were  President,  you  would  do  the  same  thing. 

Senator  Biden.  Sure,  there  is  pressure,  and  I  would  attempt  to  do 
the  same  thing  if  I  believed  it  were  right,  but  honorable  military 
men  are  faced  with  the  same  choice  that  honorable  men  in  politics 
are,  and  that  is  that  they  can't  go  along  with  it  if  they  really 
believe  the  security  of  the  country  is  being  jeopardized.  Then  they 
would  have  an  obligation  to  resign.  That  is  a  real  obligation,  not  a 
fictitious  one. 

You  are  implying  that  this  treaty  truly  jeopardizes  the  security 
of  the  United  States,  and  that  the  military  men  who  are  telling  us 
otherwise  know  that.  Now,  it  seems  to  me  for  them  to  continue  in 
office  if  they  believe  that  means  they  would  be  dishonorable  men, 
regardless  of  the  pressure.  If  I  in  fact  totally  disagree  with  a 
position  my  party  takes,  my  State  takes,  or  my  constituency  takes, 
i  don't  have  an  obligation  to  go  along.  I  have  an  obligation  to 
follow  my  conscience,  and  I  should  resign  if  I  can't  go  along  with  it. 

These  men,  you  are  saying  to  us,  know  that  this  treaty  jeopar- 
dizes the  security  of  the  United  States  of  America  but  because  of 
political  pressure  they  are  not  coming  forward. 

Admiral  Moorer.  No,  sir;  I  didn't  say  that.  I  said  that  what  they 
told  you,  I  am  sure,  was  their  opinion,  but  I  think  that  this  treaty, 
as  I  say  in  my  statement,  is  ill-advised  in  its  present  form.  I  am  not 
like  you  in  the  sense  that  I  do  not  have  access  to  the  intelligence 
reports  that  you  have.  General  Graham  was  director  of  the  intelli- 
gence agency,  and  so  far  as  the  verification  capabilities  are  con- 
cerned, he  is  an  expert. 

Senator  Biden.  I  know  that.  I  am  not  suggesting  that  General 
Graham  cannot  disagree  with  Admiral  Inman. 

General  Graham.  I  don't  think  I  do,  as  a  matter  of  fact.  One  of 
the  problems  I  think  for  a  Senator  getting  briefed  on  verification 
is,  you  may  not  know  what  questions  to  ask  because  you  don't 
know  enough  about  it.  Have  you  questioned  this  part  of  the  treaty 
that  says  the  Soviets  will  not  produce  an  SS-16  missile,  will  not 
produce  the  third  stage  of  it,  will  not  produce  the  warhead?  I  don't 
know  of  an  honest  intelligence  man,  Bobby  Inman  included,  who 
will  say,  yes,  I  can  verify  that  they  are  not  producing  the  warhead 
for  an  SS-16.  He  knows  they  can't  do  that. 


53 

I'll  bet  you  if  you  ask  him  bluntly,  can  you  tell  me,  Bobby,  can 
you  verify  whether  or  not  the  Soviets  are  producing  a  warhead  for 
an  SS-16,  he  will  tell  you  he  doesn't  know.  I  will  bet  you  Admiral 
Turner,  who  knows  a  lot  less  about  it  than  Bobby  does  because  he 
hasn't  been  in  it  as  much,  will  also  tell  you  no,  and  General  Tighe 
will  tell  you  know  if  you  ask  the  right  question. 

Senator  Biden.  You  are  a  very  interesting  fellow.  General,  to 
imply  that  after  a  Senator  spends  a  full  year,  involving  several 
hundred  hours  of  reading  and  briefings,  that  he  is  not  able  even  to 
ask  the  right  questions.  You  guys  make  such  an  incredible  indict- 
ment of  the  system  that  I  just  find  it  absolutely  difficult  to  believe 
you  are  saying  it. 

Senator  Stone.  Don't  go  away  mad,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Senator  Biden.  Oh,  no,  I  won't  do  that. 

INTRODUCTION  OF  COMBAT  TROOPS  IN  CUBA 

Senator  Stone.  Admiral  Moorer,  on  July  17,  you  and  Admiral 
Zumwalt  testified  before  this  committee  and  for  the  first  time  the 
issue  of  Soviet  military  buildups  was  raised  by  me  in  questioning 
you.  I  asked  you  was  it  not  the  case  that  Soviet  Golf  II  submarines 
carry  nuclear  misssiles,  and  that  if  servicing  such  a  submarine 
took  place  in  Cuba,  it  would  be  a  violation,  and  you  said  it  would  '  I 
asked  you  both  this  question:  I  would  like  to  ask  either  or  both  of 
you  whether  you  think  a  direct  or  indirect  effort  to  establish  a 
military  base  would  be  established  by  the  introduction  of  a  large 
number  of  combat  troops  of  the  Soviet  Union  into  Cuba. 

Admiral  Zumwalt  said  there  is  no  question  in  his  mind.  You, 
Admiral  Moorer,  said  absolutely,  yes,  sir.  I  then  asked,  would  you 
say  that  if  other  than  advisers,  the  Soviet  Union  attempted  to 
introduce  as  much  as  a  brigade  of  combat  troops  into  Cuba,  that 
that  would  constitute  a  direct  or  indirect  effort  to  establish  a  base. 

Well,  since  that  time,  within  a  day,  the  administration  witnesses 
denied  that  the  Golf  II  submarine  does  or  did  carry  nuclear  mis- 
siles, but  within  a  week  admitted  it,  and  it  is  in  the  record.  Within 
3  or  4  weeks  after  that,  they  have  now  conceded  and  now  they 
assert  that  there  is  a  Soviet  brigade  of  combat  troops  in  Cuba. 

My  final  question  to  you  was  this:  "I  have  already  inquired  about 
the  Soviet  submarine  visits.  I  have  already  inquired  about  the  Mig- 
23  and  Mig-25  presence  in  Cuba.  If  in  addition  to  that  there  were  a 
major  introduction  of  Soviet  combat  troops  into  Cuba,  could  there 
be  any  further  doubt  that  we  just  do  not  care  about  protecting  our 
hemisphere  against  Soviet  military  bases  in  this  hemisphere?" 

At  that  time  you  said,  Admiral  Moorer:  "None  whatsoever,  none 
whatever,  and  I  think  it  would  be  the  height  of  folly  for  the  United 
Stated  to  permit  that  to  happen,  sir." 

It  has  now  happened.  What  is  your  suggestion  to  our  policy- 
makers at  this  juncture?  And  I  would  like  the  opinion  of  you. 
Admiral  Moorer,  and  also  General  Graham,  of  you. 

Adi.Jral  Moorer.  In  my  opinion  this  is  directly  linked,  as  I 
pointed  out,  this  action  by  the  Soviets — as  a  matter  of  fact,  I 
predicted  this  was  going  to  happen  when  I  testified  on  the  Panama 
Canal  issue.  I  stated  that  there  was  a  Torrijos-Moscow-Castro  axis, 

■  See  the  SALT  II  Treaty  hearings,  part  2,  pp.  178-180. 


54 

and  that  the  Senate  should  not  be  surprised  if  we  did  not  find  an 
expansion  of  Soviet  activity  in  Cuba  in  very  short  order. 

I  was  sitting  right  here  in  this  very  room,  I  believe. 

In  the  first  place,  I  believe  this  is  part  of  the  overall  effort  of  the 
Soviets  to  gain  major  influence  worldwide.  I  think  there  is  no  way 
that  you  can  unlink  this  from  the  SALT  discussion.  As  I  said  this 
morning,  I  think  it  is  all  part  of  an  overall  grand  design  on  their 
part. 

In  the  first  place,  I  think  the  SALT  discussions  should  be  halted 
until  the  Soviets  reconcile  this  point.  If  they  refuse  to  do  that,  then 
I  think  there  are  several  courses  of  action  open  to  us.  Of  course,  I 
am  not  in  a  position  to  decide  on  these. 

Certainly  I  think  we  should  make  it  crystal  clear  to  the  Soviets 
and  to  the  world  at  large  that  we  are  not  going  to  tolerate  this 
gradual  creeping  injection  of  Soviet  forces  all  around  the  world.  I 
mentioned  Angola,  Mozambique,  Ethiopia,  Yemen,  and  other  areas. 
Obviously,  we  will  give  the  perception  to  the  world  at  large  that  we 
are  engaged  in  a  massive  program  of  worldwide  retrenchment. 

Senator  Stone.  Thank  you,  Admiral. 

General  Graham? 

General  Graham.  When  I  heard  about  the  brigades.  Senator 
Stone,  the  chill  that  went  through  me  was  related  to  the  fact  that  I 
was  one  of  the  key  analysts  at  the  time  of  the  1962  missile  crisis, 
which  is  the  last  time  that  the  Soviets  had  a  brigade  in  Cuba. 

We  were  thinking  about  deploying  our  troops.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  we  did  deploy  our  troops  down  in  Florida  to  go  in.  The 
question  put  to  the  intelligence  people  was,  what  are  those  Soviet 
troops  going  to  do?  Why  are  they  there?  Some  of  the  theses  were, 
well,  maybe  they  put  them  there  to  try  to  deter  us  from  attacking 
Cuba,  but  we  said  one  brigade  will  not  deter  us  from  moving 
against  Cuba. 

Then  maybe  they  are  there  to  help  make  sure  Castro  stays  in 
power  as  sort  of  a  palace  guard.  That  was  rejected.  The  final 
analysis  from  all  knowledgeable  Sovietologists  is  that  they  were 
there  to  guard  nuclear  weapons  because  the  Soviets  have  never 
allowed  nuclear  weapons  to  get  in  the  hands  of  even  their  most 
trusted  satellites.  This  is  a  consideration  that  should  be  taken  very 
much  to  heart  by  the  Senate  of  the  United  States,  because  it  does 
have  to  do  with  strategy.  This  business  about  saying,  well,  don't 
worry  about  them,  they  are  not  going  to  invade  Florida,  no,  they 
are  not  going  to  invade  Florida,  but  the  last  time  a  group  like  that 
was  there,  the  Government  of  the  United  States  decided,  and  the 
intelligence  organs  of  the  United  States  decided  they  were  there  to 
guard  nuclear  weapons. 

INTRODUCTION   OF   NUCLEAR   CAPABLE   AIRCRAFT   INTO   CUBA 

As  you  brought  out,  and  much  to  your  credit.  Senator,  you  did 
raise  your  voice  when  the  Soviets  introduced  new  nuclear  capable 
aircraft  into  Cuba  that  were  better  nuclear  delivery  systems  than 
the  ones  that  Jack  Kennedy  said  they  had  to  take  out  at  the  time 
they  took  out  their  missiles.  They  had  some  old  IL-28's  in  there, 
much  poorer  aircraft  than  what  they  put  in  there  now  that  are 
nuclear  capable,  and  then  there  was  a  chat  about,  well,  this  is  not 
the  right  model,  and  we  don't  know  whether  they  are  wired  and  so 


55 

forth,  but  I  will  tell  you,  every  one  of  those  aircraft  that  is  de- 
ployed opposite  NATO  is  counted  by  the  NATO  people  as  a  nuclear 
threat  to  NATO. 

Senator  Stone.  Are  you  speaking  of  the  Mig-23's? 

General  Graham.  Yes,  the  Mig-23's,  the  floggers.  So,  this  is  an 
extremely  serious  business,  and  it  should  not  be  handled  simply 
through  an  expression  of  concern.  I  believe  something  must  be 
done  about  checking  what  may  be  just  the  tip  of  the  iceberg.  This 
is  what  we  see  now  in  Cuba.  What  else  is  in  Cuba?  Once  again,  we 
are  getting  the  kind  of  reports  that  one  of  your  colleagues.  Senator 
Keating,  was  getting  before  the  Cuban  missile  crisis.  They  said, 
watch  out,  something  very  sinister  is  going  on  down  there  in  Cuba. 
We  could  say,  well,  this  is  just  Cuban  exiles  having  their  say  again, 
but  now  we  had  better  pay  some  attention  to  them,  as  we  did  not 
pay  attention  to  them  in  those  days  until  we  took  pictures  and 
found  out  what  was  going  on. 

There  is  one  other  aspect  of  this,  and  here  I  agree  with  Henry 
Kissinger,  and  sometimes  Henry  Kissinger  and  I  have  not  agreed 
on  things.  Dr.  Kissinger  always  insisted  that  we  continue  to  fly 
reconnaissance  flights  over  Cuba  while  some  of  my  colleagues  even 
in  the  Pentagon  said  that  for  cost  purposes  we  are  getting  enough 
pictures  with  satellites,  so  why  send  aircraft?  He  said,  t^e  day  you 
stop  sending  the  aircraft  over  Cuba,  you  are  going  to  py:2  a  signal 
to  the  Soviet  Union  that  it  is  now  open  season  for  Hem  to  do 
anything  they  want  in  Cuba. 

When  this  administration  came  into  power,  I  regret  to  say  those 
reconnaissance  flights  were  stopped.  I  think  that  makes  Henry 
Kisssinger  something  of  a  prophet  on  this  particular  occasion. 

Senator  Stone.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  have  an  additional  2  or  3 
minutes? 

Senator  Biden.  Yes,  sir. 

Admiral  Moorer.  Senator  Stone,  please  permit  me  to  make  an 
additional  comment.  I  have  been  extremely  concerned  about  the 
Soviet  pilots  in  Cuba  because  I  feel  that  in  the  short  term  they  are 
more  destabilizing  than  the  troops  were,  because  should  they  inter- 
cept an  American  plane  in  the  vicinity  of  Cuba,  a  situation  would 
be  generated  which  can  bring  about  a  confrontation.  For  them  to 
have  their  pilots  in  Cuba,  I  think,  is  another  matter  that  should  be 
taken  up  with  the  Soviets  by  the  strongest  means  available. 

Senator  Stone.  Thank  you.  Admiral. 

General,  I  have  another  question  on  this  point.  How  recently  did 
you  retire  as  head  of  the  Defense  Intelligence  Agency?  In  what 
year  was  that? 

General  Graham.  It  was  January  1,  1976. 

SECRETARY   VANCE's   ASSERTION — BRIGADE   IN   CUBA   SINCE    1975 

Senator  Stone.  1976.  As  of  that  time,  could  you  comment  on  the 
Secretary  of  State's  assertion  of  yesterday  that  the  brigade  prob- 
ably was  there  in  1975  or  even  earlier? 

General  Graham.  If  that  is  so,  then  there  was  absolutely  no 
evidence  of  that  when  I  was  Chief  of  Military  Intelligence. 

Senator  Stone.  And  you  were  conducting  the  aerial  reconnais- 
sance then? 


56 

General  Graham.  That's  right.  In  those  days  we  were  looking  a 
lot  better  than  we  have  been  in  the  last  V-k  years. 

Senator  Stone.  Well,  in  the  last  V-k  weeks  we  did  conduct  the 
appropriate  reconnaissance,  the  administration  says.  That  is  what 
a  lot  of  them  do,  piece  the  jigsaw  puzzle  together.  What  you  are 
saying  is  that  that  same  or  equivalent  surveillance,  up  until  Janu- 
ary 1,  1976,  had  not  produced  that  kind  of  evidence  or  anything 
like  that  kind  of  evidence? 

General  Graham.  That  is  correct.  The  most  that  we  could  find  in 
those  days  of  evidence  of  Soviet  presence  was  that  they  had  con- 
structed some  facilities  for  Soviet  sailors  coming  into  Cienfuegos. 
We  could  see  the  recreation  facilities  and  some  barracks  there. 
They  put  up  some  kind  of  sports  fields  that— I  forget  which  it 
was — Cubans  don't  play,  so  we  know  it  was  Soviets. 

Senator  Stone.  Gentlemen,  I  am  saying,  as  I  have  said  repeated- 
ly in  the  last  weeks,  that  what  you  saw  then  in  Cienfuegos  as  a  few 
recreational  facilities  is  considerably,  substantially,  and  in  a  major 
way  more  than  what  is  seen  now  in  Cienfuegos.  Isn't  that  a  fair 
comment,  from  what  you  know? 

General  Graham.  Yes,  sir,  that  is  right.  I  was  amazed  to  see  in 
the  newspapers  where  somebody  said,  well,  those  troops  have  been 
there  for  5  or  6  years.  If  they  were,  we  sure  missed  them,  and  we 
were  covering  Cuba  very  well.  I  believe  that  these  troops  are  part 
of  the  pattern  that  you  have  begun  to  see  with  Mig-23  aircraft 
arrriving,  with  the  Soviet  pilots  in  their  flying  combat  missions  in 
allegedly  Cuban  forces,  and  now  this  brigade.  We  are  only  seeing 
that  which  is  hard  to  hide,  and  we  had  better  take  this  extremely 
seriously. 

Senator  Stone.  Thank  you,  gentlemen. 

Mr.  Chairman,  thank  you. 

Admiral,  I  particularly  want  to  thank  you  for  assisting  with  the 
disclosure  and  discovery  of  what  General  Graham  calls  the  tip  of 
the  iceberg,  but  which  had  to  come  out,  and  which  is  now  out. 

General  Graham,  I  thank  you  for  clarifying  this  question  of 
when  this  test  substantially  began.  Thank  you. 

Senator  Biden.  Thank  you.  Senator  Stone. 

Senator  Hayakawa? 

Senator  Hayakawa.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

soviet  successful  first  strike  possible  by  1982-83 

There  seems  to  be  general  agreement  that  regardless  of  whether 
or  not  we  ratify  SALT  II,  by  about  1982  or  1983,  the  Soviets  will  be 
able  to  make  a  successful  first  strike. 

General  Graham.  Yes,  sir. 

Admiral  Moorer.  Yes. 

Senator  Hayakawa.  Now,  the  M-X  will  not  be  fully  deployed 
before  1988.  Is  that  right? 

General  Graham.  I  believe  it  is  1986,  sir.  If  everything  stays  on 
track,  you  will  get  some  of  them  in  1986. 


57 

WHAT  UNITED  STATES  SHOULD  DO  TO  COUNTER  SOVIET  STRATEGIC 

SUPERIORITY 

Senator  Hayakawa.  What  could  or  should  the  United  States  do 
now,  promptly,  in  order  to  counter  the  danger  of  Soviet  strategic 
superiority  by  1982  or  1983? 

What  are  the  things  we  should  be  doing? 

Admiral  Moorer.  Well,  Senator  Hayakawa,  I  have  always  felt 
that  you  cannot  uncouple  the  conventional  capabilities  from  the 
strategic  capabilities,  so  in  my  view,  in  answer  to  your  question,  we 
should  start  now  to  redress  this  imbalance  in  both  the  conventional 
and  the  strategic  areas.  Now,  some  people  will  say  that  we  can't  do 
an5^hing  about  that  until  the  treatj'  expires,  so  what  is  the  use? 
However,  firm  action  that  is  clearly  perceived  by  the  world  at  large 
that  this  is  what  we  are  doing  in  itself  would  have,  in  my  view,  a 
deterrent  effect.  Had  we  done  this  a  year  ago,  I  don't  think  the 
Soviets  would  have  put  troops  in  Cuba  or  built  them  up  as  they 
have. 

separation  of  strategic  AND  CONVENTIONAL  PREPARATION 

Senator  Hayakawa.  Admiral,  possibly  to  ask  another  question, 
you  say  that  strategic  preparations  and  conventional  ones  cannot 
be  separated  from  each  other.  Is  that  so? 

Admiral  Moorer.  That's  right. 

Senator  Hayakawa.  Are  we  not  being  asked  in  considering  the 
SALT  11  Treaty  to  consider  the  strategic  elements  only  and  to 
ignore  ever3d;hing  else  that  is  going  on  in  conventional  weaponry 
and  conventional  warfare? 

Admiral  Moorer.  That  is  correct.  I  have  felt  from  the  outset  and 
have  said  that  SALT  11  should  be  a  national  security  debate  and 
not  just  a  SALT  debate.  SALT  should  be  merely  a  part  of  the 
debate. 

General  Graham.  May  I  add  to  that,  Senator? 

Senator  Hayakawa.  Please  do. 

NEED  TO   ERADICATE  CLASH   OF  STRATEGIC   PHILOSOPHY 

General  Graham.  The  fundamental  problem  is  to  get  rid  of  this 
crazy  notion  that  we  have  been  pursuing  for  15  years  called  mutual 
assured  destruction  [MAD].  You  in  the  Senate,  in  your  hearings, 
have  produced  some  evidence  of  a  profound  clash  of  doctrine  in  the 
Pentagon.  On  July  9,  Secretary  of  Defense  Brown  said  that  mutual 
assured  destruction  was  the  bedrock  of  our  strategic  doctrines.  On 
July  16,  when  the  Chairman  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  was  asked, 
what  do  you  think  of  mutual  assured  destruction,  he  said,  it  is  an 
extremely  dangerous  idea,  and  we  in  the  military,  no  matter  how 
much  our  civilian  masters  think  that  is  a  good  idea,  have  not 
followed  it. 

So,  until  that  clash  of  philosophy  or  clash  of  strategy  is  removed, 
it  seems  to  me  that  we  are  not  going  to  make  the  kind  of  military 
moves  that  we  must  in  order  to  defend  this  country.  There  are 
things  that  are  never  mentioned.  Why  don't  we  go  ahead  and 
defend  the  American  people?  Under  the  MAD  concept,  we  have 
gotten  rid  of  all  our  defense.  We  have  encouraged  the  Soviets  to 


58 

come  up  with  a  Backfire  bomber  by  getting  rid  of  all  of  our  de- 
fenses against  bombers. 

Civil  defense  is  not  a  long  leadtime  item,  and  that  in  itself  would 
help  greatly  to  rectify  the  gross  imbalance  in  power,  but  if  we  only 
stare  at  that  little  piece  of  the  military  problem  which  is  called 
intercontinental  delivery,  nuclear  systems,  and  then  insist  on  ex- 
cluding some  of  them  because  they  get  in  the  way  of  making  an 
agreement,  we  aren't  even  looking  at  the  U.S.  military  problem. 
We  are  not  even  looking  at  our  strategic  problem.  We  are  certainly 
not  looking  at  the  total  complex  of  economic,  political  and  military 
matters  that  should  be  a  national  strategy. 

Instead,  we  are  picking  this  tiny  thing  and  arguing  about  cruise 
missiles,  accuracies,  and  so  forth.  While  we  stare  at  that  little  piece 
of  the  picture,  we  find  the  whole  Western  position  crumbling  away 
at  an  ever  increasing  rate. 

DEGREE   OF   SCHIZOPHRENIA   NEEDED   TO   DISCARD   LINKAGE   THEORY 

Senator  Hayakawa.  General,  I  am  grateful  to  you  for  confirming 
my  worst  suspicions.  The  insistence  on  the  part  of  both  the  Soviets 
and  our  own  administration  that  we  consider  the  SALT  agreement 
in  isolation  with  no  linkage  between  that  and  Soviet  adventurism 
in  Yemen,  Angola,  Ethiopia,  and  so  on,  we  are  not  supposed  to 
think  about  at  all,  they  say,  but  that  seems  to  require  of  us  a 
degree  of  schizophrenia  of  which  I  am  not  quite  capable. 

General  Graham.  I  think  there  is  a  gross  illogic  in  that  position, 
too.  I  am  on  the  road  all  the  time  with  the  administration  SALT 
sellers  to  try  to  offset  them.  When  they  talk  to  the  people,  they 
say,  look,  there  is  no  linkage  between  Soviet  past  and  present 
behavior  and  SALT.  SALT  is  in  an  area  all  by  itself.  Then  the  next 
speaker  gets  up  and  says,  we  have  to  have  SALT  because  the 
Soviets  will  behave  better  with  it  and  worse  without  it,  so  in  the 
future  there  is  linkage,  but  in  the  present  and  past  there  is  no 
linkage.  These  people  have  no  logic  to  their  positions  whatsoever. 

SUSPENSION   OF   SALT   DISCUSSIONS   UNTIL   CUBAN   PROBLEM   IS 

RESOLVED 

Senator  Hayakawa.  General,  didn't  I  understand  you  to  say  that 
our  response  to  the  presence  of  that  Cuban  brigade  should  be  to 
suspend  the  discussion  of  the  ratification  of  SALT  II? 

Admiral  Mooorer.  That  is  what  I  said.  In  my  opinion,  we  should 
suspend  it  until  this  issue  is  settled.  If  this  is  a  manifestation  of 
what  the  Soviets  are  planning  overall  in  conjunction  with  the 
revolutionaries  in  Cuba,  this  is  only  the  beginning.  We  have  seen 
Nicaragua  go  down  the  drain,  and  I  think  certainly  effort  is  now 
going  to  be  focused  on  all  of  Latin  America  and  South  America  too, 
here,  right  in  our  own  backyard,  where  the  Panama  Canal  is  one  of 
the  maritime  gateways  of  the  world,  it  connects  the  U.S.  Western 
States  with  the  east  coast,  but  the  whole  objective,  in  my  view,  of 
the  Soviets  from  the  outset  has  been  to  control  the  approaches  to 
that  Panama  Canal  for  the  same  reason  they  are  working  on  the 
Suez  Canal.  Now  that  they  have  gone  into  Cam  Ranh  Bay,  which  is 
the  best  naval  base  in  all  of  the  Pacific  they  have  the  Malacca 
Straits  in  Singapore  staring  down  their  throat. 


59 

So,  they  are  working  hard  all  the  time  to  control  maritime  traffic 
from  one  ocean  of  the  world  to  the  other. 

Senator  Hayakawa.  Thank  you  very  much,  Admiral.  I  think  you 
will  be  happy  to  learn  that  at  a  press  conference  in  response  to 
press  inquiries  yesterday  as  to  what  I  thought  ought  to  be  done 
about  the  presence  of  Cuban  troops,  I  said  we  should  call  off  the 
SALT  negotiations  altogether. 

Admiral  Moorer.  Senator,  I  think  you  are  absolutely  right. 

Senator  Hayakawa.  Thank  you. 

Senator  Stone  [presiding].  Thank  you.  Senator  Hayakawa. 

Admiral,  General,  thank  you  very  much. 

[Admiral  Moorer's  and  General  Graham's  prepared  statements 
follow:] 


48-260    0-79    Pt . U    -    5 


60 
Prepared  Statement  of  Adm.  Thomas  H.  Moorer,  USN,  Retired 

Mr.  Chairman  and  Members  of  the  Committee, 

I  am  honored  to  have  the  opportunity  to  testify  again  before 
this  Committee  on  the  SALT  II  treaty. 

Today,  I  am  testifying  as  Chairman  of  the  Executive  Committee  of 
the  Coalition  for  Peace  Through  Strength. 

The  Coalition  for  Peace  Through  Strength  is  a  bipartisan 
alliance  of  105  national  organizations,  204  Members  of  Congress  and 
other  pro-defense  leaders  across  America.   The  American  Security 
Council,  which  I  serve  as  a  member  of  the  Board  of  Directors,  is  the 
program  secretariat  for  the  Coalition. 

The  purpose  of  the  Coalition  is  to  work  for  the  adoption  of  a 
national  strategy  of  Peace  Through  Strength. 

It  is  our  belief  that  if  the  United  States  Senate  consents  to 
the  SALT  II  Treaty,  it  would  make  the  adoption  of  such  a  strategy 
most  unlikely. 

We  did  prepare  a  detailed  study  called  AN  ANALYSIS  OF  SALT  II. 
However,  this  is  a  78-page  document  and  thus  too  long  for  me  to 
cover  in  the  time  allotted  to  us  today. 

Instead,  I  ask  permission  to  read  a  three-page  joint  statement 
signed  by  1678  retired  general  and  flag  officers  from  all  the  armed 
services. 

As  you  know,  active  duty  military  leaders  are  not  permitted  to 
flatly  oppose  SALT  II.   This  is  why  we  at  the  Coalition  for  Peace 
Through  Strength  have  sought  out  the  views  of  retired  military 
leaders  who  are  now  free  to  speak  out. 

From  my  conversations  with  active  and  retired  military  leaders, 
I  believe  that  the  overwhelming  majority  oppose  SALT  II  as  written. 
This  has  been  confirmed  by  the  fact  that  only  four  of  the  retired 
officers  contacted  so  far  have  declined  to  join  in  the  statement 
because  they  support  SALT  II  as  written.   Another  thirty-three 
declined  for  such  reasons  as  that  they  were  undecided,  ill,  or 
thought  that  the  statement  should  be  written  differently. 

We  are  continuing  to  circulate  the  statement  and  will  later  give 
each  Senator  a  copy  of  the  statement  with  a  list  of  all  the  signers 
at  that  time. 


61 


COALITION  FOR  PEACE  THROUGH  STRENGTH 

Program  Secretariat:  American  Security  Council 
Educational  Secretariat:  American  Security  Council  Education  Foundation 


September  6,  1979 


The  Honorable  Frank  Church,  Chairman 

U.S.  Senate 

Committee  on  Foreign  Relations 

Dear  Senator  Church: 

We,  the  undersigned  retired  and  reserve  general  and  flag  officers 
of  all  U.S.  Military  Services  respectfully  request  you  to  oppose 
ratification  of  SALT  II. 

We  are  in  agreement  with  most  of  our  fellow  Americans  in  pre- 
ferring international  cooperation  and  equitable  arms-limitation  agree- 
ments to  hostility  and  competition.   But  we  cannot  agree  that  we  can 
wish  this  congenial  state  of  affairs  into  being  by  blinding  ourselves 
to  the  stark  realities  of  our  strategic  situation.   In  our  view,  SALT 
II  as  now  written  epitomizes  the  refusal  of  some  Americans  to  face  the 
facts.   The  facts  which  must  be  faced  are  these: 

Ten  years  of  U.S.  restraint  in  the  strategic  nuclear  field 
rooted  in  our  faith  in  the  SALT  process  has  not  been  recipro- 
cated by  the  Soviet  Union;  rather,  the  Soviets  have  pursued  an 
unprecedented  buildup  of  nuclear  offensive  and  defensive 
capability  which,  as  Secretary  of  Defense  Brown  points  out,  is 
aimed  at  a  war-winning  capability. 

The  concept  of  Mutual  Assured  Destruction  (MAD)  which  has 
shaped  U.S.  policy  since  the  1960 's  was  never  accepted  by  the 
Soviets  and  has  been  completely  negated  by  their  massive  stra- 
tegic defensive  effort  including  civil  defense. 

The  aggressiveness  of  Soviet  behavior  throughout  the  world  has 
increased  ominously  as  the  military  balance  has  tilted  in  favor 
of  the  USSR. 

U.S.  intelligence  capabilities  to  verify  Soviet  compliance  with 
arms-control  agreements  have  been  seriously  eroded  through  com- 
promise of  satellite  reconnaissance  systems  and  loss  of  key 
monitoring  facilities. 


Washington  Office:  499  South  Capitol  Street,  Washington,  D.C.  20003 
Washington  Communications  Center:  Boston,  Virginia  22713 


62 


It  seems  to  us  that  there  is  little  disagreement  inside  or  outside 
government  that  these  are  the  facts,  yet  the  Senate  has  been  asked  to 
ratify  a  treaty  which  apparently  ignores  those  facts.  We  are  told  by 
defenders  of  SALT  II  that  while  this  treaty  does  little  to  slow  down 
the  Soviet  military  surge,  it  is  necessary  to  ratify  it  to  preserve  the 
"process."  They  insist  that  SALT  III  and  SALT  IV  will  cure  the 
inequities  of  SALT  I  and  SALT  II.   This  ignores  Soviet  behavior  since 
SALT  I.   The  Soviets  have  become  harder,  not  easier,  to  deal  with. 

The  proponents  of  SALT  II  insist  that  we  will  improve  our  security 
through  ratification  because  the  situation  would  be  worse  without 
SALT  II. 

We  find  it  hard  to  believe  that  the  Soviets  could  significantly 
accelerate  their  current  arms  buildup  in  light  of  the  fact  that  they 
are  already  spending  15  percent  of  their  gross  national  product  on 
arms.   And  we  find  it  even  harder  to  believe  that  ratification  of 
SALT  II  would  be  followed  by  vigorous  U.S.  efforts  to  close  the 
widening  gaps  between  U.S.  and  Soviet  military  capabilities.   It  is 
almost  certain  that  Senate  ratification  of  this  treaty  would  commit  the 
United  States  to  another  seven  years  of  pursuing  peace  through  trust  of 
the  Soviets  and  adherence  to  the  obviously  bankrupt  doctrine  of  Mutual 
Assured  Destruction  (MAD) .   This  means  further  decline  of  our  capa- 
bility to  deter  war  or  to  defend  ourselves. 

We  respectfully  submit  that  the  arms-control  process  has  become 
dominated  by  a  persistent  U.S.  refusal  to  face  the  reality  of  a  failure 
of  the  twin  policies  of  detente  and  disarmament. 

SALT  II  doesn't  even  limit  arms.   The  image  of  limitation  is  pro- 
vided by  alleged  equal  numbers  of  launchers  and  aircraft,  not  to  the 
real  destructive  elements  of  nuclear  force — missiles  and  explosive 
power — where  the  Soviets  have  been  allowed  a  heavy  advantage.   To  make 
matters  worse,  the  "equal"  numbers  are  contrived  by  failing  to  count 
Soviet  delivery  systems  such  as  the  Backfire,  the  most  advanced  stra- 
tegic bomber  in  the  operational  inventory  of  either  side. 

We  also  find  the  treaty  as  written  unverifiable  and  attempts  to 
finesse  this  issue  by  redefining  terms  most  disturbing.   SALT  II  is 
much  more  complex  than  SALT  I  and  covers  qualitative  as  well  as  quan- 
titative aspects  of  nuclear  armaments  enormously  more  difficult  to 
monitor.   Given  the  compromise  of  our  key  verification  satellite 
systems  and  the  loss  of  vital  monitoring  stations  in  Iran,  we  cannot 
insure  against  Soviet  circumvention  of  the  treaty  provisions.   State 
Department  documents  describing  SALT  II  redefine  verification.  Where 
adequate  verification  once  required  an  assurance  from  U.S.  intelligence 
that  attempts  by  the  Soviets  to  circumvent  would  be  detected,  it  now 
requires  only  that  we  can  detect  cheating  on  such  a  large  scale  that  it 
alters  the  strategic  balance  in  time  to  assure  an  appropriate  U.S.  re- 
sponse. This  new  definition  completely  finesses  the  problem  of 


63 


adequacy  of  our  intelligence  capability  since  it  is  totally  dependent 
on  one's  view  of  what  constitutes  a  "strategic  balance"  and  an  "appro- 
priate response."  For  those  who  find  the  actual  balance  of  strategic 
capabilities  irrelevant,  and  believe  that  a  single  U.S.  Poseidon  sub- 
marine is  an  adequate  deterrent  regardless  of  the  size  of  the  Soviet 
forces,  SALT  II  can  be  considered  "adequately  verifiable"  with  no  D.S. 
intelligence  capability  at  all. 

We  agree  with  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  Dr.  Brown,  that  the 
Soviets  are  building  forces  capable  of  fighting  and  winning  a  nuclear 
war  with  the  United  States  and  its  allies  but  we  strongly  disagree  with 
his  view  that  this  aim  can  be  thwarted  by  ratifying  SALT  II.   Soviet 
participation  in  SALT,  or  any  other  arms  control  treaties,  is  primarily 
designed  to  further  this  goal  and  to  elicit  U.S.  accjuiescence  and  even 
cooperation  in  creating  the  necessary  Imbalcince  of  power  required  by 
that  goal. 

In  sum,  we  urge  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  to  consider  the 
grave  consequences  of  ratifying  a  treaty  which  will  commit  this  country 
to  continuation  of  disarmsunent  policies  which,  however  promising  when 
adopted,  have  imperilled  the  security  of  the  United  States  and  its 
allies  and  encourage  ever  more  aggressive  Soviet  behavior.   The  SALT 
process  is  not  so  sacrosanct  that  we  must  accept  a  lopsided  and  unveri- 
flable  agreement  simply  to  show  "progress." 


We  who  know  war  cherish  peace.  We  are  not  warmongers, 
oppose  SALT  II  have  been  dubbed  by  some. 


as  all  who 


As  military  professionals,  and  with  all  due  respect  for  our  more 
circumscribed  colleagues  still  bound  by  their  active  service,  we 
strongly  urge  you  to  reject  SALT  II  as  injurious  to  the  security 
interests  of  the  United  States  and  its  allies. 


With  Grave  Concern, 


Admiral  Thomas  H.  Moorer,  OSN,  Ret. 
On  behalf  of  the  following  retired 
generals  and  flag  officers 


Rear 

Adm. 

Rear 

Adm, 

Rear 

Adm. 

Brig 

.  Gen 

Rear 

Adm. 

Brig 

.  Gen 

Rear 

Adm. 

Rear 

Adm. 

Rear 

Adm. 

Elmer  P.  Abernethy,  USN,  Ret 

Raymond  B.  Ackerman 

Charles  Adair,  USN,  Ret 
.  Charles  J.  Adams,  USAF,  Ret 

Frank  Akers,  USN,  Ret 
.  Frank  Albanese,  USA,  Ret 

John  W.  Albrittain,  USN,  Ret 

Clarence  E.  Aldrich,  OSN,  Ret 

Leroy  J.  Alexanderson,  USNR,  Ret 


Maj. 

Gen. 

Rear 

Adm. 

Brig, 

,  Gen 

Brig, 

,  Gen 

Maj. 

Gen. 

Brig, 

.  Gen 

Brig, 

.  Gen 

Brig, 

,  Gen 

Rear 

Adm. 

Jesse  M.  Allen,  USAF,  Ret 

John  M.  Alford,  OSN,  Ret. 
.  Lawrence  H.  Allen 
.  Richard  C.  Allgood 

John  R.  Allison 
.  Conrad  S.  Allman,  USAF,  Ret 
.  Walter  F.  Alt 
.  Kenneth  G.  Althaus,  OSA,  Ret. 

Richard  G.  Altmann,  USNR,  Ret. 


64 


Rear   Adm.    Stephen  H.    Aitibruster,    USN,    Ret. 

Rear   Adm.    John  G.    Ames,    III,    USNR,    Ret. 

Maj.    Gen.    Glenn  C.    Ames,    USA,    Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Charles  C.  Anderson,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Earl  O.  Anderson,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Herbert  H.  Anderson,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Roy  G.  Anderson,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Vernon  L.  Anderson,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Winston  P.  Anderson,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  John  D.  Andrew,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  R.  S.  Andrews,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  John  G.  Appel,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Jack  J.  Appleby,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Howard  H.  Arbury,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Robert  J.  Archer,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Wilbur  W.  Aring,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Theodore  A.  Arndt,  USA,  Ret. 

Admiral  Jackson  D.  Arnold,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Kelly  Arnold,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Walter  E.  Arnold,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Thomas  E.  Arnott 

Rear  Adm.  G.  W.  Ashford,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Milton  H.  Ashkins,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  James  H.  Ashley,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Frederick  L.  Ashworth,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Raymond  Astumian 

Vice  Adm.  Bernard  L.  Austin,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Edward  Austin,  USNR,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Kenneth  A.  Ayers,  USNR,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Leo  A.  Bachman,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Robert  M.  Backes 

Brig.  Gen.  Van.  N.  Backman,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Donald  G.  Baer ,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  George  H.  Bahm,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  James  A.  Bailey,  'Jf-AF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  B.  Bailey,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  William  S.  Bailey,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Lee  E.  Bains,  USNR,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Duncan  S.  Baker,  USNR,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Felix  L.  Baker,  USN,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Harold  D.  Baker,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Felix  P.  Ballenger,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Richaird  R.  Ballinger,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Joseph  R.  Barbaro,  USN,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  Glenn  O.  Barcus,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Eugene  A.  Bar ham 

Rear  Adm.  Christopher  S.  Barker,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Roland  J.  Barnick,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Charles  H.  Barnwell,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Charles  D.  Barrett 

Brig.  Gen.  Paul  L.  Barton,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  John  W.  Baska,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Thomas  E.  Bass,  III,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Raymond  H.  Bass,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Joseph  E.  Bastion,  USA,  Ret. 


Rear  Adm.  Harold  Bater,  USNR,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Harold  R.  Bauer,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Rudolph  C.  Bauer,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  George  W.  Bauernschmidt,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Richard  M.  Baughn,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  William  H.  Baumer ,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Edward  Bautz,  Jr.,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Kenneth  H.  Bayer,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Charles  Beach 

Rear  Adm.  Charles  B.  Beasley,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Charles  Becker,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Frederick  J.  Becton,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Theodore  C.  Bedwell,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Aaron  W.  Beeman,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Charles  S.  Beightler,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  John  K.  Beling,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  David  B.  Bell,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Frederick  Bell,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  John  H.  Bell,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Russell  J.  Bellerby,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Herbert  G.  Bench,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Russell  A.  Berg,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  William  W.  Berg,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Kenneth  P.  Bergquist,  USAF,  Ret. 

Admiral  Russell  S.  Berkey,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Ferdinand  V.  Berley,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Joseph  L.  Bernier,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Robert  Bernstein,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Paul  D.  Berrigan,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Walter  B.  Bess,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Wendell  L.  Bevan,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Irwin  F.  Beyerly,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  William  W.  Beverley,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Horace  V.  Bird,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  John  F.  Bird,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  William  H.  Birdsong,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Max  K.  Bitts,  USA,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Paul  P.  Blackburn,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Donald  F.  Blake,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  William  H.  Blakefield,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Charles  E.  Blaker 

Brig.  Gen.  R.  M.  Blanchard,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  John  R.  Blandford 

Maj.  Gen.  Jonas  L.  Blank,  USAF,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Albert  M.  Bledsoe,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Frederick  B.  Blessee,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Elliott  Bloxom,  USN,  Ret. 

General  Philip  T.  Boerger,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Calvin  M.  Bolster,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Jones  E.  Bolt,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Charles  R.  Bond,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Thomas  Bonner,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Milton  O.  Boone,  USA,  Ret. 

Admiral  Walter  F.  Boone,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  John  L.  Boros 


65 


Rear  Adm.  John  T.  Bottoms,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Aubrey  J.  Bourgeois,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Clarence  M  Bowley,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  George  M.  Bowman,  USNR,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  A.  L.  Bowser 

Brig.  Gen.  John  H.  Boyes,  USA,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  George  S.  Boylan,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  William  A.  Boyson,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Russell  Boyt,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Anthony  A.  Braccia,  USNR,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  William  T.  Bradley,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Frank  A.  Braisted,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  William  H.  Brandenburg,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Frank  A.  Brandley,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  William  H.  Brandon,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Arthur  F.  Brandstatter ,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  L.  Render  Braswell,  USAF,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  Robert  A.  Breitweiser,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  James  T.  Brewer,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  James  R.  Bright,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Russell  C.  Brinker,  USNR,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  James  Brittingham,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  John  C.  Brogan,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Douglas  B.  Brokenshire,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Allison  C.  Brooks,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Grady  S.  Brooks,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Thad  A.  Broom,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Charles  R.  Broshous,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Charles  P.  Brown,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Jay  G.  Brown,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Thomas  W.  Brown,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  D.  Brown,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Samuel  R.  Browning,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Frederick  J.  Brush,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Albert  S.  Brussel,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Henry  C.  Bruton,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  William  E.  Bryan,  USAF,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Carleton  F.  Bryanc,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  John  H.  Buckner,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Carl  E.  Bull,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Ross  P.  Bullard, 

Brig.  Gen.  Cady  R.  Bullock,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Howard  G.  Bunker,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  O.  Burch,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Harvey  P.  Burden,  USN,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  Allen  M.  Burdett,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Raymond  W.  Burk,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  William  A.  Burke,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  John  W.  Burkhart,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  John  C.  Burney,  Jr.,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  John  R.  Burns 

Maj.  Gen.  Merrill  D.  Burnside,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Albert  C.  Burrows,  USN,  Ret. 

brig.  Gen.  Ernest  H.  Burt,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Charles  R.  Bushong,  USA,  Ret. 


Brig.  Gen.  Chester  J.  Butcher,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Benjamin  J.  Butler,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Ogbourne  D.  Butler 

Maj.  Gen.  Robert  G.  Butler,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Thomas  F.  Butt,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  John  L.  Butts,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Victor  A.  Byrnes 

Rear  Adm.  Jose  M.  Cabanillas,  USN,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Malcolm  W.  Cagle,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  William  R.  Calhoun,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  John  U.  Calkins,  USA,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  William  M.  Callaghan,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Joseph  W.  Callahan,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Thomas  S.  Cameron,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  John  M.  Campbell,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Robert  L.  Campbell,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Roland  A.  Campbell,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  William  B.  Campbell,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  C.  Craig  Cannon,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Robert  H.  Canterbury,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Daniel  Carlson,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Martin  D.  Carmody,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Edwin  H.  Cams,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Stephen  W.  Carpenter,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Bruce  L.  Carr,  USN,  Ret. 

General  W.  Reynolds  Carr 

Brig.  Gen.  Richard  C.  Carrera 

Lt.  Gen.  Charles  W.  Carson,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Harry  R.  Carson,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Joseph  M.  Carson,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Albert  S.  Carter,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Jesse  H.  Carter,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Hugh  J.  Casey,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Benjamin  B.  Cassiday,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  George  W.  Casslercnr,  USNR,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Gordon  L.  Caswell.  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Richard  C.  Catledge,  USAF,  Ret. 

Gen.  Jack  J.  Catton,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Cecil  T.  Caufield,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  John  H.  Caughey,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Robert  W.  Cavenagh,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  William  S.  Chairsell,  USAF,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Alvin  D.  Chandler,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Curtis  W.  Chapman,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Harry  M.  Chapman,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  James  W.  Chapman,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Steve  A.  Chappuis,  USA,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  P.  N.  Char  bonnet,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Carlos  F.  Chardon 

Maj.  Gen.  Charles  H.  Chase,  USA,  Ret. 

General  Max  M.  Cherry 

Brig.  Gen.  William  H.  Cheeseraan,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  John  H.  Chiles,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Keith  L.  Christensen,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  James  G.  Christiansen,  USA,  Ret. 


66 


Rear  Adm.  John  S.  Christiansen 

Vice  Adm.  Ralph  W.  Christie,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Gordon  P.  Chunghoon,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Bradford  G.  Chynoweth,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Albert  H.  Clancy,  USN,  Ret. 

General  Albert  P.  Clark 

Brig.  Gen.  Allen  F.  Clark,  Jr.,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adra.  David  H.  Clark,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Jeane  R.  Clark,  USN,  Ret. 

Admiral  John  E.   Clark,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  John  M.  Clark,  USAF,  Ret. 

General  Bruce  C.  Clarke 

Admiral  Ralph  S.  Clarke,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Winton  R.  Close,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig,  Gen.  John  B.  Coates,  Jr.,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Ralph  G.  Coburn,  Jr.,  USNR,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Lor  is  R.  Cochran,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Samuel  G.  Cockerhara,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Benjamin  Coe,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  James  E.  Cohn,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Philip  P.  Cole,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  C.  Cole,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Lewis  E.  Coley,  USN,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  R.  W.  Colglazier 

Maj.  Gen.  Kenneth  W.  Collins,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  John  L.  Collis,  USN,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  John  B.  Colwell,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Walter  V.  Combs,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  J.  Richard  Compton 

Brig.  Gen.  Ross  R.   Condit,  Jr.,  USA,  Ret. 

Admiral  Ray  R.  Conner,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Raymond  C.  Conroy,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Louis  J.  Conti 

Rear  Adm.  Albert  B.  Cook,  USNR,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Ralph  E.  Cook,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  R.  Cooke,  USN,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Damon  W.  Cooper,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Joshua  W.  Cooper,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Marcus  F.  Cooper,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Paul  T.  Cooper,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Ralph  C.  Cooper,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Richard  H.  Cooper,  USAR 

Rear  Adm.  Bennett  S.  Copping,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Thomas  G.  Corbin,  USAF,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  Charles  A.  Corcoran,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Frederic  W.  Corle,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Peter  Corradi,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Ted  H.  Corry,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Edward  J.  Costello,  Jr.,  USNR,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Hugh  J.  Cox,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adra.  William  R.  Cox,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  John  S.  Coye,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Jarred  V.  Crabb,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Kenneth  Craig,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  William  H.  Craig,  USA,  Ret. 


Rear  Adm.  Wyatt  Craig,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Richard  S.  Craighill,  USN,  Ret. 

General  Reginald  M.  Cram 

Brig.  Gen.  William  J.  Crandall,  USAFR,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Albert  B.  Crawford,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  B.  Hayden  Crawford 

Rear  Adm.  George  C.  Crawford,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Edward  I.  Creed,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Charles  H.  Crichton,  USN.  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Richard  G.  Cross,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Thomas  H.  Crouch,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Albert  B.  Crowther,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Harry  Crutcher,  Jr.,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adra.  Robert  R.  Crutchfield,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Allman  T.  Culbertson,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Charles  R.  Cundiff,  USNR,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  John  W.  Currier,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  R.  D.  Curtin,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Robert  H.  Curtin,  USAF,  Ret. 

General  Donald  Curtis 

Maj.  Gen.  Gilbert  Curtis,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Raymond  W.  Curtis,  USA,  Ret. 

Vice  Adra.  Walter  L.  Curtis,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Ben  Scott  Custer,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Charles  S.  D'Orsa,  USA,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  John  A.  Dabney,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Leo  P.  Dahl,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Theodore  0.  Dahl,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adra.  Carl  M.  Dalton,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  0.  T.  Dalton 

Rear  Adm.  Winfred  P.  Dana,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Maurice  W.  Daniel,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Thomas  C.  Darcy,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Carlton  S.  Dargusch,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Carl  Darnell,  Jr.,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Don  O.  Darrov?,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Anthony  F.  Daskevich,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Frederick  J.  Dau,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Lester  A.  Daughter ty,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Buddy  R.  Daughtrey,  USAF,  Ret. 

General  Harry  J.  Davidson,  Sr. 

Brig.  Gen.  Joseph  H.  Davidson,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Charles  L.  Davis,  USA,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  George  M.  Davis,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Glenn  B.  Davis,  USN,  Ret. 

General  Raymond  G.  Davis 

Maj.  Gen.  Woodard  E.  Davis,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Thurlow  W.  Davison,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Donald  S.  Dawson,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Willard  H.  Day,  USNR,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  James  K.  DeArmond,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Arthur  R.  DeBolt,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Chester  B.  DeGavre,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Merlin  L.  DeGuire,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  John  W.  Dean,  Jr.,  USA,  Ret. 


67 


Maj.  Gen.  Elbert  Decoursey,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Russell  Defauver,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Clinton  G.  Defoney,  USN,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Robert  L.  Delashaw,  USAF,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Leon  Delighter 
Maj.  Gen.  Marvin  C.  Demler,  USAF,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Kenneth  C.  Dempster,  USAF,  Ret. 
Vice  Adm.  Francis  C.  Denebrink,  USN,  Ret. 
Admiral  Robert  L.  Dennison,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Clyde  R.  Denniston,  USAF,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  John  A.  Des  Fortes,  USAF,  Ret. 
Vice  Adm.  Harold  T.  Deutermann,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  J.  P.  S.  Devereux 
Maj.  Gen.  Lawrence  R.  Dewey,  USAF,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  E.  B.  Dexter,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  William  J.  Deyo,  USA,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  John  S.  B.  Dick,  USA,  Ret. 
Lt.  Gen.  William  W.  Dick,  Jr.,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  George  W.  Dickinson,  USN,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  William  A.  Dietrich,  USAF,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Charles  E.  Dissinger,  USA,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  John  S.  B.  Divk,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Ernest  W.  Dobie,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  John  W.  Dobson,  USA,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen  Nevin  W.  Dodd,  USAF,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Sydney  B.  Dodds,  USNR,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Roy  T.  Dodge,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Joseph  E.  Dodson,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Carl  R.  Doerf linger,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  John  W.  Dolan,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  William  A.  Dolan,  USN,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  John  M.  Donalson,  USAF,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Jack  N.  Donohew,  USAF,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Philip  J.  Donovan 
Lt.  Gen.  Stanley  J.  Donovan,  USAF,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Thomas  A.  Donovan,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Edward  M.  Dooley,  USA,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Charles  R.  Doran,  USA,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Paul  P.  Douglas,  USAF,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Williain  R.  Douglas,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Wallace  R.  Dowd,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 
Admiral  James  H.  Doyle,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  William  C.  Doyle,  USA,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Abraham  J.  Dreiseszun,  USAF,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Donn  R.  Driver,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Raymond  F.  DuBois,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Thomas  H.  Dubois,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Francis  R.  Duborg,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  James  R.  Dudley,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  John  H.  Dudley,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Clifford  H.  Duerfeldt,  USN,  Ret. 
Vice  Adm.  Irving  T.  Duke,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Robert  W.  Duke,  USA,  Ret. 
Lt.  Gen.  Leo  J.  Dulacki 
Admiral  Charles  K.  Duncan,  USN,  Ret. 


Brig.  Gen.  Donald  Dunford,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  William  D.  Dunham,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Frank  Dunkley,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Charles  G.  Dunn,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Richard  T.  Dunn,  USA,  Ret. 

Admiral  Lewis  W.  Dunton,  USNR,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  James  K.  Durham 

Rear  Adm.  Willijun  H.  Duvall,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  R.  T.  Dwyer 

Brig.  Gen.  John  R.  Dyas,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Victor  A.  Dybdal,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  E.  R.  Eastwold,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Robert  E.  L.  Eaton,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Seimuel  K.  Eaton,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Harvey  W.  Eddy,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Alan  C.  Edmunds,  USAF,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  James  V.  Edmundson,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Morris  0.  Edwards,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Parmer  W.  Edwards,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Clarence  T.  Edwinson,  UAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Edward  S.  Ehlen,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Milton  Ehrlich 

Brig.  Gen.  Charles  V.  Elia,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Ernest  M.  Eller,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Frank  W.  Elliott,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Howard  V.  Elliott,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  John  C.  B.  Elliott,  USAF,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  William  E.  Ellis,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Ernest  B.  Ellsworth,  USN,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  Hugh  M.  Elwood 

Lt.  Gen.  William  J.  Ely,  USA,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  Henry  E.  Emerson 

Lt.  Gen.  Jean  E.  Engler,  USA,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  William  P.  Ennis,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Horace  H.  Epes,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  William  H.  B.  Erwin,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Graydon  C.  Essman,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  William  E.  Eubank,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Harry  L.  Evans,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Thomas  B.  Evans,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Gordon  S.  Everett,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Harry  G.  Ewart,  USNR,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Arthur  E.  Gxon,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Francis  L.  Fabrizio,  USNR,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  D.  S.  Fahrney,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  William  H.  Fairbrother,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Ivan  L.  Farman 

Rear  Adm.  Eugene  H.  Farrell,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Ralph  E.  Faucett,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  James  B.  Faulconer,  USAF,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Albert  J.  Fay,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Edward  L.  Feightner,  USN,  Ret. 

General  James  Ferguson,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  E.  Ferrall,  USfi,    Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Angelo  L.  Ferranti 


68 


Rear  Adm.  Harold  F.  Pick,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Richard  D.  Field,  USNR,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Kendall  J.  Fielder,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Ralph  E.  Fielding,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Russell  R.  Finn,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Alvan  Fisher,  USNR,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Ralph  E.  Fisher,  OSAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Richard  E.  Fisher,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  John  A.  Fitzgerald,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Phillip  H.  Fitzgerald,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  W.  F.  Fitzgerald,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  H.  Fitzgerald,  USNR,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Michael  P.  D.  Flaherty,  USN,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  Edward  M.  Flanangan,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Francis  E.  Fleck,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Lawrence  J.  Fleming,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Morton  K.  Fleming,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  B.  Fletcher,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  O.  Floyd,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  George  C.  Fogle,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Francis  D.  Foley,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Harry  J.  P.  Foley,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Joseph  F.  Foley,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Winston  P.  Folk,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  J.  E.  Fondahl 

Brig.  Gen.  Paul  P.  Foran,  USA,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Bernard  B.  Forbes,  USN,  Ret. 

General  G.  Foreman 

Rear  Adm.  James  E.  Forrest,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Edward  C.  Forsyth,  USN,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  George  I.  Forsythe,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Newton  P.  Foss,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.,  Walter  M.  Foster,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  C.  Lyn  Fox,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Claud  M.  Fraleigh,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  John  W.  Francis 

Rear  Adm.  Nickolas  J.  F.  Frank,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  John  F.  Franklin,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Wesley  C.  Franklin,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Joe  N.  Frazar,  Jr.,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Dewitt  L.  Freeman,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Mason  Freeman,  USN,  Ret. 

General  Paul  L.  Freeman,  Jr.,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Leonard  F.  Freiburghouse,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Leonard  Frisco,  USNR,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  William  J.  Fry,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Thomas  Fuller,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Samuel  G.  Fuqua,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Charles  M.  Fur  low,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Frederick  R.  Furth,  USN,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Walter  D.  Gaddis,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Frank  L.  Gailer,  USAF,  Ret. 

George  R.  Gallagher 

Rear  Adm.  W.  Earl  Gallaher,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  0.  Gallery,  USN,  Ret. 


Brig.  Gen.  Clarence  J.  Galligan,  USAF,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  Walter  T.  Galligan,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Jack  K.  Gcimble,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Wayne  N.  Garnet,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Robert  G.  Card,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  George  W.  Gardes,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  E.  Blair  Garland,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Francis  L.  Garrett,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Malcolm  E.  Garrison,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Ralph  S.  Garrison,  USNK,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Norman  F.  Gar  ton,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Eugene  W.  Gauch,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  John  D.  Gavan,  USNR,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Donald  Gay,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  J.  Edwin  Gay,  USNR,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Arthur  A.  Gentry 

Brig.  Gen.  William  F.  Georgi,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Harry  E.  Gerhard,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  John  H.  Germeraad,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  William  K.  Ghormley,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Frederic  Gibbs,  USNR,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Elmer  J.  Gibson,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Harold  B.  Gibson,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Kenneth  H.  Gibson,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  W.  M.  Gibson,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Raymond  A.  Gilbert,  USAF,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  Alvan  C.  Gillem,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Thomas  E.  Gillespie,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Charles  H.  Gingles,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Richard  P.  Glass,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  James  Glore,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  William  R.  Goade,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  George  W.  Goddard,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Guy  H.  Goddard,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  George  A.  Godding,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  H.  Godson,  USNR,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Melvin  A.  Goers,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Robert  R.  Goetzman 

Rear  Adm.  William  B.  Goggins,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Morton  J.  Gold,  USAF,  Ret. 

General  William  B.  Gold,  Jr. 

Admiral  Henry  W.  Goodall,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  John  C.  Gordon,  USAF,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  Gordon  T.  Gould,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  C.  L.  Grabenhorst,  USNR,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  Daniel  Graham,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  James  E.  Graham 

Maj.  Gen.  Donald  W.  Graham,  USAF,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  Gordon  M.  Graham,  USAF,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Arthur  R.  Gralla,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  John  G.  Gramzow,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Etheridge  Grant,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Elonzo  B.  Grantham,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Alfred  M.  Granum,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Guy  J.  Gravlee 


69 


Rear  Adm.  Oscar  Gray,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Philip  H.  Greasley,  USAF,  Ret. 

General  William  O.  Green 

Brig.  Gen.  Jaraes  W.  Green,  Jr.,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  George  B.  Greene,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  M.  A.  Greene,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  John  F.  Greenslade,  USN,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Elton  W.  Grenfell 

Admiral  Charles  D.  Griffin,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  James  A.  Grimsley,  USA,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  Francis  H.  Griswold,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Sidney  Gritz,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  August  H.  Groeschel,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Rowland  H.  Groff,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  John  V.  Grombach 

Rear  Adm.  Royce  L.  Gross,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Donald  G.  Grothaus,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  H.  Groverman,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Bradford  E.  Grow,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Richard  A.  Grussendorf,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  S.  Guest,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  M.  Gullett,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Frederick  A.  Gunn,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Karl  W.  Gustafson,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Kermit  L.  Guthrie,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Frank  S.  Haak,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Chester  E.  Haberlin 

Maj.  Gen.  Herbert  R.  Hackbarth,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Louis  J.  Hackett,  Jr.,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Jaraes  F.  Hackler,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Ira  F.  Haddock,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Theodore  G.  Haff,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Hamilton  Hains,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Peter  C.  Hains,  III,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Dudley  D.  Hale,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Stewart  L.  Hall,  USA,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  William  E.  Hall,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Kay  Halsell,  II 

Maj.  Gen.  Milton  B.  Halsey,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Lyle  E.  Halstead,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Archelaus  L.  Hamblen,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Edward  J.  Hamilton 

Rear  Adm.  Thomas  J.  Hamilton,  USN,  Ret. 

Gen.  Barksdale  Hamlett 

Rear  Adm.  Wellington  A.  Hammond,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  George  F.  Hamner ,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  William  L.  Hamrick,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Jack  L.  Hancock,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Walter  J.  Hanna,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Clifford  P.  Hannum,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Harry  J.  Hansen,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Norris  B.  Harbold,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Eads  G.  Hardaway,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Robert  M.  Hardaway,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Harold  F.  Harding,  USA,  Ret. 


Maj.  Gen.  Donald  L.  Hardy,  USAF,  Ret. 

General  Robert  B.  Harkness,  Jr. 

Vice  Adm.  F.  J.  Harlfinger,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  John  Harllee,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Joseph  H.  Harper,  USA,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  Robert  W.  Harper,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Talbot  E.  Harper,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Brooks  J.  Harral,  USN,  Ret. 

General  Ben  Harrell 

Maj.  Gen.  William  S.  Harrell,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Alfred  R.  Harris,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Benjamin  T.  Harris,  USA,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Roy  M.  Harris,  USNR,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  Bertram  C.  Harrison,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Eugene  L.  Harrison,  USA,  Ret, 

Rear  Adm.  Lloyd  Harrison,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  William  H.  Harrison,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Gerald  A.  Hart 

Brig.  Gen.  Frederick  O.  Hartel,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Thomas  J.  Hartford,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Charles  C.  Hartman,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  H.  Hartt,  USN,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Harry  L.  Harty,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Valery  Harvard,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Robert  A.  Harvey 

Brig.  Gen.  David  C.  Hastings,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  W.  G.   Hathaway 

Maj.  Gen.  John  J.  Hayes,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Hugh  C.  Haynsworth 

Maj.  Gen.  Stuart  G.  Haynsworth,  USAF,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  John  T.  Hayward,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Raymond  F.  Hebrank 

Vice  Adm.  Truman  J.  Hedding,  USN,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  Earl  C.  Hedlund,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Edwin  C.  Hef felf inger ,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  William  T.  Hef ley,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Charles  A.  Heira,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Roger  C.  Heimer 

Rear  Adm.  Paul  R.  Heineman,  USN,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  John  A,  Heintges 

Lt.  Gen.  Rolland  V.  Heiser 

Rear  Adm.  Frank  V.  Heimer 

Brig.  Gen.  Jack  W.  Hemingway,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  William  H.  Henderson 

Maj.  Gen.  Raleigh  R.  Hendrix,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Augustus  M.  Hendry,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  John  P.  Henebry 

Maj.  Gen.  William  H.  Hennig,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  John  B.  Henry,  Jr.,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Karl  G.  Hensel,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Joseph  L.  Herlihy,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Vincent  Hernandez,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  John  H.  Herring,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Daniel  W.  Hickey,  Jr.,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  George  L.  Hicks,  USNR,  Ret. 


70 


Maj.  Gen.  Gerald  J.  Higgins,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adin.  Paul  L.  High,  USN,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  John  M.  Hightower,  USA,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Jim  D.  Hill 
Maj.  Gen.  Roderic  L.  Hill,  USA,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Harry  L.  Hillyard,  USA,  Ret. 
Vice  Adra.  William  0.  Hiltabidle,  USN,  Ret. 
Lt.  Gen.  John  H.  Hinrichs,  USA,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  B.  J.  Leon  Hirshorn,  USA,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Howard  M.  Hobson,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  John  H.  Hoefer,  USNR,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  John  A.  Hoefling,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Herbert  L.  Hoerner,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Bartholanew  H.  Hogan,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  R.  Wesley  Hogan,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Harold  R.  Holcomb,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  William  H.  Holcombe,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adra.  Richard  Holden,  USN,  Ret. 
Lt.  Gen.  James  F.  Hollingsworth,  USA,  Ret. 
Admiral  William  R.  Hollingsworth,  USN,  Ret. 
General  Bruce  K.  Holloway,  USAF,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Harland  E.  Holman,  USNR,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Ernest  V.  Holmes,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Carl  O.  Holmquist,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Everett  W.  Holstrom,  USAF,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  William  H.  Holt,  USAF,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  J.  Stanley  Holtoner,  USAF,  Ret. 
Admiral  Ernest  C.  Holtzworth,  USN,  Ret. 
Vice  Adm.  Edwin  B.  Hooper,  USN,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  John  E.  Hoover,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Lewis  A.  Hopkins,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Charles  F.  Home,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Richard  C.  Home,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Charles  T.  Homer,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  John  S.  Horner,  USNR,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  John  B.  Horton,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Herschel  A.  House,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Edwin  B.  Howard,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  James  H.  Howard,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Hamilton  W.  Howe,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Hugh  H.  Howell 

Rear  Adm.  C.  C.  Howerton,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Lester  E.  Hubbell,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Edward  M.  Hudgins 

Brig.  Gen.  Oscar  Conrad  Hudson 

Brig.  Gen.  Ronald  S.  Huey 

Brig.  Gen.  Harry  J.  Huff 

Brig.  Gen.  Robert  B.  Hughes,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Robert  L.  Hughes,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  H.  E.  Humfeld,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Ladd  F.  Hunt 

Rear  Adm.  Louis  H.  Hunte,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Albert  E.  Hunter,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  George  P.   Hunter,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Raymond  P.  Hunter,  USN,  Ret. 


Rear  Adm.  Robert  N.  Hunter,  USN,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Benjamin  Hunton,  USAR,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Jack  E.  Hurff,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Richard  M.  Hurst,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Samuel  H.  Hurt,  USN,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Eugene  L.  Husdon,  USAF,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Vincent  G.  Huston,  USAF,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Charles  R.  Hutchison,  USA,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Joseph  C.  Hutchison,  USA,  Ret. 
Admiral  John  J.  Hyland,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  John  P.  Ingle,  Jr.,  USNR,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Walter  D.  Innis,  USNR,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Donald  G.  Irvine,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Roy  M.  Isaman,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Robert  M.  Ives,  USA,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  William  A.  Jack,  USAF,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  David  H.  Jackson,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Ivan  E.  Jackson,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Milton  C.  Jackson,  USNR,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  P.  W.  Jackson,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adra.  Robert  W.  Jackson,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Oscar  J.  Jahnsen,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adra.  Williara  J.  James,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Frederick  E.  Janney,  USN,  Ret. 
Lt.  Gen.  Carl  H.  Jark,  USA,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Irby  B.  Jarvis,  Jr.,  USAF,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  Hal  B.  Jennings 

Rear  Adra.  M.  J.  Jensen 

Rear  Adm.  John  R.  Johannesen,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Ernest  F.  John,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Charles  E.  Johnson,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  E.  Gillis  Johnson 

Maj.  Gen.  Earl  L.  Johnson,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Edwin  L.  Johnson,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Henry  C.  Johnson,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  John  B.  Johnson,  USNR,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Kenneth  L.  Johnson,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Ralph  C.  Johnson,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Richard  H.  Johnson,  USA,  Ret. 

Admiral  Roy  L.  Johnson,  USN,  Ret. 

General  Warren  R.  Johnson 

Admiral  Means  Johnston,  Jr. 

Rear  Adm.  Don  A.  Jones 

Brig.  Gen.  Bruce  B.  Jones,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Carlton  B.  Jones,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  George  M.  Jones,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Stanley  W.  Jones,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  C.  Jonson,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Allen  R.  Joyce,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Charles  E.  Jung,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Carl  S.  Junkermann,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Williara  L.  Kabler ,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Joseph  I.  Kane,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adra.  Constantine  A.  Karaberis,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Draper  L.  Kauffman,  USN,  Ret. 


71 


Rear  Adm.  John  H.  Kaufman,  USN,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Louis  Kaufman,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Paul  Kaufman,  USNR,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Albert  Kaye,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Edgar  S.  Keats,  USN,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  George  Keegan,  USAF,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Gerald  F.  Keeling,  USAF,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Naiff  H.  Kelel 
Brig.  Gen.  Harold  K.  Kelley,  USAF,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Arthur  W.  Kellond,  USAF,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Maurice  w.  Kendall,  USAF,  Ret. 
Maj-  Gen.  Richard  C.  Kendall,  USA,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  John  M.  Kenderdine,  USA,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Kenneth  W.  Kennedy,  USA,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Thomas  B.  Kennedy,  USAF,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Richard  A.  Kern,  USNR,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Redmond  F.  Kernan 
Brig.  Gen.  H.  E.  Kessinger,  USA,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Wayne  0.  Kester ,  USAF,  Ret. 
Vice  Adm.  Dixwell  Ketcham,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Gerald  L.  Ketchum,  USN,  Ret. 
Vice  Adm.  Ingolf  N.  Kiland,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Benjamin  H.  King,  USAF,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  James  I.  King,  USA,  Ret. 
Vice  Adm.  Jerome  H.  King,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  John  J.  King,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Philip  V.  King,  USNR,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Thomas  H.  King,  USAF,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Leon  S.  Kintberger,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  John  M.  Kinzer,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Louis  J.  Kirn,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Bernard  J.  Kitt,  USA,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Julius  Klein 
Lt.  Gen.  Richard  P.  Klocko,  USAF,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Richard  A.  Knobloch,  USAF,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Frank  J.  Kobes,  Jr.,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Herman  J;  Kossler,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm,  William  J.  Kotsch,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Edgar  P.  Kranzf elder ,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Frederick  C.  Krause 
Brig.  Gen.  Martin  R.  Krausz,  USA,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Philip  F.  Kromer ,  USA,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Clifford  J.  Kronauer 
Lt.  Gen.  Victor  H.  Krulak 
Rear  Adm.  Howard  F.  Kuehl,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Chester  A.  Kunz,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  William  B.  Kunzig,  USA,  Ret. 
General  Laurence  S.  Kuter ,  USAF,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Paul  L.  Lacy,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  John  J.  Laffan,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  James  A.  Lake,  USA,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Kir by  Lamar,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Valdemar  G.  Lambert,  USN,  Ret. 
General  F.  H.  Lamson-Scribner 
Maj.  Gen.  James  E.  Landrum,  USA,  Ret. 


Maj.  Gen.  Robert  B.  Landry,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Richard  Lane,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Clarence  J.  Lang,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Cyrille  P.  Laporte,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Louis  R.  Laporte,  USNR,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  William  W.  Lapsley,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Wharton  E.  Larned,  USNR,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Harold  O.  Larson,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Harold  V.  Larson,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  William  B.  Latta,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Robert  E.  Laub,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  John  T.  Lawler 

Brig.  Gen.  John  D.  Lawlor,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Baskin  R.  Lawrence,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Sidney  J.  Lawrence,  USN,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  William  S.  Lawton,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Osmund  A.  Leahy,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  H.  Leahy,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  John  E.  Leary,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  John  E.  Lee,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Lamar  Lee,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  Frederick  E.  Leek 

Rear  Adm.  James  E.  Leeper ,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  William  C.  Lemly 

Rear  Adm.  Frederick  W.  Lemly,  USNR,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Kelley  B.  Lemmon,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Charles  F.  Leonard,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  N.  Leonard,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Cecil  P.  Lessig,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Joseph  W.  Leverton 

Maj.  Gen.  William  P.  Levine,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  B.  E.  Lewellen,  USN,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  John  T.  Lewis,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Oliver  W.  Lewis,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Porter  Lewis,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Vernon  B.  Lewis,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  William  D.  Lewis,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  R.  E.  Libby,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  David  I.  Liebman,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Lawrence  S.  Lightner,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Walter  E.  Linaweaver,  USN,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  Lawrence  J.  Lincoln 

Gen.  Rush  B.  Lincoln,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Joseph  J.  Lingle 

Brig.  Gen.  Andy  A.  Lipscomb,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  John  J.  Liset,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Elmer  L.  Littell,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Olin  A.  Lively 

Brig.  Gen.  B.  C.  Lockwood,  Jr.,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Thomas  A.  Long,  USN,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Victor  D.  Long,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  H.  Longley,  USNR,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Michael  Lorenzo,  USNR,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  Walter  E.  Lotz,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Charles  E.  Loucks,  USA,  Ret. 


72 


Rear 

Adiii. 

Maj. 

Gen. 

Mai. 

Gen. 

Br  iq 

.  Gen 

Brig 

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Maj. 

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Maj. 

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Brig 

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Maj. 

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Brig 

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Rear 

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Rear 

Adm. 

Maj. 

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Brig 

.  Gen 

Brig 

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Rear 

Adm. 

Rear 

Adm. 

Rear 

Adm. 

Maj. 

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Rear 

Adm. 

Rear 

Adm. 

Maj. 

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Rear 

Adm. 

Rear 

Adm. 

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Rear 

Adm. 

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Brig 

.  Gen, 

Rear 

Adm. 

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ral  R, 

Rear 

Adm. 

Rear 

Adm. 

Brig, 

.  Gen, 

Rear 

Adm. 

Maj. 

Gen. 

Brig. 

.  Gen, 

Maj. 

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Rear 

Adm. 

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.  Gen, 

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Vice 

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Maj. 

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Rear 

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Rear 

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Adm. 

Kenneth  Loveland,  USN,  Ret. 
Jess  up  D.  Lowe,  OSAF,  Ret. 
Sumter  L.  Lowrv,  USA,  Ret. 
.  Bernard  R.  Luczak,  tJSA,  Ret. 
.  Garland  A.  Ludv,  USA,  Ret. 
Robert  P.  Lukeman,  USAF,  Ret. 
William  S.  Lundberg,  USA,  Ret. 
.  Reginald  P.  Lyman,  USA,  Ret. 
George  E.  Lvnch,  OSA,  Ret. 
.  George  P.  Lvnch,  USA,  Ret. 
John  J.  Lynch,  USN,  Ret. 
Ralph  C.  Lynch,  USN,  Ret. 
Nelson  M.  Lynde,  USA,  Ret. 
.  Donald  J.  Lynn 
.  Archibald  W.  Lyon,  USA,  Ret. 
Harvey  E.  Lyon,  USN,  Ret. 
Hylan  B.  Lyon,  USN,  Ret. 
Raymond  R.  Lyons,  USN,  Ret. 
Clinton  S.  Lvter,  USA,  Ret. 
Donald  J.  MacDonald,  USN,  Ret. 
Duncan  C.  MacMillan,  USN,  Ret. 
John  J.  Maginnis 
John  B.  Macgregor,  USN,  Ret. 
Robert  A.  Macpherson,  USN,  Ret. 
.  Robert  S.  Macrum,  USAF,  Ret. 
Dashiell  L.  Madeira,  USN,  Ret. 
Frank  M.  Madsen,  USAF,  Ret. 
.  W.  S.  Magalhaes 
Thomas  B.  Magath,  USNR,  Ret. 
.  J.  Maglione,  USAF,  Ret. 
Charles  J.  Maguire,  USN,  Ret. 
Harrv  P.  Mahin,  USN,  Ret. 
,  Thaddeus  F.  Malanowski,  USA,  Ret. 
Ralph  W.  Ma lone,  USN,  Ret. 
Robert  W.  Maloy,  USAF,  Ret. 
,  Ben  J.  Mangina 
Daniel  J.  Manning 
Joseph  I.  Manning,  USN,  Ret. 
,  Alexander  Marble,  USA,  Ret. 
,  Theodore  H.  Marshall,  USA,  Ret. 
William  J.  Marshall,  USN,  Ret. 
Clarence  A.  Martin,  USA,  Ret. 
,  Edward  0.  Martin,  USAF,  Ret. 
Sherman  F.  Martin,  USAF,  Ret. 
David  L.  Martineau,  USN,  Ret. 
Harrv  C.  Mason,  USN,  Ret. 
Stanhope  B.  Mason,  USA,  Ret. 
Theo.  C.  Ma taxis,  USA,  Ret. 
Paul  L.  Mather,  USN,  Ret. 
Salve  H.  Matheson,  USA,  Ret. 
Bob  O.  Mathews,  USN,  Ret. 
John  H.  Maurer,  USN,  Ret. 
Azro  J.  Maxham 

William  S.  Maxwell,  USN,  Ret. 
Walter  S.  Maver ,  USN,  Ret. 


Brig. 
Brig. 
Mai. 
Maj. 


Brig.  Gen. 
Rear  Adm. 


Maj. 
Rear 


Gen. 
Adm, 


Brig.  Gen.  Richard  W.  Mavo,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  John  H.  McAuliffe,  USNR,  Ret. 

Gen.  Madison  M.  McBrayer,  USAF,  Ret. 
Gen.  George  H.  McBride,  USA,  Ret. 
Gen.  William  D.  McCain 
Gen.  Chester  E.  McCarty,  USAF,  Ret. 
Admiral  J.  W.  McCauley,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Arthur  J.  McChrystal,  USA,  Ret. 
Clyde  F.  McClain,  USAF,  Ret. 
John  G.  McClaughry,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  William  M.  McCloy,  USNR,  Ret. 

Charles  M.  McCorkle,  USAF,  Ret. 
James  R.  McCormick,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Victor  B.  McCrea,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Kenneth  A.  McCrimmon,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Leo  B.  McCuddin,  USN,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Robert  H.  McCutcheon,  USAF,  Ret. 
Admiral  David  L.  McDonald,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Everett  A.  McDonald,  USAF,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Ellsworth  D.  McEathron,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  John  A.  McEwan,  USA,  Ret. 
Lt.  Gen.  Thomas  K.  McGehee,  USAF,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Francis  M.  McGoldrick,  USA,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Thomas  J.  McGuire,  USA,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Godfrey  T.  McHugh,  USAF,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  D.  E.  McKay,  USN,  Ret. 
Lt.  Gen.  George  H.  McKee,  USAF,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Logan  McKee,  USN,  Ret. 
General  Seth  J.  McKee,  USAF,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  William  A.  McKee,  USA,  Ret. 
Gen.  C.  M.  McKeen,  USA,  Ret. 

Henrv  R.  McKenzie,  USA,  Ret. 
Eugene  B.  McKinney,  USN,  Ret. 
William  R.  McKinney,  USN,  Ret. 
John  R.  McKnight,  USN,  Ret. 
John  H.  McLain,  USAF,  Ret. 
Richard  E.  McLaughlin 
Ephraim  R.  McLean,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  G.  A.  McLean,  USN,  Ret. 
Gordon  McLintock 
Robert  McMath 
Gen.  Henry  W.  McMillan,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  George  J.  McMillin,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Edwin  E.  McMorries,  USN,  Ret. 
James  A,  McNally 
Raymond  F.  McNelly,  USA,  Ret. 
Melvin  F.  McNickle,  USAF,  Ret. 
Richard  R.  McNulty,  USNR,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Claude  M.  McQuarrie,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Charles  J.  McWhinnie,  USNR,  Ret. 
Gen.  John  C.  McWhorter,  USA,  Ret. 
Gen.  Keith  E.  McWilliams 
Rear  Adm.  States  M.  Mead,  USNR,  Ret. 
Lt.  Gen.  Fillmore  K.  Mearns,  USA,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Edward  P.  Mechling,  USAF,  Ret. 


Maj. 
Maj. 
Rear 
Rea  r  Adm 
Rear  Adm 
Brig 


Gen. 
Adm. 


Gen. 


Major  Gen. 
Vice  Adm. 


Vice  Adm. 
Brig.  Gen. 


Maj. 


Rear 
Maj. 
Maj. 


Adm. 
Gen. 
Gen. 


Rear  Adm. 


Maj. 
Brig. 


73 


Maj.  Gen.  John  B.  Medaris,  USA,  Ret. 

General  Vernon  E.  Megee 

Rear  Adm.  Roqer  W.  Mehle,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  John  L.  Melqaard.  tJSN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Robert  E.  Mellinq,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Albert  L.  Melton,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Corwin  Mendenhall,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Chauncey  D.  Merrill,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Charles  H.  Mester,  Jr. 

Briq.  Gen.  Frank  Meszar,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Ralph  M.  Metcalf,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Alfred  B.  Metsger,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Edward  F.  Metzer,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Richard  J.  Meyer,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Walter  C.  Michaels,  USNR,  Ret. 

Briq.  Gen.  Howard  E.  Michelet,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Bill  A.  Miles,  USNR,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Edwin  S.  Miller,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  George  H.  Miller,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Harold  B.  Miller,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Junior  F.  Miller,  USA,  Ret. 

Briq.  Gen.  Robert  B.  Miller,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Ward  S.  Miller,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Eugene  J.  Mincks 

Maj.  Gen.  Charles  F.  Minter,  Sr.,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Augustus  M.  Minton,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Clinton  A.  Misson,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Burt  L.  Mitchell,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Cleo  N.  Mitchell,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  William  L.  Mitchell,  Jr.,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  S.  Edward  Mittler,  USNR,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Chester  J.  Moeglein,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Robert  L.  Moeller,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Robert  E.  Moffet,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  A.  Moffett,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Lloyd  W.  Moffit,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Edmund  W.  Montgomery 

Lt.  Gen.  Richard  M.  Montgomery,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Harley  F.  Moonev,  Jr.,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Benjamin  E.  Moore,  USN,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  French  R.  Moore,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Harlev  L.  Moore,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  John  B.  Moore 

Lt.  Gen.  Joseph  H.  Moore 

Brig.  Gen.  Leon  A.  Moore,  Jr.,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Moore  Moore,  Jr.,  USNR,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Robert  L.  Moore,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  T.  Moore,  USNR,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  William  J.  Moran,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  James  L.  Moreland,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Henrv  S.  Morgan,  Jr. 

Maj.  Gen.  Martin  J.  Morin,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  William  F.  Morr,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  John  H.  Morrill,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Albert  R.  Morris,  USA,  Ret. 


Briq.  Gen.  John  H.  Morrison,  USA  Ret. 

Briq.  Gen.  Manlev  G.  Morrison,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Richard  I.  Morton,  USA,  Ret. 

Briq.  Gen.  Alvin  J.  Moser 

Rear  Adm.  Charles  W.  Moses,  USN,  Ret. 

Admiral  William  C.  Mott,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Horace  D.  Moulton,  USNR,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Charles  F.  Mudgett,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Dolf  E.  Muehleisen,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  E.  L.  Mueller,  USA,  Ret. 

General  Richard  Mulberrv,  Jr. 

Maj.  Gen.  Hal  L.  Muldrow,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Henry  J.  Muller,  USA,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  George  W.  Mundy,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  George  P.  Munson,  Jr.,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  John  D.  Murphy,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  John  W.  Murphy,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Robert  F.  Murphy,  USA,  Ret. 

General  S.  A.  Murphy 

Maj.  Gen.  James  L.  Murrav 

Brig.  Gen.  Joseph  Murrav,  Jr.,  USA,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Llovd  M.  Must  in 

Brig.  Gen.  Philip  D.  Myers,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Warren  E.  Mvers 

Rear  Adm.  Charles  D.  Nace,  USN,  Ret. 

General  Gus  G.  Nagv 

Brig.  Gen.  Ezekiel  W.  Napier,  USAF,  Ret. 

Gen.  Joseph  J.  Nazzaro,  USAF,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Ray  C.  Needham,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Spurgeon  H.  Neel,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Richard  C.  Neeley,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Carson  R.  Neifert,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Douglas  T.  Nelson,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Roy  W.  Nelson,  Jr.,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  T.  Nelson,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  J.  H.  Nevins,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  James  P.  Newberry,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Langdon  C.  Newman,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Henry  C.  Newton,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Franklin  A.  Nichols,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Richard  E.  Nichols,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Charles  A.  Nicholson,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Wallace  H.  Nickell,  USA,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  Herman  Nickerson  Jr. 

Rear  Adm.  Hugh  R.  Nieman,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Samuel  Nixdorff,  USN,  Ret. 

Admiral  A.  G.  Noble,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Paul  R.  Norby,  USNR,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Robert  H.  Northwood,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  William  P.  Nuckois 

Brig.  Gen.  Bernard  A.  Nurre,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Howard  O'Connor 

Rear  Adm.  Michael  G.   O'Connor,  USN,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  James  W.  O'Grady,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Charles  S.  O'Mallev,  USA,  Ret. 


74 


Rear  Adm.  John  F.  Oakley,  USNR,  Ret. 
Lt.  Gen.  Arthur  W.  Oberbeck,  USA,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Joseph  C.  Odell,  USA,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  T.  C.  Odora,  USAF,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Russell  G.  Ogan,  USAF,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Milton  L.  Ogden,  USA,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  William  U.  Ogletree,  USA,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Nils  0.  Ohman,  USAF,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Clay  Olbon,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Richard  M.  Oliver,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  William  M.  Oiler,  OSN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Alfred  C.  Olney,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Carl  B.  Olson 
Brig.  Gen.  Gustaf  P.  Olson,  USA,  Ret. 
Vice  Adm.  Howard  E.  Orem,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  William  H.  Organ,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  David  P.  Osborne,  USN,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Frank  A.  Osmanski 
General  J.  A.  Ostroph 

Rear  Adm.  William  W.  Outerbridge,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Edwin  B.  Owen,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Hinton  A.  Owens,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Norris  W.  Potter,  USNR,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Roger  W.  Paine,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Ralph  A.  Palladino,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Charles  J.  Palmer,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  George  G.  Palmer,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  George  A.  Pappas,  Jr. 

Rear  Adm.  Charles  W.  Parker,  USN,  Ret. 
Vice  Adm.  Edward  N.  Parker,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Hugh  A.  Parker,  USAF,  Ret. 

Admiral  George  A.  Parkinson,  USNR,  Ret. 

General  Harlan  C.  Parks,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Joel  D.  Parks,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Frank  J.  Parrish 

Brig.  Gen.  Benton  K.  Partin 

Maj.  Gen.  William  A.  Patch,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Goldsborough  S.  Patrick,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Stanley  F.  Patten,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Alex  M.  Patterson,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Richard  0.  Patterson,  USNR,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  H.  C.  Pattison,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Leonard  E.  Pauley,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Albert  G.  Paulsen 

Admiral  Charles  N.  Payne,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  D.  J.  Peacher 

Rear  Adm.  Rufus  J.  Pearson,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Theodore  E.  Pearson,  USNR,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gejj  Willard  Pearson,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Edwin  R.  Peck,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Oscar  Pederson,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Byron  E.  Peebles,  USA,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  Howard  W.  Penney,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Donald  G.  Penterman,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Louis  W.  Perkins 


Brig.  Gen.  Howard  P.  Persons,  USA,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Roy  W.  Peters,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  George  E.  Peterson,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Richard  W.  Peterson,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Frank  I.  Pethick,  Jr.,  USAR,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Robert  L.  Petit,  USAF,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Roger  E.  Phelan,  USAF,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Tobias  R.  Philbin,  Jr.,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Chester  G.  Phillips,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Eugene  Phillips 
Lt.  Gen.  Jammie  M.  Philpott,  USAF,  Ret. 
Rear  Adro.  Ben  B.  Pickett,  USN,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Joseph  E.  Pieklik,  USA,  Ret. 
General  Arthur  J.  Pierce,  USAF,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Russell  K.  Pierce,  USAF,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Gladwyn  E.  Pinkston,  USAF,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Ernest  A.  Pinson,  USAF,  Ret. 
Vice  Adm.  Robert  B.  Pirie,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Eli  P.  Plaskow 
Rear  Adm.  William  G.  Pogue,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Boleslaw  H.  Pokigo,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  David  P.  Polatty,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Douglas  C.  Polhamus,  USAF,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Jack  P.  Pollock,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Joseph  G.  Poneroy,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Mackenzie  E.  Porter,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Robert  L.  Porter,  USN,  Ret. 
General  Robert  W.  Porter,  Jr.,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Alton  G.  Post,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  S.  Post,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Edwin  L.  Powell,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Kenneth  R.  Powell,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  George  T.  Powers,  III,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Richard  R.  Pratt,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Arthur  W.  Price,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 

Admiral  Frank  H.  Price,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Oran  0.  Price,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Fay  B.  Prickett,  USA,  Ret. 

Admiral  Alfred  M.  Pride,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  George  S.  Prugh,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  M.  Pugh,  II,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Harold  F.  Pullen,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  George  S.  Purple 

Rear  Adm.  Ira  D.  Putnam,  USNR,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Frank  E.  Raab,  Jr.,  USNR,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  H.  Rafferty,  USN,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Lawson  P.  Ramage,  USN,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Paul  H.  Ramsey,  USN,  Ret. 

Admiral  John  E.  M.  Ranneft 

Maj.  Gen.  Henry  A.  Rasmussen,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  T.  Rassieur,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Clemens  V.  Rault,  USN,  Ret. 

General  Edwin  W.  Rawlings,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Ralph  W.  Rawson,  USNR,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Clarence  C.  Ray,  USN,  Ret. 


75 


Rear  Adm. 
Brig.  Gen. 
Vice  Adm. 
Maj.  Gen. 
Maj.  Gen. 
Brig.  Gen. 
Rear  Adm. 


Rear  Adm. 
Brig.  Gen 


Maj. 
Brig 


Herman  L.  Ray,  USN,  Ret. 

Joseph  G.  Rebman,  USA,  Ret. 
E.  F.  Rectanus,  USN,  Ret. 
William  H.  Reddell,  USAF,  Ret. 
William  N.  Redling,  USA,  Ret. 

Albert  Redman,  Jr.,  USA,  Ret. 
Allan  L.  Reed,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Michael  J.  Reichel,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Leslie  L.  Reid,  USNR,  Ret. 

George  H.  Reifenstein,  USNR,  Ret. 

Stewart  E.  Reimel,  USA,  Ret. 
Richard  D.  Reinhold,  USAF,  Ret. 
Henry  J.  Reis-El  Bara 

Reiter,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 
Reitz 
Edward  E.  Renfro,  USN,  Ret. 
Thomas  F.  Rew,  USAF,  Ret. 
Vorley  M.  Rexroad,  USAF,  Ret. 
Reynolds,  USA,  Ret. 
Reynolds,  USAF,  Ret. 
Z.  Reynolds,  USN,  Ret. 
E.  Reynolds,  USA,  Ret. 
Rice,  USN,  Ret. 
Rice,  USN,  Ret. 
Rice,  USN,  Ret. 
Rich,  USAF,  Ret. 
Richards,  USA,  Ret. 
Richardson,  USN,  Ret. 


Gen. 
Gen 

Rear  Adra.  Harry  L 
Brig.  Gen.  Ivan  A 
Rear  Adm. 
Gen. 
Gen 
Gen 
Gen 


Maj. 
Brig 
Brig 
Brig 


Emmett  R. 
George  E. 


James  R. 
,  William 
Lester  K. 
Joseph  E. 
Robert  H. 
Clyde  K. 
George  J. 
Alvin  F. 


Rear  Adm. 
Rear  Adm. 


Rear 
Rear 


Adm. 
Adm. 


Rear  Adm. 

Brig.  Gen 

Rear  Adm. 

Rear  Adm. 

Vice  Adm. 

Brig.  Gen 

Maj.  Gen. 

Rear  Adir.. 

Rear  Adm.  Clifford  G.  Richardson,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Hugh  A.  Richeson,  USA,  Ret. 

James  B.  Ricketts,  USN,  Ret. 

Herman  P.  Riebe,  USN,  Ret. 

Charles  E.  Rieben,  USNR,  Ret. 

Robert  E.  Riera,  USN,  Ret. 

Cecil  D.  Riggs,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Whitaker  F.  Riggs,  USN,  Ret. 
General  D.  E.  Riley,  USAF,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Richard  A.  Risden,  USA,  Ret. 
Lt.  Gen.  James  P.  P.iseley 
Brig.  Gen.  Robinson  Risner,  USAF,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Osmond  J.  Ritland,  USAF,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  B.  A.  Robbins 
Lt.  Gen.  Jay  T.  Robbins,  USAF,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Joe  A.  Robbins,  USN  Ret. 

Levi  J.  Roberts,  USNR,  Ret. 

Armand  J.  Robertson,  USN,  Ret. 

Pearl  H.  Robey,  USAF,  Ret. 

Ray  A.  Robinson,  USAF,  Ret. 

Allan  B.  Roby,  USN,  Ret. 

Harry  J.  Rockafeller,  USAR,  Ret. 

Walter  F.  Rodee,  USN,  Ret. 

Jermain  F.  Rodenhauser ,  USAF,  Ret. 
Rafael  Rodr iguez-Ema,  USA,  Ret. 
Frederick  C.  Roecker ,  USA,  Ret. 
Andrew  W.  Rogers,  USA,  Ret. 


Rear  Adm. 


Rear 

Adm. 

Rear 

Adm. 

Maj. 

Gen. 

Maj. 

Gen. 

Rear 

Adm. 

Maj. 

Gen. 

Rear 

Adm. 

Maj. 

Gen. 

Brig 

.  Gen 

Brig 

.  Gen 

Brig 

.  Gen 

Brig.  Gen.  Jack  A.  Rogers,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Kenwood  B.  Rohrer 

Maj.  Gen.  Andrew  P.  Rollins,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Michael  R.  Roman,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  K.  Rcmioser ,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  David  L.  Roscoe,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 

Drig.  Gen.  John  M.  Rose,  Jr.,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Philip  H.  Ross,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Richard  M.  Ross 

Rear  Adra.  Henry  J.  Rotridge,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  John  A.  Rouse,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Charles  H.  Royce,  US.^,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Edward  A.  Ruckner,  USNR,  Ret. 

Rear  Adra.  Thomas  J.  Rudden,  USN,  Ret. 

Vice  Adra.  Theodore  D.  Ruddock,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Paul  E.  Ruestow,  USAF,  Ret. 

Gen.  Clark  L.  Ruffner,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  George  Ruhlen,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Louis  J.  Rumaggi,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Richard  G.  Rumney,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adra.  Joseph  W.  Russel,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Michael  P.  Russillo,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Clifford  G.  Ryan 

Maj.  Gen.  Charles  W.  Ryder,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Edward  A.  Sahli 

Maj.  Gen.  Charles  E.  Saltzman,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  James  G.  Sampson,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Crawford  F.  Sams,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Kenneth  O.  Sanborn,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  E.  R.  Sanders,  USN,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Harry  Sanders,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Homer  L.  Sanders,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Ira  T.  Sanders,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Leo  A.  Santini,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Edward  W.  Sawyer,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Valentine  H.  Schaeffer,  USN,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  George  E.  Schafer 

Brig.  Gen.  Evan  W.  Schear,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Harold  G.  Scheie,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Otto  A.  Scherini,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Edward  C.  D.  Scherrer,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  John  J.  Schieffelin,  USNR,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Walter  F.  Schlech,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Howard  F.  Schlitz,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  John  W.  Schmidt,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Raymond  J.  Schneider,  USN,  Ret. 

Vice  Adra.  William  A.  Schoech,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Herbert  E.  Schonland,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Robert  A.  Schow,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Ned  Schramm,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Floyd  B.  Schultz,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Carl  F.  Schupp,  II 

Brig.  Gen.  Francis  F.  Schweinler,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Albert  B.  Scoles,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Tom  W.  Scctt,  USAF,  Ret. 


48-260  0 


7  9  Pt.U 


76 


Rear  Adm.  Eugene  T.  Seaward,  OSN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Wiltz  P.  Segura 

Rear  Adm.  F.  Gordon  Selby,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Moise  B.  Seligman 

Vice  Adm.  Benedict  J.  Semmes,  USNR,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  John  W.  Sessums,  Jr.,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Paul  E.  Seufer,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  W.  T.  Sexton,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  John  N.  Shaffer,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Leland  G.  Shaffer,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Louis  D.  Sharp,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Raymond  N.  Sharp,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  William  J.  Sharrow 

Rear  Adm.  Charles  W.  Shattuck,  USNR,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Samuel  R.  Shaw 

Brig.  Gen.  William  L.  Shaw 

William  H.  Shawcross 

Rear  Adm.  Maurice  W.  Shea,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  William  F.  Sheehan,  USA,  Ret. 

General  Ralph  A.  Sheldrick 

General  Lemuel  C.  Shepherd 

Brig.  Gen.  Paul  D.  Sherman 

Lt.  Gen.  James  C.  Sherrill,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Stephen  Sherwood,  USN,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Ralph  L.  Shifley,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Clarence  B.  Shimer,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  John  G.   Shinkle,  USA,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Allen  M.  Shinn,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  James  M.  Shoemaker 

Lt.  Gen.  Raymond  L.  Shoemaker 

Vice  Adm.  Wallace  B.  Short,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Anthony  T.  Shtogren,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Roland  P.  Shugg,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  William  R.  Shuler,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Edwin  L.  Shull,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Burton  H.  Shupper ,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Thomas  N.  Sibley,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  B.  Sieglaff,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Norman  D.  Sillin,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Rupert  M.  Simmerli,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Robert  H.  Simmert,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Cecil  L.  Simmons,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Henry  Simon,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Maurice  E.  Simpson,  USN,  Ret. 

General  William  H.  Simpson 

Maj.  Gen.  John  F.  Sims 

Brig.  Gen.  Turner  A.  Sims,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  John  K.  Singlaub,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  William  K.  Skaer,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Robert  B.  Skinner,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Lecount  H.  Slocum,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Morris  Smellow,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Curtis  S.  Smiley,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Allen  Smith,  Jr,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Bertram  D.  Smith,  USN,  Ret. 


Brig.  Gen.  C.  Coburn  Smith,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Charles  H.  Smith,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Donald  J.  Smith 

General  Frederic  H.  Smith,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  George  F.  Smith,  USAF,  Ret. 

Admiral  Harold  P.  Smith,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Hugh  R.  Smith 

Brig.  Gen.  James  M.  Smith 

Brig.  Gen.  L.  W.  Smith 

Brig.  Gen.  Lynn  D.  Smith,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Paul  E.  Smith,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Spencer  R.  Smith,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Stuart  H.  Smith,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Wilbur  A.  Smith,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  William  T.  Smith,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Willard  W.  Smith,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Ralph  A.  Snavely,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  O.  Snead,  USN,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Edwin  K.  Snyder 

Maj.  Gen.  Oscar  P.  Snyder,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Maxwell  C.  Snyder,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Albin  R.  Sodergren,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Leo  E.  Soucek,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Richard  B.  Spear 

Brig.  Gen.  Max  H.  Specht,  USA,  Ret. 

General  John  F.  Speer 

Brig.  Gen.  William  Spence,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Donald  0.  Spoon,  USA,  Ret. 

General  R.  I.  Stack 

Brig.  Gen.  John  E.  Stannard,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  George  R.  Stanley,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Conrad  L.  Stansberry,  USA,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Allen  T.  Stanwix-Hay,  USA,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  James  B.  Stapleton,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Merlin  H.  Staring,  USN,  Ret. 
General  Albert  B.  Starr 
Maj.  Gen.  Maxwell  W.  Steel,  USAF,  Ret. 
Vice  Adm.  George  P.  Steele,  II,  USN,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Wycliffe  E.  Steele,  USAF,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Floyd  W.  Stewart,  USA,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  James  L.  Stewart,  USAF,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  LeRoy  J.  Stewart,  USA,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Kenneth  Stiles,  USAF,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Alden  E.  Stilson,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  James  J.  Stilwell,  USN,  Ret. 
General  Richard  G.  Stilwell,  USA,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Lewis  W.  Stocking 
Vice  Adm.  Thomas  M.  Stokes,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Jack  W.  Stone,  USAF,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Frank  B.  Stone,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Leslie  0.  Stone,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Martin  R.  Stone,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Aaron  P.  Storrs,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Charles  L.  Strain,  USN,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Leland  S.  Stranathan,  USAF,  Ret. 


77 


Rear  Adm.  William  W.  Strange,  USNR,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Elliott  B.  Strauss,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Eugene  L.  Strickland,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Robert  W.  Strong,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  A.  Stuart,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Coulter  R.  Sublet t,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Henry  Suerstedt,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Henry  R.  Sullivan,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  John  B.  Sullivan,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  A.  Sullivan,  USN,  Ret. 

William  F.  Suraraerell 

Rear  Adm.  Paul  E.  Summers,  USN,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  Alexander  D.  Surles,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Frederick  J.  Sutterline,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Frank  C.  Sutton,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Daniel  J.  Sweeney,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Willieim  E.  Sweeney,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Douglas  M.  Swift,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Charles  A.  Symroski,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Alden  P.  Taber,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Avelin  P.  Tacon,  USAF,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  C.  M.  Talbott,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Benjamin  B.  Talley,  USA,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  George  C.  Talley,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Lawrence  F.  Tanberg,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Robert  M.  Tarbox,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Raymond  D.  Tarbuck,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Thomas  M.  Tarpley,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  August  F.  Taute,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Edwin  A.  Taylor,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Edwin  B.  Taylor 

Rear  Adm.  Ford  N.  Taylor,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Joseph  I.  Taylor,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Leonard  B.  Taylor,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Robert  Taylor,  III,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  William  A.  Temple,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Joseph  N.  Tenhet,  Jr.,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Frederick  R.  Terrell,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Roy  M.  Terry,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Harold  C.  Teubner ,  USAF,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  Herbert  B.  Thatcher,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Thoralf  T.  Thielen 

Maj.  Gen.  Arthur  Thomas,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Lloyd  H.  Thomas,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Charles  S.  Thompson,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  James  H.  Thompson,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Mark  R.  Thompson,  USNR,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Roy  E.  Thompson,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Walter  G.  Thomson,  USNR,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Wallace  0.  Thompson 

Rear  Adm.  William  Thompson,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  John  F.  Thorlin,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Harrison  R.  Thyng,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Paul  W.  Tibbets,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Murray  J.  Tichenor,  USN,  Ret. 


Vice  Adm.  Eramett  H.  Tidd,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Carl  Tiedeman,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Thomas  S.  Timberraan,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  James  B.  Tipton,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Benton  C.  Tolley 

Rear  Adm.  Kemp  Tolley,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Rutledge  B.  Tompkins,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  William  A.  Tope,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Harold  W.  Torgerson,  USNR,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  John  D.  Torrey,  Jr.,  USA,  Ret. 

General  Salvador  Torros 

Vice  Adm.  George  C.  Towner,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Charles  0.  Triebel,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Thomas  K.  Tripp,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  George  W.  Trousdale,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Orlando  C.  Troxel,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Herman  J.  Trum,  III,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Richard  B.  Tuggle,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Benjamin  O.  Turnage,  Jr.,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Carl  C.  Turner,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Joseph  W.  Turner,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Hiram  L.  Tuttle 

General  Nathan  F.  Twining,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Harold  H.  Twitchell,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Achilles  L.  Tynes,  USA,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  Edward  H.  Underhill,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Edgar  H.  Underwood,  USAF,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  F.  T.  Unger ,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Clarence  Unnevehr ,  USNR,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Fay  R.  Upthegrove,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Lee  N.  Utz 

Lloyd  W.  Van  Antwerp 

Rear  Adm.  Clyde  J.  Van  Arsdall,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Lawrence  E.  Van  Buskirk,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Willicim  M.  Van  Harlingen,  USA,  Ret 

Rear  Adm.  Blinn  Van  Mater,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Thaddeus  J.  Van  Metre,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Harry  Van  Wyk,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  James  E.  Van  Zandt,  USNR,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Roland  B.  Vanasse,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Daniel  Vance,  Jr. 

Rear  Adm.  George  Vandeurs,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Walter  M.  Vann,  USA,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Frank  W.  Vannoy,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  K.  L.  Veth,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Fred  W.  Vetter,  Jr.,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Felix  L.  Vidal,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Warren  C.  Vincent,  USNR,  Ret. 

Admiral  Quentell  Violett,  USNR,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Norman  H.  Vissering,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Edward  H.  Vogel,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Ernest  S.  Von  Kleeck,  USN,  Ret, 

Rear  Adm.  Curtis  F.  Vossler,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  John  R.  Wadleigh,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Ruben  E.  Wagstaff,  USN,  Ret. 


78 


Rear  Adm  Charles  L.  Waite,  USN,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Alden  H.  Waitt,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  George  H.  Wales,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Edward  K.  Walker,  USN,  Ret. 
Vice  Adm.  Thomas  J.  Walker,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Henry  T.  Waller 
Rear  Adm.  Harry  N.  Wallin,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Harvey  T.  Walsh,  USN,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Louis  A.  Walsh,  Jr.,  USA  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Wilfred  A.  Walter,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Ernest  K.  Warburton,  USAF,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Norvell  G.  Ward,  USN,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Robert  W.  Ward,  USA,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Herbert  O.  Wardell,  USA,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Daniel  H.  Wardrop,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Thomas  G.  Warfield,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Aln  D.  Warnock,  USA,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Henry  L.  Warren,  USAF,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Hugh  Warren,  USNR,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Jacob  W.  Waterhouse,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  John  R.  Waterman,.  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Odale  D.  Waters,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  William  W.  Watkin,  USA,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  James  H.  Watkins,  USAF,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Tarleton  H.  Watkins,  USAF,  Ret. 
Lt.  Gen.  Albert  Watson,  II,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Carl  E.  Watson,  USNR,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Harold  E.  Watson,  USAF,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Paul  C.  Watson,  USAF,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  George  A.  Weaver,  USNR,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Wilburn  C.  Weaver,  USA,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  John  H.  Weber,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  David  A.  Webster,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  George  B.  Webster,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Charles  S.  Weeks,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  John  F.  Wegforth,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Harold  F.  Weidner 

Brig.  Gen.  Walter  D.  Weikel,  AUS,  Ret. 

Major  Gen.  Frank  D.  Weir 

Rear  Adm.  Robert  O.  Welander,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Seth  L.  Weld,  Jr.,  USA,  Ret. 

Vice  Adm.  Charles  Wellborn,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Joseph  A.  Wellings,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Benjamin  0.  Wells,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  David  J.  Welsh,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Walton  K.  Weltraer 

Maj.  Gen.  Donald  L.  Werbeck,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Holden  C.  West 

Brig.  Gen.  Leslie  J.  Westberg,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Edward  W.  Westlake 

Maj.  Gen.  James  H.  Weyhenmeyer ,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  William  J.  Whelan,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  David  L.  Whelchel,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Sherburne  Whipple,  Jr.,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Richard  S.  Whitcomb,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Roger  E.  Whitcomb,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Charles  F.  White,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Charles  H.  White,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Donald  M.  White,  USN,  Ret. 


Maj.  Gen.  John  W.  White,  USAF,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Marshall  W.  White,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Scott  Whitehouse,  USNR,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Otis  M.  Whitney,  USA,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Howard  R.  Whittaker,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Carlos  W.  Wieber,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Geoffrey  P.  Wiedeman,  USAF,  Ret. 
Vice  Adm.  Charles  W.  Wilkins,  USN,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  John  H.  Wilkins,  USAF,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Collin  P.  Williams 
Maj.  Gen.  George  V.  Williams,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  James  W.  Williams,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Macpherson  B.  Williams,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Richard  C.  Williams,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Roy  D.  Williams,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Delbert  F.  Williamson,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Francis  T.  Williamson,  USN,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  John  H.  Willis,  USN,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Delmar  E.  Wilson,  USAF,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Edwin  Mark  Wilson,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  George  H.  Wilson,  USAF,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  James  A.  Wilson 
Maj.  Gen.  Thomas  N.  Wilson,  USAF,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  William  R.  Wilson 
Vice  Adm.  L.  J.  Wiltse,  USN,  Ret. 
Maj.  Gen.  Loren  G.  Windom,  USA,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Walter  C.  Winn,  USN,  Ret. 
Brig.  Gen.  Jowell  C.  Wise,  USAF,  Ret. 
Rear  Adm.  Narvin  0.  Wittmann,  USN,  Ret. 

Lt.  Gen.  Thomas  Wolfe 

Brig.  Gen.  Frank  P.  Wood,  USAF,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Hunter  Wood,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Lester  O.  Wood,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Robert  R.  Wooding,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  William  R.  Woodward,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Edward  L.  Woodyard,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Francis  A.  Woolfley,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Joseph  M  Worthington,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Stanley  T.  Wray,  USAF,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Edwin  K.  Wright,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Thomas  K.  Wright,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Henry  J.  Wuensch 

Rear  Adm.  Don  W.  Wulzen,  USN,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Ira  T.  Wyche,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Evan  W.  Yancey,  USN,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  Earl  P.  Yates,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Charles  E.  Yeager ,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  George  H.  Yeager,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Emmett  F.  Yost,  USAF,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Charles  M.  Young,  Jr.,  USA,  Ret. 

Admiral  Edwin  J.  S.  Young,  USN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  George  H.  Young,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Mason  J.  Young,  USA,  Ret. 

Maj.  Gen.  Carl  A.  Youngdale 

Brig.  Gen.  Ninian  L.  Yuille,  USA,  Ret. 

Rear  Adm.  William  T.  Zink,  Jr.,  OSN,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Kenneth  F.  Zitzman,  USA,  Ret. 

Brig.  Gen.  Virgil  L.  Zoller,  USAF,  Ret. 

Admiral  Elmo  R.  Zumwalt,  Jr.,  USN,  Ret. 

Briq.  Gen.  Edwin  A.  Zundel,  USA,  Ret. 


79 

The  committee  will  stand  in  brief  recess  while  the  Senators  go  to 
vote.  When  we  come  back,  we  will  take  our  final  witnesses.  Again, 
may  I  thank  you  both? 

[Whereupon,  a  brief  recess  was  taken.] 

Senator  Biden  [presiding].  The  committee  will  please  come  to 
order. 

Our  next  two  witnesses  are  retired  Gen.  David  W.  Winn  and  Dr. 
Victor  Fediay.  They  will  be  speaking  on  behalf  of  the  Institute  of 
American  Relations. 

Dr.   Fediay,  would  you  please  come  up  to  the  witness  table? 

General,  thank  you  very  much  for  your  patience  in  sitting  here 
as  long  as  you  have.  I  assure  you  that  the  lack  of  attendance  is  not 
due  to  a  lack  of  interest  in  your  statement  but  due  to  the  confusion 
of  voting  and  other  matters  taking  place  on  the  floor  of  the  Senate 
right  now.  I  am  sure  you  know  this  is  a  very  busy  time.  I  am  very 
anxious  to  hear  your  statement.  Please  proceed  in  any  way  that 
would  be  most  comfortable  to  you. 

STATEMENT  OF  BRIG.  GEN.  DAVID  W.  WINN  (RETIRED), 
POLICY  BOARD,  INSTITUTE  OF  AMERICAN  RELATIONS, 
WASHINGTON,  D.C.,  ACCOMPANIED  BY  VICTOR  FEDIAY, 
PRESIDENT,  INSTITUTE  OF  AMERICAN  RELATIONS 

General  Winn.  I  had  a  chance  to  learn  a  little  bit  about  patience, 
so  that  was  no  problem,  Mr.  Senator. 

The  statement  I  am  about  to  make  reflects  my  own  opinion.  It 
should  not  in  any  way  be  attributed  to  my  former  period  with  the 
Air  Force.  It  does  not  represent  the  Air  Force. 

Senator  Biden.  Are  you  speaking  on  behalf  of  the  Institute  of 
American  Relations? 

General  Winn.  They  have  arranged  for  my  presence  here.  To 
that  extent,  yes,  but  as  far  as  speaking  for  the  Institute  of  Ameri- 
can Relations  officially,  I  do  not  do  so. 

I  am  very  pleased  to  be  here  to  contribute  my  opinions  to  this 
discussion. 

Senator  Biden.  We  are  anxious  to  hear  from  you. 

General  Winn.  My  last  job  was  Commander  of  the  North  Ameri- 
can Defense  Command  Combat  Operations  Center.  This  facility  is 
located  in  the  Cheyenne  Mountain  Complex  near  Colorado  Springs; 
with  all  sources  of  intelligence  available.  They  watch  the  Soviet 
Union  each  day  around  the  clock.  Our  responsibilities  were  to 
provide  the  President  and  the  National  Command  authorities 
warning  and  evaluation  of  any  threat  to  the  North  American  conti- 
nent. From  that  window,  Soviet  capability  was  impressive. 

For  example,  they  outshot  us  5  to  1  in  space  launchers  and  4  to  1 
in  missiles  in  1977.  We  saw  some  events  that  exceeded  our  own 
capabilities  and  our  technological  expectations.  Sometimes  it  took 
us  too  long  to  know  what  we  were  seeing,  and  sometimes  we  were 
not  sure  at  all  what  we  were  seeing.  Our  intelligence  collection  is 
good,  but  in  my  opinion  it  does  not  support  the  conclusion  that 
adequate  technical  verification  of  Soviet  capabilities  is  possible. 

Yet  my  concern  for  the  future  does  not  stem  from  verification 
limitations  that  I  know  exist.  I  am  concerned  about  the  basic 
premise  of  our  strategic  arms  limitation  negotiations.  The  lopsided 
conception  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty  implications  worries  me  far  more 


80 

than  the  prospect  of  ICBM's  flying  both  ways  over  the  Arctic.  I  got 
out  of  the  Air  Force  early  because  I  could  not  find  an  arena  where 
positions,  policies,  or  concepts  could  be  debated. 

For  example,  I  tried  to  raise  issues  against  the  decision  eliminat- 
ing ADCOM  [the  Aerospace  Defense  Command].  That  decision  to 
me  did  not  make  sense  from  a  military  or  management  point  of 
view.  I  objected  to  killing  the  only  integrated  homeland  air  defense 
command  we  possessed.  Nobody  even  answered  the  mail.  All  argu- 
ments were  totally  ignored  from  start  to  finish,  not  just  mine.  The 
ADCOM  decision  was  steamrollered  from  the  top. 

Shredding  out  our  only  full-time,  dedicated  heartland  defense 
command  contributes  directly  to  the  SALT  II  imbalance.  The  mis- 
sion of  a  fully  integrated  command  is  now  to  be  split  four  ways. 

It  was  said  that  this  would  save  $12  million  a  year.  At  the  same 
time,  we  were  in  the  process  of  eliminating  all  but  a  handful  of 
ground  radars  with  combat  capability,  turning  our  air  sovereignty 
over  to  the  FAA  with  civilian  radars  and  controllers. 

I  asked  a  senior  officer  privately,  if  the  decision  to  kill  ADCOM 
were  yours  to  make,  would  you  do  it,  and  he  said  yes.  I  turned 
away,  and  he  said,  Dave,  you  just  don't  understand  the  pressures. 

Well,  he  is  right,  I  don't  know  the  pressures,  and  I  don't  under- 
stand the  pressure  for  SALT  II.  Why  do  we  insist  on  this  treaty? 
The  bottom  line  of  the  SALT  II  advocates  is  that  we  are  better  off 
with  it  than  without  it.  I  think  the  opposite  is  true.  Take  for 
instance  the  Backfire  bomber  problem.  B-52's  are  counted  in  SALT 
II,  despite  their  age  and  the  high  threat  under  which  they  might 
have  to  fly.  The  Soviet  Backfires  are  not  counted,  despite  our  near 
total  inability  even  to  detect  them,  much  less  to  destroy  them. 

Contrast  that  with  the  defense  our  aging  B-52's  and  FB-lll's 
would  meet  to  reach  a  Soviet  target.  While  we  systematically  re- 
duced both  our  homeland  defense  interceptor  aircraft  and  ground 
control  radars,  Russia  has  built  and  built  and  built.  The  Soviets 
took  the  lesson  of  the  Cuban  crisis  of  1962  very  seriously.  This 
lesson  was  simply  that  the  power  ratio  at  that  time  was  wrong  for 
them.  The  United  States  could  defend  herself.  In  the  early  sixties, 
it  didn't  matter  where  our  interests  were  threatened.  The  numbers 
were  wrong  for  them.  Now  the  numbers  are  different.  You  have  to 
conclude  that  we  haven't  paid  the  price  to  maintain  our  military 
parity.  The  reason  that  Russia  arms  is  to  become  a  force  against 
which  there  is  no  defense.  With  SALT  II,  we  see  in  action  the  belief 
that  there  is  a  disconnect  between  raw  military  power  and  their 
international  behavior. 

The  SALT  II  issue  is  more  than  ballistic  missiles,  bombers,  and 
submarines.  A  lot  of  history  and  a  few  fundamentals  are  involved. 

It  has  been  over  6  years  since  I  returned  from  Hanoi's  Hoa  Lo 
Prison.  During  these  6  years,  and  especially  during  the  last  30 
months,  a  pattern  in  American  dialog  has  developed  that  is  famil- 
iar to  me,  and  that  pattern  goes  back  to  Hanoi.  When  my  para- 
chute popped  open  over  North  Vietnam,  there  was  little  doubt  that 
my  own  freedom  was  over.  The  Hanoi  prisoner  had  no  choices. 
Pressure  was  total.  Control  was  complete.  There  was  no  end  short 
of  yielding.  For  the  prisoner,  the  inevitable  result  was  inability  to 
continue  resistance. 


81 

Now  America  is  being  challenged,  and  we  have  all  been  condi- 
tioned in  a  sense  much  like  that  prisoner  in  Hanoi. 

Freedom  throughout  the  world  is  being  squeezed  left,  and  I 
wonder  how  many  of  us  are  aware  and  anxious  about  it.  The 
prisoner  in  Hanoi  was  left  with  nothing  to  link  him  to  tradition, 
family,  or  country.  The  United  States  is  not  yet  cut  off  from  its 
traditional,  historical,  and  constitutional  strength,  but  the  same 
inexorable  pressures  faced  by  the  prisoner  in  solitary  can  be  seen 
ahead  for  the  American  people.  America's  solitary  confinement  is 
our  isolation  from  the  premises  on  which  SALT  and  other  issues 
are  being  faced,  and  the  same  temptation  to  cave  in  is  working  on 
free  people  in  the  same  way  they  did  on  the  captive  man  in  Hanoi. 
We  are  being  pushed,  and  pushed  very  hard. 

The  basic  question,  I  think,  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty  debate  is,  do 
we  have  a  choice  in  this  matter?  SALT  II  is  an  agreement  which 
we  will  honor  with  those  whose  aim  is  the  destruction  of  free 
choice.  Is  the  SALT  II  ratification  process  the  final  argument  that 
everything  will  come  out  OK  if  we  simply  trust  those  who  say  they 
understand  these  things? 

The  American  people  just  as  the  Soviet  citizen  may  not  under- 
stand the  technicalities  of  assured  destruction,  or  even  when  it  is 
about  to  occur,  but  every  person  understands  that  life  without 
choice  is  the  ultimate  weakness. 

This  treaty  lacks  fundamental  logic  and  ignores  history.  Its  worst 
feature  is  that  it  is  being  sold  on  a  mother  knows  best  basis,  when 
people  ought  to  wonder  whether  mother  knows  what  she  is  doing. 
We  don't  have  to  do  this,  but  the  circle  of  decision  gets  smaller  and 
smaller.  We  risk  having  fewer  choices  in  deciding  when  wisdom 
needs  the  strength  to  say  no  in  meeting  its  responsibilities. 

In  its  recently  published  annual  report,  the  International  Insti- 
tute of  Strategic  Studies  in  London  warns  the  free  world  that  the 
Soviet  Union  leaves  the  United  States  and  its  allies  far  behind  in 
military  force,  both  strategic  and  conventional.  The  new  generation 
of  missiles  developed  and  deployed  by  the  Soviet  Union  is  more 
powerful  than  any  of  ours,  which  have  not  been  significantly  im- 
proved since  the  sixties.  The  Institute  estimates  that  the  Soviet 
Union  is  in  the  position  of  achieving  a  first  strike  capability 
against  the  United  States. 

These  conclusions  of  the  prestigious  London  Institute,  plainly 
stated,  put  the  ratification  of  SALT  II  into  a  very  dubious  category. 
During  the  10  years  of  SALT  negotiations,  the  balance  has  clearly 
changed  in  the  overall  security  posture  vis-a-vis  that  of  the  Soviet 
Union.  We  still  have  a  fundamental  policy  objective  of  essential 
equivalence. 

Defense  Secretary  Brown,  speaking  of  the  uncertainties  of  Soviet 
response,  said: 

Basically  they  require  us  to  insist  on  essential  equivalence  with  the  Soviet  Union 
in  strategic  nuclear  forces. 

He  also  said: 

The  issue  is  now  to  make  it  clear  to  the  Soviets  that  they  cannot  gain  any 
military  or  political  advantage  from  their  strategic  forces.  Insistence  on  essential 
equivalence  guards  against  any  danger  that  the  Soviets  might  be  seen  as  superior, 
even  if  the  perception  is  not  technically  justified. 


82 

By  way  of  partial  clarification  of  what  is  understood  to  be  the 
essential  equivalence,  Secretary  Brown  said: 

By  essential  equivalence  we  mean  the  maintenance  of  conditions  such  that  Soviet 
strategic  nuclear  forces  do  not  become  usable  instruments  of  political  leverage 
coverage,  diplomatic  coercion,  or  military  advantage.  Any  advantage  in  force  char- 
acteristics enjoyed  by  the  Soviets  are  offset  by  U.S.  advantages  in  other  characteris- 
tics, and  the  U.S.  posture  is  not  in  fact  and  is  not  seen  as,  inferior  in  performance  to 
the  strategic  nuclear  forces  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

These  conditions  exist  today,  and  our  objective  in  the  current  SALT  II  negotia- 
tions is  to  maintain  them  in  the  future. 

The  International  Institute  of  Strategic  Studies  disagrees  with 
Secretary  Brown.  The  conditions  for  essential  equivalence  of  Febru- 
ary 1978,  obviously  are  not  a  reality  in  September  1979.  According 
to  the  London  Institute,  the  Soviets  are  "seen  as  superior,  and  the 
U.S.  posture  is  in  fact  seen  as  inferior." 

As  if  to  prove  that  the  strategic  forces  are  usable  instruments  of 
political  leverage,  diplomatic  coercion,  or  military  advantage,  the 
Soviet  Union  has  special  military  troops  to  maneuver  jointly  with 
Cubans  on  Cuban  territory.  Under  the  umbrella  of  strategic  superi- 
ority, the  Soviets  apparently  feel  free  to  use  their  forces  in  the 
proximity  of  Nicaragua  or  any  country  which  may  become  their 
next  target.  The  presence  of  3,000  Soviet  troops  is  not  a  direct 
threat  to  the  United  States,  but  for  wars  in  Central  America  it 
could  be  decisive. 

It  is  imperative  that  a  SALT  Treaty  which  the  United  States 
ratifies  does  not  force  the  United  States  to  look  the  other  way  at 
every  geopolitical  move  the  Soviet  Union  makes,  even  in  the  west- 
ern hemisphere.  If  the  U.S.S.R.  should  decide  to  test  our  will  today 
or  tomorrow,  how  many  warheads  would  be  presumed  to  be  aboard 
the  SS-18?  As  agreed  in  the  treaty?  If  they  chose  to  use  their 
superior  navy  to  close  the  Mediterranean  and  the  Indian  Ocean  in 
1980,  where  would  the  Backfire  bombers  be  based?  And  what  range 
would  Backfires  reach,  to  what  targets,  just  in  case  we  tried  to 
respond? 

Would  SALT  II  have  helped?  Treaties  do  not  deter.  Negotiations 
never  reach  the  bottom  line  of  deterrence. 

Without  any  agreement  at  all,  we  halted  the  B-1  and  enhanced 
radiation  weapons,  and  stretched  out  other  programs  into  the 
period  we  now  seek  to  cover  with  SALT  II. 

Advocates  of  SALT  II  insist  that  it  puts  a  cap  on  the  number  of 
MIRV-type  warheads  the  Soviets  can  install  on  the  308  heavy 
missiles.  It  is  a  strange  argument.  The  agreement  prohibits  the 
United  States  from  having  any  such  missiles.  By  1985,  the  Soviets 
will  probably  have  improved  the  accuracy  and  yield  of  increased 
numbers  of  warheads.  They  could  increase  the  MIRV's  on  each  SS- 
18  to  20  or  even  30. 

There  is  an  argument  that  the  M-X  will  re-establish  the  strate- 
gic balance  in  our  favor,  but  if  the  production  of  the  M-X  moves 
forward  as  rapidly  as  possible,  it  would  be  ready  for  initial  deploy- 
ment only  by  1986,  and  not  fully  available  until  1989.  By  that  time, 
the  SS-18's  could  be  fully  MIRVed  with  30  accurate  warheads  per 
missile.  That  could  give  the  Soviet  Union  the  capability  of  striking 
all  M-X  and  Minuteman  missiles  in  one  attack,  forcing  the  United 
States  to  launch  on  warning  or  face  destruction  without  retali- 
ation. 


83 

The  SALT  II  numbers  game  is  obviously  not  in  our  favor,  but 
that  clearly  is  not  the  main  reason  why  the  treaty  should  not  be 
ratified  in  its  present  form.  The  conditions  for  negotiation  of  SALT 
III  will  be  even  more  restrictive  for  the  United  States  than  experi- 
enced in  SALT  II  if  it  is  ratified  as  it  stands.  The  vulnerability  of 
peace  arrangements  will  be  absolute  if  the  conditions  of  SALT  II 
permit  the  maximization  of  Soviet  advantage  in  space  and  in  the 
air  while  Soviet  conventional  forces  continue  to  grow. 

Simply  by  having  so  much  to  negotiate  away,  the  Soviet  Union 
has  sent  us  a  message.  The  first  line  is,  let's  negotiate  if  it  makes 
you  feel  better.  The  last  line  is,  let  the  results  speak  for  them- 
selves. 

Senator  Biden.  Thank  you  very  much.  General.  Your  testimony 
is  very  straightforward,  and  it  reiterates  some  of  the  points  that 
have  been  made  earlier  by  your  former  colleagues  and  evidences 
the  same  concern.  Consequently,  I  only  had  a  few  questions,  but  in 
light  of  the  fact  that  I  have  only  SV2  minutes  to  vote  on  the  next 
amendment  that  is  up  on  the  floor,  I  will  not  even  attempt  to  ask 
those  questions.  I  thank  you  on  behalf  of  the  committee  for  your 
statement.  Thank  you  for  your  patience. 

This  hearing  will  stand  in  recess  until  2  o'clock. 

[Whereupon,  the  committee  recessed,  to  meet  again  at  2  p.m. 
the  same  day.] 


84 

Afternoon  Session 

The  committee  met,  pursuant  to  notice,  at  2:10  p.m.,  in  room  318, 
Russell  Senate  Office  Building,  Hon.  Frank  Church  (chairman  of 
the  committee),  presiding. 

Present:  Senators  Church,  McGovern,  Biden,  Sarbanes,  Muskie, 
Javits,  Percy,  and  Hayakawa. 

The  Chairman.  The  hearing  will  please  come  to  order. 

OPENING  STATEMENT 

This  afternoon  we  continue  to  hear  from  public  witnesses  on  the 
SALT  II  Treaty. 

Appearing  first  will  be  Hon.  Charles  Yost,  Senator  Thomas  Mcln- 
tyre  and  Coretta  Scott  King,  on  behalf  of  Americans  for  SALT. 

Next  we  will  hear  from  three  religious  groups.  Cardinal  Krol  will 
testify  for  the  U.S.  Catholic  Conference.  Dr.  Claire  Randall  will 
appear  for  the  National  Council  of  Churches.  Albert  Vorspan  will 
testify  on  behalf  of  the  Union  of  American  Hebrew  Congregations. 

Ambassador  Yost,  we  will  ask  you  to  begin,  if  you  will. 

Ambassador  Yost.  Senator  Mclntyre  will  open  for  us  if  that  is 
agreeable  to  you,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  an  appropriate  way  for  us  to  commence 
these  hearings. 

Tom,  it  does  my  heart  good  to  see  you  again. 

Senator  McIntyre.  Even  with  my  bald  head? 

The  Chairman.  To  see  you  looking  so  well.  And  I  think  that  I 
express  the  feeling  of  all  of  your  colleagues  and  friends  in  the 
Senate  when  I  give  you  a  warm  welcome  back. 

STATEMENT  OF  HON.  THOMAS  J.  McINTYRE,  JR.,  PRESIDENT, 

AMERICANS  FOR  SALT> 

Senator  McIntyre.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman  and  members  of 
the  Foreign  Relations  Committee.  Today  I  offer  my  testimony  on 
the  importance  of  SALT  II  on  behalf  of  Americans  for  SALT,  a 
nationwide  citizens'  campaign  of  which  I  am  president. 

Americans  for  SALT  is  a  coalition  of  individuals  and  major  orga- 
nizations in  support  of  the  ratification  of  the  SALT  II  agreement. 
The  individuals  include  retired  military  officers,  former  Govern- 
ment officials  and  other  prominent  Americans.  The  organizations 
include  religious  groups,  business  associations,  labor  unions,  scien- 
tific and  educational  organizations,  and  public  interest  groups. 

The  working  consensus  of  these  many  Americans  is  that  the 
ratification  of  SALT  II  is  essential  for  the  security  of  the  American 
people  in  several  important  ways. 

First,  SALT  caps  the  Soviet  strategic  threat.  The  nuclear  threat 
we  would  likely  face  without  SALT  will  be  both  quantitatively  and 
qualitatively  more  formidable  than  the  threat  under  SALT. 

It  is  precisely  because  many  of  us  are  concerned  about  an  unre- 
stricted Soviet  strategic  buildup  that  we  wish  to  place  SALT  re- 
strictions on  the  Soviets.  The  more  one  is  concerned  about  the 
formidable  Soviet  threat  under  SALT,  the  more  one  should  seek  to 
avoid  an  even  greater  threat,  one  without  SALT. 


See  page  86  for  Senator  Mclntyre's  prepared  statement. 


85 

Second,  under  this  treaty  we  will  be  able  to  plan  our  defense 
programs  more  effectively  because  we  will  be  able  to  predict  with 
greater  accuracy  and  greater  confidence  the  size  and  shape  of  the 
Soviet  threat.  The  treaty  requires  them  to  fit  their  forces  into  a 
well-defined  grid  of  specific  limits,  sublimits,  and  qualitative  re- 
strictions. 

Moreover,  the  treaty  prohibits  the  Soviets  from  interfering  with 
our  national  technical  means  of  monitoring  their  weapons  develop- 
ment and  deployment.  Under  SALT,  we  will  be  able  to  focus  our 
R.  &  D.  moneys  much  more  effectively  to  counter  the  Soviet  buildup 
since  that  threat  itself  will  be  more  predictable. 

Third,  SALT  leaves  us  free  to  choose  the  strategic  and  theater 
weapons  we  need  to  secure  our  common  defense. 

When  I  served  as  chairman  of  the  Subcommittee  on  Military 
Research  and  Development  of  the  Senate  Armed  Services  Commit- 
tee, my  colleagues  and  I  were  especially  vigilant  on  this  point.  So  I 
am  particularly  reassured  that  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  testified 
that  the  United  States  will  be  free  to  exploit  its  truly  formidable 
military  technology  to  meet  the  Soviet  challenge. 

Fourth,  I  believe  we  have  an  opportunity  to  reunite  our  Nation 
behind  a  prudent  national  defense  program  through  the  debate  on 
SALT.  For  too  long,  Mr.  Chairman  and  members  of  the  committee, 
we  have  been  divided  about  both  our  defense  requirements  and 
SALT. 

At  the  heart  of  this  division  is  a  fallacy,  a  fallacy  that  SALT  and 
national  defense  are  mutually  exclusive.  The  American  people 
want  both  a  strong  national  defense  and  a  SALT  agreement.  The 
SALT  debate  gives  us  an  opportunity  to  reconstruct  a  broad  work- 
ing American  middle  that  will  support  both  a  strong  defense  pro- 
gram and  arms  limitations  as  a  means  to  that  same  end. 

However,  Mr.  Chairman,  if  the  treaty  is  rejected,  I  fear  we  will 
return  to  a  polarized  politics  which  will  make  it  difficult  for  us  to 
rally  a  stable  base  of  public  support  behind  defense  programs.  At  a 
time  when  we  find  a  deep  American  desire  to  get  together  to 
manage  our  affairs  in  so  many  troubling  policy  areas — inflation, 
energy,  taxes — we  need  to  demonstrate  again  to  ourselves  and  our 
allies  and  our  adversaries  that  we  can  find  common  ground  to 
manage  the  most  dangerous  of  all  problems,  nuclear  weapons. 

This  suggests  my  final  point.  Although  it  cannot  be  proved  in 
any  systematic  way,  we  somehow  all  know  that  this  agreement 
enhances  our  security  because  it  represents  the  common  interests 
of  both  nuclear  superpowers  in  avoiding  the  use  of  nuclear  weap- 
ons. 

The  treaty  will  not  eliminate  the  possibility  of  nuclear  war,  but 
it  does,  because  of  this  unstated  premise,  make  the  use  of  these 
weapons  somehow  less  likely.  SALT  will  not  eliminate  military 
competition,  but  it  will  make  it  less  dangerous  and  more  orderly. 

In  sum,  I  believe  the  American  people,  and  in  fact  people  all  over 
the  globe,  know  they  will  be  more  secure  in  a  world  in  which  the 
two  most  powerful  nations  continue  to  work  in  our  common  inter- 
est to  reduce  the  likelihood  of  nuclear  war  within  the  framework  of 
this  treaty. 

Thank  you. 

[The  prepared  statement  of  Hon.  Thomas  J.  Mclntyre  follows:] 


86 

Prepared  Statement  of  Hon.  Thomas  J.  McIntyre,  Jr. 

Mr.  Chairman,  members  of  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee:  Today  I  offer 
my  testimony  on  the  importance  of  SALT  II  on  behalf  of  Americans  for  SALT,  a 
nationwide  citizens'  campaign  of  which  I  am  President.  Americans  for  SALT  is  a 
coalition  of  individuals  and  major  organizations  in  support  of  the  ratification  of  the 
SALT  II  Agreement.  The  individuals  include  retired  military  officers,  former  gov- 
ernment officials  and  other  prominent  Americans.  The  organizations  include  reli- 
gious groups,  business  associations,  labor  unions,  scientific  and  educational  organiza- 
tions and  public  interest  groups. 

The  working  consensus  of  these  many  Americans  is  that  the  ratification  of  SALT 
II  is  essential  for  the  security  of  the  American  people.  I  believe  SALT  will  enhance 
our  security  in  several  important  ways. 

First,  SALT  caps  the  Soviet  strategic  threat.  The  nuclear  threat  we  would  likely 
face  without  SALT  will  be  both  quantitatively  and  qualitatively  more  formidable 
than  the  threat  under  SALT. 

As  Secretary  Brown  has  testified: 

The  Soviet  total  strategic  missile  and  bomber  force  will  likely  be  30  percent  larger 
without  SALT  than  with  it. 

Their  total  strategic  MIRVed  ballistic  missiles,  both  land  and  sea,  will  likely  be  50 
percent  greater  without  SALT  than  under  SALT. 

Their  MIRVed  ICBM's  could  be  up  to  75  percent  greater  if  unrestricted  by  SALT. 

Their  total  strategic  nuclear  warheads  and  gravity  bombs  could  easily  be  half 
again  as  large  a  force  if  unrestricted  by  SALT. 

The  threat  to  our  ICBM's  from  their  silo  killer  warheads  could  double  without 
SALT  restraints  on  MIRVed  ICBM  launchers  and  number  of  warheads  permitted  on 
each. 

Without  SALT,  the  Backfire  bomber  production  could  grow  unrestricted  beyond 
its  current  level.  Without  SALT,  the  Soviet  SS-16,  the  only  mobile  ICBM  fully 
developed  by  either  side,  could  be  deployed.  Without  SALT,  the  Soviets  could  pro- 
ceed to  develop  their  fifth  generation  of  ICBM's  without  any  restrictions. 

In  sum,  it's  precisely  because  many  of  us  are  concerned  about  an  unrestricted 
Soviet  strategic  buildup  that  we  wish  to  place  SALT  restrictions  on  the  Soviets.  The 
more  one  is  concerned  about  the  formidable  Soviet  threat  under  SALT,  the  more 
one  should  seek  to  avoid  an  even  greater  one  without  SALT. 

There  is  a  second  way  SALT  will  enhance  our  security.  Under  this  treaty,  we  will 
be  able  to  plan  our  defense  programs  more  effectively,  because  we  will  be  able  to 
predict  with  greater  accuracy  and  confidence  the  size  and  shape  of  the  Soviet 
threat.  Under  SALT,  we  will  know  the  number  and  kinds  of  strategic  weapons 
developed  and  deployed  by  the  Soviets,  because  the  treaty  requires  them  to  fit  their 
forces  into  a  well  defined  grid  of  specific  limits,  sublimits  and  qualitative  restric- 
tions. Moreover,  the  treaty  prohibits  the  Soviets  from  interfering  with  our  national 
technical  means  of  monitoring  their  weapons  development  and  deployment.  Since 
our  own  military  research  and  development  programs  must  be  designed  to  hedge 
uncertainties  about  the  Soviet  threat,  the  greater  the  unknown,  the  more  difficult 
our  own  R.  &  D.  task.  In  other  words,  under  SALT,  we  will  be  able  to  focus  our  R.  & 
D.  monies  much  more  effectively  to  counter  the  Soviet  buildup  since  that  threat 
itself  will  be  more  predictable. 

Let  me  suggest  an  important  way  this  is  true.  As  we  all  know,  current  intelli- 
gence projections  suggest  the  Soviets  will  be  able  to  mount  a  technical  threat  to  our 
ICBM's  in  the  early  to  mid-1980's.  Any  of  the  basing  schemes  under  consideration  to 
ensure  our  ICBM's  would  survive  this  threat  is  designed  against  a  specific  presup- 
posed number  of  attacking  silo-killer  Soviet  warheads.  Under  SALT  II,  we  can 
predict  the  maximum  number  our  M-X  basing  design  must  be  able  to  counter, 
because  the  treaty  will  limit  the  number  of  MIRVed  ICBM  launchers  and  the 
number  of  warheads  permitted  on  each.  Without  SALT,  that  number  will  be  much 
higher  and  much  more  difficult  to  predict. 

This  is  vividly  true  in  the  case  of  the  threat  to  our  ICBM's  from  the  Soviet  heavy 
missiles.  SALT  restrict's  the  SS-18's  to  308  with  no  more  than  10  warheads  on  each. 
Without  SALT,  they  could  keep  their  hot  production  line  going  and  could  relatively 
cheaply  build  up  to  500  SS-18's.  They  could  also  double  the  number  of  warheads  on 
each.  So  instead  of  having  to  design  an  MX  basing  scheme  that  would  counter  a 
threat  of  3,000  warheads  from  the  SS-18's  under  SALT,  we  would  have  to  design 
one  to  counter  10,000  warheads  from  the  SS-18's.  So  in  this  case  as  in  others,  SALT 
will  help  us  design  an  effective  solution  to  a  critical  military  problem  we  will  face. 

Third,  SALT  leaves  us  free  to  choose  the  strategic  and  theater  weapons  we  need 
to  insure  our  common  defense.  With  virtually  no  exceptions  and  certainly  no  impor- 
tant exceptions,  the  United  States  will  be  free  to  exploit  its  formidable  military 
technology  to  meet  the  Soviet  challenge.  I  am  particularly  reassured  that  the  Joint 


87 

Chiefs  of  Staff  testified  this  is  the  case.  When  I  served  as  Chairman  of  the  Subcom- 
mittee on  Military  Research  and  Development  of  the  Senate  Armed  Services  Com- 
mittee, my  colleagues  and  I  were  particularly  vigilant  on  this  point.  Throughout  our 
hearings,  we  consistently  inquired  about  the  degree  of  technological  freedom  the 
emerging  agreement  would  leave  us.  We  urged  the  Administration  to  avoid  as  much 
as  possible  any  such  restrictions. 

I  realize  that  our  success  in  ensuring  this  freedom  is  a  source  of  some  frustration 
to  some  who  wish  that  SALT  would  have  resolved  domestic  debates  about  what 
weapons  systems  we  require.  I  never  believed  that  this  was  a  proper  objective  of 
SALT  negotiations.  If,  of  course,  we  would  have  been  required  in  the  bargaining  to 
accept  restrictions,  we  could  judge  that  bargain  in  the  aggregate.  But  I  personally 
reject  the  view  that  it  should  be  an  objective  of  SALT  either  to  preclude  or  mandate 
a  particular  U.S.  weapons  system.  I  always  felt  that  was  something  we  should 
decide  for  ourselves  in  our  councils. 

There  is  a  fourth  way  SALT  can  enhance  our  national  security.  I  believe  that  we 
have  an  opportunity  to  reunite  our  nation  behind  a  prudent  national  defense 
program  through  the  debate  on  SALT.  For  too  long,  we  have  been  divided  about 
both  our  defense  requirements  and  SALT.  At  the  heart  of  this  division  is  a  fallacy 
that  SALT  and  national  defense  are  mutually  exclusive.  I  believe  SALT  should  be  a 
means  to  a  more  effective  common  defense  for  our  nation  rather  than  as  an  aspect 
of  detente  or  as  an  end  in  itself.  Further,  I  believe,  the  American  people  want  both 
a  strong  national  defense  and  a  SALT  agreement. 

The  SALT  debate  gives  us  an  opportunity  to  reconstruct  a  broad  working  Ameri- 
can middle  that  will  support  both  a  strong  defense  program  and  arms  limitations  as 
a  means  to  that  same  end.  For  the  first  time  since  Vietnam,  we  have  an  opportunity 
to  rebuild  a  working  majority  on  this  common  ground. 

However,  if  the  treaty  is  rejected,  I  fear  we  will  return  to  a  polarized  politics 
which  will  make  it  difficult  for  us  to  rally  a  stable  base  of  public  support  behind 
defense  programs.  At  a  time  when  we  find  a  deep  American  desire  to  get  together  to 
manage  our  affairs  in  so  many  troubling  policy  areas — inflation,  energy,  taxes — we 
need  to  demonstrate  again  to  ourselves,  our  allies,  and  our  adversaries  that  we  can 
find  common  ground  to  manage  the  most  dangerous  of  all  problems,  nuclear  weap- 
ons. 

This  suggests  my  final  point.  Although  it  can't  be  proved  in  any  systematic  way, 
we  somehow  all  know  that  this  agreement  enhances  our  security  because  it  repre- 
sents the  common  efforts  of  both  nuclear  superpowers  to  avoid  the  use  of  nuclear 
weapons.  The  treaty  will  not  eliminate  the  possibility  of  nuclear  war,  but  it  does, 
because  of  this  unstated  premise,  make  the  use  of  these  weapons  somehow  less 
likely.  SALT  will  not  eliminate  military  competition,  but  it  will  make  it  less  danger- 
ous and  more  orderly. 

In  sum,  I  believe  that  the  American  people,  in  fact  people  all  over  the  globe,  know 
that  they  will  be  more  secure  in  a  world  in  which  the  two  most  powerful  nations 
continue  to  work  in  our  common  interests  to  reduce  the  likelihood  of  nuclear  war 
within  the  framework  of  this  treaty. 

The  Chairman.  Thank  you  very  much,  Senator,  for  an  excellent 
statement. 

I  believe  that  in  the  interest  of  time,  we  should  hear  from  each 
member  of  the  panel.  Then  we  will  address  questions  to  the  panel. 
I  think  that  Mrs.  King  might  testify  next. 

Mrs.  King  often  speaks  for  the  poor,  and  we  would  be  interested 
in  knowing  what  there  is  in  SALT  for  Americans  who  are  con- 
cerned about  food,  housing,  and  living  standards  for  our  own 
people. 

Mrs.  King,  I  am  very  pleased  to  welcome  you  this  afternoon. 

STATEMENT  OF  MRS.  CORETTA  SCOTT  KING,  MEMBER, 
AMERICANS  FOR  SALT 

Mrs.  King.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman,  and  your  distinguished 
colleagues  on  the  committee. 

I  greatly  appreciate  the  opportunity  to  appear  before  this  com- 
mittee in  support  of  ratification  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty.  I  am  doubly 
honored  to  appear  before  you  today,  honored  by  the  privilege  of 


88 

speaking  to  this  important  committee  on  a  subject  of  such  grave 
significance  to  the  peace  of  the  world. 

I  am  honored  to  be  the  first  woman,  the  only  mother,  and  the 
only  representative  of  any  American  minority  to  have  this  privi- 
lege. I  am  not  unaware  of  the  heavy  responsibility  that  this  places 
on  me,  Mr.  Chairman,  because  it  is  exactly  the  women,  the  moth- 
ers, and  the  minorities  of  this  country  that  are  the  real  silent 
majority,  who  pay  the  highest  price  for  the  continuance  of  the 
world's  arms  race  and  would  pay  the  highest  price  for  any  nuclear 
or  even  nonnuclear  war. 

In  the  course  of  the  past  few  weeks,  the  committee  has  heard 
voluminous  testimony  on  the  merits  and  shortcomings  of  this 
treaty  by  experts  in  the  field  of  nuclear  and  strategic  matters.  I, 
too,  come  to  you  as  an  expert  because  I  am  a  citizen  of  this  Nation; 
and  as  a  citizen,  I  know  that  the  issues  in  this  historic  debate  on 
SALT  are  not  confined  to  missile  counts  and  throw-weight  and  base 
modes. 

As  we  all  know,  a  more  basic  and  fundamental  issue  tests  us  and 
challenges  us  today,  and  it  is  this:  Shall  we,  in  the  name  of  nation- 
al security,  commit  ourselves  to  a  course  of  confrontation  and 
potential  nuclear  annihilation  by  rejecting  this  treaty;  or  shall  we 
as  a  Nation  seek  a  more  lasting  security  through  the  peaceful 
resolution  of  conflict  in  a  way  that  allows  us  to  free  our  spirits  and 
resources  for  the  development  of  human  potential  in  our  society? 

These  are  public  policy  choices  which  must  be  made  by  citizens, 
for  they  are  the  true  experts.  They  are  the  people  whose  lives  are 
to  be  risked,  whose  children's  lives  are  to  be  mortgaged,  and  whose 
parents'  lives  are  to  be  wasted  should  we  choose  to  pursue  a  course 
of  superiority  and  winability  in  an  arms  race  that  knows  no  win- 
ners. 

Yet,  most  Americans  are  overlooked  and  excluded  from  this 
debate.  Public  polls  showing  citizen  support  for  the  SALT  process 
are  ignored  or  glossed  over  because  we  are  told  citizens  are  not 
experts. 

My  husband,  Martin  Luther  King,  Jr.,  knew  these  same  frustra- 
tions during  another  historical  national  debate.  Though  a  recent 
recipient  of  the  Nobel  Peace  Prize,  my  husband  was  informed  by 
so-called  specialists  on  the  Vietnam  war  that  he  was  not  enough  of 
an  expert  to  discuss  this  basic  issue  of  war  and  peace,  of  violence 
and  nonviolence. 

I  fervently  hope  that  we  as  a  Nation,  in  contemplating  the 
wisdom  of  this  treaty  to  limit  nuclear  weapons,  will  listen  to  those 
whose  lives  are  directly  affected  by  the  outcome  of  this  debate:  The 
mother  in  Utah  who  gives  her  child  milk  knowing  the  dangers  of 
radiation  from  nuclear  weapons  testing— that  mother  is  an  expert 
on  SALT;  the  unemployed  youth  who  cannot  find  a  job  and  knows 
that  military  spending  creates  less  jobs  than  spending  on  human 
need— that  youth  is  an  expert  on  SALT;  the  elderly  American 
holding  his  grandchild,  who  witnessed  the  massive  loss  of  life  in 
past  world  wars — that  American  is  an  expert  on  SALT. 

Indeed,  no  issue  of  public  policy  is  more  personal  than  this  issue 
of  limiting  nuclear  weapons  and  ending  this  senseless  arms  race. 
Let  me  give  you  an  example  from  an  area  of  personal  concerns: 
unemployment.   Studies   have   shown   that   $1   billion   of  military 


89 

spending  creates  about  75,000  jobs.  The  same  amount,  if  spent  on 
construction,  creates  100,000;  on  health  care,  139,000  jobs;  on  edu- 
cation, 188,000  jobs. 

Thus,  the  military  budget  swells  in  the  name  of  national  security 
while  our  most  precious  resources  stand  idle.  Our  communities 
may  be  ringed  by  missiles  and  our  cities  surrounded  by  silos,  but 
how  secure  are  we  if  America's  future,  blighted  by  high  unemploy- 
ment, holds  only  the  prospect  of  deterioration  and  decay. 

The  twiii  perils  of  unemployment  and  inflation  are  not  confined 
to  our  shores.  Today,  the  economically  dislocating  effects  of  the 
arms  race  can  be  felt  throughout  the  world.  Children  with  distend- 
ed bellies  still  suffer  for  want  of  adequate  food;  yet  global  military 
expenditures  now  exceed  $400  billion  a  year. 

This  vast  expansion  of  destructive  power  at  the  expense  of 
human  needs  has  served  to  decrease  our  global  security  and  leaves 
us  ever  more  vulnerable  to  random  annihilation  through  nuclear 
exchange  or  accident.  Yet  we  recognize  these  perils  and  have 
shown  the  vision  and  moral  leadership  to  engage  in  a  process  of 
negotiated  restraint. 

As  we  in  this  country  reexamine  our  commitment  to  the  SALT 
process,  we  must  ask  ourselves  this  question:  What  perception  will 
the  world  community  have  of  our  Nation  should  we  fail,  after  7 
years  of  deliberation,  to  proceed  with  this  historic  agreement  to 
limit  nuclear  weaponry?  Nothing  less  than  our  future  is  at  stake. 

Without  SALT,  any  prospect  of  progress  toward  further  arms 
limitation  is  clouded.  Without  SALT,  any  hope  of  replenishing  our 
human  resources  is  undermined.  Without  SALT,  any  dream  of 
peace  for  our  children  and  their  children  is  diminished;  in  its  place, 
a  legacy  of  tension  and  fear. 

Skeptics  will  say  that  the  SALT  process  is  untenable  in  today's 
world,  that  mutual  accommodation  is  unthinkable,  and  that  har- 
mony in  international  relations  is  impossible.  They  choose  instead 
to  pursue  a  policy  of  confrontation  and  violence,  despite  the  poten- 
tial for  human  extinction. 

I  am  accustomed  to  a  great  deal  of  skepticism  and  even  outrage 
at  the  thought  that  the  principles  of  nonviolent  social  change  are 
relevant  to  world  affairs.  Yet,  I  firmly  believe  that  the  world's 
people,  though  often  divided  by  nationalism  and  racism,  are  united 
in  their  instinctive  will  to  live  and  their  civilized  will  to  do  so  in 
peace. 

I  am  reminded  of  my  husband's  words  almost  15  years  ago  now, 
and  I  quote:  "I  refuse  to  accept  the  cynical  notion  that  nation  after 
nation  must  spiral  down  a  militaristic  stairway  into  the  hell  of 
nuclear  destruction.  I  believe  that  unarmed  truth  and  an  uncondi- 
tional love  will  have  the  final  word  of  reality." 

Mr.  Chairman,  this  treaty  to  limit  strategic  weapons  is  not  a 
perfect  agreement.  Indeed,  it  has  been  termed  "a  modest  step." 
How  do  you  define  "modest"  when  any  progress  toward  bringing 
nuclear  weapons  under  some  control  means  a  better  chance  for  a 
peaceful  future  for  everyone? 

I  am  sure  I  will  be  well  understood  when  I  say  I  have  learned  the 
virtue  of  patience,  although  patience  can  seem  a  terrible  taskmas- 
ter when  every  fiber  of  one's  being  longs  for  speed  in  setting  right 
what  one  knows  to  be  wrong. 


90 

The  important  thing  is  to  keep  pressing  forward,  to  take  advan- 
tage of  every  opportunity  for  making  progress,  even  if  it  is  only  one 
step  at  a  time.  This  opportunity  to  limit  nuclear  weapons  under 
the  SALT  II  Treaty,  to  reduce  the  probability  of  destroying  civiliza- 
tion itself,  and  to  turn  our  labors  toward  improving  the  quality  of 
all  our  lives  rather  than  the  useless  waste  of  our  resources  must 
not  be  lost. 

My  experience,  Mr.  Chairman,  is  that  the  United  States  is  most 
respected  in  the  rest  of  the  world  where  our  other  virtues  are  most 
recognized,  the  virtues  of  quiet  rather  than  noise,  of  the  power  to 
build  rather  than  the  power  to  destroy,  and  of  the  spiritual  power 
of  being  a  mediator  in  disputes,  a  reconciler  among  nations  rather 
than  a  belligerent  and  demanding  nation. 

We  as  a  people  are  by  far  the  most  powerful  nation  in  the  world, 
Mr.  Chairman,  not  only  politically,  economically,  and  militarily 
but,  I  firmly  believe,  spiritually.  We  have  the  potential  for  world 
leadership.  What  other  nation  could  have  sponsored  a  Camp  David 
peace  conference?  What  other  world  leader  but  Jimmy  Carter 
could  have  brought  together  those  two  ancient  enemies  to  a  table 
of  dialog?  What  other  nation  could  have  sent  an  Andrew  Young  to 
the  United  Nations  for  the  healing  of  the  nations  and  the  opening 
of  conversation  and  dialog  of  all  peoples  until  he  gained  the  love 
and  respect  of  almost  everyone  in  that  most  suspicious  and  conspir- 
acy-ridden of  all  world  institutions? 

The  United  States,  Mr.  Chairman,  is  a  great  hope  for  peace  if  we 
can  but  learn  to  use  our  power  with  more  dignity  and  restraint. 

And  finally,  Mr.  Chairman,  let  us  not  delude  ourselves  out  of  the 
challenge  before  us.  It  is  not  a  technical  nor  a  military  one;  it  is  a 
moral  one,  a  challenge  of  moral  leadership.  The  whole  world  is 
watching  the  United  States,  whether  the  United  States  will  take 
the  high  road  of  making  the  dramatic  offer  to  continue  this  small 
peace  process  that  we  already  have  started  with  SALT  II. 

My  late  husband  found  it  necessary  to  remind  his  listeners  that 
once  to  every  man  and  nation  is  given  the  moment  to  decide.  That 
this  is  an  hour  for  courage  and  decision.  The  U.S.  Senate  can 
decide  to  take  one  small  step  forward  for  dialog  and  peace  with  the 
Soviet  Union,  which  could  be  one  giant  step  forward  for  the 
women,  the  mothers,  the  children,  and  the  poor,  not  only  for  this 
country  and  the  Soviet  Union,  but  for  the  whole  world. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Thank  you  very  much,  Mrs.  King,  for  a  very 
eloquent  statement  given  with  much  feeling. 

I  would  now  like  to  ask  Ambassador  Charles  Yost  to  present  his 
testimony. 

STATEMENT  OF  AMBASSADOR  CHARLES  W.  YOST, 
COCHAIRMAN  OF  AMERICANS  FOR  SALT ' 

Mr.  Yost.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

I  testify  before  you  today  as  a  cochairman  of  Americans  for 
SALT  and  as  a  former  foreign  service  officer  with  some  45  years  of 
experience  in  international  affairs.  That  service  included  substan- 
tial experience  in  negotiating  with  the  Soviets  at  the  Dumbarton 
Oaks,  San  Francisco,  and  Potsdam  Conferences,  two  assignments  in 


'  See  page  92  for  Ambassador  Yost's  prepared  statement. 


91 

Vienna  under  the  Four  Power  occupation,  director  of  the  State 
Department's  Office  of  Eastern  European  Affairs,  and  at  the 
United  Nations  for  7  years,  including  those  of  the  BerHn,  Cuban, 
and  Congo  crises. 

I  have,  therefore,  no  illusions  either  about  Soviet  objectives  or 
about  the  need  for  great  vigilance  in  doing  business  with  them. 

Senator  Mclntyre  has  described  the  character  and  purpose  of  our 
organization.  I  am  submitting  as  an  annex  to  my  testimony  a  list  of 
the  cochairmen,  of  the  members  of  our  advisory  council  and  of 
about  140  prominent  persons  who  are  publicly  supporting  our  orga- 
nization and  our  goals. 

As  you  will  note,  many  of  those  persons  are  officers  or  repre- 
sentatives of  other  organizations  with  substantial  nationwide  mem- 
berships, some  of  which  assisted  in  the  establishment  of  Americans 
for  SALT,  and  many  of  which  have  taken  a  public  position  in 
support  of  ratification  of  the  treaty. 

With  respect  to  the  attitude  of  the  American  public  toward  the 
treaty,  you  gentlemen  are,  of  course,  aware  that  a  substantial 
number  of  public  opinion  polls  taken  over  the  past  year  show  that 
about  70  percent  of  Americans  polled  consistently  favored  a  strate- 
gic arms  control  agreement  with  the  Soviet  Union. 

The  Secretaries  of  State  and  Defense,  the  Chairman  of  the  Joint 
Chiefs  of  Staff,  and  the  senior  officials  of  the  administration  in 
their  testimony  to  you  before  the  recess  have  submitted  convincing 
evidence  that  this  particular  strategic  arms  control  treaty  before 
you  will,  on  balance,  reinforce  the  security  of  the  United  States, 
will  not  inhibit  us  from  further  strengthening  our  armed  forces  in 
ways  necessary  to  our  defense,  and  will  in  several  important  re- 
spects place  the  United  States  in  a  more  advantageous  military 
position  than  if  the  treaty  should  be  rejected  or  delayed. 

Distinguished  private  citizens  with  long  experience  in  negotiat- 
ing with  the  Soviets,  such  as  Averell  Harriman  and  John  McCloy, 
have  supported  these  views  and  have  recommended  ratification.  So, 
indeed,  have  the  principal  leaders  of  our  European  allies. 

After  studying  the  testimony  offered  to  this  committee  and  ex- 
amining the  provisions  of  the  treaty  thoroughly,  Americans  for 
SALT  is  strengthened  in  its  conviction  that  the  treaty,  if  ratified, 
will  serve  to  reinforce  both  the  security  of  the  United  States  and 
the  prospects  of  world  peace. 

It  therefore,  in  our  view,  clearly  meets  the  objective  which  those 
70  percent  of  Americans  who  in  opinion  polls  supported  an  arms 
control  agreement  with  the  Soviets  had  in  mind.  Reports  from 
public  interest  groups  throughout  the  country  which  are  alined 
with  us  confirmed  that  this  is  the  case. 

Many  of  them,  like  many  of  you,  would  have  preferred  that  the 
treaty  provide  for  more  substantial  reductions.  However,  part  of  a 
loaf  is  decidedly  better  than  no  bread.  If  the  SALT  process  is 
continued  and  not  interrupted,  such  larger  reductions,  to  which 
both  parties  to  the  treaty  are  pledged,  can  be  promptly  pursued  in 
the  next  stage  of  the  negotiations. 

On  the  other  hand,  as  Mrs.  King  has  just  pointed  out,  rejection 
or  indefinite  delay  would  seriously  increase  international  tensions 
and  risks  of  world  conflict.  If  the  treaty  is  not  approved,  the  Soviets 


48-260    0-79    Pt.U 


92 

would  gain  specific  substantial  military  advantages  which  the 
treaty  would  deny  them. 

They  would,  instead  of  being  obliged  to  reduce  from  2,500  to 
2,250  missile  launchers,  be  able  to  increase  by  1985  to  as  many  as 
3,000.  Instead  of  being  limited  to  10  warheads  on  each  of  their  300 
heavy  missiles,  they  would  be  able  to  install  as  many  as  30  on  each, 
a  difference  of  3,000  warheads. 

They  would  be  able  to  deploy  three  or  four  new  strategic  systems 
rather  than  only  the  one  permitted  under  the  treaty.  They  would 
be  able  to  interfere  significantly  with  our  monitoring  of  their  mili- 
tary activities  in  ways  that  would  be  prohibited  by  the  treaty. 

All  these  options  offered  to  'die  Soviets  by  rejection  of  the  treaty 
could  constitute,  together,  a  most  serious  threat  to  our  national 
security.  I  should  like  to  recedl  in  this  connection  the  public  state- 
ment Secretary-  Kissinger  made  in  January  1977,  just  before  leav- 
ing office,  and  I  qvjote: 

I  believe  that  to  achieve  a  usable  <"jperiority  in  strategic  n'jclear  weapons  is 
extremely  unlikely  and  relatively  easy  to  prevent,  and  the  obsession  vdth  it  dis- 
tracts us. 

What  I  presume  Mr.  Kissinger  meant  was  that  as  long  as  we 
maintain  a  credible  second  strike  capability  and  show  a  clear  in- 
tention to  use  it  if  necessary,  any  superiority  the  Soviet  Union 
might  have  in  some  weapons  is  not  usable,  either  militarily  or 
politically,  because  their  use  would  bring  about  almost  total  devas- 
tation of  their  homeland. 

We  do  certainly  have  that  capability  at  present  and  are  in  the 
process  of  reinforcing  it  with  Trident  submarines  and  missiles  and 
with  air-launched  cruise  missiles.  The  SALT  II  Treaty  places  no 
obstacles  in  the  way  of  our  maintaining  that  capability.  As  long^  as 
we  do  maintain  it,  scenarios  of  our  docilely  succumbing  to  nuclear 
blackmail  are,  in  my  view,  wholly  implausible. 

The  time  available  to  me  does  not  permit  my  dealing  in  any 
further  depth  with  the  substance  of  the  treaty.  I  should  like,  there- 
fore, to  submit  for  the  record  a  statement  of  10  points  explaining 
briefly  why  I  personally  support  the  Treaty  and  why  the  principal 
arguments  of  its  opponents  seem  to  me  unconvincing. 

I  trust  that  a  sober  assessment  of  the  benefits  of  the  SALT  II 
Treaty  and  of  the  quite  predictable  consequences  of  its  being  reject- 
ed will  commend  themselves  to  you  gentlemen  and  lead  you  to  the 
same  conclusions. 

Thank  you. 

[The  prepared  statement  of  Ambassador  Charles  W.  Yost  fol- 
lows:] 

Prepared  Statement  of  Ambassador  Charles  W.  Yost 

Mr.  Chairman  and  Members  of  the  Committee:  I  testify  before  you  today  as  a  Co- 
Chair  of  Americans  for  SALT  and  as  a  former  Foreign  Service  Officer  with  some  45 
years  of  experience  in  international  affairs.  That  service  included  substantial  expe- 
rience in  negotiating  with  the  Soviets— at  the  Dumbarton  Oaks,  San  Francisco  and 
Potsdam  Conferences,  two  assignments  in  Vienna  under  Four  Power  occupation,  as 
Director  of  the  State  Department's  Office  of  Eastern  European  Affairs,  and  at  the 
United  Nations  for  seven  years,  including  those  of  the  Berlin,  Cuban  and  Congo 
crises.  I  have  no  illusions,  therefore,  either  about  Soviet  objectives  or  about  the  need 
for  great  vigilance  in  doing  business  with  them. 

"Americans  For  SALT"  is  a  private  organization  established  for  the  purpose  of 
mobilizing  public  support  for  the  conclusion  and  ratification  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty. 
There  is  submitted  as  an  annex  to  this  testimony  a  list  of  the  co-chairmen,  of  the 


93 

members  of  our  Advisory  Council  and  of  about  140  prominent  persons  who  are 
publicly  supporting  our  organization  and  our  goals.  As  you  will  note,  many  of  these 
persons  are  officers  or  representatives  of  other  organizations  with  substantial  na- 
tionwide memberships,  some  of  which  assisted  in  the  establishment  of  "Americans 
For  SALT"  and  many  of  which  have  taken  a  public  position  in  support  of  ratifica- 
tion of  the  treaty. 

With  respect  to  the  attitude  of  the  American  public  toward  the  treaty,  you 
gentlemen  are  of  course  aware  that  a  substantial  number  of  public  opinion  polls 
taken  over  the  past  year  show  that  about  70  percent  of  Americans  polled  consistent- 
ly favored  a  strategic  arms  control  agreement  with  the  Soviet  Union.  The  Secretar- 
ies of  State  and  Defense,  the  Chairman  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  and  the  senior 
officials  of  the  Administration  in  their  testimony  to  you  before  the  recess  have 
submitted  convincing  evidence  that  this  particular  strategic  arms  control  treaty, 
SALT  n,  will,  on  balance,  reenforce  the  security  of  the  United  States,  will  not 
inhibit  us  from  further  strenghthening  our  armed  forces  in  ways  necessary  to  our 
defense,  and  will  in  several  important  respects  place  the  United  States  in  a  more 
advantageous  military  position  than  if  the  treaty  should  be  rejected  or  delayed. 
Distinguished  private  citizens  with  long  experience  in  negotiating  with  the  Soviets, 
such  as  Averell  Harriman,  John  J.  McCloy,  and,  subject  to  some  conditions,  Henry 
Kissinger,  have  supported  these  views  and  recommended  ratification  of  the  treaty. 

After  the  study  of  testimony  offered  to  this  Committee  and  a  careful  examination 
of  the  provisions  of  the  treaty  by  its  own  experts,  "Americans  For  SALT"  is 
strengthened  in  its  conviction  that  the  treaty,  if  ratified,  will  serve  to  reenforce  both 
the  security  of  the  United  States  and  the  prospects  of  world  peace.  It  therefore 
clearly  meets  the  objective  which  those  70  percent  of  Americans  who  in  opinion 
polls  supported  an  arms  control  agreement  with  the  Soviets  had  in  mind.  Reports 
from  public  interest  groups  throughout  the  country  which  are  aligned  with  us 
confirm  that  this  is  the  case. 

Many  of  them,  like  many  of  you,  would  have  preferred  that  the  treaty  provide  for 
more  substantial  reductions.  However,  part  of  a  loaf  is  decidedly  better  than  no 
bread.  If  the  SALT  process  is  continued  and  not  interrupted,  such  larger  reduction, 
to  which  both  parties  to  the  treaty  are  pledged,  can  be  promptly  pursued  in  the  next 
stage  of  negotiations. 

Returning  for  a  moment  to  Mr.  Kissinger,  I  should  like  to  recall  a  public  state- 
ment he  made  in  January  1977,  just  before  leaving  office:  "I  believe  that  to  achieve 
a  usable  superiority  in  strategic  nuclear  weapons  is  extremely  unlikely  and  relative- 
ly easy  to  prevent,  and  the  obsession  with  it  distracts  us." 

What  Mr.  Kissinger  meant  was  that,  as  long  as  we  maintain  a  credible  second 
strike  capability,  and  show  a  clear  intention  to  use  it  if  necessary,  any  superiority 
the  Soviet  Union  might  have  in  some  weapons  is  not  usable,  either  militarily  or 
politically,  because  its  use  would  bring  about  almost  total  devastation  of  their 
homeland.  We  do  certainly  have  that  capability  at  present  and  are  in  the  process  of 
reenforcing  it  with  Trident  submarines  and  missiles  and  with  air-launched  cruise 
missiles.  The  SALT  II  Treaty  places  no  obstacles  in  the  way  of  our  maintaining  that 
capability.  As  long  as  we  do  maintain  it,  scenarios  of  our  docilely  succumbing  to 
nuclear  blackmail  are  in  my  view  wholly  implausible. 

The  time  available  to  me  does  not  permit  my  dealing  in  any  depth  with  the 
substance  of  the  treaty.  I  should  like  therefore  to  submit  for  the  record  a  statement 
of  10  points  explaining  briefly  why  I  personally  support  the  treaty  and  why  the 
principal  arguments  of  its  opponents  seem  to  me  unconvincing. 

In  conclusion  I  would  recall  that  when  the  actor  Maurice  Chevalier  was  asked 
how  he  felt  about  getting  old,  he  replied  that  he  was  not  particularly  enthusiastic 
about  it  but  he  preferred  it  to  the  alternative.  I  believe  that  a  sober  assessment  of 
the  benefit  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty,  and  of  the  quite  predictable  consequences  of 
rejecting  it,  should  lead  us  to  the  same  conclusion. 

I  have  carefully  followed  the  debate  on  the  SALT  II  Treaty  during  the  past  year, 
including  testimony  pro  and  con  before  this  and  other  Senate  committees.  To 
summarize  my  conclusions,  there  seem  to  me  ten  major  points  which  emerge  in 
favor  of  ratification  of  the  treaty.  Several  of  these  points  seem  to  me  to  refute 
convincingly  the  principal  arguments  put  forward  by  opponents  of  the  treaty. 

1.  The  highest  officials  of  our  Government,  including  those  responsible  for  our 
national  defense,  have  testified  unequivocally  that  this  treaty  will,  modestly  but 
usefully,  strengthen  the  security  of  the  United  States.  I  see  no  reason  to  doubt 
either  their  judgement  or  their  sincerity. 

2.  The  treaty  does  not  prohibit  the  United  States  from  taking  a  wide  variety  of 
additional  measures  to  strengthen  its  national  defense,  if  the  Administration  and 
the  Congress  deem  it  necessary  to  do  so.  Such  permitted  measures,  several  of  which 
are  already  under  way,  include  Minuteman  modernization,  deployment  of  Trident 


94 

submarines  and  missiles,  deployment  of  cruise  missiles,  deplojonent  of  the  MX 
missile,  and  an  unlimited  range  of  improvements  in  conventional  forces. 

3.  If  the  treaty  is  not  approved,  the  Soviets  would  gain  specific  substantial 
military  advantages  which  the  treaty  would  deny  them.  They  would,  instead  of 
being  obliged  to  reduce  from  2,500  to  2,250  missile  launchers,  be  able  to  increase  by 
1985  to  as  many  as  3,000;  instead  of  being  limited  to  10  warheads  on  each  of  their 
300  heavy  missiles  they  would  be  able  to  install  as  many  as  30  on  each  (a  difference 
of  6,000  warheads,  more  than  their  total  present  number);  they  would  be  able  to 
deploy  three  or  four  new  strategic  systems,  rather  than  only  the  one  permitted 
under  the  treaty;  they  would  be  able  to  interfere  significantly  with  our  monitoring 
of  their  military  activities  in  ways  that  would  be  prohibited  by  the  treaty.  All  these 
options  offered  gratuitously  to  the  Soviets  by  rejection  of  the  treaty  could  constitute 
together  a  most  serious  threat  to  our  national  security. 

4.  One  of  the  principal  arguments  by  opponents  of  the  treaty  relates  to  an  alleged 
approaching  vulnerability  of  our  Minuteman  missiles.  If  such  a  vulnerability  were 
to  occur,  it  would  occur  either  with  or  without  the  treaty.  Personally  I  consider  such 
a  supposed  vulnerability  to  be  purely  theoretical.  As  long  as  we  maintain  other 
invulnerable  systems,  such  as  our  strategic  submarines,  the  Soviets  will  not  be  fools  ., 
enough  to  risk  destruction  of  most  of  their  cities  and  industries  by  attacking  us. 
Moreover,  they  would  not  be  able  to  achieve  political  advantages  by  threatening  to 
do  so,  since  both  we  and  they  would  know  that  such  threats  were  bluff  and  would 
not  be  carried  out. 

5.  Our  principal  NATO  allies  have  publicly  urged  ratification  of  the  treaty  and 
several  of  their  leaders  have  publicly  emphasized  the  dismay  they  would  feel  if  it 
were  rejected.  In  his  testimony  before  this  Committee  July  31  Henry  Kissinger  said: 
"There  is  no  doubt  that  failure  to  ratify  the  treaty  will  shake  European  confidence 
in  an  American  government  that  for  seven  years  assured  them  that  it  knew  what  it 
was  doing." 

6.  There  can  be  little  doubt  that  rejection  of  the  treaty,  afer  seven  years  of 
painstaking  negotiation,  would  lead  to  a  further  escalation  of  the  arms  race,  the 
deployment  of  additional  new  systems  on  both  sides,  and  very  heavy  expenditures 
which  would  not  be  incurred  if  the  treaty  takes  effect.  There  is  no  warrant  for 
believing  that  the  Soviets  have  reached  a  ceiling  of  military  expenditure.  Experi- 
ence clearly  shows  that  they  will  spend  whatever  amounts  they  think  are  required 
to  keep  even  with  us. 

7.  On  the  question  of  linkage  with  SALT  of  Soviet  behavior  in  the  Third  World, 
there  is  no  reason  whatsoever  to  suppose  that  the  Soviets  would  behave  better  if 
SALT  is  rejected  than  if  it  is  ratified.  On  the  contrary,  a  significant  inhibition  on 
their  objectionable  behavior — their  concern  not  to  risk  being  too  offensive  to  us — 
would  be  diminished  by  the  interruption  of  the  SALT  relationship. 

8.  There  is  no  reason  to  believe  that,  if  the  treaty  is  rejected  or  if  amendments  are 
added  which  would  require  renegotiation,  such  renegotiation  could  be  either  begun 
or  concluded  quickly.  The  United  States  is  about  to  enter  an  election  year.  More 
important,  the  Soviet  Union  is  already  preparing  for  and  about  to  undergo  a  change 
in  leadership.  It  is  highly  probable  that  the  SALT  process  would  remain  in  suspense 
until  that  change,  which  as  Mr.  Harriman  has  pointed  out  could  be  adversely 
affected  by  rejection  of  SALT,  has  been  completed  and  assimilated.  By  that  time  any 
one  of  a  dozen  contingencies  could  occur,  as  we  have  seen  so  often  in  the  past  7 
years,  to  cause  further  and  indefinite  delay. 

9.  If  the  treaty  ever  should  be  renegotiated,  to  accommodate  amendments  pro- 
posed by  the  United  States,  we  would  of  course,  if  we  expected  a  new  treaty  to 
result,  have  to  be  prepared  to  make  concessions  to  the  Soviets  to  balance  those  we 
would  be  asking  of  them.  What  concessions  would  we  be  prepared  to  make?  We 
might  in  fact  end  up  with  no  treaty  at  all  or  with  one  worse  on  balance  than  the 
one  we  now  have  before  us. 

10.  Finally,  rejection  of  the  treaty  would  delay  indefinitely,  perhaps  for  many 
years,  the  process  of  negotiating  the  more  substantial  reductions  which  are  stipulat- 
ed in  the  Statement  of  Principles  in  the  present  text  and  which  both  proponents 
and  opponents  of  the  treaty  solemnly  proclaim  is  their  principal  objective. 

Americans  for  "SALT 

President 
Thomas  Mclntyre,  Former  United  States  Senator. 

Cochairs 

Marjorie  Benton,  Delegate  to  the  United  Nations  Special  Session  on  Disarma- 
ment. 

Clark  Clifford,  Former  Secretary  of  Defense. 


95 

The  Reverend  Theodore  M.  Hesburgh,  C.S.C,  President,  University  of  Notre 
Dame. 

Townsend  Hoopes,  Former  Under  Secretary  of  the  Air  Force. 

Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  Former  United  States  Senator;  Former  Ambassador  to  the 
United  Nations,  and  to  Vietnam. 

Lloyd  McBride,  President,  United  Steelworkers  of  America. 

Charles  Yost,  Former  Ambassador  to  the  United  Nations. 

Advisory  council 

Thomas  Bradley,  Mayor,  City  of  Los  Angeles. 

Marjorie  Bell  Chambers,  President,  American  Association  of  University  Women. 

Norman  Cousins,  President,  World  Federalists  Association. 

Milton  S.  Eisenhower,  President  Emeritus,  The  Johns  Hopkins  University. 

Murray  Finley,  President,  Amalgamated  Clothing  and  Textile  Workers  Union. 

Douglas  Eraser,  President,  United  Auto,  Aerospace  and  Agricultural  Implement 
Workers  of  America. 

Emil  Mazey,  United  Auto,  Aerospace  and  Agricultural  Implement  Workers  of 
America. 

Joyce  D.  Miller,  President,  Coalition  of  Labor  Union  Women. 

Francis  B.  Sayre,  Jr.,  Associate  Director,  The  Wilson  Center,  Smithsonian  Institu- 
tion. 

Rabbi  Arthur  Schneier,  Park  East  Synagogue. 

Stuart  Symington,  Former  United  States  Senator;  Former  Secretary  of  the  Air 
Force. 

Foy  Valentine,  Executive  Secretary,  Southern  Baptist  Christian  Life  Commission. 

Jerome  B.  Wiesner,  President,  Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology. 


96 


Hayward  Alker,  Pmlenor  of  Political  Science. 

Maisachus^-inlCwnite  of  Technology 
Marion  Anderson!  Employment  Research 

Auociation 
Les    Aspin.    Member.    United    States    House    of 

Representatives 
Richard  Bamet.  Senior  Fellow.  Institute  for 

Policy  Studies 
Dons  Bato 
Roben  S.  Benismm,  Chairman  of  the  Board  of 

Governors.  United  Natior.s  Association 
Meyer  Berger.  Chairman,  Meyer  Berger  Company 
Charles  V.  Bergstrom,  Executive  Director.  Office 

for  Governmental  Aflairr,  Lutheran  CoufKil  in 

the  U   S.  A. 
Hans  Bethe.  Professor  of  Nuclear  Physics,  Cornell 

University 
David  Blumberg.  Former  President.  B'nai  B'rith 
Philip  W   Bonsai,  Form«r  United  States 

Ambassador 
Kenneth  Bouldmg.  Ptofettor  of  Economics, 

University  of  Colorado 
Thomas  Bradley.  Mayor.  City  of  Los  Angeles 
Joel  Brooke.  Former  President,  Fund  for  Peace 
Helen  Caldicon.  M.D. 
Bob  Carr,  Member,  United  States  House  of 

Representatives 
Marjone  Bell  Chambers.  President,  American 

Association  of  University  Women 
Charles  N.  Coilatos.  Commissioner  of  Veteran's 

Services,  The  Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts 
Arthur  Collins.  Jr..  Lt  General.  US  Army  (Ret.) 
Randloph  P.  Compion,  Chairman  of  the  Board, 

Compton  Foundation 
Howard  R.  Conant.  Chairman,  Interstate  Steel 

Company 
Sister  Carol  Coston,  Executive  Director,  Network. 
Norman  Cousins.  President,  '.Vorld  Federalists 

Association 
Anhur  Macy  Cox,  Former  Specialist  in  Soviet 

Affairs.  U.S.  Central  Intelligence  Agency 
Karl  Deutsch,  Stanfield  Professor  of  tnternationai 

Peace.  Harvard  University 
James  A.  Donovan.  Colonel,  United  States 

Marine  Corps  (Ret.) 
Paul  Doty,  Director.  Program  for  Science  and 

International  Affairs,  Harvard  University 
Thomas  Downey.  Member,  United  States  House 

of  Representatives 
Sidney  DreH.  Deputy  Director,  Stanford  Linear 

Accelerator  Center 
TiUord  E.  Dudley,  President,  Property 

Management  and  Maintenance 
Charles   Dyson,  Chairman  of  the  Board,  Dyson 

Kissner  Corporation 
Helen  W   Edey,  M.D 
Milton  S.  EiFenhower,  President  Emeritus,  The 

Johns  Hopkins  University 
Abraham  Femberg.  Chairman  Emeritus,  The 

Weinman  Institute  of  Science 
Bernard  T-  Feid,  Professor  of  Physics. 

Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology 
Joseph  Fiiner,  President,  Nobiemet  International 
Stanley  Fine,  Rear  Admiral.  United  Stales  Navy 

(Ret  } 
Murray  Finley.  President,  Amalgamated  Clothing 

and  Textile  Workers  Union 
David  Fmn,  Chairman  of  the  Board.  Ruder 

&  Finn 
Douglas  Fraser,  President,  United  Auto, 

Aerospace  and  Agricultural  Implement  Workers 

of  America 
John  Kenneth  Gaibranh,  Profe*sor  Emeritus, 

Department  of  Economics,  Harvard  University 
Edward  Garvey.  Executive  Director,  National 

Football  League  Players  Association 
Robert  W   Gilmore.  Vice  Chairman,  Narional 

Committee  on  U.S. -China  Relations 
Ernest  Gross.  Attorney  at  Law 
C.  Jarrett  Gray,  President.  Women's  Division  of 

Global  Ministries.  United  Methodist  Church 
Morton  Halpenn.  Director.  Center  for  National 

Security  Studies 
Armand  Hammer,  President,  Occidental 

Petroleum 
T.  Walter  Hardy.  Jr ,  Chaimian  of  the  Board, 

Hardy  Salt  Company 
Tom  Harkin,  Member,  United  States  House  of 

Representative* 


SUPPORTERS* 

James  Herman.  President,  International 

Longshoremen's  &  Warehousemen's  U^ton 
Beniamin  L.  Hooks.  Executive  Director.  National 

Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Colored 

People 
Proctor  W.  Houghton.  President,  Houghton 

Chemical  Company 
Most  Reverend  Raymond  G-  Honthausen, 

Archbishop  of  Seattle 
Henry  George  Jacobs,  President.  H.G.  Jacobs 

Foundation 
Michael  F   Jacobson,  Executive  Director,  Center 

for  Science  in  the  Public  Interest 
Mildred  Jeffrey,  Former  National  Chair,  National 

Women's  Political  Caucus 
Mark  Kaplan,  Attorney  at  Law 
Donald  M.  Kendall,  Chairman  and  Chief 

Executive  Officer,  PepsiCo,  Inc. 
Henry  Kendall,  Founder,  Union  of  Cor>cerned 

Scientists 
Isaac  C.  Kidd.  Jr .  Admiral,  United  States 

Navy  (Ret.) 
George  Kutiakowsky,  Professor  Ementus  of 

Chemistry.  Harvard  University;  Former  * 

Presidential  Science  Advisor 
Phihp  M   Klutznick.  Senior  Panner.  Ktutrnick 

Investments 
Betty  Goei?  Lall.  Associate  Director,  New  Yorn 

State  School  of  Indusi'ia!  and  Labor  Reiatic^s: 

Oeltgate  to  United  Nations  Panel  of  Experts  on 

the  Relationship  between  Disarmament  and 

International  Security 
Edward  Lamb.  Chairman  of  the  Board,  Lamb 

Entc'orises.  Inc. 
Eugene  Lang,  Chairman,  REFAC  Technology 

Development  Corporation 
John  Marshall  Lee,  Vice  Admira!.  United  States 

Navy  (Pet. I 
C.  Payne  Lucas,  Executive  Director.  Africare 
Bishop  James  K.  Maihewi.  Washington  D.C. 

Area  United  Methodist  Church 
Robert  Matteson.  Former  Director,  Program 

Planning  Staff.  United  States  Arms  Control 

and  Disarmament  Agency 
Emil  Mazey,  Secretary-Treasurer,  United  Auto, 

Ae'ospace  and  Agricultural  Implement  Workers 

of  America 
Eugene  J.  McCarthy.  Former  United  States 

Senator 
George  C   McGhee,  Former  Ambassador,  Former 

Under  Sei.re'.dry  of  State  for  Political  Affairs 
Joyce  D.  Miller,  President,  Coalition  of  Labor 

Union  Women 
Patsy  Mink.  President.  Americans  for  Democratic 

Action 
Ins  Mitgang.  National  Chair,  National  Women's 

Political  Caucus 
Dsvid  Mtxner.  Mixner  Scott  Associates 
L.  Calvin  Moore.  Citizenship  Legislative  Director. 

Oil,  Chemital  and  Atomic  Workers 
Kenneth  Montgomery,  Attorney  at  Law 
Edward  P.  Morgan.  News  Commentator 
Hans  J   Morgenthau,  Professor  of  Political 

Science,  New  School  of  Social  Research 
Frank  E.  Moss,  Former  United  Slates  Senator 
M,  Stewart  Mott,  Ne«  York,  New  York 
Paul  Newman   Actor 
Henry  E,  Niles.  Chairman,  Business  Executives 

Move  for  New  National  Priorities 
Ara  Ot^emal,  Chairman    SATRA  Corporation 
Wolfgang  Panofsky,  Director,  Stanford  Lmear 

Accelerator  Center 
John  Aristotle  Phillips,  Princeton  Student  who 

designed  his  own  bomb 
Harvey  Picker,  Dean,  School  of  International 

Affairs.  Columbia  University 
Rabbi  Ely  Pilchik.  President.  Central  Conference 

of  American  Rabbis 
Jo  Pomerance,  Chairperson,  Task  Force  for  a 

Nuclear  Te^t  Ban  Treaty 
Avery  Post.  President.  United  Church  of  Christ 
Max  Potash.  President,  Polyvinyl  Chemical 

Industries 
Neal  Potter.  President,  Montgomery  County 

Council  (Maryland) 
William  Potter,  Professor  of  Political  Science 

Tulane  University 
Bernard  Rapoport,  Chairman,  American  Income 

Life  Insurance  Company 


AMERICANS    FOR    SALT     Gg>^^ 

Rudolph  Rasin,  President,  The  Rasin  Corporation 
Roger  Raveile,  Professor  of  Science  and  Public 

Policy,  University  of  Cahfornia,  San  Diego 
Joseph  Reber,  President.  The  Reber  Corporation 
Charles  Robinson,  Chairman.  Delaware  Trust 

Company 


Robert  V.  Roosa.  Former  Under  Secretary  of 

Treasury  for  Monetary  Affairs 
.James  W.  Rouse,  Chairman  of  the  Board,  The 

Rouse  Company  » 

Ralph  Rudd.  Clark,  Friends  Committee  on 

National  Legislation 
Jack  Rutna,  Professor  of  Electrical  Engineering. 

Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology 
Bruce  Russeit.  Professor  of  Political  Science, 

Yale  University 
John  Ryor,  Former  President,  National 

Education  Association 
Stanley  Salen.  National  Commission  for  Citizens 

in  Education 
Francis  B.  Sayre,  Jr.,  Associate  Oirectoi,  The 

Wilson  Center,  Smithsonian  inttilution 
Rabbi  Alexander  Schindler,  President,  American 

Hebrew  Congregation 
Lo'j'S  Schneider,  Executive  Secretary,  American 

Friends  Service  Committee 
Rabbi  Arthur  Schneier,  Park  East  Synagogue 
Patricia  Schroeder,  Member,  Uniied  States 

House  of  Representatives 
Herbert  ScoviHe,  Jr.,  Formei  Deputy  Director 

of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency 
Peter  Scott.  Mixner  Scott  Associates 
Glenn  T.  Seaborg,  Former  Chairman,  Atomic 

Energy  Commisi.on 
Jacob  Sheinkman,  Secretary-Treasurer, 

Amalgamated  Clothing  and  Textile  Workers 

Union 
Sargent  Shriver,  Former  Ambassador  to  France, 

Former  Director  of  the  Peace  Corps 
J.  David  Singer,  Mental  Health  Research  Unit. 

University  of  Michigan 

C.  Maxwell  Stanley,  Chairman  of  I'le  Board, 
Stanley  Consultants,  Inc. 

Sol  Stctin.  Senior  Executive  Vice  President, 

Amalgamated  Clothing  and  Textile  Workers 

Union 
Philip  Stewart,  Professor  of  Political  Science 

Ohio  State  University 
Robert  Stuart.  President,  National  Can 

Corporation.  Chairman  of  the  Board,  World 

Federalists  Association 
Louis  Susman.  Attorney  at  Law 
Stuart  Symington,  Former  United  States 

Senator;  Former  Secretary  of  the  Air  Force 
William  Thompson,  Stated  C;erk  of  General 

Assen-ibly,  United  f-reEbyte'ian  Churches 
Jarnes  C.  Thomson,  Curator.  Nieman  Foundation 

tor  Journalism 
John  Toll.  Chairman,  Arms  Reversal  Program 
John  Topping.  President,  Ripon  Society 
Arnold  E.  True.  Rear  Admiral,  United  States 

Navy  (Ret.) 
Kosta  Tsipis.  Research  FeKow.  Massachusetts 

Institute  of  Technology 
Foy  Valentine.  Executive  Secretary,  Southern 

Baptist  Christian  Life  Commission 
Nan  Waterman.  Chairperson,  Common  Cauae 
Bernard  S  Weiss,  Former  Vice  President. 

Gimbel  Brothers 
Charles  W.  Whaien,  Jr.,  Former  Member,  United 

States  House  of  Representatives 
John  H   Whitaker.  Senior  Vice  President, 

Whitaker  Cable  Company 
Jerome  B.  Wiesner,  President,  Massachusetts 

Institute  of  Technology;  Former  Presidential 

Advisor 
William  Winpisinger.  President,  International 

Association  of  Machinists 
Emily  Womach,  Chair  of  the  Board  and 

President,  Women's  National  Bank 
Jerry  Wurf.  President.  American  Federation  of 

Slate,  County  and  Municipal  Employees 
William  Wynn.  President.  Retail  Clerks  Iniernationat 

Union 

D.  Robert  Varnail,  Jr  .  Chairman.  Yarwey 
Corporation 


'Inclusion  of  the  rwmet  listed  above  does  not  necessarily  indicate  organizational  endorsement. 
'This  is  a  paaial  list. 


97 

DR.  Kissinger's  testimony  on  salt  ii 

The  Chairman.  Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Yost,  for  a  very  clear 
statement  of  your  position.  The  10  points  to  which  you  refer  will  be 
incorporated  in  the  record. 

You  refer  to  Mr.  Kissinger  and  his  statement  of  January  1977  in 
which  he  said,  I  believe,  that  to  achieve  a  usable  superiority  in 
strategic  nuclear  weapons  is  extremely  unlikely  and  relatively  easy 
to  prevent,  and  the  obsession  with  it  distracts  us.  Have  you  read 
Mr.  Kissinger's  more  recent  testimony  on  the  SALT  II  Treaty? 

Ambassador  Yost.  I  have,  indeed.  And  he  referred,  I  noted,  to  a 
statement  somewhat  similar  to  this  which  he  had  made  in  a  press 
conference,  as  he  described  it,  in  a  moment  of  fatigue  and  exas- 
peration. This  particular  statement,  however,  I  don  t  believe  was 
made  in  any  such  context.  It  was  made  in  a  relaxed  moment  when 
he  was  about  to  retire.  And  I  have  no  reason  to  believe  he  would 
have  changed  his  mind  in  regard  to  the  statement  or  that  it  is  not 
just  as  true  now  as  it  was  then. 

The  Chairman.  You  believe  that  this  statement  has  the  candor 
that  we  normally  associate  with  a  death  statement;  that  is,  he  was 
approaching  the  end  of  his  tenure  and  could  consider  these  matters 
in  a  reflective  and  candid  \yay?  [Laughter.] 

Ambassador  Yost.  I  do  think  so.  Senator.  Actually,  if  one  reads 
the  statements  he  made  in  the  last  month  or  two  before  he  left 
office,  they  were  characterized  by  that  frankness  which  I  think 
reflected  exactly  the  state  of  mind  you  describe. 

NUCLEAR  superiority   PROMOTES   SOVIET  ADVENTURISM 

The  Chairman.  I  found  his  argument  unconvincing,  that  is  the 
argument  that  he  made  when  he  appeared  before  this  committee 
that  nuclear  superiority,  whatever  that  may  be,  somehow  creates 
political  advantages  that  can  be  used  tactically  in  promoting  Soviet 
adventurism. 

It  seems  to  me  that  in  the  past,  there  is  no  evidence  nor  do  I 
recall  that  the  Secretary  was  able  to  cite  any  evidence  to  support 
that  proposition.  At  times  when  we  have  had  that  nuclear  superior- 
ity, we  have  been  faced  with  extreme  Soviet  adventurism,  as  in 
Berlin  and,  indeed,  in  Cuba  in  1962.  And  I  hardly  believe  that  the 
Russians  will  withdraw  from  Angola,  Ethiopia,  or,  indeed,  from 
Cuba  where,  we  now  know,  they  have  deployed  a  combat  brigade, 
because  of  any  belief  that  we  will  nuke  them  if  they  don't. 

Ambassador  Yost.  I  would  quite  agree.  Senator.  I  think  both 
sides  realize  that  the  results  of  resorting  to  nuclear  weapons  would 
rebound  on  them  in  such  a  devastating  fashion  that  they  are 
extremely  unlikely  to  use  them.  And  since  each  side  knows  that 
the  other  feels  that  way,  nuclear  blackmail  is  simply  not  convinc- 
ing. 

The  Chairman.  It  is  not  convincing,  and  Secretary  Kissinger  did 
not  make  it  so  in  his  testimony,  at  least  not  to  me. 

OVERKILL   CAPACITY   TO    DESTROY 

Would  you  agree  that  once  the  two  countries  have  achieved  that 
degree  of  nuclear  strength  that  both  have  overkill  capacity  to 
destroy  the  other  even  after  surviving  an  initial  attack,  that  then 


98 

the  further  accumulation  of  these  weapons  becomes  irrational, 
wasteful  and,  indeed,  can  only  increase  the  level  of  danger  that 
any  nuclear  war  that  might  result  from  such  gross  miscalculation 
or  some  tragic  mistake  would  prove  to  be  utterly  devastating  to 
both  civilizations? 

Ambassador  Yost.  It  certainly  seems  so  to  me.  Nor  do  I  think 
that  we  can  rely — if,  for  example,  the  treaty  should  not  be  ap- 
proved— on  the  Soviets  not  continuing  to  match  whatever  we  felt 
we  should  spend  on  nuclear  weapons.  I  noticed  that  one  of  the 
witnesses  this  morning  expressed  the  view  that  they  would  be 
unlikely  to  do  so,  that  they  had  reached  the  limit  of  their  expendi- 
tures. 

Frankly,  I  think  that  is  a  rather  naive  point  of  view.  I  think  they 
have  demonstrated  over  many  years  that  at  no  matter  what  cost  or 
sacrifice,  they  will  spend  whatever  they  think  is  necessary  to 
match  us. 

MINORITY   AWARENESS   OF   SALT   II 

The  Chairman.  Mrs.  King,  you  spoke  from  the  heart  this  after- 
noon, and  I  have  no  question  about  your  personal  commitment  to 
the  support  of  this  treaty.  What  I  would  like  to  ask  you  is,  to  the 
extent  that  you  feel  you  can  answer  the  question:  Does  the  black 
community  in  this  country  as  a  whole  really  care  about  SALT,  or 
does  any  other  minority  group,  for  that  matter?  Do  you  think  that 
there  is  an  awareness  of  how  SALT  relates  or  could  relate  to  these 
other  problems  that  you  have  mentioned,  that  is,  the  problems  of 
poverty,  the  problems  of  insufficient  food,  the  problems  of  inad- 
equate housing,  that  tend  to  plague  so  many  of  our  black  citizens? 

Mrs.  King.  Yes,  I  think  very  definitely  that  the  black  community 
is  aware  of  this  relationship.  I  think  that  that  awareness  was 
created  during  the  Vietnam  war  period  when  Martin  Luther  King, 
Jr.,  tied  that  relationship  between  excessive  spending  on  an  ill- 
fated,  immoral  war  to  the  lack  of  resources  for  the  disadvantaged 
and  deprived  communities. 

Also,  the  concern  is  that  blacks  have  in  the  past  been  selected  in 
larger  numbers  to  participate  in  combat  when  there  was  a  war, 
and  we  know  what  that  means  in  terms  of  broken  families  and 
lives  that  are  destroyed  and  so  on.  So  I  think  that  the  black 
community  is  very  much  aware  of  what  this  could  mean. 

We  are  very  concerned  about  the  bread  and  butter  issues.  Most 
black  people  feel  that  we  can  have  both.  There  was  a  discussion 
during  the  last  Vietnam  crisis,  guns  versus  butter  and  so  on.  I 
think  black  people  want  the  Government  to  be  prepared  but  they 
do  not  feel  that  being  prepared  means  neglecting  those  human 
needs  that  are  so  vital  to  the  survival  of  our  culture  and  heritage 
and  our  very  being. 

The  Chairman.  I  wanted  to  make  a  comment  on  that  particular 
portion  of  your  testimony  because  it  seems  to  me  a  very  poignant 
example  of  how  weak  a  given  government  can  be  despite  the  enor- 
mity of  the  arms  with  which  it  surrounds  itself.  That  is  the  recent 
case  of  Iran. 

There  was  certainly  no  insufficiency  of  weaponry  to  protect  the 
Shah  and  his  regime;  yet  the  lack  of  solidarity  among  his  people, 
the   lack  of  support,   rendered   those   forces   impotent  when  the 


99 

people  once  took  to  the  streets  against  him.  And  in  the  long  run, 
the  strength  of  this  country  will  depend  in  part  upon  its  weapons 
but  far  more  fundamentally  upon  the  cohesiveness  of  the  American 
people  and  their  willingness  to  support  the  country  in  times  of 
danger  and  to  fight  for  it. 

That,  in  turn,  as  you  have  said,  does  not  depend  upon  surround- 
ing our  cities  with  missiles  if  our  cities  are  full  of  decadence  and 
decay  and  the  needs  of  our  people  left  unattended. 

CONTRIBUTION   SALT   MAKES   IN   CONTROLLING   NUCLEAR   ARMS 

Senator  Mclntyre,  I  have  just  one  question  I  would  like  to  ad- 
dress to  you,  and  then  I  will  turn  to  Senator  Javits.  I  ask  this 
question  because  Senator  McGovern  is  not  here  and  he  might  not 
return.  It  is  a  question  I  think  he  might  want  asked.  He  has  often 
brought  up  the  point  in  the  course  of  the  hearings. 

If  this  treaty  depends  on  a  cocommitment  to  a  whole  series  of 
new  weapons  systems  such  as  the  M-X  missile,  the  cruise  missile, 
the  Trident  submarine,  the  others  that  have  been  urged  upon  us, 
what  contribution  do  you  think  the  treaty  makes  to  the  ostensible 
objective  which  it  seeks  to  serve,  namely,  putting  wraps  on  the 
nuclear  arms  race? 

We  know  that  under  the  treaty,  both  sides  can  continue  to  add 
thousands  of  nuclear  warheads  to  their  arsenals.  And  we  are  told 
that  we  should  ratify  the  treaty  only  if  we  also  approve  a  very 
expensive  new  commitment  to  the  construction  and  deployment  of 
additional  nuclear  weapons  systems  not  prohibited  by  the  treaty. 

So  there  are  those,  including  Senator  McGovern,  who  have  asked 
whether  this  is  really  an  arms  control  treaty  or  an  arms  accelera- 
tion treaty  when  viewed  in  that  context. 

Senator  McIntyre.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  think  it  is  regrettable,  but  it 
is  a  matter  of  fact  of  life  that  the  treaty  is  being  subjected  to  all 
forms  of  linkage.  As  I  said  in  my  statement,  I  believe  the  treaty 
puts  on  a  cap,  some  limitations  on  the  Soviet  threat.  The  treaty 
continues  the  SALT  process,  which  hopefully  will  begin  to  bring 
the  levels  further  down  in  SALT  III  and  SALT  IV. 

We  do  have  to  recognize,  what  I  know  we  saw  in  the  R.  &  D. 
subcommittee  6  or  7  years  ago,  what  we  considered  to  be  quantum 
leaps  in  the  research  and  development  that  the  Soviets  were  sup- 
porting compared  to  which  had  previously  been  more  or  less  incre- 
mental. 

So  we  have  to  turn  our  attention  to  the  fact  that  our  land-based 
missiles  may  very  well  be  in  jeopardy  by  the  mideighties. 

Now,  I  don't  suppose  you  recall,  Mr.  Chairman,  but  when  the 
M-X  was  first  broached,  it  had  a  $20  to  $50  billion  price  tag,  and  the 
Air  Force  could  not  tell  your  Armed  Services  Committee  how  they 
were  going  to  do  it.  I  believe  I  went  to  the  floor  and  spoke  against 
the  M-X  system  as  being  premature.  As  history  shows,  the  Navy 
was  wrong  to  go  too  fast  on  the  Trident. 

But  now  I  do  think  we  are  ready  to  move  out  with  a  solution.  So 
if  an  M-X  system  can  be  put  together  that  will  insure  that  the 
land-based  missiles  will  not  be  at  risk  in  the  mideighties,  then  I 
would  be  for  it. 

So  I  regret,  too,  that  this  treaty  did  not  do  all  we  wanted  it  to  do. 
I  regret  that  the  turndown  is  not  more  significant.  Yet,  you  want 


100 

to  cite  one  thing,  the  Russians  are  bound  to  do  something  under 
this  treaty.  It  may  be  singular,  to  demolish  and  destroy  some  250  of 
their  missile  launchers. 

Now,  you  can  say  they  are  obsolete  launchers,  but  they  are  as 
good  as  the  ones  we  have  on  our  Minuteman  11.  We  know  the 
Soviets  are  aggressive.  They  are  adventuresome,  and  nothing  will 
change  them. 

If  we  do  not  pass  this  treaty,  it  is  not  going  to  make  them  worse 
or  better.  If  we  pass  the  treaty,  it  is  not  going  to  make  them  any 
different. 

As  a  young  man  in  World  War  II,  I  ended  up  in  Czechoslovakia 
in  the  Army  of  Occupation,  in  Strakonice,  Czechoslovakia.  I  will 
never  forget  it.  We  were  along  side  the  Russians,  and  the  Russians 
were  as  aggressive  as  any  people  I  have  ever  met  in  my  life. 

Their  soldiers  thought  nothing  of  trying  to  steal  our  Jeeps,  and 
the  only  Vvay  you  could  get  it  through  their  head  that  they  were 
not  to  take  the  Jeep  was  to  take  your  45  and  put  it  in  their  face. 

We  are  dealing  with  a  difficult  people.  But  we  must  try  to 
understand  them.  We  must  realize  that  the  SALT  process  is  so 
important,  because,  as  Ccretta  King  has  said,  and  I  have  heard 
scenarios  as  you  have  of  nuclear  exchanges,  it  is  just  insanity. 

So  I  say  yes,  we  must  continue  to  improve  our  nilitary  system  to 
be  sure  to  balance,  to  maintain  the  essential  equivalence  and  to 
continue  to  strive  so  that  the  SALT  process  will  eventually  turn 
this  arms  race  around. 

The  Chairman.  Thank  you  very  much. 

Senator  Javits. 

Senator  Javits.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

I  would  like  to  join  the  Chair  in  welcoming  the  witnesses. 

It  is  a  great  service  you  have  produced  for  the  committee  today, 
and  I  am  very  happy  to  see  you  going  out  and  answering  many  of 
the  questions  that  many  people  in  the  communities  ask.  You  have 
great  talent.  It  is  a  good  thing. 

We  had  this  morning  a  very  powerful  aggregation  of  organiza- 
tions on  the  other  side.  That  is  good,  too.  It  puts  us  to  our  proof  to 
argue  with  them.  But  I  am  glad  to  see  that  there  is  an  effective 
committee  on  the  pro  side. 

UNITED   STATES   SEIZED   BY   STATE   OF   EUPHORIA   AFTER   SALT   I 

I  have  one  question  to  ask  of  you,  Senator.  We  served  together. 
Retired  admirals  and  generals  testified  this  morning.  They  say  that 
in  the  5  years  after  SALT  I  was  ratified,  the  United  States  was 
seized  by  a  euphoria  that  disarmament  was  at  hand. 

We  were  sold  on  the  idea  of  overkill  without  taking  account  of 
the  fact  that  in  the  meantime,  counterforce  had  perhaps  overtaken 
that  concept;  that,  therefore,  we  allowed  the  Soviet  Union  to  race 
way  ahead  of  us  until  today  we  don't  have  superiority,  and  even 
the  doctrine  of  equivalence  has  now  been,  they  think,  seriously 
jeopardized. 

Now,  from  your  own  experience,  would  you  be  kind  enough  to 
make  any  comment  that  you  wish? 

Senator  McIntyre.  Senator,  I  have  great  respect  for  our  retired 
military  and  great  respect  for  the  military  people  I  had  the  oppor- 
tunity to  work  with  while  in  the  Senate.  I  once  decided  that  the 


101 

difficulty  with  the  admirals  of  the  ocean  and  sea  when  they 
became  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  is  that  they  wanted  every  ship 
they  could  get. 

I  thought  it  was  our  job  to  try  to  test  their  requests  in  the 
Yankee  sane  way.  So  I  believe  that  our  retired  military  and  other 
distinguished  people  who  may  have  testified  this  morning — and  I 
didn't  hear  their  testimony — can  recount  all  our  past  mistakes,  but 
when  they  tell  you  that  the  Russians  are  far  superior,  I  disagree. 

We  have  a  new  Trident  submarine  about  to  go  in.  We  are  putting 
in  F-14's  to  replace  the  F-4's  that  were  so  successful.  We  have 
more  things  going  for  us.  I  have  been  constantly  amazed  with  our 
technology  and  with  the  creativity  of  our  experts.  So  I  don't  say  we 
are  second  at  all.  I  think  we  are  in  a  period  of  essential  equiv- 
alence. 

I  deplore  the  tactics  of  the  people  who  are  against  this  treaty.  It 
is  so  easy  to  be  against,  picking  away  and  trying  to  say  that 
mistakes  have  been  made  in  the  past  when  they  probably  contrib- 
uted to  those  mistakes. 

UNITED   STATES   AT   MERCY  OF  SOVIET  BLACKMAIL   BY    1985 

Senator  Javits.  The  argument  is  also  made  by  the  same  wit- 
nesses that  they  believe  that  a  euphoria  could  seize  us  again  after 
we  sign  SALT  II  and  that  we  will  slip  even  further  behind,  so  that 
by  1985,  at  the  expiration  of  the  treaty  period,  we  will  be  complete- 
ly at  the  mercy  of  whatever  the  Soviets  want  to  do  through  nuclear 
blackmail. 

Senator  McIntyre.  Let  me  say  here,  and  then  I  will  quit  on  this, 
the  question  of  what  we  are  going  to  construct  and  build  for  our 
defense  is  one  that  should  be  taken  by  itself  and  not  in  conjunction 
with  this  important  treaty.  We  should  be  able  to  decide  in  our  own 
minds,  and  in  your  debates  on  the  floor  of  the  Senate  and  in  the 
committees,  with  the  help  of  our  military,  whether  there  are  gaps 
we  should  close  and  whether  there  are  weaknesses  we  should  over- 
come. These  issues  should  stand  by  themselves,  our  Armed  Forces 
and  our  defense  system.  The  treaty,  which  I  believe  is  a  step 
toward  what  we  all  want,  sanity  and  peace,  should  be  judged  on  its 
own. 

Senator  Javits.  So  you  would  not  subscribe  to  Dr.  Kissinger's 
proposition  either,  would  you,  that  when  you  sign  this  treaty,  you 
have  to  have  a  flat  commitment  of  x  dollars  or  x  programs,  or 
whatever  else  you  have  to  promise  in  order  to  guarantee  in  ad- 
vance? 

Senator  McIntyre.  No.  I  do  not  subscribe  to  the  theory  of  tran- 
quilizers. I  think  we  can  in  our  own  House,  Senate,  and  administra- 
tion decide  what  we  need  to  close  any  gap.  We  have  the  technology 
to  do  it  and  more. 

Senator  Javits.  And  that  this  is  a  democratic  country,  Senator, 
and  that  that  is  the  way  it  is  done,  not  by  generals  writing  condi- 
tions. 

Senator  McIntyre.  Right. 

Senator  Javits.  Now,  I  had  the  great  privilege  of  serving  with 
Ambassador  Yost  in  the  United  Nations  in  1970.  I  have  very  high 
regard  for  him.  I  have  read  your  10  points,  by  the  way,  and  I 


102 

believe  they  are  excellent.  I  wish  you  had  read  them  to  us.  They 
could  very  well  be  a  syllabus  for  the  debate  on  this  treaty. 
Ambassador  Yost.  Thank  you,  Senator. 

UNITED   STATES   WILLPOWER  TO   USE   TRIAD 

Senator  Javits.  I  would  like  to  call  one  thing  to  your  attention. 
It  is  a  very  important  point  which  I  will  be  raising  time  and  again. 
We  have  a  Triad.  That  is  our  defense.  The  Soviet  Union,  in  effect, 
has  a  unitary  system,  to  wit,  land-based  missiles. 

The  rest  of  it  is  coming  aboard,  the  Navy  SLBM's,  et  cetera,  but 
they  hardly  pretend  that  it  represents  a  major  part  of  their  offen- 
sive nuclear  capability. 

Now,  all  the  witnesses  are  arguing  as  if  we  had  nothing  but  land- 
based  missiles,  as  if  we  had  no  SLBM's  and  no  bombers.  They  are 
just  disregarding  them,  pushing  it  out  of  the  window.  And  yet  we 
have  spent  billions  on  these  programs. 

The  Secretary  of  Defense  testified  here  that  these  legs  of  the 
Triad  are  critical  to  us,  that  they  are  a  significant  part  of  our 
counterforce  capability  certainly  for  the  next  5  years  until  we  get 
the  M-X  missile. 

Now,  I  notice  that  you  say:  "As  long  as  we  maintain  other 
invulnerable  systems  such  as  our  strategic  submarines,  the  Soviets 
will  not  be  fools  enough  to  risk  destruction  of  most  of  their  cities 
and  industries  by  attacking  us."  Well,  if  you  listen  to  Dr.  Kissinger, 
Ambassador  Yost,  you  would  not  believe  that. 

He  says  no  President  of  the  United  States  will  dare  to  use  them 
when  the  showdown  comes. 

Now,  you  have  been  our  representative  at  the  United  Nations 
and  this  is  your  paper.  What  do  you  say  about  that? 

Ambassador  Yost.  Senator,  I  have  heard  that  argument  not  only 
from  Dr.  Kissinger  but  from  many  others,  and  it  has  never  seemed 
to  me  convincing.  After  all,  why  did  we  build  a  Triad  if  we  didn't 
intend  to  use  it?  The  purpose,  of  course,  is  deterrence.  And  to 
simply  assume  that  if  one  element  of  the  Triad  is  outmoded  or  for 
any  reason  is  unusable,  that  we  are  going  to  throw  up  our  hands 
and  abandon  the  other  two  seems  to  me  to  run  counter  to  the 
entire  purpose  of  our  defense  programs  for  the  last  30  years. 

So  I  would  entirely  agree  with  you  that  we  do  have  other  ele- 
ments of  our  Triad,  unlike  the  Soviets,  who  rely  almost  entirely  on 
their  land-based  missiles,  and  we  are  in  the  process  of  reinforcing 
the  sea-based  missiles  and  we  are  about  to  go  in  for  air-launched 
cruise  missiles. 

So  I  would  say  that  regardless  of  whether  or  not  our  land-based 
missiles  become  vulnerable,  that  we  are  in  a  very  safe,  secure 
situation. 

Senator  Javits.  We  should  not  duplicate  everything  the  Russians 
do  man-for-man,  tank-for-tank,  plane-for-plane,  missile-for-missile. 
On  the  contrary.  I  am  a  tennis  player.  I  know  the  surest  way  to 
lose  is  to  play  the  other  fellow's  game. 

justification  for  advocacy  of  salt 

Mrs.  King,  I  have  just  one  question  of  you.  I  am  delighted  that 
you  are  with  us. 


103 

This  is  a  very  rough  game  for  poor  people.  A  huge  part  of  our 
budget  is  going  for  defense  with  more  in  the  mill.  So  much  going 
for  military  spending  is  pretty  sad  stuff,  and  more  will  go,  I  regret 
to  tell  you.  Under  those  circumstances,  how  do  you  justify,  in  the 
interests  of  the  poor,  your  advocacy  of  SALT? 

It  certainly  maintains  the  level  of  roughly  present  expenditures 
and  may  involve  us  in  more.  Can  we  explain  to  the  poor — and  you 
are  one  of  the  most  eloquent  exponents — that  without  this  treaty, 
if  we  do  turn  it  down,  the  desperate  of  our  country  could  be  very 
much  worse  off  than  they  are  today? 

Mrs.  King.  I  think,  as  difficult  as  it  is  to  explain  to  people  who 
are  struggling  with  the  necessities  of  life  that  the  alternative  is 

Senator  Javits.  Worse. 

Mrs.  King.  Total  destruction,  almost,  we  have  to  try  to  do  that. 
In  some  of  my  lecturing  in  talking  to  college  students  who  are  very 
idealistic,  I  have  had  to  try  to  answer  some  of  these  questions.  And 
I  am  a  practical  idealist,  you  know.  I  dream  of  a  day  when  we 
actually  will  have  a  disarmed  world,  you  know. 

I  share  the  views  that  my  husband  had  that  we  have  to  move 
toward  that  time.  But  I  realize  that  we  are  not  nearly  there  and  we 
have  a  long,  long  way  to  go.  And  as  long  as  there  are  the  realities 
of  being  destroyed  by  other  nations,  responsible  people  in  govern- 
ment must  make  preparation. 

So  I  have  said  as  far  as  I  am  concerned  I  do  believe  in  disarma- 
ment. I  am  a  nonviolent  person.  I  believe  that  ultimately  we  have 
to  disarm  the  whole  world.  But  I  can  only  say  to  people  that  I  talk 
to  that  it  is  very  unrealistic  to  think,  even  to  equate  not  spending  a 
certain  amount  for  defense  in  the  real  world  we  live  in,  and  to  use 
the  argument  that  we  must  take  away  from  the  preparedness  in 
case  there  is  a  war,  that  we  must  take  away  from  that  and  use  that 
money  for  the  resources  to  feed  the  poor. 

The  poor  must  be  fed.  We  must  do  that.  But  to  use  that  as  an 
argument  and  say  that,  there  are  some  people  who  feel  that  some- 
how there  is  no  justification  for  spending  the  enormous  amount  for 
our  military  defense  and  spending  so  little  for  the  human  needs. 

I  subscribe  to  that,  too,  but  I  am  realistic  enough  to  know  that 
our  Government  is  not  going  to  do  that  at  this  time.  Until  we  can 
somehow  sit  down  together  and  work  these  things  out  between  the 
Russians  and  ourselves,  we  have  to  somehow  destroy  the  feeling  of 
fear,  eliminate  the  feeling  of  fear  within  people. 

As  my  colleague  has  said  here,  it  is  a  process.  We  have  to  start 
this  process,  and  I  think  this  is  the  beginning.  We  are  a  long  way 
from  having  the  answer,  but  I  feel  it  is  important  for  me  to  be  here 
to  say  something  in  support  of  this  treaty  because  without  this,  I 
fear  what  the  alternative  will  be  for  all  of  us. 

Senator  Javits.  I  can  assure  you,  Mrs.  King,  without  it  there  will 
be  no  limit  whatever  on  the  stakes  of  the  game. 

Mrs.  King.  Yes. 

Senator  Javits.  Therefore,  any  limit  is  better  for  the  poor  who 
are  bound  to  get  the  worst  chewed  up  in  a  war. 

Mrs.  King.  Right. 

Senator  Javits.  So,  the  most  we  can  do  is  limit  the  stakes  and 
cut  down  the  possibilities. 

Thank  you. 


104 

The  Chairman.  Thank  you,  Senator  Javits. 

When  I  asked  Senator  McGovern's  question,  I  didn't  know  he 
was  going  to  return  in  time  to  ask  it  himself.  So  he  will  now  ask 
the  questions  I  had  intended  to  put  to  you.  [Laughter.] 

Senator  McGovern.  You  probably  did  a  better  job  with  it  than  I 
would  have,  Mr.  Chairman. 

I  just  want  to  observe  that  we  have  three  unusually  thoughtful 
and  qualified  witnesses  here  today  in  Ambassador  Yost,  Mrs.  King 
and  our  colleague.  Senator  Mclntyre.  I  wanted  to  ask  a  couple  of 
general  questions. 

OVERALL   STANCE   OF   UNITED   STATES-SOVIET   RELATIONSHIP 

I  would  like  to  begin  with  you,  Mr.  Yost,  if  I  may. 

Last  spring,  Richard  Barnett  wrote  an  article  in  the  Foreign 
Affairs  Quarterly  in  which  he  pleaded  for  a  more  comprehensive 
approach  to  the  Soviet  Union.  He  makes  this  observation  in  the 
opening  paragraph  of  the  article. 

He  observes  that  the  strategic  arms  limitation  negotiations  in 
Geneva  and  Moscow  have  been  exhausting,  and  the  arguments 
over  ratification  in  Washington  promise  to  be  embittering.  The 
process  has  not  led  to  an  improved  international  climate.  Indeed,  a 
strong  case  can  be  made  that  in  the  last  few  years,  the  SALT 
negotiations  have  exacerbated  tensions  between  the  two  superpow- 
ers. 

Do  you  feel  that  through  the  whole  SALT  process — and  this 
article  was  written  4  or  5  months  ago  and  we  have  now  had  the 
experience  for  several  weeks  of  the  ratification  process — we  are 
improving  our  overall  stance  and  our  relationships  with  the  Soviet 
Union,  the  relationship  between  the  so-called  superpowers,  or  are 
they  being  exacerbated. 

Ambassador  Yost.  No,  Senator,  I  don't  agree  that  without  the 
SALT  negotiation,  the  SALT  process  over  the  past  few  years,  our 
relations  with  the  Soviet  Union  would  have  been  better.  I  think 
they  would  have  been  decidedly  worse.  With  all  the  other  differ- 
ences of  opinion  and  conflicts  that  we  have  with  the  Soviets,  at 
least  the  SALT  process,  although  in  my  opinion  it  moved  much  too 
slowly,  requiring  7  years,  nevertheless  was  an  anchor  and  it  did 
serve  as  one  common  objective  that  we  were  both  agreed  on  pursu- 
ing. 

And  while,  of  course,  there  was  sharp  argument  about  some 
elements  in  it,  on  the  whole  it  served  to  keep  us  from  drifting 
further  apart.  It  is,  after  all,  the  knowledge  of  the  two  governments 
that  their  peoples  are  hostage  to  each  other,  that  either  can  de- 
stroy the  other,  that  provides  some  limits  on  the  ambitions  or 
adventurism  that  might  otherwise  be  shown. 

And  the  fact  that  both  are  engaging  and  have  been  willing  to 
engage  now  for  10  years  in  this  process  of  trying  gradually  to  n.ove 
toward  some  more  stable  situation  is  a  positive  factor  that  has 
improved  relations. 

I  am  confident  that  had  that  process  not  existed,  or  if  it  should 
now  end,  our  relations  would  be  infinitely  worse  and,  as  Senator 
Javits  has  just  said,  both  sides  would  be  spending  far  more  on 
armaments  than  they  have  been. 


105 

Senator  McGovern.  Well,  I  am  inclined  to  agree  with  what  you 
have  said,  that  the  effort  has  been  worthwhile.  However  it  has  also 
been  frustrating.  It  is  one  process  that  will  help  remove  some  of 
the  ambiguity  between  the  two  superpowers.  How  much  it  will  do 
in  the  way  of  actual  arms  limitation,  to  say  nothing  of  arms 
reduction,  I  am  not  at  all  clear  on.  But  I  do  think  it  helps  remove 
some  of  the  elements  of  confusion  and  ambiguity  between  the  great 
powers  and  in  that  sense  is  important. 

All  three  of  you  now  have  argued,  I  take  it,  that  it  is  in  the 
interest  of  the  United  States  that  this  agreement  be  ratified.  Is 
that  correct? 

[Mrs.  King  nods  affirmatively.] 

[Senator  Mclntyre  nods  affirmatively.] 

[Ambassador  Yost  nods  affirmatively.] 

LINKAGE  TO   OTHER   ASPECTS   OF   UNITED   STATES-SOVIET   RELATIONSHIP 

Senator  McGovern.  If  that  is  true,  it  seems  to  me,  then,  that  we 
ought  not  surrender  that  interest.  If  it  is  in  the  U.S.  interest  to 
ratify  this  treaty,  we  ought  not  surrender  that  because  we  are 
peeved  or  concerned  or  alarmed  by  developments  in  some  other 
aspect  of  the  Soviet-American  relationship.  Would  you  agree  with 
that? 

Ambassador  Yost.  Yes,  I  would.  It  has  been  my  experience  over 
the  last  30  years  that  clashes  between  us  and  the  Soviet  Union  in 
many  parts  of  the  world  are  simply  bound  to  occur.  As  regrettable 
as  they  are,  they  are,  I  am  afraid,  unavoidable  in  the  present 
climate. 

I  feel  that  if  we  should,  whenever  there  is  a  clash  of  this  kind, 
suspend  the  arms  control  process,  it  would  aggravate  rather  than 
improve  the  situation. 

Senator  McGovern.  I  don't  think  there  is  any  doubt  about  the 
judgment  of  some  of  the  Senators  who  have  said  that  the  presence 
of  the  Soviet  forces  in  Cuba  is  going  to  make  it  harder  to  ratify  this 
treaty.  On  the  other  hand,  in  terms  of  logical  thinking  about  what 
is  in  the  interest  of  the  United  States,  it  does  seem  peculiar  that 
we  would  punish  ourselves  by  denying  ourselves  this  treaty  be- 
cause we  are  unhappy  about  something  else  the  Soviets  do. 

If  the  treaty  is  in  our  interest,  how  does  it  serve  the  U.S.  interest 
then  to  reject  it  because  we  are  unhappy  about  something  that  has 
taken  place  elsewhere  in  the  world?  That  is  to  inflict  punishment 
on  ourselves,  is  it  not? 

Ambassador  Yost.  I  would  feel  so.  Senator.  I  feel,  for  the  reasons 
I  stated  in  those  10  points,  that  the  treaty  is  very  definitely  in  our 
security  interests  and  that  it  should  stand  on  its  own  feet.  The 
Soviets  are  doing  a  great  many  things  in  many  parts  of  the  world 
of  which  I  strongly  disapprove. 

Nevertheless,  I  continue  to  think  that  it  is  in  our  interest  to 
make  this  particular  agreement  with  them  and  ratify  it. 

Senator  McGovern.  I  do  think  it  is  important  for  us  to  empha- 
size that  this  treaty  is  not  a  reward  for  Soviet  good  behavior,  and 
rejecting  the  treaty  is  not  a  logical  form  of  punishment  for  Soviet 
misbehavior. 

If  you  are  going  to  accept  the  proposition  that  this  treaty  helps 
the  United  States,  it  seems  to  me  that  the  so-called  linkage  argu- 


106 

ment  on  how  we  are  going  to  use  our  support  or  withdrawing  our 
support  from  the  treaty  to  regulate  the  Soviets  elsewhere  around 
the  world  does  not  carry  much  weight. 

Ambassador  Yost.  I  agree. 

Senator  McGovern.  My  time  is  just  about  up  but  I  just  want  to 
underscore  again  here  what  Mrs.  King  and  Senator  Mclntyre  and 
you  have  said,  Ambassador  Yost.  I  think  there  are  sources  of 
American  strength  that  are  very  important  for  us  to  use  around 
the  world.  But  the  one  area  where  we  do  not  have  a  clear  advan- 
tage over  the  Soviet  Union  is  in  the  military  field. 

There  are  a  good  many  other  fields  where  we  do:  the  field  of 
economics,  the  field  of  human  rights,  and  in  our  ability  to  use 
intelligent  diplomacy.  Those  are  the  areas  where  I  would  hope 
more  of  the  competition  would  be  directed  rather  than  keeping  so 
much  of  it  focused  on  the  military  struggle. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Thank  you.  Senator  McGovern. 

Senator  Hayakawa. 

Senator  Hayakawa.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Let  me  start  by  saying  to  you.  Senator  Mclntyre,  it  is  a  pleasure 
to  see  you  again.  Let  me  also  welcome  Mrs.  King  and  Ambassador 
Yost. 

I  would  like  to  ask  Ambassador  Yost  something,  to  start  with.  He 
just  said  the  Soviets  are  doing  many  things  in  many  parts  of  the 
world  of  which  you  profoundly  disapprove.  Ambassador  Yost. 

Ambassador  Yost.  [Nods  affirmatively.] 

ANTICIPATED   SOVIET   BEHAVIOR   AFTER   SALT   II 

Senator  Hayakawa.  What  bothers  me  is  so  many  of  the  things  of 
which  you  disapprove — and  I  am  sure  you  and  I  agree  on  what  we 
disapprove  of,  Soviet  adventurism  in  Angola,  Ethiopia,  South 
Yemen,  weapons  and  military  advisers  to  40  or  more  African  na- 
tions, stirring  things  up  in  the  Middle  East,  Latin  America  and  so 
on — so  many  of  these  things  happened  after  the  signing  of  SALT  L 
What  is  going  to  happen  after  the  signing  of  SALT  II? 

It  seems  as  if  SALT  I  gave  them  the  assurance  that  they  could  go 
ahead  with  these  things. 

Ambassador  Yost.  Well,  Senator,  I  would  not  be  inclined  to 
associate  those  two  elements  so  closely.  I  would  think  that  we 
should  combat  those  particular  examples  of  Soviet  adventurism 
which  you  have  cited  and  that  we  should  find  appropriate  means  of 
doing  so.  It  differs  in  each  case,  of  course.  There  is  no  across-the- 
board  solution. 

I  personally  would  like  to  see  the  United  Nations  used  a  good 
deal  more  than  it  is  in  dealing  with  some  of  those  problems  you 
mentioned.  But  I  do  not  think  that  it  would  be  either  desirable  or 
effective  to  try  to  link  all  of  them  with  the  SALT  Treaty  or  the 
SALT  process. 

As  I  mentioned  earlier,  I  am  sure,  since  incidents  of  this  kind  are 
bound  to  keep  occurring,  that  would  be  the  end  of  any  arms  control 
negotiation  because  they  will  keep  occurring. 

If,  for  example,  the  treaty  should  be  rejected  or  indefinitely 
delayed,  I  don't  think  it  would  improve  Soviet  behavior  one  iota. 
They  would  go  right  on  doing,  in  Angola  or  wherever  else,  exactly 


107 

what  they  have  been  doing.  In  fact,  they  might  behave  a  little 
worse  because  this  one  element  of  restraint,  their  expectation  and 
desire  to  have  an  arms  control  agreement  with  us,  would  be  elimi- 
nated. 

So,  while  I  agree  with  what  Senator  McGovern  has  said,  that 
there  is  an  obvious  political  connection  which  affects  American 
public  opinion  necessarily,  I  do  think  that  we  should  try  to  sepa- 
rate these  issues  to  the  extent  that  we  can  because  in  our  view  the 
SALT  Treaty  is  so  much  in  our  security  interest  that  it  would  be 
very  foolish  indeed  to  throw  it  away  in  the  hope  that  it  might 
make  the  Soviets  behave  better  in  Angola,  Cuba  or  wherever, 
because  I  don't  think  that  they  would. 

SALT   I   NOT  TIED   TO   ADVENTURISM 

Senator  Hayakawa.  Your  reply  essentially,  then,  is  that  the 
signing  of  SALT  I  is  not  to  be  connected  with  the  adventurism. 

Ambassador  Yost.  I  don't  think  it  made  any  difference  in  their 
behavior  in  the  past. 

SALT   II    MAY    DIMINISH    ADVENTURISM 

Senator  Hayakawa.  Are  you  not  also  saying  the  signing  of  SALT 
II  may  diminish  that  adventurism  in  the  future? 

Ambassador  Yost.  I  think  the  whole  SALT  process,  as  long  as  it 
goes  on,  not  simply  the  fact  that  we  have  signed  and  ratified  SALT 
II  but  that  we  have  immediately,  as  the  statement  of  principles  in 
SALT  II  provides,  started  the  negotiation  of  SALT  III,  will  have 
some  moderating  effect  on  their  behavior.  It  certainly  will  not  stop 
all  the  behavior  of  which  we  disapprove,  but  it  will,  in  my  opinion, 
be  less  serious,  less  troublesome  than  if  there  were  no  SALT  proc- 
ess. 

Senator  Hayakawa.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Ambassador. 

EFFECT   OF   CUBAN   PROBLEM   ON   SALT   POSITION 

The  next  question  I  would  like  to  ask,  and  I  address  it  to  all 
three  of  you  and  any  one  of  you  is  free  to  answer  it  in  any  way  you 
like,  is:  Does  the  revelation  of  the  existence  of  a  Soviet  combat 
brigade  in  Cuba  influence  in  any  way  your  position  on  SALT  II? 
That  is,  not  only  on  the  treaty  itself  but  our  approach  to  its 
ratification. 

Ambassador  Yost.  Should  I  say  a  few  words  and  see  if  my 
colleagues  want  to? 

Senator  Hayakawa.  Go  ahead. 

Ambassador  Yost.  No,  Senator,  I  think  not,  for  the  reasons  I 
have  just  cited.  I  think  SALT  II  is  in  our  interest;  that  we  will  be 
more  secure  with  it  than  without  it;  that  their  arms  would  be 
restrained  in  ways  they  would  not  be  without  the  treaty,  and 
therefore,  we  should  go  ahead  and  pin  down  that  treaty  while  we 
can. 

I  dislike  seeing  Soviet  troops  in  Cuba.  I  hope  we  can  find  other 
ways  of  dealing  with  that  and  eliminating  that  situation.  I  don't 
think  there  is  anything  that  we  need  to  be  panicky  about.  After  all, 
we  are  a  considerable  power,  and  3,000  troops  there,  while  unpleas- 
ant, is  obviously  not  going  to  undermine  our  national  security. 


1+8-260    0-79    Pt.4    - 


108 

That  does  not  mean  I  think  we  should  ignore  it.  I  think  we 
should  pursue  with  the  Soviets  through  other  means  the  elimina- 
tion of  that  situation.  But  I  don't  think  that  we  should  throw  away 
the  benefits  I  think  the  SALT  Treaty  would  bring  us. 

Senator  McIntyre.  Well,  Senator,  I  always  wonder  why  we  are 
always  surprised.  There  should  be  no  surprise  involved  in  this 
matter.  But  I  would  say,  and  I  must  say  this,  too,  that  you  gentle- 
men have  had  the  benefit  now  of  yesterday's  hearings  from  which 
you  have  the  up-to-the  minute  information.  And  I  don't  have  this. 

I  would  say,  depending  on  the  nature  of  those  troops  and  the 
amount  of  them  and  the  possibility  of  bases  being  constructed,  that 
I  would  want  them  out  of  there.  And  I  would  also  want  SALT  IL 

You  see,  the  reason  I  want  SALT  II  is  so  that  we  can  know  what 
they,  our  Russian  adversaries,  are  up  to. 

Mr.  Chairman,  you  must  have  known  that  there  were  Russians 
in  Cuba  before  it  appeared  the  other  day.  I  don't  know  what  you 
found  out  yesterday,  but  let's  get  them  out  of  there.  But  let's  also 
get  SALT  II. 

The  Chairman.  Senator,  I  knew  there  were  Russian  military 
personnel  in  Cuba  engaged  in  training  activities  and  also  certain 
communications  activities,  but  not  until  last  week  did  I  know  that 
there  was  a  Russian  combat  unit  there. 

I  wish  we  lived  in  a  world  of  perfect  logic.  I  have  been  saying 
from  the  beginning  that  this  treaty  should  be  dealt  with  on  its 
merits.  I  continue  to  hope  that  it  will  be  dealt  with  on  its  merits. 
But  I  could  not  truthfully  say  that  the  development,  the  confirma- 
tion of  the  existence  of  a  combat  brigade  of  Russian  troops  in  Cuba 
that  were  placed  there  secretly,  does  not  have  a  chilling  effect  in 
the  Senate. 

You  know  as  a  former  Senator  that  it  would  have  such  an  effect. 

Senator  McIntyre.  As  one  who  knows  what  that  means  on  the 
street  corners  of  Boise 

The  Chairman.  Yes,  and  throughout  the  country.  I  also  think 
that  unless  this  matter  is  satisfactorily  resolved,  I  would  be  mis- 
leading you  and  misleading  the  country  to  say  that  I  believe  the 
Senate  would  be  prepared  to  ratify  the  treaty. 

It  is  one  thing  for  the  Cubans  to  move  into  Angola  and  Ethiopia, 
which  has  never  exercised  me  very  much  because  I  think  in  the 
end  it  is  going  to  be  for  the  Africans  to  solve;  but  it  is  another 
thing  to  move  a  combat  unit  secretly  to  within  90  miles  of  our 
shores.  I  think  that  the  Senate  is  bound  to  view  the  two  together. 
That  is  just  a  simple  statement  of  fact,  the  facts  with  which  we 
live. 

Senator  Biden. 

Senator  Biden.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman.  I  will  be  very  brief. 

The  Chairman.  We  do  have  a  vote,  I  might  say.  The  Senators 
might  want  to  go  vote  and  come  back  so  that  we  don't  have  an 
interruption. 

Senator  Biden.  I  apologize  to  the  witnesses  for  not  having  heard 
their  testimony,  but  I  have  had  an  opportunity  to  read  the  testi- 
mony. 


109 

SOVIETS   NOT   MILITARILY   SUPERIOR   TO   UNITED   STATES 

I  would  like  to  say  one  thing  which  contradicts  something  that 
seems  to  be  gaining  some  credibility  around  here.  I,  for  one,  do  not 
believe  the  Soviets  are  militarily  superior  to  the  United  States  of 
America.  None  of  the  witnesses  have  said  that  but  we  have  been, 
in  effect,  for  the  last  several  weeks  talking  as  if  that  is  true.  It  is 
not  true. 

We  have  to  look  at  military  posture  not  just  in  terms  of  strategic 
capability  and  conventional  capability,  but  geographic  location,  po- 
tential enemies,  reliability  of  allies  and  a  whole  range  of  other 
questions.  I  don't  think  there  is  a  military  man  in  this  country  who 
would  trade  places  with  the  Soviet  Union  given  the  entire  range  of 
things  they  would  have  to  trade  if  we  were  in  a  fighting  situation. 

But  I  want  to  say  that  for  the  record  because  it  was  mentioned 
again  here.  I  don't  think  George  meant  much  beyond  what  he  said. 
He  talked  about  Soviet  equality  in  the  military  field  and  the  need 
to  emphasize  the  other  areas.  I  don't  even  concede  that,  if  you  take 
the  entire  spectrum  of  military  considerations,  the  Soviets  are 
superior. 

I  wonder  what  would  happen.  I  wonder  what  Senator  Hayakawa 
and  Senator  Garn  and  others  are  going  to  say  if,  in  fact,  the 
administration  is  able  to,  by  whatever  means  would  be  employed, 
force  this  brigade  out  of  Cuba?  If  the  administration  forces  the 
brigade  out  of  Cuba,  does  that  say  that  we  should  have  SALT?  I 
assume  that  that  is  what  it  means. 

I  assume  it  means  that  if  they  say  they  cannot  have  SALT  with 
the  brigade  in  Cuba  because  it  somehow  shows  how  weak  we  are, 
that  if,  in  fact,  the  brigade  is  forced  to  leave,  I  assume  they  will  be 
prepared  to  point  out  how  strong  we  are  and  why  then  it  would  be 
useful  to  have  SA.LT. 

I  am,  as  you  might  guess,  prepared  to  make  that  argument  if  and 
when  the  brigade  leaves. 

SALT   DISCUSSED   IN   VACUUM 

I  would  like  to  compliment  you,  Mrs.  King,  on  bringing  into 
focus  what  often  is  not  focused  on  here.  We  tend  to  become,  as 
Senator  Church  says,  nuclear  theologians  when  we  discuss  SALT. 
And  we  discuss  it  not  only  in  a  vacuum  in  the  military — that  is,  we 
discuss  strategic  and  not  conventional — but  we  also  discuss  it 
within  a  vacuum  of  what  is  happening  in  the  rest  of  the  world  and 
the  rest  of  our  economy. 

And  your  point  about  inflation  and  unemployment  being  by- 
products of  the  failure  to  have  a  SALT  agreement  is  one  which 
should  be  reiterated  time  and  again.  It  is  not  in  and  of  itself  reason 
to  vote  for  SALT  if  SALT  were  not  a  good  agreement,  if  it  injured 
our  security.  But  if  it  is  at  a  minimum  an  even  call,  even  if  it  is 
close,  those  two  factors  play  very  heavily.  I  would  like  to  compli- 
ment you  on  bringing  them  out. 

And  Senator  Mclntyre,  as  usual  you  have  put  your  finger  right 
on  the  thrust  of  why  we  need  SALT  from  a  security  standpoint. 
You  point  out  in  your  statement  that  there  are  several  reasons  but 
two  main  reasons.  One,  failure  to  have  SALT  diminishes  our  capa- 
bility of  monitoring  and  controlling  Soviet  threat.  And  second,  with 


no 

the  SALT  agreement  it  allows  us  to  do  the  things  we  have  to  do 
anyway  if  we  decide  we  must  do  them  and  moves  forward  in 
continuing  the  process. 

But  you  again  don't  argue  it,  as  I  read  your  statement,  from  a 
position  of  anything  other  than  U.S.  security.  U.S.  military  security 
is  enhanced. 

The  reason  why  I  am  not  asking  any  questions  is  I  agree  with 
what  you  all  say.  And  I  would  just  like  to  compliment  each  of  you 
on  the  way  in  which  you  have  approached  it.  You  seem  to  have 
covered  all  of  the  basics. 

Ambassador  Yost,  you  point  out  in  your  statement  that  there  are 
differences  between  us  and  the  Soviets.  They  are  always  going  to 
be  there  and  we  should  not  reject  something  just  because  we  have 
differences  in  other  areas.  I  guess  I  have  no  desire  to  be  conten- 
tious after  the  testimony  I  heard  this  morning  from  the  anti-SALT 
people,  but  I  am  going  to  have  to  go  vote. 

I  would  like  to  compliment  you  all  once  again  for  putting  the 
issue  into  what  I  believe  is  a  proper  perspective.  I  am  very  anxious 
to  see,  if  the  administration  is  successful  in  moving  the  troops  out 
of  Cuba,  whether  or  not  there  will  be  the  same  rallying  point, 
whether  or  not  we  will  refer  to  Carter's  moving  the  troops  out  of 
Cuba  in  the  same  way  we  refer  to,  throughout  these  hearings,  the 
Kennedy  blockade  of  Cuba,  that  we  could  do  it  then  because  we 
were  strategically  stronger  and  we  can't  do  it  now  if  it  were  to 
occur  again. 

Well,  the  opponents  of  SALT  have  made  it  sound  like  it  has 
occurred  again.  It  has  not.  They  make  it  sound  like  it  has.  And  I 
would  be  very  anxious  to  see  what  they  have  to  say. 

Senator  Sarbanes  would  like  to  question  you  all.  I  imagine  he  is 
on  his  way  back.  And  I  will  be  back  also.  I  must  leave  now.  Besides, 
if  I  didn't  come  back,  with  the  Cardinal  about  to  testify,  I  wouldn't 
be  allowed  back  into  Philadelphia  anyway.  So  I  will  be  back  short- 

Thank  you  very  much. 

If  we  could  recess  for  5  minutes  to  give  Senator  Sarbanes  time  to 
come  back.  I  apologize  for  having  to  do  this. 

[Recess.] 

The  Chairman.  The  hearing  will  come  to  order. 

Ambassador  Yost.  Mr.  Chairman,  Mrs.  King  had  to  leave.  She 
asked  me  to  apologize  to  you. 

The  Chairman.  All  right.  Thank  you. 

Our  next  member  to  question  is  Senator  Muskie. 

Senator  Muskie.  I  apologize  for  not  being  here  when  you  read 
your  opening  statements,  but  I  have  read  them  all  and  I  have 
listened  to  my  colleagues  in  their  question  period.  It  gives  me  a  lot 
of  reading  time  as  they  all  tend  to  use  their  10  minutes,  which  I 
think  is  very  useful,  and  the  questions  have  been  good.  I  really 
have  nothing  to  add  to  them. 

I  particularly  liked  Senator  Mclntyre's  testimony  in  which  he 
emphasized  two  points  which  tend  to  get  overlooked  in  the  debate 
over  the  details  of  the  treaties  and  the  details  of  asymmetrical 
defense  postures  in  the  two  countries. 

The  first  is  that  the  Soviets  without  the  treaty  would  really  be 
less  restrained  with  respect  to  future  defense  spending  and  arms 


Ill 

buildup  than  they  would  be  with  the  treaty.  That  point,  I  think, 
needs  to  be  emphasized  over  and  over  again.  The  treaty  itself  is  not 
likely  to  be  either  the  cause  or  the  contributing  factor  to  future 
Soviet  buildup  except  to  the  effect  that  it  restrains  their  potential. 
Without  the  treaty,  their  potential  is  enhanced. 

NO   UMITATIONS   ON   U.S.   OPTIONS 

On  the  other  side  of  that  coin,  insofar  as  I  know,  based  upon  the 
testimony  I  have  heard,  U.S.  options  for  defense  buildup,  including 
strategic  nuclear  weapons,  are  not  limited  in  any  way  that  we  are 
now  considering.  Am  I  correct  in  that.  Senator  Mclntyre? 

Senator  McIntyre.  That  is  essentially  correct,  yes. 

Senator  Muskie.  So  the  net  effect  of  the  treaty  from  that  point  of 
view  is  that  the  Soviets  are  restrained  with  respect  to  options  they 
would  clearly  exercise.  We  are  not  restrained  with  respect  to  op- 
tions we  are  considering  with  or  without  the  treaty. 

Senator  McIntyre.  The  opponents  would  clearly  say  we  are  re- 
straining ourselves  on  our  GLCM's  and  our  SLCM's,  submarine- 
launched  cruise  missiles  and  the  ground-launched  cruise  missiles. 
But  the  answer  to  that,  of  course,  is  that  these  provisions  are  in 
the  protocol  and  do  not  restrict  us  in  any  practical  way.  We  cannot 
deploy  these  systems  before  the  protocol  expires.  Moreover,  there 
was  no  restraint  there,  really,  on  our  development  or  testing. 

Senator  Muskie.  And  with  respect  to  Ambassador  Yost,  I  did  find 
your  ten  points  very  useful.  I  think  they  are  an  excellent  basis  on 
which  to  rationalize  for  the  average  citizen  the  pros  and  cons  from 
the  national  interest  point. 

Ambassador  Yost.  Thank  you,  sir. 

Senator  Muskie.  And  I  think  that  must  be  done. 

Finally,  I  would  like  to  say,  Mr.  Chairman,  it  is  very  useful  to 
bring  into  these  hearings,  with  the  exception  of  Senator  McIntyre 
and  Ambassador  Yost,  perhaps,  the  average  citizen's  perspective  on 
these  treaties  and  to  emphasize  the  values  and  concerns  the  aver- 
age citizen  ought  to  be  raising  as  he  or  she  evaluates  the  national 
interest  as  represented  by  these  treaties. 

I  think  that  is  terribly  important.  The  polls  continue  to  point  out 
that  citizens  are  for  arms  control.  Yet  we  have  witnesses  day  after 
day,  technicians,  experts  getting  into  the  details  of  the  treaty  and 
tending  to  overlook  or  to  overshadow  or  to  put  into  a  dim  light  the 
fundamental  reasons  why  arms  control  is  important. 

Mrs.  King's  testim.ony  highlighted  that  point.  I  remember  dis- 
cussing that  particular  point  with  Mr.  Kosygin  in  Moscow  in  1971, 
and  clearly,  we  both  were  influenced  by  that  perspective,  the  fact 
that  the  resources  of  this  world  were  being  drained  away  from  the 
human  needs  of  this  planet's  occupants  to  fuel  an  arms  race  which 
at  that  time,  I  think,  cost  about  $200  billion  a  year.  Now  Mrs.  King 
uses  the  figure  $400  billion. 

The  figure  changes  upward  so  rapidly  it  is  difficult  to  stay  on  top 
of  the  latest  statistic.  But  that  kind  of  spending  on  arms,  $400 
billion,  obviously  dilutes  the  capacity  of  the  world's  governments  or 
the  will  of  the  world's  governments  to  deal  with  the  problems  of 
the  disadvantaged.  And  the  problems  of  the  disadvantaged  underlie 
most  of  the  tensions  and  confrontations  upon  the  face  of  this  globe. 


112 

Were  it  not  for  the  problems  of  the  disadvantaged,  those  who 
seek  power  would  not  find  power  so  easily  attainable  as  they  now 
find  it.  And  I  think  it  is  those  kinds  of  fundamental  concerns  that 
ought  to  be  highlighted  as  often  as  possible  in  these  hearings  and 
in  the  public  debate  over  these  treaties.  There  are  risks  to  moving 
in  the  direction  of  peace.  There  are  incomparably  greater  risks  for 
moving  in  the  direction  of  war. 

I  know  that  oversimplifies  the  situation  but  I  find  some  of  the 
experts  oversimplifying,  too,  and  occasionally  their  oversimplifying 
ought  to  be  set  off  against  the  oversimplification  of  human  beings 
interested  in  simply  surviving,  getting  enough  to  eat  and  a  decent 
environment  in  which  to  raise  families  and  to  look  forward  to  a 
better  future. 

So  I  am  delighted,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  this  kind  of  testimony  is 
now  entering  the  hearings,  and  I  appreciate  the  testimony  we 
received. 

I  have  no  further  questions.  I  think  the  appropriate  questions 
have  been  asked  and,  I  think,  well  answered. 

Senator  McIntyre.  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Senator  McIntyre. 

Senator  McIntrye.  May  I  request  two  charts,  "Potential  Soviet 
Strategic  Threat  in  1985,  With  or  Without  SALT,"  and  "U.S.  Free- 
dom to  Develop  Strategic  Strength  Under  SALT  II,"  be  included  in 
the  record. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well.  The  data  will  be  included  in  the 
record  as  you  have  requested. 

[The  information  referred  to  follows:] 


113 


i/ai.i_J:REEDOM_TO  DrvFLOP  Strategic  Strfnbth 
Undfr  salt  II 


(supplied  by  Senator  Thomas  Mclntyrel 

SALT 
Permits 

n  SALT 
Prohibits 

U.S. 
Strategic 
Forces 
At  Sea 

Trident  I  Missile 

@ 

Trident  II  Missile 

$ 

Poseidon  Missile  Improvements 

0 

Trident  Submarine 

0 

Advanced  Small  Strategic  Submarine 

1 

Submarine  Survivability  —  Quietness 

§ 

SALT 
Permits 

n  SALT 
Prohibits 

U.S. 

Strategic 

Forces 

ON 

Land 

Air-Launched  Cruise  Missile —Range 

• 

Air-Launched  Cruise  Missile  ~ 

PFNFTRATinN 

f 

Advanced  Strategic  Air-Launched 

MrssTi  F 

- 1 
• 

B-52  Conversion  to  Cruise  Missile 

r.ARRTFR 

• 

Advanced  Cruise  Missile  Carrier 

• 

B-1 

• 

Advanced  Penetrating  Bomber 

1 

Improved  FB-111 

• 

B-52  Improvements 

1 

114 


U.S.  Freedom  to  Drvelop  Strategic  Strength 


„SALT      SALT 
Permits   Prohibits 


U.S. 
Strategic 
Forces 

ON 

Land 

H-X  Missile 

• 

Minuteman  III  Missile  — Improved 

Yield 

1 

Minuteman  UI  Missile  — Fractiona- 

CV..j^   ^«*i^-^  ^  "71.-*//  V.th   TION 

• 

Minuteman  II  —  Replacements 

• 

SuRvivABLE  Basing  —  M-X 

• 

SuRvivABLE  Basing  —Minuteman 

• 

Missile  Penetration  Aids 

• 

SALT 
Permits 

n  SALT 
Prohibits 

U.S. 
Theatre 
Nuclear 
Forces 

Ground-Launched  Cruise  Missile 

• 

Sea-Launched  Cruise  Missile 

• 

Mobile  Medium- range  Ballistic 

Missile 

1 

.  determined  at  hearings  of  Senate  Armed  Services 
Committee,  Juiy  /5,  1979. 


115 

POTENTIAL  SOVIET  STRATEGIC  THREAT  IN  1985 
—  With  and  Without  SALT  ~ 

[supplied  by  Senator  Thomas  Mclntyrel 


With  SALT   Without  SALT 


Soviet  Strategic  Missile  &  Bombers 

2250* 

3000** 

Soviet  MIRVed  Strategic  Missiles 

1200* 

1800** 

Soviet  MIRVed  Land-based  Strategic 

Missiles 

820* 

1300*** 

Soviet  Silo- killer  Warheads 

6000*** 

10,000-15.000*^ 

Soviet  Total  Strategic  Warheads  &  Bombs 

9500*** 

13.000-18.000*' 

From  Treaty 

Secretary  Brown's  Statement  to  the  Senate 
Armed  Services  Committee.  July  23.  19/9 

Determined  in  Senate  Armed  Services  Committee 
hearing.  July  2.).  1979.  during  questioning  of 
Secretary  Brown  and  Undersecretary  Perry 


116 

Senator  Mclntyre  and  Ambassador  Yost,  thank  you  very  much 
for  your  testimony.  The  committee  is  in  your  debt. 

John  Cardinal  Krol,  the  Archbishop  of  Philadelphia;  the  Cardi- 
nal will  appear  on  behalf  of  the  U.S.  Catholic  Conference. 

Cardinal  Krol,  we  are  grateful  to  you  to  come  to  appear  as  a 
witness  today,  and  I  would  invite  you  to  proceed  with  your  testimo- 
ny as  you  see  fit. 

STATEMENT  OF  JOHN  CARDINAL  KROL,  ARCHDIOCESE  OF 
PHILADELPHIA,  ON  BEHALF  OF  THE  U.S.  CATHOLIC  CONFER- 
ENCE, WASHINGTON,  D.C.,  ACCOMPANIED  BY  THE  REVEREND 
J.  BRYAN  HEHIR  AND  EDWARD  DOHERTY  » 

Cardinal  Krol.  Thank  you. 

Mr.  Chairman,  members  of  the  committee,  as  indicated,  I  am 
John  Cardinal  Krol,  Archbishop  of  Philadelphia.  I  speak  on  behalf 
of  the  U.S.  Catholic  Conference  [U.S.C.C]  comprising  over  350  bish- 
ops in  the  United  States,  serving  more  than  50  million  Catholics. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  respectfully  request  that  my  full  written  testi- 
mony be  submitted  for  the  record. 

The  Chairman.  Without  objection,  your  prepared  statement  will 
be  inserted  in  the  record  at  the  appropriate  point. 

Cardinal  Krol.  I  am  accompanied  by  Father  Bryan  Hehir,  the 
one  with  the  Roman  collar  on  my  right;  Mr.  Edward  Doherty,  on 
my  left,  both  from  the  U.S.C.C. 

I  will  confine  my  remarks  to  a  summary  of  the  complete  testimo- 
ny. At  the  outset,  I  express  the  very  sincere  gratitude  of  the 
Bishops  of  the  U.S.  Catholic  Conference  for  the  opportunity  to 
present  their  views  on  the  moral  dimensions  of  the  nuclear  arms 
race.  My  testimony,  the  testimony  which  I  submit,  is  divided  into 
three  sections.  The  first  section  focuses  your  attention  on  the  moral 
and  religious  principles  which  are  applicable.  The  second  section 
focuses  these  and  applies  these  principles  to  certain  aspects  of  the 
current  debate  on  the  SALT  II  Treaty,  and  a  third  section  directs 
your  attention  to  the  future  beyond  SALT  II. 

Now,  the  first  section,  the  moral  principles  underlying  my  testi- 
mony have  been  enunciated  in  papal  declarations  and  in  the  docu- 
ments of  the  Second  Vatican  Council.  In  these  statements,  the 
arms  race  is  condemned  as  a  plague  on  the  human  race,  a  radically 
defective  way  of  maintaining  the  peace,  and  an  aggression  against 
the  poor  of  this  country  and  of  the  world. 

The  imperative  of  our  age  is  that  all  must  work  to  put  an  end  to 
the  arms  race  and  make  a  real  beginning  of  disarmament,  not 
unilaterally,  indeed,  but  at  an  equal  rate  on  all  sides,  on  the  basis 
of  agreements  and  backed  up  by  genuine  and  effective  guarantees. 
These  principles  are  the  authentic  position  of  the  Catholic  Church 
and  of  faithful  Catholics. 

However,  the  application  of  these  principles  to  a  particular  pro- 
posal such  as  the  SALT  II  Treaty  admits  of  a  divergence  of  views. 
Accordingly,  the  position  I  present  today,  while  based  on  generally 
accepted  principles,  is  not  necessarily  a  unanimous  position  among 
the  bishops,  nor  does  it  represent  all  the  Catholics  in  the  United 
States.  It  is,  however,  the  official  position  of  the  U.S.  Bishops 
Conference  as  adopted  by  its  administrative  board.  In  offering  this 


'  See  page  127  for  Cardinal  Krol's  prepared  statement. 


117 

testimony,  the  bishops  seek  to  fulfill  a  dual  role  of  responsible 
citizenship  and  religious  leadership.  That  dual  role  requires  that 
we  speak  the  truth  plainly. 

The  Catholic  bishops  of  this  country  believe  that  for  too  long  we 
Americans  have  been  preoccupied  with  preparations  for  war.  Too 
long  have  we  been  guided  by  the  false  criterion  of  equivalence  or 
superiority  of  armaments.  Too  long  have  we  allowed  other  nations 
virtually  to  dictate,  albeit  obliquely  and  indirectly,  how  much  we 
should  spend  on  stockpiling  weapons  of  destruction. 

Is  it  not  time  to  give  priority  to  steps  towards  peace,  to  move 
toward  it  through  gradual,  bilateral,  negotiated  disarmament? 

I  am  here,  Mr.  Chairman,  to  support  ratification  of  the  SALT  II 
Treaty  as  a  partial  and  very  limited  step  in  the  process  of  halting 
the  proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons  and  moving  toward  real  re- 
ductions. The  support  for  ratification  is  severely  qualified  because 
of  the  moral  principles  which  govern  our  view  of  arms  control.  The 
massive  complexity  of  the  nuclear  arms  race  is  something  which 
diplomats  and  analysts  grapple  with  daily.  We  respect  that  techni- 
cal complexity.  We  have  tried  to  study  and  to  assimilate  it  in  this 
testimony. 

For  the  church,  however,  the  nuclear  arms  race  is  principally 
defined,  as  Mrs.  King  had  said,  in  religious  and  moral  categories 
since  war  in  any  form  raises  the  question  of  human  rights  and 
human  life. 

In  a  nuclear  age,  the  moral  imperative  to  prevent  war  has  taken 
on  a  qualitatively  new  character.  From  Pius  XII  to  John  Paul  II, 
the  moral  teaching  is  unequivocal:  The  nuclear  arms  race  is  unre- 
servedly condemned,  while  the  process  of  arms  control  and  disarm- 
ament is  urgently  commended. 

The  pursuit  of  peace  is  not  based  on  a  naive  or  Utopian  view  of 
the  world.  The  Christian  tradition  is  eloquent  about  the  vision  of 
peace.  It  is  also  realistic  about  the  fact  of  war.  Hence,  the  Second 
Vatican  Council  declared  that  "governments  cannot  be  denied  the 
right  of  legitimate  self-defense  once  every  means  of  peaceful  settle- 
ment has  been  exhausted." 

The  perspective  of  this  testimony,  therefore,  recognizes  that  some 
forms  of  war  can  be  morally  legitimate,  but  judges  that  nuclear 
war  involving  the  use  of  weapons  of  uncontrolled  destructiveness 
surpasses  the  boundaries  of  legitimate  selfdefense. 

The  prohibition  of  use:  It  follows  that  the  primary  moral  impera- 
tive of  the  nuclear  age  is  to  prevent  any  use  of  nuclear  weapons.  It 
is  this  prohibition  which  is  reflected  in  the  following  judgment  of 
the  Second  Vatican  Council: 

Any  act  of  war  aimed  indiscriminately  at  the  destruction  of  entire  cities  or  of 
extensive  areas  along  with  their  population  is  a  crime  against  God  and  man  himself. 
It  merits  unequivocal  and  unhesitating  condemnation. 

It  should  be  noted,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  in  the  sixteen  documents 
of  the  Second  Vatican  Council,  this  was  the  onl}'  formal  condemna- 
tion ^'^sued,  there  was  none  other.  It  reflects  the  gravity  of  the 
moral  problem  before  us  in  these  hearings.  The  primary  purpose  of 
the  bishops'  support  of  SALT  II  is  to  join  in  any  reasonable  effort 
designed  to  make  nuclear  war  in  any  form  less  likely.  Our  support 
of  the  treaty  remains  qualified,  however,  because  of  the  moral 
paradox  of  the  deterrence  policy. 


118 

The  moral  dilemma  of  deterrence:  The  moral  paradox  of  deter- 
rence is  that  its  purpose  is  to  prevent  the  use  of  nuclear  weapons, 
but  it  does  so  by  an  expressed  threat  to  attack  the  civilian  popula- 
tion of  one's  adversary.  Such  a  threat  runs  directly  counter  to  the 
central  moral  affirmation  of  Christian  teaching  on  war:  that  inno- 
cent lives  are  not  open  to  direct  attack. 

In  their  moral  statement  on  strategic  policy  in  1976,  the  Ameri- 
can Catholic  Bishops  argued  that: 

We  must  be  aware  that  not  only  is  it  wrong  to  attack  civilian  populations,  it  is 
also  wrong  to  threaten  to  attack  them  as  a  part  of  a  strategy  of  deterrence. 

This  moral  judgment  that  the  use  of  strategic  nuclear  weapons 
and  the  declared  intent  to  use  them  in  our  deterrence  policy  are 
both  wrong  is  a  fundamental  principle  in  the  U.S.C.C.  position.  It 
means  that  deterrence  can  be  tolerated  as  a  lesser  evil  than  use,  as 
long  as  serious  negotiations  are  pursued,  aimed  at  phasing  out 
nuclear  deterrence.  If  the  pursuit  of  that  goal  is  forsaken,  the 
moral  attitude  of  the  Catholic  Church  would  almost  certainly  have 
to  shift  to  one  of  uncompromising  condemnation  of  both  use  and 
possession  of  nuclear  weapons. 

Based  on  these  moral  principles,  we  cannot  regard  the  SALT  II 
Treaty  as  a  major  achievement  in  arms  control.  It  certainly  is  not 
an  arms  reduction  treaty.  It  is  more  accurately  characterized  as  a 
measure  which  regulates  the  expansion  of  the  arms  race.  Neverthe- 
less, it  does  set  some  limits.  Consequently,  the  Catholic  Bishops  of 
the  United  States  urge  the  Senate  to  ratify  this  treaty  because  of 
the  process  of  negotiation  which  produced  it  and  the  further  negoti- 
ations which  it  permits  offer  the  promise  of  escape  from  the  danger 
of  nuclear  holocaust,  and  from  the  ethical  dilemma  of  nuclear 
deterrence. 

The  second  part  is  the  principles  governing  the  current  debate  on 
the  SALT  II  Treaty. 

The  bishops  have  taken  this  position  in  support  of  SALT  II 
conscious  of  the  objections  of  those  who  oppose  SALT  II.  We  have 
serious  reservations  about  the  treaty  because  we  know  it  is  a 
deceleration,  not  a  reversal  of  the  arms  race.  The  analysis  of  this 
testimony  concludes  that  the  quantitative  and  qualitative  limits  on 
delivery  systems  and  weapons  achieved  by  SALT  II  are  worthy  of 
support.  We  are  sympathetic,  however,  to  those  critics,  including 
some  of  my  fellow  bishops,  who  cannot  find  in  the  SALT  process 
thus  far  evidence  of  real  arms  reduction.  Unless  there  is  movement 
beyond  SALT  II  toward  more  substantial  measures  of  arms  control, 
our  support  of  SALT  II  will  be  hard  to  sustain. 

We  are  also  aware  of  the  far  more  numerous  opponents  of  SALT 
II  who  criticize  the  treaty  as  failing  to  protect  U.S.  security.  Some 
argue  that  the  treaty  will  not  prevent  the  U.S.S.R.  from  achieving 
a  first  strike  capability  against  our  land-based  missiles  which  they 
will  then  use  to  change  the  strategic  balance  in  various  parts  of  the 
world.  Others  argue  that  the  perception  of  the  U.S.S.R.  having  a 
first  strike  potential  will  produce  a  shift  in  the  global  political 
balance. 

I  am  not  a  political  or  technical  expert,  but  I  must  raise  some 
questions.  To  the  first  criticism:  Would  not  the  leaders  of  the 
U.S.S.R.  be  insane  to  initiate  a  nuclear  war,  even  in  the  possession 
of  a  first  strike  capability  against  our  ICBM's,  when  the  basic 


119 

reality  of  the  nuclear  age  remains  deterrence  based  on  the  assured 
destruction  policy?  Even  those  of  us  who  oppose  the  present  policy 
of  deterrence  have  to  recognize  its  function. 

To  the  second  criticism:  Can  it  be  argued  that  an  increase  of 
strategic  power  can  so  easily  be  translated  by  the  Soviets  into  an 
effective  instrument  of  political  influence?  Is  not  the  influence  of 
the  strategic  balance  on  a  particular  political  situation  most  com- 
plex and  unpredictable  precisely  in  those  situations  of  the  develop- 
ing world  where  forces  of  nationalism  and  a  plethora  of  ideological 
positions  are  vying  for  control?  Has  not  the  cost  of  using  nuclear 
weapons  on  the  part  of  those  who  employ  them  deprived  these 
weapons  of  much  of  their  strategic  utility  and  made  their  political 
value  equally  problematic? 

Mr.  Chairman,  you  cited  some  examples,  including  Iran  and 
Soviet  adventurism  in  the  past,  and  I  ask,  has  the  military  superi- 
ority of  the  U.S.S.R.  enabled  it  to  achieve  a  decisive  political  ad- 
vantage over  its  neighbor  China?  I  raise  these  questions  to  mdicate 
that  while  we  have  examined  the  objections  of  those  who  oppose 
SALT  with  the  arguments  just  stated,  we  have  not  found  them 
sufficient  to  deter  our  support  for  the  treaty.  There  are  risks  in  the 
SALT  II  process,  but  we  believe  that  they  are  worth  taking  to 
solidify  what  has  been  achieved  by  the  treaty  and  to  move  beyond 
it  to  a  more  significant  reduction. 

The  third  section  is  beyond  SALT  II.  It  is  our  hope  that  the  U.S. 
agenda  for  future  negotiations  will  be  bold,  I  might  say  a  bit  bolder 
than  it  has  been,  and  imaginative,  aimed  at  demonstrable  reduc- 
tions in  both  weapons  and  delivery  systems. 

We  realize,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  it  has  been  argued  during  these 
hearings  that  ratification  of  the  treaty  should  be  linked  to  new  and 
massive  programs  for  expanding  and  improving  U.S.  strategic  nu- 
clear and  conventional  forces.  Several  witnesses  have  said  that 
SALT  II  is  acceptable  precisely  because  it  does  not  prevent  the 
United  States  from  matching  expanding  Soviet  capabilities.  Strate- 
gic equivalence  has  become  the  new  name  for  the  arms  race. 

At  the  time  of  SALT  I,  Dr.  Kissinger  was  quoted  as  asking:  What 
good  is  strategic  superiority  at  these  levels  of  numbers?  Are  we  not 
justified  in  asking  today  whether  strategic  equivalence  is  an  abso- 
lute necessity?  Why  must  we  accept  this  criterion  which  ties  our 
defense  spending  to  our  adversary's  decisions,  when  we  now  have 
the  potential  of  destroying  every  human  being  in  the  world  four 
times  over? 

I  have  come  here  today,  Mr.  Chairman,  because  we  believe  in 
negotiated  arms  control.  Because  of  that  belief,  we  must  question 
the  logic  of  an  absolute  adherence  to  the  criterion  of  strategic 
equivalence.  It  would  radically  distort  our  intention  to  have  our 
support  of  SALT  II  coupled  with  plans  for  new  military  expendi- 
tures. The  treaty  should  be  ratified  as  an  arms  control  measure, 
not  as  a  maneuver  to  increase  the  strategic  budget. 

The  proposed  new  strategic  systems  will  require  a  massive  outlay 
of  funds  at  a  time  of  increasing  fiscal  stringency.  The  Constitution 
of  the  United  States  calls  upon  the  executive  and  legislative 
branches  of  government  not  only  to  provide  for  the  common  de- 
fense, but  also  to  establish  justice,  to  promote  the  general  welfare 
and  secure  the  blessings  of  liberty  for  ourselves  and  our  posterity. 


120 


Estimates  for  the  M-X  missile  alone  run  from  $30  billion  upward 
over  the  next  decade.  With  the  national  debt  today  at  over  $800 
billion,  and  pressure  being  exerted  on  legislative  bodies  at  all  levels 
to  reduce  expenditures,  the  investment  of  $30  billion  in  one  weap- 
ons system  inevitably  will  result  in  new  limits  on  spending  tor 
essential  human  services  here  and  abroad. 

It  is  our  recommendation  that  systems  like  the  M-X,  as  well  as 
Trident  II,  should  be  considered  negotiable  in  return  for  compara- 
ble concessions  by  the  U.S.S.R.  in  SALT  III.  We  have  been  told  that 
the  aim  of  SALT  III  will  be  deep  cuts  in  the  strategic  arsenals  of 
both  superpowers.  We  fervently  hope,  we  fervently  pray,  that  this 

^  Mr  ^Chairman,  the  attention  of  the  whole  world  has  been  cap- 
tured by  the  new  Pope  John  Paul  II.  He  has  already  taken  note  of 
the  significance  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty  for  world  peace.  The  treaty, 
he  said, 

is  not  yet  a  reduction  of  weaponry  or,  as  could  be  hoped,  a  provision  for  disarma- 
ment But  that  does  not  mean  that  the  foreseen  measures  are  not  a  sign,  which  we 
St  to  greet  with  pleasure,  of  the  desire  to  pursue  a  dialogue  without  which  every 
hope  of  working  effectively  for  peace  could  vanish. 

The  Pope  asked  for  prayers  "to  bring  progress  to  the  great  cause 
of  laying  down  weapons  and  pursuing  honest,  stable  and  effective 
agreements"  of  peace  and  concord.  It  is  in  this  spirit  that  the  U^. 
Catholic  Conference  submits  this  testimony  to  the  Senate  Foreign 

Relations  Committee.  ,  ^  r  j.i. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman,  and  thank  you,  members  of  the  com- 

"^The^' Chairman.  Thank  you  very  much,  Cardinal  Krol,  for  an 
extremely  well  reasoned,  comprehensive  statement  on  the  position 
of  the  U.S.  Catholic  Conference  on  this  treaty  ^     ,     ,     -.u  ^ 

I  have  been  informed  that  I  need  to  go  to  the  floor  to  deal  with  a 
resolution  that  is  presently  being  debated  that  would  call  for  the 
suspension  of  all  further  Senate  consideration  of  SALT  until  writ- 
ten assurances  are  received  from  the  President  that  Soviet  forces 
in  Cuba  pose  no  threat  to  the  United  States  nor  to  U.S.  foreign 
policy.  I  think  this  is  an  indication  of  the  realities  to  which  1 

^^  But  beforfleaving-and  I  would  then  extend  to  Senator  Muskie 
the  balance  of  my  time-I  want  to  say  that  I  appreciate  very  much 
the  decision  that  has  been  made  by  the  Catholic  Church  and  by 
other  churches,  Protestant  and  Jewish  churches,  to  speak  out  on 
Siportant  political  issues  when  they  affect  moral  principles 
Indeed,  the  core  of  this  whole  attempt  to  bring  nuclear  arms  under 
some  restraint  is  essentially  moral  in  nature,  and  I  think  your 
statement  underscores  this  very  persuasively. 

I  sometimes  think  that  the  great  moral  blindness  of  the  last 
century  was  the  institution  of  human  slavery,  but  the  most  respect- 
able of  our  leaders  in  that  period,  at  least  m  the  early  part  of  the 
century,  were  content  to  raise  no  questions  concerning  slavery 
Even  as  the  century  advanced,  it  became  the  subject  of  a  great 
nItSnal  debate  in  which  the  most  respectable  people  found  ways  to 
rationalize  and  to  justify  the  continued  existence  of  slavery  It 
Sme  at TasHo  the\errible  tragedy  of  the  Civil  War  before  that 
issue  was  resolved. 


121 

It  may  well  be  that  the  great  moral  blindness  of  our  times  is  the 
nuclear  arms  race,  and  most  respectable,  most  powerful  world  lead- 
ers and  experts  of  every  kind  find  ways  to  rationalize  its  continu- 
ation and  to  justify  it  on  one  basis  or  another.  I  think  that  the 
great  contribution  of  your  statement  is  to  bring  us  back  to  the 
basic  moral  questions  and  force  us  to  confront  them.  I  am  grateful 
to  you  for  your  statement.  It  is  a  very  important  contribution  to 
the  commit  iecj's  consideration  of  this  treaty. 

Seiiator  Muskie,  please. 

Senator  Muskie.  This  is  the  first  time  at  these  hearings  I  have 
had  a  chance  to  ask  the  first  question,  and  I  really  don't  have  a 
quastion  so  much  as  a  reaffirmation  of  what  Senator  Church  has 
just  said. 

NEED  ?0R  MORAL  IMPERATIVE  TO  BE  EMPHASIZED 

I  was  delighted  in  Augi!st  to  learn  that  you  were  interested  in 
coming  to  this  hearing  because  at  that  point  the  hearings,  by  and 
large,  had  emphasized  the  concerns  of  people  who  deal  with  arms 
and  arms  diplomacy,  on  the  impact  upon  national  security,  and 
those  who  believe  that  national  security  was  not  so  threatened  that 
we  should  ignore  the  moral  imperative  involved  were  concerned 
that  the  moral  imperative  was  not  being  sufficiently  emphasized. 

It  is  not  that  those  who  were  testifying  were  unaware  of  the 
moral  imperative;  it  is  just  that  they  were  so  preoccupied  and  had 
been  for  years  in  negotiating  the  means  for  moving  toward  a 
reduction  in  arms  that  I  am  not  sure  they  were  as  sensitive  as  they 
ought  to  be  to  the  fact  that  this  treaty  does  not  produce  a  reduction 
in  arms. 

At  what  level  a  reduction  would  begin,  no  one  would  dare  pre- 
dict. I  would  not  predict  that  a  SALT  III  Treaty  would  result  in  a 
reduction  in  arms,  or  even  a  leveling  off  of  the  arms  race.  And  I 
think  it  is  important  that  we  be  reminded  that  those  kinds  of  risks 
lie  ahead  of  us,  and  indeed,  that  they  would  be  exacerbated  if  this 
treaty  is  rejected. 

So  I  feel  I  have  been  privileged  this  afternoon,  Your  Eminence, 
to  listen  to  your  statement.  I  hesitate  to  ask  questions  because  your 
statement  is  so  clearly,  carefully  structured,  thoughtfully  produced, 
and  based  upon  a  rather  careful  study  of  the  record,  the  issues,  the 
questions,  the  challenges  that  have  been  raised  that  I  doubt  that 
the  effect  of  your  statement  would  be  improved  by  interpretations 
based  upon  ad  hoc  questions  put  to  you  by  Senators  on  this  side  of 
the  table. 

RESERVATIONS   THAT  TREATY   DOES   NOT  GO   FAR   ENOUGH 

There  is  just  one  question  I  would  really  like  to  ask,  not  that  the 
point  would  be  left  ambiguous,  if  it  is  ambiguous,  in  the  record. 
You  were  very  careful  at  the  outset  to  point  out  that  this  was  the 
official  position  of  the  National  Council  but  that  it  did  not  neces- 
sarily represent  the  views  of  every  member  or  of  every  bishop. 

Would  it  be  accurate  to  characterize  the  views  of  those  who  have 
reservations  about  the  statement  or  about  the  SALT  II  Treaty  to 
say  that  their  reservations  are  based  upon  a  conviction  that  the 
treaty  does  not  go  far  enough  in  the  direction  of  reducing  arms. 


122 

rather  than  that  it  poses  a  nonacceptable  risk  to  our  national 
security? 

Cardinal  Krol.  The  first  part  is  correct.  Their  objection  is  that  it 
simply  does  not  go  far  enough.  We  have  expressed  that  reservation. 
They  expected  that  it  should  have  moved  in  the  direction  of  reduc- 
tion, disarmament.  And  actually  it  doesn't  do  that  at  all.  There  is 
no  reversal.  All  it  does  is  control  or  regulate  the  growth.  And  it  is 
precisely,  I  would  say,  for  that  reason  that  there  is  a  divergence  of 
opinion  among  the  fellow  bishops. 

It  is,  I  would  say,  a  small  minority  of  bishops,  but  with  great 
conviction. 

Senator  Muskie.  I  remember.  Cardinal  Krol,  enjoying  your  hospi- 
tality in  Philadelphia,  and  I  remember  that  the  bedroom  which  I 
occupied  was  also  occupied  by  the  beautiful  painting  of  the  current 
Pope  whose  eyes  followed  one  wherever  one  moved  in  the  room.  I 
have  seen  those  kinds  of  paintings  before,  but  I  had  never  seen 
such  a  dramatic  one,  or  representing  a  personage  whose  influence 
and  authority  was  so  overwhelming.  I  can't  say  that  I  slept  the 
sleep  of  the  innocent  totally  that  night  under  such  surveillance, 
but  I  would  say  that  your  testimony  here  this  morning  represents 
that  kind  of  surveillance  from  the  enormously  significant  moral 
position  of  the  Catholic  Church,  and  as  a  Catholic,  I  am  delighted 
that  it  has  been  used  as  you  have  used  it  here  this  afternoon. 

Cardinal  Krol.  Thank  you.  Senator. 

Senator  Muskie.  Senator  Percy. 

Senator  Percy.  Your  Eminence,  we  all  appreciate  your  presence 
here  and  we  respect  the  position  that  you  have  taken. 

TELEVISED   COVERAGE   OF   SALT   FLOOR   DEBATE 

I  think  one  of  the  most  disappointing  aspects  of  my  consideration 
of  SALT  II,  which  may  be  one  of  the  most  important  votes  that  I 
will  cast  in  the  U.S.  Senate,  has  been  the  low  level  of  interest 
seemingly  shown  by  our  constituents.  There  is  no  comparison  with 
the  high  level  of  emotion  and  interest  we  saw  on  the  issue  of  the 
Panama  Canal.  Yet  in  SALT  II  we  are  dealing  with  the  future  of 
the  human  race.  We  tried  to  grapple  with  one  of  the  problems  of 
the  nuclear  age  in  the  Non-Proliferation  Act  that  we  passed  in  the 
Congress  about  1  year  ago,  and  we  are  trying  to  grapple  with 
another  aspect  of  the  problem  here.  I  think  broadcasting  these 
hearings  is  important.  Your  presence,  speaking  on  behalf  of  such  a 
highly  valued  group  of  men  and  women,  is  important  because  it 
promotes  public  understanding  and  helps  focus  public  attention  on 
the  importance  of  this  issue. 

In  your  opinion,  would  it  be  well  for  us  to  try  to  solve  the 
technical  problems  and  open  up  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  to 
television  and  radio  coverage  of  the  SALT  debate  so  the  people  of 
this  country  can  share  in  the  debate  and  grasp  its  significance  as 
you  and  the  group  that  you  represent  have  so  ably  expressed? 

Cardinal  Krol.  Senator,  I  don't  think  I  would  be  the  best  judge 
of  that.  One  of  the  problems  that  you  would  have  in  this  is  that 
you  are  showing  the  perfection  of  refinement  of  debate  on  a  matter 
which  is  complex  and  involved.  We  have  tried  to  apply  the  moral 
principles.  There  are  other  principles  of  security  and  so  on,  and  I 
don't  know  whether  you  could  convey  that  even  by  the  intelligent 


123 

and  reasonable  debates  that  you  have  in  the  Senate.  I  don't  know.  I 
don't  think  I  am  a  good  judge  of  that.  The  televising  of  these 
hearings  has  provided  some  preparation  beforehand,  and  there 
could  be  some  interest  generated  through  the  media  if  the  debate  is 
to  be  televised.  The  problem  is  whether  the  coverage  of  the  media 
would  be  read  and  to  what  degree  would  it  be  understood.  But  it 
would  be  very  helpful  to  have  the  people  interested  and  knowledge- 
able. 

There  is  also  a  question  of  priorities.  If  you  want  to  talk  about 
energy,  or  inflation,  or  about  the  shortage  of  gasoline,  that  will 
command  the  interest  of  people.  But  it  seems  the  people  are  willing 
to  entrust  their  elected  Representatives  and  Senators  with  the 
SALT  II  decision.  It  is  your  responsibility  with  clear-minded  knowl- 
edge and  perception  and  courage  to  make  the  decisions.  I  am  here 
only  to  help  you  by  casting  some  light  particularly  on  the  moral 
aspects.  As  Mrs.  King  said,  this  was  basically  and  ultimately  a 
moral  issue,  which  is  the  same  theme  that  I  developed  in  the  first 
section.  But  it  is  up  to  you  gentlemen  who  have  to  be  courageous — 
and  I  appreciate  fully  the  risks  involved  in  the  democratic  process- 
es of  election.  I  think  it  was  Churchill  who  said  that  democracy  is 
the  worst  form  of  government  in  the  world  but  better  than  any 
other  kind.  I  realize  what  you  have  to  face  when  you  have  elec- 
tions. But  there  is  an  area  where  you  have  to  be  true  to  yourself,  to 
the  truth,  and  vote  with  courage. 

Senator  Percy.  Thank  you. 

MORAL   RESPONSIBILITY   OF   NATIONS   TO   DEFEND   THEMSELVES 

I  would  like  to  clarify  a  point  you  made.  You  have  pointed  out 
that  we  ought  to  move  toward  de-escalating  the  arms  race  and 
bilaterally  eliminate  nuclear  weapons,  if  at  all  possible,  in  their 
totality.  You  said  this  is  a  moral  issue. 

Is  it  not  also  true,  though,  that  it  is  a  moral  responsibility  of  the 
Nation  to  adequately  and  properly  defend  its  citizens?  We  have  a 
case  in  Lebanon  where  a  nation  saw  fit  not  to  provide  adequate 
defense  for  its  own  borders,  its  own  people,  and  it  has  been  torn 
asunder  for  years  now. 

Isn't  there  a  moral  obligation  to  see  that  we  adequately  provide 
for  our  defense  so  as  to  deter  any  aggression? 

Cardinal  Krol.  Yes,  I  have  emphasized  that,  that  the  right  of 
self-defense  is  a  sound  moral  principle  for  individuals  and  for  na- 
tions. The  right  of  self-defense  is  rooted  in  the  law  of  nature,  and  of 
nature's  God.  At  the  same  time,  there  is  a  basic  principle  we  study 
in  moral  theology,  "en  inculpate  tutelae,"  that  is,  you  can  only  use 
as  much  force  as  is  necessary  to  repel  the  aggressor. 

Now,  when  a  little  child  comes  at  you  with  a  toy  baseball  bat, 
you  don't  run  for  a  machine  gun;  and  it  is  a  crude  comparison,  but 
that  is  the  concept  involved  there,  and  when  you  have  these  nucle- 
ar stockpilings  on  both  sides,  the  basic  moral  issue  is  the  unprotect- 
ed civilian.  If  somebody  comes  at  you  with  a  gun,  with  arms,  you 
shoot  at  them,  but  when  you  have  missiles  and  nuclear  power  that 
wipe  out,  as  were  wiped  out  in  Nagasaki,  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
innocent  people,  unarmed,  that  is  morally  indefensible.  And  the 
nuclear  power  inherently  has  that  kind  of  a  potential  and  for  that 
reason,  the  bishops  oppose  nuclear  power  as  a  viable  weapon. 


48-260    0-79    Pt . 4 


124 

REJECTION   OF   UNILATERAL  DISARMAMENT 

Senator  Percy.  You,  as  I  see  your  statement,  reject  unilateral 
disarmament.  When  you  face  an  adversary  of  increasing  strength 
and  apparently  different  moral  persuasions  than  we  do,  there 
would  be  no  sense,  I  would  think,  in  unilaterally  disarming.  That  is 
why  this  whole  process  of  bilateral  negotiation  seems  to  be  the 
sensible  way  to  go  about  it. 

Do  I  surmise  that  you  would  concur  with  that  conclusion? 

Cardinal  Krol.  Positively,  Senator.  That  was,  in  fact,  Paul  VI 
speaking  at  the  U.N.  in  1965,  when  he  made  that  statement  "No 
more  war;  war  never  again,"  and  he  insisted  disarmament  was  the 
first  step  toward  peace.  But  he  added  a  sentence  which  is  not  very 
frequently  quoted.  It  is  on  the  first  page  of  my  testimony:  "As  long 
as  man  remains  that  weak,  changeable,  and  even  wicked  being  he 
often  shows  himself  to  be,  defensive  armaments  will  also  be  neces- 
sary." 

On  the  following  page,  the  "Constitution  on  the  Church  in  the 
Modern  World"  says  this,  that:  "Since  peace  must  be  born  of 
mutual  trust  between  peoples  instead  of  being  forced  on  nations 
through  threat  of  arms,  all  must  work  to  put  an  end  to  the  arms 
race  and  make  a  real  beginning  of  disarmament,  not  unilaterally 
indeed,  but  at  an  equal  rate  on  all  sides,  on  the  basis  of  agreements 
and  backed  up  by  genuine  and  effective  guarantees."  That  is  exact- 
ly the  principle. 

Senator  Percy.  Thank  you,  sir,  very  much  indeed. 

Cardinal  Krol.  Thank  you,  Senator. 

Senator  Muskie.  Senator  Biden. 

Senator  Biden.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Your  Eminence,  Senator  Muskie  said  that  to  ask  questions  in  a 
sense  would  detract  from  the  statement  and  the  manner  in  which 
it  was  put  together,  but  being  the  product  of  13  years  of  Catholic 
education,  I  can't  resist  the  opportunity  to  ask  a  Cardinal  a  ques- 
tion. 

ADOPT   defense   POSTURE   BASED  ON   COUNTERFORCE   CAPABILITY 

Your  Eminence,  I  am  concerned  that  one  of  the  paragraphs  in 
your  statement  might  be  taken  out  of  context.  One  of  the  debates 
that  has  been  raging  in  this  committee  for  the  past  2  months  has 
been  whether  or  not  the  United  States  should  adopt  a  defense 
posture  based  upon  the  concept  of  counterforce  capability. 

The  argument  has  been  made  that  the  policy  upon  which  our 
nuclear  deterrent  for  the  past  20  years  has  been  based,  which  is 
mutual  assured  destruction,  is  not  a  good  policy,  not  a  workable 
policy,  not  a  moral  policy  because  it  means  just  what  it  says:  that 
the  Soviets  should  know  that  if  they  were  to  strike  the  United 
States  or  its  allies  with  nuclear  weapons,  then,  as  they  say  in  south 
Philadelphia,  school  is  out,  it  is  all  over. 

Now,  along  come  Dr.  Kissinger  and  others  and  they  say  we  need 
the  M-X  missile,  we  need  the  enhanced  radiation  weapon,  and  we 
need  other  things  like  GLCM's  and  SLCM's  and  ALCM's,  because 
we  must  counter  the  counterforce  capability  of  the  Soviet  Union. 
They,  with  their  big  missiles,  can  strike  in  the  mid-1980's  our 
ground-based  missiles  and  knock  out  those  missiles,  and  only  kill 


125 

10  to  20  million  Americans,  and  it  is  suggested  that  if  the  United 
States  were  to  retaliate  massively  under  that  circumstance,  then  it 
would  be  immoral,  because  the  Soviets  would  retaliate  in  turn  and 
we  would  have  created  mutual  suicide.  In  your  statement  you  say: 
"The  moral  paradox  of  deterrence  is  that  its  purpose  is  to  prevent 
the  use  of  nuclear  weapons,  but  it  does  so  by  an  expressed  threat  to 
attack  the  civilian  population  of  one's  adversary.  Such  a  threat 
runs  directly  counter  to  the  central  moral  affirmation  of  the  Chris- 
tian teaching  on  war:  that  innocent  lives  are  not  open  to  direct 
attack." 

What  I  am  leading  to  is  that  I  don't  see  how  nuclear  weapons  of 
the  size  that  either  side  has  now  can  be  employed  in  a  surgical 
way,  and  that  a  policy  which  is  designed  to  deter  the  use  of  those 
weapons  on  civilian  populations  by  essentially  saying  that  we  have 
no  option  open  to  us  but  to  respond  in  kind  seems  to  me  to  be  one 
of  the  only  ways  to  preclude  the  prospect  of  it  occurring.  And  I  just 
wonder  whether  or  not  you  can  help  me  as  a  U.S.  Senator  deal 
with  that  dilemma  a  little  further.  Should  we  be  designing  weapons 
that  are  designed  to  be  surgically  used?  Is  that  what  our  Church  is 
saying? 

Cardinal  Krol.  Senator,  after  13  years  of  Catholic  education,  I 
am  sure  you  have  heard  the  expression  "the  lesser  of  two  evils." 
There  is  a  goal,  there  is  an  ideal.  There  is  a  practical  reality.  You 
can  never  lose  sight  of  your  goal,  but  you  have  got  to  go  through 
the  practical  reality  to  achieve  your  goal.  We  do  not  recommend  or 
favor  a  counterforce  capability.  I  have  described  the  criterion  of 
strategic  equivalence  as  a  false  criterion:  strategic  equivalence  is 
another  name  for  the  arms  race.  What  I  don't  like  about  it  and 
what  I  think  every  thinking  American  shouldn't  like  about  it  is 
that  somebody  else  is  dictating  how  much  we  are  to  spend.  As  I 
mentioned  in  the  testimony,  we  have  enough  power  now  to  kill  all 
the  people  in  the  world  four  times  over.  Our  development  is  more 
than  sufficient.  Well,  what  are  we  going  to  do  with  the  three  other 
striking  forces,  and  why  do  we  need  five?  I  mean,  that  is  why  it  is 
a  plague,  it  is  an  insanity. 

Senator  Biden.  I  agree. 

Cardinal  Krol.  But  in  this  question  of  the  deterrence,  I  have 
made  it  plain  that  we  are  opposed  to  the  use,  even  to  the  threat. 
But  we  will  take  deterrence  in  the  process  as  the  lesser  of  two 
evils. 

I  think  it  was  Senator  Hayakawa  that  talked  about  the  Soviets, 
what  they  are  doing.  I  think  we  have  to  look  not  only  at  their 
actions,  we  must  try  to  understand  why  they  act  as  they  do.  I  think 
we  have  to  look  at  the  basic  integrated  philosophy  of  communism. 
They  refer  to  it  as  a  dialectical  materialism,  a  dialectic  in  which 
we  find  theses  and  antitheses,  constant  tension,  constant  struggle, 
all  directed  to  the  goal  of  world  domination. 

For  a  while  we  followed  the  isolation  policy.  We  would  not  talk 
to  the  Soviets.  But  that  is  not  the  way  to  pursue  truth  or  get  truth 
to  prevail.  We  are  dealing  with  a  people  and  we  know  what  their 
ideology  and  goals  are.  They  have  never  denied  that  their  ultimate 
goal  is  world  domination.  They  have  never  denied  or  modified  their 
goal  of  the  extermination  of  religion.  But  we  are  dealing  with  them 
not  because  we  approve  their  ideology,  not  because  we  approve  all 


126 

of  their  actions,  but  for  the  interests  of  the  human  race  and  the 
human  family,  we  have  to  try  to  have  or  at  least  acknowledge  some 
principles  of  truth  and  agree  to  some  principles.  And  even  when  we 
reach  the  agreement,  we  have  to  be  aware  of  the  fact  that  the 
track  record  of  performance  on  agreements  by  the  Soviets  is  not 
the  best.  We  come  back  to  another  maxim  which,  as  an  attorney, 
you  would  know,  that  the  law  serves  the  vigilant  and  not  the 
dormant.  We  must  be  alert  and  vigilant. 

The  SALT  II  Treaty,  as  I  tried  to  point  out,  is  not  the  world's 
greatest  achievement. 

Senator  Biden.  I  was  hoping,  quite  frankly,  you  would  answer 
the  question  that  way.  My  concern — both  as  a  Senator  who  is  a 
proponent  of  SALT  and  as  a  practicing  Catholic — is  that  some 
might  very  well  take  that  statement  of  yours  out  of  context,  not 
having  had  the  benefit  of  the  scholastic  education. 

I  felt  certain  that  Your  Eminence  did  not  want  to  be  even 
indirectly  associated  with  being  a  proponent  of  a  counterforce 
strategy. 

I  would  like  to  make  one  further  statement,  and  although  it 
sounds  somewhat  gratuitous,  I  really  mean  it.  It  is  a  sincere  state- 
ment. I  think  the  Holy  Father  is  going  to  do  more  for  opening  up 
the  East- West  dialog  and  opening  up  the  prospects  for  more  free- 
dom and  tolerance  in  Eastern  Europe,  and  eventually  in  the  Soviet 
Union,  than  all  the  arms  control  agreements  and  all  the  agree- 
ments that  the  superpowers  have  signed  so  far.  I  cannot  think  of  a 
better  choice  that  could  have  been  made  for  a  Pope.  I  just  got  back 
from  the  Soviet  Union  and  Eastern  Europe  and  even  Communist 
leaders  within  those  countries  were  talking  about  the  impact  the 
Pope  has  had,  although  some  of  them  clearly  were  a  little  worried 
about  it.  And  in  Western  Europe,  they  are  absolutely  ecstatic  about 
the  impact  the  Pope  is  having. 

And  he  is  doing  it  in  such  a  forthright  yet  tactful  way.  He  is  not 
choosing  up  sides,  east  and  west  and  good  and  bad,  but  he  is  having 
a  tremendous  impact  on  the  tens  of  millions  of  people  who  had  just 
lost  hope.  I  am  really,  really  proud.  It  almost  makes  me  want  to  be 
Polish. 

Cardinal  Krol.  That  is  a  laudable  desire.  Senator. 

Senator  Biden.  Seriously,  I  just  wanted  to  tell  Your  Eminence 
that  from  my  perspective  the  Pope's  personality  and  presence  have 
had  extensive  repercussions  at  the  highest  political  levels  through- 
out the  world.  But  I  am  sure  Your  Eminence  already  knows  that. 

Thank  you  very  much  for  your  time. 

Senator  Muskie.  I  have  been  trying  for  years  to  get  Senator 
Biden  to  make  that  kind  of  a  statement  about  the  Poles. 

Senator  Biden.  My  Irish  mother  had  problems  with  that,  but  we 
may  be  able  to  work  it  out. 

Senator  Muskie.  Well,  Your  Eminence,  clearly  you  made  an 
impression  on  the  committee.  I  am  sorry  that  other  members  were 
not  present  because  of  preoccupation  with  similar  duties  elsewhere 
on  the  floor,  but  I  repeat  that  I  am  delighted  that  you  could  come, 
that  you  made  your  statement.  I  think  you  have  made  an  impor- 
tant contribution,  and  I  look  forward,  too,  to  the  visit  of  the  Pope, 
We  Poles  have  got  to  stick  together. 

Thank  you  very  much. 


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[Cardinal  Krol's  prepared  statement  follows:] 

Prepared  Statement  of  John  Cardinal  Krol 

Mr.  Chairman  and  Members  of  the  Committee:  I  am  Cardinal  John  Krol,  Arch- 
bishop of  Philadelphia.  I  speak  on  behalf  of  the  U.S.  Catholic  Conference  (USCC) 
comprising  over  350  bishops  of  the  United  States,  serving  more  than  50  million 
Catholics. 

I  express  the  sincere  gratitude  of  the  USCC  for  the  opportunity  to  present  the 
views  of  the  Catholic  Bishops  of  the  United  States  on  the  moral  aspects  of  the 
nuclear  arms  race. 

I.   THE   PERSPECTIVE   OF   THE   TESTIMONY 

The  moral  principles  underljdng  my  testimony  have  been  enunciated  clearly  in 
papal  documents  and  speeches,  and  in  Vatican  Council  II.  Pius  XII  pleaded  on  the 
eve  of  the  World  War  II:  "Nothing  is  lost  by  peace,  everj^hing  may  be  lost  by  war" 
(Aug.  24,  1939).  Paul  VI  speaking  to  the  General  Assembly  of  the  U.N.  said:  "No 
more  war,  war  never  again.  Peace  must  guide  the  destinies  of  all  peoples  and  of  all 
mankind.  .  .  .  Disarmament  is  the  first  step  toward  peace.  ...  As  long  as  man 
remains  that  weak,  changeable  and  even  wicked  being  he  often  shows  himself  to  be, 
defensive  armaments  will  also  be  necessary"  (Oct.  4,  1965). 

Vatican  Council  II,  in  its  "Constitution  on  the  Church  in  the  Modern  World," 
declared:  "The  arms  race  is  one  of  the  most  grievous  plagues  of  the  human  race, 
and  it  inflicts  an  intolerable  injury  upon  the  world"  (para.  81);  "The  arms  race  is 
not  a  secure  way  of  maintaining  true  peace,  and  the  resulting  balance  of  power  is 
no  sure  and  genuine  path  to  achieving  it"  (para  80);  "Since  peace  must  be  born  of 
mutual  trust  between  peoples,  instead  of  being  forced  on  nations  through  dread  of 
arms,  all  must  work  to  put  an  end  to  the  arms  race  and  make  a  real  beginning  of 
disarmament,  not  unilaterally  indeed,  but  at  an  equal  rate  on  all  sides,  on  the  basis 
of  agreements  and  backed  up  by  genuine  and  effective  guarantees"  (para  82). 

These  principles  reflect  the  authentic  position  of  the  Catholic  Church  and  of  all 
faithful  Catholics.  The  manner  and  degree  to  which  these  principles  are  reflected  in 
a  particular  proposal,  such  as  the  SALT  II  Treaty,  admits  a  divergence  of  views.  For 
this  reason,  I  recognize,  and  I  want  this  Committee  to  know,  that  while  the  princi- 
ples to  which  we  subscribe  are  clear  and  generally  accepted,  the  position  I  present 
here  today  is  the  view  of  the  majority  of  the  Administrative  Board  of  the  Bishops 
Conference;  it  is  not  a  unanimous  position  within  the  Conference  of  Bishops,  nor  it 
it  the  unanimous  position  of  all  Catholics  in  the  United  States.  It  is  however  the 
official  policy  of  the  U.S.  Catholic  Conference,  and  in  expressing  it,  we  Bishops  seek 
to  fulfill  a  role  of  responsible  citizenship,  as  well  as  the  religious  leadership. 

This  role  requires  me  to  speak  the  truth  plainly.  The  Catholic  Bishops  of  this 
country  believe  that  too  long  have  we  Americans  been  preoccupied  with  prepara- 
tions for  war;  too  long  have  we  been  guided  by  the  false  criterion  of  equivalence  or 
superiority  of  armaments;  too  long  have  we  allowed  other  nations  to  virtually 
dictate  how  much  we  should  spend  on  stockpiling  weapons  of  destruction.  Is  it  not 
time  that  we  concentrate  our  efforts  on  peace  rather  than  war?  Is  it  not  time  we 
take  that  first  step  towards  peace:  gradual,  bilateral,   negotiated  disarmament? 

It  is  impossible  to  regard  this  Treaty  as  a  spectacular  achievement  in  the  field  of 
arms  control.  But  we  support  its  ratification  as  a  partial  and  imperfect  step  in  the 
direction  of  halting  the  proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons  and  as  part  of  an  ongoing 
process,  begun  in  1972,  to  negotiate  actual  reductions  in  nuclear  arms.  Our  support 
is,  however,  heavily  qualified  precisely  because  of  the  moral  principles  which  govern 
our  view  of  arms  control. 

No  question  of  foreign  affairs  surpasses  the  arms  race  in  terms  of  moral  complex- 
ity and  moral  content.  Along  with  the  correlative  issue  of  world  poverty,  the  arms 
race  forms  the  heart  of  the  moral  agenda  of  foreign  policy. 

The  massive  technical  complexity  of  the  arms  race  in  its  political  and  strategic 
dimensions  is  something  that  people  in  our  government  grapple  with  daily.  V'e 
respect  that  technical  complexity  and  have  tried  to  assimilate  it  in  this  testimony. 
At  the  same  time,  for  the  Church  the  arms  race  is  principally  a  problem  defined  in 
religious  and  moral  categories.  The  specter  of  war,  in  any  form,  raises  for  Christian 
ethics  the  central  question  of  the  taking  of  human  life.  Since  the  life  of  every  single 
human  person  bears  the  sacred  dignity  of  the  image  of  God,  the  question  of  the 
religious  and  moral  significance  of  warfare  has  received  more  sustained  reflection  in 
Roman  Catholic  theology  than  almost  any  other  moral  problem.  From  St.  Augus- 
tine's masterful  treatment  of  war  in  Chapter  19  of  "The  City  of  God"  to  the  Vatican 
Council  II's  injunction  to  the  Church  that  it  should  "undertake  a  completely  fresh 


128 

appraisal  of  war"  there  has  been  present  in  Catholic  tradition  an  abiding  determi- 
nation to  limit  the  impact  of  war  on  the  human  family. 

In  the  nuclear  age,  the  moral  sanctions  against  war  have  taken  on  a  qualitatively 
new  character.  From  Pius  XII  to  John  Paul  II,  the  moral  argument  is  clear:  the 
nuclear  arms  race  is  to  be  unreservedly  condemned  and  the  political  process  of  arms 
control  and  disarmament  is  to  be  supported  by  the  Christian  community.  This 
pursuit  of  peace  is  not  based  on  a  naive  or  Utopian  view  of  the  world.  The  Christian 
tradition  is  eloquent  about  the  vision  of  peace;  it  is  also  realistic  about  the  fact  of 
war.  Hence,  Vatican  Council  II,  recognizing  the  inadequate  nature  of  the  political 
structure  of  the  international  community,  stated  that  "governments  cannot  be 
denied  the  right  of  legitimate  self-defense  once  every  means  of  peaceful  settlement 
has  been  exhausted".  (Pastoral  Constitution  on  the  Church  in  the  Modern  World, 
para.  79.) 

The  perspective  which  shapes  this  testimony,  therefore,  recognizes  that  some 
forms  of  war  can  be  morally  legitimate,  but  judges  that  nuclear  war  surpasses  the 
boundaries  of  legitimate  self-defense.  The  application  of  this  basic  moral  principle  to 
our  present  situation  requires  that  we  distinguish  two  problems  of  the  nuclear  age: 
the  use  of  nuclear  weapons  and  the  strategy  of  deterrence.  Both  are  pertinent  to  our 
assessment  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty. 

The  prohibition  of  use. — The  primary  moral  imperative  of  the  nuclear  age  is  to 
prevent  any  use  of  strategic  nuclear  weapons.  This  prohibition  is  expressed  in  the 
following  passage  of  Vatican  Council  II:  '  Any  act  of  war  aimed  indiscriminately  at 
the  destruction  of  entire  cities  or  of  extensive  areas  along  with  their  population  is  a 
crime  against  God  and  man  himself.  It  merits  unequivocal  and  unhesitating  con- 
demnation". (The  Pastoral  Constitution,  para.  80.) 

This  was  the  only  formal  condemnation  of  the  Council  and  indicates  the  serious- 
ness with  which  the  bishops  of  the  world  viewed  the  possible  use  of  what  they  called 
"modern  scientific  weapons".  Our  first  purpose  in  supporting  SALT  II  is  to  illus- 
trate our  support  for  any  reasonable  effort  which  is  designed  to  make  nuclear  war 
in  any  form  less  likely.  I  have  said  that  our  support  of  the  Treaty  is  qualified;  one 
reason  for  this  is  the  paradox  of  nuclear  deterrence. 

The  moral  dilemma  of  deterrence. — The  moral  paradox  of  deterrence  is  that  its 
purpose  is  to  prevent  the  use  of  nuclear  weapons,  but  it  does  so  by  an  expressed 
threat  to  attack  the  civilian  population  of  one's  adversary.  Such  a  threat  runs 
directly  counter  to  the  central  moral  affirmation  of  the  Christian  teaching  on  war: 
that  innocent  lives  are  not  open  to  direct  attack.  The  complexity  of  the  moral 
dilemma  is  reflected  in  the  statement  on  deterrence  of  the  American  Bishops  in 
1976:  "With  respect  to  nuclear  weapons,  at  least  those  with  massive  destructive 
capability,  the  first  imperative  is  to  prevent  their  use.  As  possessors  of  a  vast 
nuclear  arsenal,  we  must  also  be  aware  that  not  only  is  it  wrong  to  attack  civilian 
populations  but  it  is  also  wrong  to  threaten  to  attack  them  as  part  of  a  strategy  of 
deterrence.  We  urge  the  continued  development  and  implementation  of  policies 
which  seek  to  bring  these  weapons  more  securely  under  control,  progressively 
reduce  their  presence  in  the  world,  and  ultimately  remove  them  entirely'  .  (To  live 
in  Christ  Jesus:  1976.) 

The  moral  judgment  of  this  statement  is  that  not  only  the  use  of  strategic  nuclear 
weapons,  but  also  the  declared  intent  to  use  them  involved  in  our  deterrence  policy, 
are  both  wrong.  This  explains  the  Catholic  dissatisfaction  with  nuclear  deterrence 
and  the  urgency  of  the  Catholic  demand  that  the  nuclear  arms  race  be  reversed.  It 
is  of  the  utmost  importance  that  negotiations  proceed  to  meaningful  and  continuing 
reductions  in  nuclear  stockpiles,  and  eventually  to  the  phasing  out  altogether  of 
nuclear  deterrence  and  the  threat  of  mutual-assured  destruction. 

As  long  as  there  is  hope  of  this  occurring.  Catholic  moral  teaching  is  willing, 
while  negotiations  proceed,  to  tolerate  the  possession  of  nuclear  weapons  for  deter- 
rence as  the  lesser  of  two  evils.  If  that  hope  were  to  disappear  the  moral  attitude  of 
the  Catholic  Church  would  almost  certainly  have  to  shift  to  one  of  uncompromising 
condemnation  of  both  use  and  possession  of  such  weapons. 

With  this  in  mind,  the  Catholic  Bishops  of  this  country  ask  the  Senate  of  the 
United  States  to  ratify  this  Treaty  because  the  negotiations  which  produced  it,  and 
the  further  round  of  negotiations  which  it  permits,  offer  the  promise  of  escape  from 
the  danger  of  a  nuclear  holocaust  and  from  the  ethical  dilemma  of  nuclear  deter- 
rence. 

II.   THE   SALT   II   TREATY 

Nevertheless,  we  have  serious  reservations  about  this  Treaty.  SALT  I  had  created 
a  hope  among  people  that  SALT  II  would  require  real  reductions  on  both  sides.  This 
hope  has  not  been  fulfilled  and  there  is  no  clear  indication  that  SALT  III  can  revive 


129 

that  hope.  That  is  why  some  of  my  fellow  bishops  and  many  more  concerned 
Catholics  refuse  to  support  SALT  II. 

The  U.S.  proposals  of  1977  had  significant  reductions  in  view  but  these  were 
rejected  by  the  U.S.S.R.  The  present  Treaty  limits  strategic  nuclear  delivery  systems 
to  2,250  (after  1981)  on  both  sides  and  this  will  require  the  dismantling  of  about  250 
Soviet  launchers.  Such  a  reduction  is  not  very  significant  considering  the  destruc- 
tive power  (3,550  megatons  for  the  U.S.,  and  7,868  megatons  for  the  U.S.S.R.)  that 
will  remain  and  continue  to  increase  on  each  side. 

Secondly  the  Treaty  does  not  preclude  either  side  from  proceeding  to  replace  its 
present  land-based  ICBMs  wth  a  new  system,  or  modif3ring  existing  systems  within 
limits,  it  is  true,  as  to  size  and  number  of  warheads  but  obviously  embodjdng 
significant  improvements  in  accuracy.  These  systems  will  obviously  be  more  destruc- 
tive. 

On  the  other  hand  it  cannot  be  argued,  as  do  some  critics,  that  the  Treaty  does 
not  constrain  Soviet  strategic  weapons  expansion.  Under  the  Treaty  the  U.S.S.R. 
will  not  be  permitted  to  deploy  an  already-tested  mobile  missile  (SS-16);  it  must 
count  all  SS-18  missiles  as  having  multiple  warheads  though  some  may  not;  it  must 
stop  its  current  program  of  deplojdng  additional  missiles  with  multiple  warheads  by 
about  1982  and  may  not  increase  the  number  of  warheadls  in  existing  missiles. 

SALT  II  is  thus  basically  a  deceleration,  not  a  reversal  of  the  nuclear  arms  race. 
Wliile  the  weight  of  this  testimony  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  the  quantitative 
and  qualitative  limits  on  delivery  systems  and  weapons  constitute  an  arms  control 
achievement  worthy  of  support,  that  conclusion  becomes  harder  to  defend  if  one 
assumes  SALT  II  to  be  the  end  of  the  process.  Much  more  remains  to  be  done. 

By  far  the  most  numerous  opponents  of  ratification  are  those  who  reject  the 
Treaty  as  failing  to  protect  U.S.  security.  In  particular,  there  are  those  who  argue 
that  this  Treaty  will  permit  the  U.S.S.R.  to  achieve  a  first-strike  capability  against 
our  land-based  ICBM  s,  and  that  they  will  use  this  threat  to  challenge  and  change 
the  strategic  balance  in  various  parts  of  the  world.  Can  this  really  be  reliably 
predicted?  With  the  U.S.  in  possession  of  a  large  nuclear  arsenal  and  varied  means 
of  delivery  would  not  the  leaders  of  the  U.S.S.R.  be  insane  to  start,  or  threaten  to 
start,  a  nuclear  war,  even  in  possession  of  a  first-strike  capability  vis-a-vis  our  land- 
based  ICBM's?  Can  we  gainsay  the  tragic  reality  that  deterrence  is  still  based  on  the 
posture  and  policy  of  mutual-assured  destruction?  Even  if  the  U.S.S.R.  were  to 
acquire  the  capability  to  neutralize  the  U.S.  Minuteman  force  of  ICBM's,  is  it  not 
clear  that  the  other  legs  of  the  Triad  will  continue  to  deter  a  Soviet  first-strike,  if 
indeed  that  were  the  Soviet  intention? 

Some  critics  of  the  Treaty,  however,  do  not  base  their  opposition  mainly  on  the 
premise  that  the  U.S.S.R.  would  risk  a  first-strike.  Rather  they  argue  that  the 
perception  in  the  world  of  the  U.S.S.R.  having  first-strike  capability  will  lead  to  an 
adverse  shift  in  the  global  political  balance.  I  do  not  pose  as  a  political  or  technical 
expert,  but  I  must  ask  whether,  in  the  nuclear  age,  it  can  be  argued  that  an 
increment  of  strategic  power  can  so  easily  be  translated  into  an  effective  instrument 
of  political  influence.  This  translation  from  the  strategic  balance  to  specific  political 
conflicts  seems  particularly  complex  precisely  in  those  situations  in  the  developing 
world  where  forces  of  nationalism  and  a  plethora  of  ideological  positions  are  vjdng 
for  control.  The  cost  of  using  nuclear  weapons  on  the  part  of  those  who  employ 
them  has  deprived  them  of  much  of  their  strategic  utility  and  has  made  their 
political  usefulness  equally  problematical.  For  example,  the  U.S.S.R.  has  not  been 
able  to  achieve  a  decisive  political  advantage  vis-a-vis  China,  despite  the  former's 
admitted  military  superiority. 

On  balance,  we  are  satisfied  that  while  the  Treaty  does  not  require  a  reduction  in 
nuclear  weaponry  on  either  side,  at  the  same  time  it  will  not  substantially  endanger 
U.S.  security.  Whatever  risks  may  be  involved  are  worth  taking  for  the  sake  of 
ensuring  that  the  SALT  II  negotiations  will  be  followed  quickly  by  a  third  round 
aimed  at  more  significant  reductions. 

III.    BEYOND   SALT   II 

By  itself  SALT  II  is  no  more  than  a  beginning.  It  creates  a  certain  momentum 
which  should  make  possible  more  impressive  arms  control  achievements.  If  not,  our 
confidence  may  have  been  misplaced.  What  are  the  prospects? 

It  is  our  hope  that  the  U.S.  agenda  for  future  negotiations  will  be  bold  and 
imaginative,  and  that  the  aim  of  the  negotiators  should  be  real,  demonstrable 
reductions  in  both  weapons  and  delivery  systems.  Our  negotiating  posture  should 
not  sacrifice  long-term  possibilities  for  real  disarmament  in  the  name  of  short-term 
tactical  advantages  in  the  strategic  competition. 

It  can  hardly  be  a  source  of  satisfaction  or  pride  that  the  ratification  of  this 
Treaty  may  be  in  doubt  or  that  an  arms  control  agreement  can  only  be  purchased  in 


130 

conjunction  with  substantially  increased  expenditures  for  other  arms.  There  is  a 
prevalent  belief  in  this  country  that  our  national  security  can  only  be  preserved  by 
the  djTiamic  of  technlological  development  and  investment  in  new  and  ever  more 
destructive  weapon  systems.  One  reads  that  the  decision  to  deploy  the  MX  missile  is 
a  response  to  such  perceptions  but  perhaps  still  not  sufficient  to  reconcile  opponents 
of  the  Treaty. 

We  have  already  referred  to  the  opportunities  which  the  Treaty  affords  for 
further  escalation  of  nuclear  weaponry  by  both  sides.  It  has  been  argued  during 
these  hearings  that  ratification  of  the  Treaty  should  be  linked  to  a  new  and  massive 
program  for  expanding  and  improving  U.S.  strategic  nuclear  as  well  as  conventional 
forces.  If  the  (Congress  accepts  this  advice,  the  hope  which  I  referred  to  earlier  for  a 
reversal  of  the  nuclear  arms  race  will  grow  even  dimmer. 

Many  of  us  remember  being  told  by  the  then  Secretary  of  Defense  McNamara  in 
the  late  sixties  that  U.S.  security  depended  on  U.S.  strategic  forces  being  main- 
tained at  a  level  2  or  3  times  greater  than  that  of  the  U.S.S.R.  in  terms  of 
deliverable  warheads.  The  United  States  now  has  9,200  strategic  nuclear  weapons 
(re-entry  vehicles  and  aerial  bombs)  compared  to  5,000  for  the  U.S.S.R.;  yet  we  are 
told  we  are  no  longer  superior,  in  fact  are  facing  strategic  inferiority,  and  must 
exert  ourselves  to  maintain  or  recover  "equivalence".  Where  McNamara  once  was 
confident  that  neither  side  would  be  able  to  acquire  a  first-strike  capability,  we  are 
now  told  that  the  U.S.S.R.  is  acquiring  a  first-strike  capability  and  that  the  United 
States  must  hasten  to  do  likewise.  Witness  after  witness  have  told  this  Committee 
that  SALT  II  is  acceptable  precisely  because  it  does  not  prevent  the  United  States 
from  meeting  this  challenge.  Strategic  "equivalence"  is  the  new  name  for  the 
nuclear  arms  race! 

At  the  time  of  SALT  I  Dr.  Kissinger  was  quoted  as  asking,  "what  good  is  strategic 
superiority  at  these  levels  of  numbers?".  Are  we  not  justified  in  asking  today,  is 
strategic  equivalence  an  absolute  necessity?  Is  this  doctrine  not  an  infallible  recipe 
for  continuing  the  strategic  arms  race?  Are  we  not  moving  inexorably  toward  a 
situation  in  which  each  side  has  a  first-strike  capability,  a  posture  and  a  policy,  not 
of  deterrence  by  mutual-assured  destruction,  but  of  readiness  for  and  reliance  on 
the  capability  for  fighting  a  nuclear  war? 

We,  the  Catholic  Bishops,  find  ourselves  under  the  obligation  of  questioning 
fundamentally  the  logic  of  the  pattern  of  events  implied  by  determined  pursuit  of 
strategic  equivalence.  Our  purp)ose  in  coming  before  this  distinguished  Committee  is 
to  speak  on  moral-religious  grounds  in  support  of  arms  control  designed  to  be  a  step 
toward  real  measures  of  disarmament.  It  would  radically  distort  our  intention  and 
purpose  if  our  support  of  SALT  II  were  in  any  way  coupled  with  plans  for  new 
military  expenditures.  The  Treaty  should  be  approved  as  an  arms  control  measure, 
not  a  maneuver  to  increase  the  strategic  budget. 

These  proposed  new  strategic  systems  will  require  a  massive  outlay  of  funds  at  a 
time  of  increasing  fiscal  stringency.  The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  calls 
upon  the  executive  and  legislative  branches  of  our  government  not  only  to  provide 
for  the  common  defense  but  also  to  establish  justice,  to  promote  the  general  welfare 
of  the  nation  and  to  secure  the  blessings  of  liberty  for  ourselves  and  our  posterity. 
Estimates  for  the  M-X  missile  run  from  $30  billion  upwards  over  the  next  decade; 
with  the  existing  national  debt  at  $805  billion  and  pressure  being  exerted  on 
legislative  bodies  at  all  levels  to  reduce  expenditures,  the  investment  of  $30  billion 
in  one  weapons  system  inevitably  will  result  in  new  limits  on  spending  for  essential 
human  services  here  and  abroad. 

This  topic  of  the  competition  of  arms  for  scarce  resources  has  been  an  abiding 
concern  for  me.  Speaking  at  the  Synod  of  Bishops  in  1971  I  argued  then,  and  still 
believe  now,  that:  "The  armaments  race  violates  the  rights  of  the  world's  poor  in  a 
way  that  is  fruitless  and  intolerable.  The  reason  is  that  it  is  not  the  way  to  protect 
human  life  or  foster  peace,  but  on  the  contrary  the  causes  of  war  are  thereby 
aggravated  little  by  little". 

It  is  our  recommendation  that  systems  like  the  MX,  as  well  as  Trident  II,  should 
be  considered  as  negotiable  in  return  for  equivalent  concessions  by  the  U.S.S.R.  in 
SALT  III.  We  have  been  told  that  the  aim  of  SALT  III  will  be  "deep  cuts"  in  the 
strategic  arsenals  of  both  superpowers;  we  fervently  hope  this  will  be  true.  As  we 
consider  the  future  of  U.S.  defense  policy,  including  the  deployment  of  the  M-X,  it 
might  be  well  to  review  one  dimension  of  the  SALT  I  negotiations.  At  that  time,  the 
possibility  existed  of  excluding  the  deployment  of  MIRVs;  we  did  not  take  that 
option.  Now  we  find  that  one  of  the  major  objections  of  those  opposing  SALT  II  is 
the  threat  posed  by  the  Soviets  to  our  land-based  ICBM's.  The  Soviet  MIRV  capabili- 
ty is  a  central  element  of  the  threat  to  our  ICBM's,  a  threat  which  we  might  have 
obviated  by  a  different  negotiating  posture  in  SALT  I.  Our  hope  is  that  we  will 
carefully  consider  the  M-X,  and  related  decisions  in  the  light  of  their  impact  on  the 


131 

negotiating  process  of  SALT  III.  Perhaps  the  most  important  single  strategic  arms 
control  step  would  be  the  elimination  of  MIRV's  from  the  respective  ICBM  forces. 
Unrealistic  as  it  may  seem  to  hardheaded  defense  planners,  the  question  should  be 
raised  now  whether  the  United  States  could  try  immediately  to  negotiate  a  lower 
MIRV  level  for  ICBM's. 

IV.    SUMMARY 

The  foregoing  testimony  may  be  summarized  in  the  following  propositions: 

1.  Catholics  reject  means  of  waging  or  even  deterring  war  which  could  result  in 
destruction  beyond  control  and  possibly  a  final  holocaust  of  humanity. 

2.  In  particular,  strategic  nuclear  weapons  of  massive  destructiveness  and  poison- 
ous regional  or  global  aftereffects  must  never  be  used. 

3.  Consequently,  the  reduction,  through  negotiated  agreements,  and  eventually 
the  elimination  of  such  weapons,  must  be  the  overriding  aim  of  policy.  Without  it, 
there  can  be  only  one  alternative:  the  indefinite  continuation  and  escalation  of  the 
strategic  competition.  The  doctrine  of  strategic  equality,  by  itself,  does  not  insure 
against  such  competition;  rather  it  almost  guarantees  it.  Some  risks  must  be  taken 
in  the  direction  of  control,  both  to  avoid  nuclear  war  and  to  rescue  us  from  the 
moral  dilemma  of  nuclear  deterrence. 

4.  SALT  II,  the  result  of  seven  years  of  negotiation,  represents  a  limited  but 
acceptable  agreement  which  constrains  the  nuclear  forces  of  both  the  United  States 
and  the  U.S.S.R.,  does  not  jeopardize  U.S.  security,  and  can  be  the  beginning  of  a 
continuing  and  necessary  process  for  obtaining  meaningful  and  progressive  reduc- 
tions. The  Treaty  should  be  ratified  by  the  Senate. 

5.  This  process  must  not  be  sacrificed  to  a  narrow  and  technologically  oriented 
insistence  upon  exploitation  of  new  nuclear  options,  including  counterforce  options. 
In  particular,  final  decisions  regarding  deployment  of  the  M-X  and  Trident  II 
should  be  deferred  until  the  utility  of  those  options  for  negotiation  in  SALT  III  can 
be  explored. 

6.  Failure  by  the  United  States  to  take  full  advantage  of  the  possibilities  for 
further  restraints  and  reductions  will  eventually  rob  U.S.  foreign  and  defense  policy 
of  moral  legitimacy. 

Mr.  Chairman,  the  attention  of  the  whole  world  has  been  captured  by  the  new 
Pope,  John  Paul  II.  He  has  already  taken  note  of  the  significance  of  the  SALT  II 
Treaty  for  World  peace.  The  Pope's  remarks  came  in  his  weekly  Sunday  talk  before 
leading  the  noon  Angelus  in  St.  Peter's  Square.  The  SALT  accord,  he  said,  "is  not 
yet  a  reduction  of  weaponry  or,  as  could  be  hoped,  a  provision  for  disarmament.  But 
that  does  not  mean  that  the  foreseen  measures  are  not  a  sign,  which  we  ought  to 
greet  with  pleasure,  of  the  desire  to  pursue  a  dialogue,  without  which  every  hope  of 
working  effectively  for  peace  could  vanish." 

"Believers  and  men  of  goodwill  who  feel  themselves  so  impelled  by  conscience  to 
pledge  themselves  as  'artisans  of  peace'  cannot  ignore  the  importance  of  anything 
that  favors  a  climate  of  alleviating  tensions.  This  helps  to  encourage  other  indis- 
pensable progress  on  the  road  to  limitation  and  reduction  of  armaments". 

The  Pope  asked  for  prayers  "to  bring  progress  to  the  great  cause  of  la3dng  down 
weapons  and  pursuing  honest,  stable  and  effective  agreements"  of  peace  and  con- 
cord. It  is  with  such  sentiments  that  the  U.S.  Catholic  Conference  submits  this 
testimony  to  the  Foreign  Relations  Committee. 

Senator  Muskie.  Our  next  witness  is  Claire  Randall,  General 
Secretary  of  the  National  Council  of  Churches. 

STATEMENT  OF  DR.  CLAIRE  RANDALL,  GENERAL  SECRETARY, 
NATIONAL  COUNCIL  OF  CHURCHES,  ACCOMPANIED  BY 
ALLEN  GUYERi 

Dr.  Randall.  Mr.  Chairperson,  I  am  Claire  Randall,  the  general 
secretary  of  the  National  Council  of  Churches.  I  am  accompanied 
by  Dr.  Allen  Guyer  who  is  one  of  a  very  large  number  of  persons 
within  the  churches'  ranks  who  have  given  serious  and  careful 
thought  to  these  issues  and  who  are  the  ones  who  advise  and  guide 
and  help  boards  and  agencies  and  executives  as  we  try  to  deal  with 
these  complex  issues.  Therefore  we  work  not  only  from  our  moral 


'  See  page  136  for  Dr.  Randall's  prepared  statement. 


132 

understandings  but  from  some  of  the  technical  aid  that  we  do 
receive. 

I  would  like  also  to  say  just  briefly  that  22  church  bodies  have 
made  statements,  copies  of  which  will  be  coming  to  all  Senators 
shortly,  in  support  of  SALT  II,  which  we  think  is  a  very  important 
matter,  and  27  such  churches  and  others  have  come  together  in  a 
coalition,  the  Religious  Committee  on  SALT  II,  which  is  working  at 
this  very  hard  and  is  reaching  out  across  the  country  in  education 
and  information  ways. 

So  it  is  that  we  are,  as  churches,  working  on  this  issue. 

I  might  also  just  interject  here  as  my  friend  Coretta  King  inter- 
jected some  other  pieces  that  perhaps  have  not  been  presented 
here,  that  there  are  many  women  in  this  country  who  not  only  as 
mothers  but  in  other  ways  are  deeply  concerned  about  the  issues 
that  are  before  us  in  the  SALT  II  discussion.  And  certainly  the 
churches  feel  that  this  is  a  life  and  death  issue,  and  therefore  it  is 
a  theological  and  moral  issue,  as  has  been  pointed  out. 

I  would  like  to  share  briefly  with  you  some  of  what  the  Council 
of  Churches  would  have  me  say  in  this  case,  and  also  to  point  out 
that  we  are  made  up  of  32  denominations  in  this  country,  which 
includes  the  six  large  black  Baptist  and  Methodist  churches  and 
the  eight  or  so  orthodox  churches,  not  just  the  mainstream  Protes- 
tant churches,  which  I  think  is  important  to  know. 

And  the  National  Council  of  Churches  has,  since  its  formation  30 
years  ago,  given  leadership  among  the  Protestant  and  Orthodox 
churches  to  the  struggle  for  peace  and  justice.  The  council  came 
into  existence  shortly  after  the  world  had  witnessed  the  devastat- 
ing effects  of  nuclear  weapons,  and  its  leadership  and  the  members 
of  the  churches  ever  since  have  been  keenly  aware  of  the  danger  to 
all  humanity  posed  by  the  threat  of  nuclear  war,  and  in  a  sense, 
the  line  that  we  have  gone  across  as  we  have  entered  into  a 
nuclear  age. 

In  the  Old  Testament,  we  are  told  to  beat  our  swords  into  plow- 
shares. In  the  New  Testament  we  are  asked  not  to  return  evil  for 
evil  but  to  love  our  neighbors.  These  biblical  injunctions,  because 
we  believe  these  principles  expressed  in  action,  create  the  climate 
which  leads  to  just,  peaceful  relations  between  peoples  and  nations. 
These  biblical  injunctions  must  be  listened  to  in  our  opinion. 

At  its  meeting  in  May  of  this  year,  the  governing  board  of  the 
National  Council  of  Churches  voted  unanimously,  and  I  might  say 
enthusiastically,  in  favor  of  the  ratification  of  the  Strategic  Arms 
Limitation  Treaty.  It  is  my  purpose  in  this  testimony  to  set  forth 
some  of  the  reasons  the  National  Council  supports  ratification.  We 
have  based  our  testimony  on  the  short  phrases  that  are  a  part  of 
the  introduction  to  the  SALT  II  Treaty.  I  will  not  read  those 
phrases  but  simply  comment  at  this  point  on  them. 

The  United  States  already  has  in  its  nuclear  arsenal,  as  you  well 
know,  enough  nuclear  weapons  to  kill  every  man,  woman,  and 
child  in  the  world,  not  once,  but  several  times.  And  once  is  too 
much,  and  more  is  impossible,  and  thus  an  absurd  idea.  And  even 
limited  use  of  this  power  would  visit  devastation  on  future  genera- 
tions as  well  as  the  present  due  to  radiological  contamination.  The 
devastation  of  every  major  Soviet  city  by  U.S.  nuclear  weapons 
might  achieve  what  defense  planners  call  a  strategic  objective.  But 


133 

the  winds  that  sweep  round  the  globe  would  bring  deadly  radiation 
to  the  United  States  even  if  no  Soviet  bombs  explode  in  the  United 
States.  And  so  there  are  devastating  consequences  for  humankind. 

In  SALT  II,  the  United  States  and  the  U.S.S.R.  are  mutually 
agreeing  to  limit  strategic  offensive  arms.  Our  country  and  the 
Soviet  Union  have  opposing  ideological,  political  and  economic  sys- 
tems, but  unless  all  humanity  is  to  be  endangered,  these  two  major 
powers  must  find  ways  to  improve  relations.  The  treaty  provisions 
which  limit  arms  are  of  vital  significance,  but  we  must  not  under- 
estimate the  symbolic  importance  of  the  two  superpowers'  ability 
to  reduce  tension  and  danger  by  mutual  agreement  without  resort 
to  war.  The  ratification  of  the  treaty  by  these  two  nations  with 
such  opposing  views  would  give  evidence  to  all  the  world  that 
differences  between  nations  can  be  dealt  with  by  peaceful  means. 

While  the  treaty  is  a  symbol  of  mutual  trust,  it  does  not  depend 
for  its  success  on  mutual  trust,  and  there  have  been  those  who 
testified  to  help  us  come  to  that  conclusion. 

In  1968,  under  pressure  from  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union,  many  nations  renounced  nuclear  weapons  for  themselves 
and  joined  the  Non-Proliferation  Treaty.  Article  VI  contains  a 
promise  made  by  the  superpowers  to  make  progress  in  reducing 
and  eliminating  their  nuclear  arsenals  and  to  move  quickly  toward 
completion  of  a  ban  on  all  nuclear  testing. 

In  affirming  a  statement  that  was  drawn  up  by  leaders  of  the 
National  Council  of  Churches  and  representative  leaders  of  Soviet 
churches  this  spring,  the  governing  board  of  the  National  Council 
expressed  profound  concern  about  the  danger  of  a  precarious  bal- 
ancing of  humanity  on  the  brink  of  a  nuclear  catastrophe.  We 
know  that  still  more  terrible  weapons  are  being  developed  which 
can  only  lead  to  far  greater  fear  and  suspicion,  and  thus  to  a  still 
more  feverish  arms  race.  Against  this  we  say  with  one  voice:  No.  In 
the  name  of  God,  no. 

Neither  the  United  States  nor  the  Soviet  Union  is  ready  to 
accept  a  treaty  which  gives  the  other  nation  strategic  offensive 
superiority.  The  United  States  and  the  U.S.S.R.  weapons  systems 
are  not  identical.  Therefore,  an  element  of  judgment  is  involved  in 
determining  parity.  After  long,  careful  negotiations,  agreement  has 
been  reached  which  most  American  military  and  intelligence  lead- 
ers have  testified  provides  equality  and  equal  security.  We  have 
indicated  some  of  those  facts  which  we  believe  lead  us  to  agree  that 
this  is  something  which  we  can  believe. 

Without  an  agreement  setting  limits  on  the  arms  race  there  can 
be  no  strategic  stability.  Each  side  will  inevitably  make  huge  in- 
vestments to  achieve  what  is  perceived  as  superiority.  The  fear 
that  the  other  nation  is  achieving  strategic  superiority  has  fueled 
the  arms  race  already  between  the  United  States  and  the  U.S.S.R. 

SALT  II  does  not  reduce  U.S.  arms.  It  only  sets  a  ceiling.  With- 
out such  a  mutually  agreed  upon  ceiling,  both  countries  would  be 
tempted  to  an  arms  race  which  would  use  scarce  resources,  divert 
scientific  research  from  avenues  designed  to  benefit  all  human 
kind,  and  in  fact  endanger  rather  than  enhance  the  security  of  the 
United  States.  Our  Nation's  security  does  not  depend  solely  on  its 
military  might.  It  depends  as  much  on  our  economic  stability  and 


134 

fairness,  our  technical  competence,  and  the  faith  of  the  people  that 
our  Government  is  truly  benefiting  all  its  citizens. 

The  nations  of  the  world,  in  1978,  spent  more  than  a  billion 
dollars  a  day  on  armaments.  We  are  informed  that  the  World 
Health  Organization  required  a  mere  $83  million  to  eradicate 
smallpox  from  this  Earth.  The  United  States  now  has  an  unaccept- 
able rate  of  inflation,  millions  of  its  citizens  are  unemployed,  and 
perhaps  more  will  be,  almost  20  percent  of  the  population  is  illiter- 
ate. The  true  strength  of  a  nation  is  the  strength  of  its  people.  The 
only  rewards  of  an  arms  race  with  no  limitations  are  widespread 
moral  devastation,  cynicism,  hopelessness,  and  possibly  even  the 
end  of  civilization. 

So  surely  limiting  the  arms  race  meets  the  interests  of  both 
parties. 

While  pressing  for  the  earliest  possible  approval  of  the  SALT 
accords,  the  National  Council  of  Churches  governing  board  af- 
firmed that  while  we  understand  that  SALT  II  does  not  provide  for 
more  substantial  arms  reduction,  it  does  provide  a  new  and  essen- 
tial framework  of  parity  for  negotiating  substantial  and  equal  re- 
ductions in  SALT  III,  and  further  steps  in  the  direction  of  general 
and  complete  disarmament.  It  promises  a  new  opportunity  to  con- 
solidate institutions  for  halting  the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons.  The 
success  of  SALT  II  would  open  the  way  to  decisive  progress  on 
other  critical  disarmament  issues.  It  would  enable  our  two  govern- 
ments, speaking  of  the  U.S.S.R.  and  the  United  States,  to  share 
more  fully  in  the  constructive  works  of  peace  in  economic,  techni- 
cal, and  cultural  affairs.  It  would  help  to  promote  a  new  climate  of 
international  relations  in  general. 

Limiting  the  arms  race  by  ratifying  SALT  II  is  an  important 
step,  but  it  is  only  one  step  among  many  that  must  be  taken.  SALT 
II  limits  the  arms  race.  It  does  not  reduce  it.  SALT  II  does  not  deal 
with  the  vital  matter  of  nuclear  nonproliferation.  It  does  not  ban 
chemical  or  radiological  arms,  but  by  limiting  strategic  arms,  the 
National  Council  believes  SALT  II  helps  to  establish  a  climate  in 
which  work  in  these  vital  areas  can  proceed. 

The  joint  statement  on  subsequent  negotiations,  which  is  at- 
tached to  SALT  II,  established  the  framework  for  negotiating  fur- 
ther limitations  and  reduction  in  the  numbers  of  strategic  arms 
and  so  on.  Thus,  the  ratification  of  SALT  II  not  only  limits  the 
current  strategic  arms  race  but  helps  make  possible  negotiations 
looking  forward  to  an  actual  arms  reduction. 

And  so  the  statement  that  the  governing  board  of  the  National 
Council  affirmed  expressed  profound  anxiety  for  the  future  of  our 
own  and  all  peoples.  It  was  encouraged  by  certain  things  that  had 
been  taking  place  showing  that  the  peoples  of  the  world  are  calling 
for  disarmament. 

Ratification  of  SALT  II  is  not  full  disarmament  or  the  establish- 
ment of  peace.  But  we  believe  it  promises  a  new  opportunity  to 
consolidate  institutions  for  halting  the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons, 
opens  the  way  to  decisive  progress  on  other  critical  disarmament 
issues,  and  enables  the  governments  of  the  United  States  and  the 
U.S.S.R.  to  share  more  fully  in  the  constructive  works  of  peace  in 
economic,  technical  and  cultural  affairs.  Therefore,  we  urge  ratifi- 
cation of  SALT  II. 


135 

May  I  say  that  actions  by  this  U.S.  Senate  can  and  do  affect  the 
well  being  of  all  the  world's  peoples.  We  urge  you  to  remember 
that  as  you  deal  with  this  critical  treaty  I  am  sure  you  do,  but  we 
would  emphasize  that  for  you. 

And  may  I  be  bold  enough  to  close  with  a  challenge  to  you  from 
the  book  of  Deuteronomy: 

"I  have  set  before  you  life  and  death,  blessing  and  curse,  said  the 
Lord.  Therefore  choose  life,  that  you  and  your  descendants  may 
live."  This  is  the  strongest  feeling  that  we  in  the  churches  I  think 
have.  It  is  embodied  in  that  biblical  quotation. 

Thank  you. 

The  Chairman.  Thank  you  very  much,  Dr.  Randall,  for  an  excel- 
lent statement,  I  must  say. 

NATIONAL  COUNCIL  OF  CHURCHES  SPREADING  WORD  OF  SALT 

SUPPORT 

I  wonder  what  the  National  Council  of  Churches  is  doing  to 
spread  the  word.  You  clearly  feel  very  strongly  about  the  treaty 
and  the  need  for  the  Senate  to  ratify  the  treaty.  But  the  Senate, 
being  a  representative  body,  is  influenced  by  the  people  who  live  in 
each  of  the  50  States,  and  what  is  the  National  Council  of  Churches 
of  Christ  doing  to  spread  this  message? 

Dr.  Randall.  There  are  several  things  that  we  are  doing.  We 
have  staff  and  committees  that  work  on  these  matters  in  trying  to 
get  the  materials  and  the  educational  information  prepared.  We 
had  this  consultation  in  the  spring  for  three  days  with  church 
leaders  from  the  U.S.S.R.  in  which  we  were  miraculously,  I  think, 
able  to  make  a  statement  together  calling  for  this  kind  of  under- 
standing of  the  life  and  death  matters  that  we  are  dealing  with. 
This  statement  has  been  widely  used  and  is  being  widely  dissemi- 
nated, and  I  think  has  a  strong  religious  appeal  because  of  its  very 
basic  religious  tone. 

In  addition,  I  mentioned  before  you  came  back  in  that  there  are 
22  church  bodies  that  have  made  statements  in  support  of  SALT  II, 
copies  of  which  are  being  sent  to  Senators. 

We  also  are  part  of  the  coalition,  the  Religious  Committee  on 
SALT  II,  which  is  one  way  we  are  attempting  to  consolidate  our 
efforts  of  education  and  information  being  sent  out.  And  I  have 
been  informed  of  the  fact  that  this  material  and  this  kind  of 
education  is  beginning  to  spread  around,  and  the  interesting  thing 
is  that  when  such  education  is  made  available  to  people,  and  the 
opportunity  to  think  along  these  lines,  that  there  is  a  very  real 
appreciation  and  understanding  and  support  for  this  direction,  an 
understanding  of  its  limitations,  but  also  of  its  necessity. 

The  Chairman.  Well,  I  would  expect  so,  but  I  am  keenly  aware 
of  the  money  that  is  being  raised  and  the  rather  frenetic  effort  on 
the  part  of  certain  organizations  opposed  to  the  treaty  to  saturate 
the  country  with  arguments  and  frightening  charges  with  respect 
to  what  the  treaty  would  do.  I  don't  think  that  advocates  of  the 
treaty  have  done  as  much  to  try  and  get  their  message  out. 

The  message  you  bring  to  us  today  is  a  splendid  one,  as  I  have 
said,  but  I  would  urge  you  to  do  everything  in  your  power  to  reach 
your  own  membership  with  it. 


136 

Dr.  Randall.  We  are  urging,  and  have  been  urging  the  churches, 
the  individual  churches  to  work  through  the  many  channels  that 
they  have  on  this. 

We  are  quite  aware  of  the  problem  which  you  have  expressed, 
and  we  find  that  a  difficult  problem  to  deal  with  also  since,  as  we 
all  know,  the  kinds  of  monetary  resources  which  such  groups  have 
are  not  available  to  the  mainstream  of  the  church  in  the  same  way. 
But  we  have  analyzed  and  are  analyzing  that  situation,  trying  to 
find  those  ways  in  which  we  can  respond,  go  around  or  counterbal- 
ance that  very  problem,  and  we  shall  continue  to  do  more. 

The  Chairman.  Thank  you  very  much  for  your  testimony. 

Dr.  Randall.  Thank  you. 

[Dr.  Claire  Randall's  prepared  statement  follows:] 

Prepared  Statement  of  Dr.  Claire  Randaul 

My  name  is  Claire  Randall.  I  am  general  Secretary  of  the  National  Council  of  the 
Churches  of  Christ  in  the  U.S.A. 

The  National  Council  of  Churches  of  Christ  in  the  U.S.A.  is  a  cooperative  agency 
of  thirty-two  Protestant  and  Orthodox  bodies  in  this  country.  I  do  not  purport  to 
speak  for  all  members  of  the  communions  which  are  constituent  to  the  National 
Council  of  Churches.  I  am  speaking  for  the  Governing  Board,  the  policymaking  body 
which  is  composed  of  persons  selected  by  member  denominations  in  proportion  to 
their  size.  It  is  this  group  which  determines  the  policy  positions  through  which  the 
Council  seeks  to  fulfill  its  expressed  purpose  "to  study,  and  to  speak  and  to  act  on 
conditions  and  issues  in  the  nation  and  the  world  which  involve  moral,  ethical  and 
spiritual  principles  inherent  in  the  Christian  gospel." 

The  National  Council  of  the  Churches  of  Christ  in  the  U.S.A.  has  since  its 
formation  30  years  ago  given  leadership  in  the  Protestant  and  Orthodox  churches  to 
the  struggle  for  peace  and  justice.  The  Council  came  into  existence  shortly  after  the 
world  had  witnessed  the  devastating  effects  of  nuclear  weapons,  and  its  leadership 
and  the  members  of  the  churches  ever  since  have  been  keenly  aware  of  the  danger 
to  all  humanity  posed  by  the  threat  of  nuclear  war. 

In  the  Old  Testament  we  are  told  to  beat  our  swords  into  plowshares.  In  the  New 
Testament  we  are  asked  not  to  return  evil  for  evil  but  to  love  our  neighbors  as 
ourselves — and,  in  fact,  to  love  our  enemies.  We  seek  peace,  but  only  because  of 
these  biblical  injunctions,  but  because  we  believe  these  principles  expressed  in 
action  create  the  climate  which  leads  to  just,  peaceful  relations  between  peoples  and 
nations. 

At  its  meeting  in  May,  1979,  the  Governing  Board  of  the  National  Council  of 
Churches  voted  unanimously  in  favor  of  the  ratification  of  the  Strategic  Arms 
Limitation  Treaty.  It  is  my  purpose  in  this  testimony  to  set  forth  some  of  the 
reasons  the  National  Council  of  Churches  supports  ratification.  My  remarks  will  be 
related  to  the  purpose  of  the  Treaty  as  stated  in  its  introduction:  "Conscious  that 
nuclear  war  would  have  devastating  consequences  for  all  mankind  (Preamble,  SALT 
II  Treaty,  1979),  *     *     *." 

The  United  States  already  has  in  its  nuclear  arsenal  enough  nuclear  weapons  to 
kill  every  man,  woman  and  child  in  the  world,  not  once,  but  several  times.  Once  is 
too  much.  And  even  limited  use  of  this  power  would  visit  devastation  on  future 
generations  as  well  as  the  present  due  to  radiological  contamination.  The  devasta- 
tion of  every  major  Soviet  city  by  U.S.  nuclear  weapons  might  achieve  what  defense 
planners  call  a  strategic  objective.  But  the  winds  that  sweep  'round  the  globe  would 
bring  deadly  radiation  to  the  U.S.A.  even  if  no  Soviet  bombs  explode  in  the  U.S.A. 
Such  "devastating  consequences  for  all  mankind"  must  be  prevented. 

Convinced  that  the  additional  measures  limiting  strategic  offensive  arms  provided 
for  in  this  treaty  will  contribute  to  the  improvement  of  relations  between  Parties, 
help  to  reduce  the  risk  of  outbreak  of  nuclear  war  and  strengthen  internationally 
peace  and  security  (Preamble),  *  *  *. 

In  SALT  II  the  U.S.A.  and  the  U.S.S.R.  are  mutually  agreeing  to  limit  strategic 
offensive  arms.  Our  country  and  the  Soviet  Union  have  opposing  ideological,  politi- 
cal, and  economic  systems,  but  unless  all  humanity  is  to  be  endangered  these  two 
major  powers  must  find  ways  to  improve  relations.  The  Treaty  provisions  which 
limit  arms  are  of  vital  significance.  But  we  must  not  underestimate  the  s5mibolic 
importance  of  the  two  "super  powers'  "  ability  to  reduce  tension  and  danger  by 
mutual  agreement— without  resort  to  war.  The  ratification  of  the  Treaty  by  two 


137 

nations  with  such  opposing  views  give  evidence  to  all  the  world  that  differences 
between  nations  can  be  dealt  with  by  peaceful  means. 

While  the  Treaty  is  a  symbol  of  mutual  trust  it  does  not  depend  for  its  success  on 
mutual  trust.  Article  XV  provides  for  verification  of  compliance.  The  chief  military 
and  intelligence  officers  of  our  nation  have  said  the  United  States  is  capable  of 
verifying  Soviet  compliance.  We  believe  the  Treaty  does,  in  fact,  "help  to  reduce  the 
risk  of  outbreak  of  nuclear  war  and  strengthen  international  peace  and  security." 
Mindful  of  their  obligations  under  Article  VI  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Non-Prolifera- 
tion  of  Nuclear  Weapons  (Preamble),  *  *  * 

In  1968  under  pressure  from  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  many 
nations  renounced  nuclear  weapons  for  themselves  and  joined  the  Non-Proliferation 
Treaty.  Article  VI  contains  a  promise  made  by  the  super  powers  to  make  progress 
in  reducing  and  eliminating  their  nuclear  arsenals  and  to  move  quickly  toward 
completion  of  a  ban  on  all  nuclear  testing. 

The  Governing  Board  of  the  National  Ck)uncil  of  Churches,  in  May,  1979,  ex- 
pressed profound  concern  about  the  danger  of  a  precarious  balancing  of  humanity 
on  the  brink  of  nuclear  catastrophe.  We  know  that  still  more  terrible  weapons  are 
being  developed  which  can  only  lead  to  greater  fear  and  suspicion  and  thus  to  a  still 
more  feverish  arms  race.  Against  this  we  say  with  one  voice — No!  In  the  name  of 
God— No! 
Guided  by  the  principle  of  equality  and  equal  security  (Preamble),  *  *  * 
Neither  the  United  States  nor  the  Soviet  Union  is  ready  to  accept  a  treaty  which 
gives  the  other  nation  strategic  offensive  superiority.  The  U.S.A.  and  the  U.S.S.R. 
weapons  systems  are  not  identical.  Therefore,  an  element  of  judgment  is  involved  in 
determining  parity.  After  long,  careful  negotiations,  agreement  has  been  reached 
which  most  American  military  and  intelligence  leaders  have  testified  provides 
"equality  and  equal  security."  We  note  the  United  States  now  has  almost  twice  as 
many  deliverable  strategic  nuclear  warheads  as  the  Soviet  Union.  The  U.S.S.R.  has 
1,400  land  based  missiles  versus  1,054  in  the  U.S.A.  and  950  submarine  launched 
ballistic  missiles  to  656  in  the  U.S.A.  Both  nations  in  the  Treaty  have  agreed  to  an 
overall  ceiling  of  2,250  nuclear  delivery  vehicles  by  1985,  with  equally  important 
sub-limits  in  various  categories  (U.S.  Department  of  State,  1978).  The  agreed  upon 
verifiable  limits,  we  believe,  do  provide  "equality  and  equal  security." 

Recognizing  that  the  strengthening  of  strategic  stability  meets  the  interests  of  the 
Parties  and  the  interests  of  international  security  (Preamble),  *  *  ♦ 

Without  an  agreement  setting  limits  on  the  arms  race  there  can  be  no  strategic 
stability.  Each  side  will  inevitably  make  huge  investments  to  achieve  what  is 
perceived  as  superiority.  The  fear  that  the  other  nation  is  achieving  strategic 
superiority  has  fueled  the  arms  race  between  the  U.S.A.  and  the  U.S.S.R. 

SALT  II  does  not  reduce  U.S.  arms.  It  only  sets  a  ceiling.  Without  such  a 
mutually  agreed  upon  ceiling  both  countries  would  be  tempted  to  an  arms  race 
which  would  use  scarce  resources,  divert  scientific  research  from  avenues  designed 
to  benefit  all  human  kind  and,  in  fact,  endanger  rather  than  enhance  the  security 
of  the  United  States.  Our  nation's  security  does  not  depend  solely  on  its  military 
might.  It  depends  as  much  on  our  economic  stability  and  fairness,  our  technological 
competence,  and  the  faith  of  the  people  that  our  government  is  truly  benefiting  all 
its  citizens. 

The  nations  of  the  world,  in  1978,  spent  more  than  a  billion  dollars  per  day— 400 
billion  per  year— on  armaments.  We  are  informed  that  the  World  Health  Organiza- 
tion required  a  mere  83  million  dollars  to  eradicate  smallpox  from  the  face  of  the 
earth.  The  United  States  now  has  an  unacceptable  rate  of  inflation,  millions  of  its 
citizens  unemployed,  almost  20  percent  of  the  population  illiterate.  The  true 
strength  of  a  nation  is  the  strength  of  its  people.  The  only  rewards  of  an  arms  race 
with  no  limitations  are  widespread  moral  devastation,  cjTiicism,  hopelessness,  and 
possibly  even  the  end  of  civilization. 

Surely  limiting  the  arms  race  "meets  the  interests  of  the  Parties  and  the  interests 
of  international  security." 

Reaffirming  their  desire  to  take  measures  for  the  further  limitation  and  for  the 
further  reduction  of  strategic  arms,  having  in  mind  the  goal  of  achieving  general 
and  complete  disarmament  (Preamble),  *  *  * 

While  pressing  for  "the  earliest  possible  approval  of  the  SALT  II  accords,"  the 
National  Council  of  Churches  Governing  Board  affirmed:  "While  we  understand 
that  SALT  II  does  not  provide  for  more  substantial  arms  reduction,  it  does  provide  a 
new  and  essential  framework  (of  parity)  for  negotiating  substantial  and  equal  reduc- 
tions in  SALT  III,  and  further  steps  in  the  direction  of  general  and  complete 
disarmament.  It  promises  a  new  opportunity  to  consolidate  institutions  for  halting 
the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons.  The  success  of  SALT  II  would  open  the  way  to 
decisive  progress  on  other  critical  disarmament  issues.  It  would  enable  our  two 


138 

governments  to  share  more  fully  in  the  constructive  works  of  peace  in  economic, 
technical  and  cultural  affairs.  It  would  help  to  promote  a  new  climate  of  interna- 
tional relations  in  general." 

Declaring  their  intention  to  undertake  in  the  near  future  negotiations  further  to 
limit  and  further  to  reduce  strategic  offensive  arms  (Preamble),  *  *  *. 

Limiting  the  arms  race  by  ratifying  SALT  II  is  an  important  step,  but  it  is  only 
one  step  among  many  that  must  be  taken.  SALT  II  limits  the  arms  race.  It  does  not 
reduce  it.  SALT  II  does  not  deal  with  the  vital  matter  of  nuclear  nonproliferation.  It 
does  not  ban  chemical  or  radiological  arms.  But  by  limiting  strategic  arms  the  NCC 
believes  SALT  II  helps  to  establish  a  climate  in  which  work  in  these  vital  areas  can 

The  joint  statement  of  Principles  and  Basic  Guidelines  for  Subsequent  Negotia- 
tions on  the  Limitation  of  Strategic  Arms  which  is  attached  to  SALT  II  establishes 
the  framework  for  negotiating  "further  limitation  and  reduction  in  the  numbers  of 
strategic  arms,  as  well  as  for  their  further  qualitative  limitations."  Thus  the  ratifi- 
cation of  SALT  II  not  only  limits  the  current  strategic  arms  race  but  helps  make 
possible  negotiations  looking  forward  to  an  actual  arms  reduction. 

The  NCC  Governing  Board's  May  1979  statement  expressed  "profound  anxiety  for 
the  future  of  our  own  and  all  peoples."  It  was  encouraged  by  the  unprecedented 
range  of  disarmament  negotiations;  by  the  strengthening  of  the  more  significant 
measures  taken  by  the  United  Nations  for  disarmament;  by  the  renewed  vitality  of 
nongovernmental  organizations  in  the  disarmament  field;  and  by  the  indications 
that  the  peoples  of  the  world  are  calling  for  disarmament. 

Ratification  of  SALT  II  is  not  full  disarmament  or  the  establishment  of  peace.  But 
we  believe  it  promises  a  new  opportunity  to  consolidate  institutions  for  halting  the 
spread  of  nuclear  weapons,  opens  the  way  to  decisive  progress  on  other  critical 
disarmament  issues,  and  enables  the  governments  of  the  U.S.A.  and  the  U.S.S.R.  to 
share  more  fully  in  the  constructive  works  of  peace  in  economic,  technical  and 
cultural  affairs.  Therefore,  we  urge  ratification  of  SALT  II. 

Actions  by  this  United  States  Senate  can  and  do  affect  the  well  being  of  all  the 
world's  peoples.  We  urge  you  to  remember  that  as  you  deal  with  this  critical  Treatjs^. 
Therefore,  may  I  close  with  a  challenge  to  you  from  the  book  of  Deuteronomy:  'I 
have  set  before  you  life  and  death,  blessing  and  curse.  Therefore  choose  life,  that 
you  and  your  descendants  may  live"  (Deuteronomy  30:19). 

NOTES 

Treaty  Between  the  United  States  of  America  and  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  on 
the  Limitation  Df  Strategic  Offensive  Arms,  Vienna,  Austria,  June  18,  1979. 
U.S.  Department  of  State.  SALT  and  American  Security,  November  1978. 

Preamble  to  the  Treaty  Between  the  United  States  of  America  and  the  Union 
OF  Soviet  Sociaust  Repubucs  on  the  Limitation  of  Strategic  Offensive  Arms 

Vienna,  Austria,  June  18,  1979 

The  United  States  of  America  and  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics,  herein- 
after referred  to  as  the  Parties, 

Conscious  that  nuclear  war  would  have  devastating  consequences  for  all  mankind, 

Proceeding  from  the  Basic  Principles  of  Relations  Between  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  of  May  29,  1972, 

Attaching  particular  significance  to  the  limitation  of  strategic  arms  and  deter- 
mined to  continue  their  efforts  begun  with  the  Treaty  on  the  Limitation  of  Anti- 
Ballistic  Missile  Systems  and  the  Interim  Agreement  on  Certain  Measures  with 
Respect  to  the  Limitation  of  Strategic  Offensive  Arms,  of  May  26,  1972, 

Convinced  that  the  additional  measures  limiting  strategic  offensive  arms  provided 
for  in  this  Treaty  will  contribute  to  the  improvement  of  relations  between  the 
Parties,  help  to  reduce  the  risk  of  outbreak  of  nuclear  war  and  strenghten  interna- 
tional peace  and  security.  .    ,      ^  ,      XT       T>     1  x- 

Mindful  of  their  obligations  under  Article  VI  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Non-Prolitera- 
tion  of  Nuclear  Weapons, 

Guided  by  the  prinicple  of  equality  and  equal  security. 

Recognizing  that  the  strengthening  of  strategic  stability  meets  the  interests  of  the 
Parties  and  the  interests  of  international  security. 

Reaffirming  their  desire  to  take  measures  for  the  further  limitation  and  for  the 
further  reduction  of  strategic  arms,  having  in  mind  the  goal  of  achieving  general 
and  complete  disarmament,  r  „lu      i. 

Declaring  their  intention  to  undertake  in  the  near  future  negotiations  further  to 
limit  and  further  to  reduce  strategic  offensive  arms. 


139 

The  Chairman.  Our  last  witness  this  afternoon  is  Albert  Vor- 
span,  who  represents  the  Union  of  American  Hebrew  Congrega- 
tions here  in  Washington. 

Mr.  Vorspan,  it  is  a  pleasure  to  welcome  you  to  the  committee 
this  afternoon.  I  am  sorry  that  you  have  had  to  wait  so  long.  It  is 
now  a  little  after  5  o'clock,  so  please  proceed  with  your  testimony. 

STATEMENT  OF  ALBERT  VORSPAN,  VICE  PRESIDENT,  UNION 
OF  AMERICAN  HEBREW  CONGREGATIONS,'  ACCOMPANIED  BY 
RABBI  DAVID  SAPERSTEIN,  DIRECTOR,  RELIGIOUS  ACTION 
CENTER  OF  REFORM  JUDAISM,  AND  COCHAIR,  RELIGIOUS 
COMMITTEE  ON  SALT 

Mr.  Vorspan.  Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Chairman,  and  despite 
the  lateness  of  the  hour,  I  do  want  to  thank  you  and  the  committee 
for  this  opportunity.  I  am  really  grateful  for  this  opportunity  be- 
cause I  think  what  happened  here  this  afternoon — I  am  grateful 
that  I  had  to  sit  through  it,  too — what  I  think  happened  this 
afternoon  is  something  which,  to  me,  is  indispensible  to  the  SALT 
debate — that  this  debate  has  been  placed  in  a  moral  framework. 
The  issue  of  what  is  right,  the  issue  of  the  future  of  the  human 
race  has  been  voiced  and  echoed  this  afternoon  not  only  from  the 
profound  testimony  of  Roman  Catholic  and  Protestant  religious 
leaders,  but  if  I  may  say  so,  from  that  side  of  the  podium  as  well. 

And  if  I  can  say,  I  think  we  have  all  failed  to  some  extent  in 
posing  the  issue  in  terms  of  these  very  fundamental  dimensions.  I 
think  most  Americans,  while  they  in  general  support  the  idea  of 
SALT,  are  intoxicated  with  and  mystified  by  what  they  read  about 
this  debate  and  these  issues.  And  the  reason  I  believe  that  the 
discussion  this  afternoon  was  very  important  is  that  in  my  under- 
standing of  what  SALT  signifies,  the  testimony  of  the  Cardinal,  the 
testimony  of  the  distinguished  Protestant  leader,  the  testimony  of 
rabbis  and  other  religious  leaders  are  as  relevant  to  the  deepest 
issues  involved  here  as  the  testimony  of  a  general  or  an  admiral 
presently  serving  or  retired,  and  I  am  very  grateful  for  the  oppor- 
tunity to  have  been  part  of  that. 

My  name  is  Albert  Vorspan.  I  am  the  vice  president  of  the  Union 
of  American  Hebrew  Congregations.  This  is  the  central  body  of 
Reformed  Judaism  in  the  United  States  of  America. 

In  the  interest  of  time,  Mr.  Chairman,  being  very  conscious  of 
the  weight  of  discussions  here,  including  many  repetitive  discus- 
sions, I  am  going  to  be  very  brief.  I  would  like  the  opportunity  to 
submit  a  longer,  more  detailed  statement  for  the  record. 

The  Chairman.  Of  course. 

Mr.  Vorspan.  But  I  will  only  spend  a  few  minutes  summarizing 
in  sharp  telescope  some  of  the  things  that  seem  to  me  to  be  very 
important. 

The  organization  that  I  represent  includes  720  Reform  syna- 
gogues throughout  the  United  States,  roughly  1  million  members. 
Like  the  distinguished  people  who  sat  here  earlier  today,  I  do  not 
pretend  for  one  moment  that  every  member  of  every  one  of  those 
synagogues  shares  the  view  adopted  by  the  board  of  the  Union.  But 
I  do  say  that  it  was  very  significant  that  after  a  study  of  an  entire 
year,  with  proponents  and  opponents  of  the  SALT  Treaty  being 


'  See  page  143  for  Mr.  Vorspan's  prepared  statement. 


48-260    0-79    Pt.i+    -    10 


140 

brought  before  our  group,  in  the  end,  the  decision  that  was  made 
was  a  unanimous  decision,  I  think  an  enthusiastic  decision,  and  I 
think,  the  onus  is  on  us  as  it  is  on  every  other  religious  group  to 
bring  that  message  to  our  people,  to  the  people  in  this  country,  and 
to  oppose  it  in  terms  of  the  issues  of  choosing  life. 

With  me  today  is  Rabbi  David  Saperstein,  who  is  the  director  of 
the  Religious  Action  Center  of  the  Union  of  American  Hebrew 
Congregations  here  in  Washington.  I  want  to  echo  what  has  been 
said,  but  I  will  do  it  very,  very  briefly.  I  think  many  Americans 
have  been  led  to  believe  that  the  choice  faced  by  the  Senate  and 
the  American  people  is  a  choice  between  SALT  II  and  some  ideal 
treaty.  The  choice,  as  I  think  we  have  heard  it  today,  is  that 
however  disappointed  many  of  us  are  that  SALT  II  does  not  go 
nearly  far  enough,  that  SALT  II  is  in  some  measures  almost  cos- 
metic and  atmospheric;  despite  that,  what  we  are  talking  about  is  a 
SALT  II  compared  to  what?  And  it  seems  to  me  that  the  "com- 
pared to  what"  is  the  nightmare  of  chaos  which  can  lead  ultimate- 
ly, inevitably  only  to  profound  tragedy  for  the  human  race. 

I  am  one  of  those  who  shares  the  disappointment  that  this  step  is 
too  small,  but  I  am  also  one  of  those  who  believes  that  this  treaty 
must  be  weighed  against  events  happening  in  an  onrushing  way 
every  minute  of  the  day.  SALT  II  cannot  be  seen  in  a  vacuum 
because  it  seems  to  me  that  forces  are  converging  on  us,  on  all  the 
human  beings  on  this  planet  which  make  it  absolutely  essential 
someday,  somehow,  for  the  human  race  to  get  a  handle  on  this 
struggle.  And  those  events  include  the  following:  The  immense  size 
of  the  superpowers'  arsenal;  the  fact  that  the  nuclear  club  is  ex- 
pected to  increase  sevenfold  by  the  year  1990,  from  5  to  35  nations; 
the  massive  resort  by  dozens  of  countries  to  nuclear  technology  as 
an  energy  source  following  the  energy  crisis  of  1973  and  1974;  the 
mounting  prospects  of  the  utilization  by  terrorist  groups  of  stolen 
fissionable  material,  or  even  tactical  nuclear  weapons;  the  rising 
curves  of  hostility  and  violence  in  regions  such  as  Southeast  Asia, 
the  Korean  Peninsula,  the  Persian  Gulf,  Southern  Africa,  and 
Latin  America,  and  the  potential  that  these  tensions  can  trigger  or 
escalate  a  nuclear  conflict;  the  ongoing  conventional  and  nuclear 
arms  race,  reaching  $400  billion  in  military  expenditures  this  year 
alone;  the  lack  of  firm  or  coherent  policies  of  security  and  disarma- 
ment at  the  highest  levels  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
and  U.S.S.R. 

I  share  with  the  distinguished  witnesses  who  sat  here  earlier 
today  the  belief  that  mankind  faces,  as  the  Senate  faces,  a  penulti- 
mate choice,  a  moment  of  truth,  the  kind  of  choice  which  God  set 
out  for  us  in  the  book  of  Deuteronomy:  "I  have  set  before  you  this 
day  the  blessing  and  the  curse,  life  and  death,  good  and  evil. 
Therefore,  choose  life  in  order  that  you  may  live." 

I  speak  also  as  a  representative  of  a  Jewish  organization  and 
that  Jewish  organization  has  deep  concerns  about  our  fellow  broth- 
ers and  sisters  in  all  parts  of  the  country,  and  one  of  the  aspects  of 
this  debate  which  resonates  within  the  Jewish  community  is  the 
question:  Does  our  support  for  SALT  II  relate  to  our  concern  for 
Soviet  Jewry  and  progress  toward  peace  in  the  Middle  East  and 
would  it  be  good  or  bad  for  those  issues?  Proponents  of  linkage 
argue  that  we  should  refuse  to  ratify  SALT  II  unless  the  U.S.S.R. 


141 

improves  its  human  rights  performance  and  supports  progress 
toward  peace  in  the  Middle  East.  Deep  as  is  our  concern  for  Jews 
in  the  Soviet  Union  and  other  people  in  the  Soviet  Union,  deep  as 
is  our  commitment  to  peace  in  the  Middle  East,  we  believe  that 
SALT  II  must  be  examined  and  measured  and  judged  on  its  own 
merits.  Our  support  for  SALT  II  in  no  way  signifies  our  approval  of 
Soviet  domestic  or  international  policies.  The  SALT  Treaty  is  of 
momentous  intrinsic  moral  and  strategic  interest.  It  is  deserving  of 
ratification  on  its  own  merits.  If  the  world  disappears  into  a  nucle- 
ar holocaust,  our  concerns  for  human  rights  and  peace  become 
irrelevant.  Human  life  is  the  ultimate  civil  and  human  right. 

In  fact,  however,  SALT  II  can  only  help  to  improve  the  situation 
of  Soviet  Jewry  and  other  dissidents,  and  others  seeking  to  emi- 
grate. Recently  Senator  Kennedy  put  this  problem  to  Andrei  Sak- 
harov,  one  of  the  truly  courageous  fighters  for  human  rights  in  the 
Soviet  Union.  Senator  Kennedy  reported,  and  I  quote. 

When  I  met  last  year  with  Andrei  Sakharov  in  Moscow  he  stressed  that  the 
greatest  threat  to  humanity  and  human  rights  is  the  threat  of  nuclear  war.  His  plea 
to  us  is  to  ratify  SALT:  not  only  to  reduce  the  threat  of  nuclear  war  but  also  to 
create  the  mutual  confidence  necessary  to  resolve  the  other  important  issues  be- 
tween the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United  States.  Let  the  advocates  of  linkage  explain 
how  the  cause  of  human  rights  in  the  Soviet  Union  will  be  served  by  Senate  refusal 
to  ratify  SALT. 

I  firmly  believe  that  it  is  in  the  interest  of  Jews  in  the  Soviet 
Union,  of  persons  of  all  religious  faiths,  seeking  liberalization  and 
seeking  the  right  to  emigrate,  if  the  stability  that  is  involved  in 
SALT  II  can  be  formalized  and  extended. 

I  want  to  conclude,  Mr.  Chairman,  by  indicating  that  I  believe 
religious  organizations  in  this  country  and  the  U.S.  Senate  share  in 
one  sense  a  certain  responsibility,  and  that  responsibility  is  what 
you,  Mr.  Chairman,  spoke  to,  I  believe  with  great  eloquence,  earlier 
today. 

One  of  the  great  moments  in  my  life  in  dealing  with  public  issues 
in  the  United  States  was  on  that  day  when  Protestant,  Catholic 
and  Jewish  religious  bodies  stood  together  in  this  Chamber,  in  this 
Senate,  to  speak  for  civil  rights  at  a  time  when  that  issue  was  in 
danger  of  becoming  embroiled  in  political  considerations  only.  And 
I  think  SALT  is  in  a  similar  condition  today. 

And  I  want  to  pledge  at  least  for  my  small  group  that  we  will  do 
all  in  our  power  to  raise  the  moral  issue,  to  educate  our  people,  to 
expose  them  to  both  sides  and  to  deal  with  the  fundamental  reli- 
gious and  moral  message  which  I  believe  SALT  bears  for  the 
human  race.  What  this  Senate  can  say  can  be  a  proclamation 
heard  throughout  the  world,  a  proclamation  unlike  that  made  by  a 
person  named  Isaiah  centuries  ago,  that  the  joint  benefits  for  both 
sides  outweigh  even  deep  differences,  that  there  are  ways  besides 
bloodshed  for  nations  to  redress  grievances  and  resolve  disputes, 
that  nations  need  not  be  prisoners  and  hostages  of  a  bitter,  unre- 
mitting past.  We  can  be  the  shapers  of  a  better  world  and  a  more 
hopeful  future,  that  humankind  is  not  inexorably  doomed  to  repeat 
the  disasters  of  history.  What  always  was,  need  not  always  be. 

Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Vorspan. 

I  have  been  reading  from  your  statement  parts  that  you  were 
unable  to  recite  in  order  to  save  time.  I  must  say  that  it  is  an 


142 

extremely  moving  and  profound  statement,  and  I  would  want  it  to 
appear  in  the  record  in  its  entirety. 

Mr.  VoRSPAN.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  You  made  an  argument  that  is  often  overlooked 
which  is  that  the  most  fundamental  human  right  of  all  is  the  right 
to  exist.  The  development  of  nuclear  weapons  has  put  the  right  of 
existence  in  jeopardy,  the  existence  of  our  people,  our  national 
civilization,  that  of  the  Soviet  Union,  and  indeed,  who  knows, 
depending  upon  the  scope  and  ferocity  of  the  nuclear  holocaust,  a 
full  scale  nuclear  exchange,  perhaps  the  survival  of  the  human 
race  itself.  And  all  other  rights,  however  important  they  may  be  to 
the  condition  of  life,  rest  upon  that  base. 

Mr.  VoRSPAN.  I  made  that  argument  not  as  a  unilateral  disarma- 
ment advocate  in  any  way,  but  I  do  believe  that  there  is  a  kind  of  a 
readiness,  a  kind  of  a  weariness  that  prepares  people  for  talking  in 
terms  of  10  million,  20  million,  40  million,  60  million  in  ways  in 
which  those  figures  lose  all  sense  of  meaning  whatsoever.  And  then 
somebody  comes  along  and  says  well,  we  have  miscalculated,  there 
is  a  way  to  survive  this  thing.  It  really  is  only  35  million.  But  there 
is  an  obscenity  involved  in  that,  and  I  think  it  is  the  weary  accept- 
ance of  the  fundamental  premise  of  the  way  we  have  been  doing 
business  as  a  civilization,  about  which  I  am  talking  now.  And 
therefore  I  think  that  the  reverence  for  life,  the  concern  for  the 
preciousness  of  life,  while  it  sounds  like  a  cliche  and  a  sermon  that 
we  ask  clergymen  to  come  and  deliver  to  us,  is  really  the  heart  of 
the  matter  that  we  are  talking  about. 

So  I  am  grateful  to  you  for  your  question. 

The  Chairman.  I  think  that  the  answer  must  be  found  in  the 
mutual  recognition  of  the  foolishness  and  futility  of  an  unre- 
strained nuclear  arms  race,  and  the  need  for  both  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  as  the  two  so-called  superpowers  to 
not  only  check  the  acceleration  of  nuclear  arms,  but  to  begin  to 
reverse  the  trend,  reduce  the  danger,  and  ultimately,  if  a  sufficient- 
ly effective  inspection  and  control  system  can  be  devised,  to  elimi- 
nate nuclear  weapons  entirely  from  the  face  of  the  Earth. 

When  you  consider  the  importance  of  that  goal  and  how  far  we 
are  from  it,  SALT  II  becomes  a  very  small  step  indeed,  but  it  is 
something,  it  moves  in  the  right  direction,  and  it  keeps  the  journey 
alive. 

Mr.  VoRSPAN.  The  alternative  to  it,  if  I  may  say  so,  may  doom 
forever  the  possibility  of  the  kind  of  dream  and  the  kind  of  vision 
we  have  been  talking  about  here. 

The  Chairman.  There  is  that  risk. 

No  one  knows  for  sure  but  there  is  that  risk. 

Thank  you  very  much  for  your  statement. 

Mr.  VoRSPAN.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Javits. 

Senator  Javits.  Thank  you. 

Thank  you  very  much  also,  Mr.  Vorspan.  I  join  the  chairman  in 
the  observations  which  he  has  made  and  I  assure  you  that  it  is  a 
matter  of  deep  gratification  to  me  that  there  is  such  a  parallel 
approach  between  a  Jewish  representative  here  as  with  the  Catho- 
lic and  Protestant  representatives.  I  was  not  here  when  the  Cardi- 
nal testified,  but  I  read  his  statement  and  I  had  a  verbatim  report 


143 

of  it;  there  is  an  extraordinary  parallelism.  That,  I  think,  is  ex- 
tremely gratifying.  Of  course,  Dr.  Claire  Randall  who  testified  for 
the  Protestant  denominations  took  exactly  the  same  attitude. 

So  I  can  only  tell  you  that  all  of  us  here  on  this  committee, 
whether  we  are  for  or  against  the  treaty,  have  the  same  motiva- 
tion, and  I  think  for  Senator  Church  and  myself  and  many  other 
members,  you  can  be  sure  that  we  know  that  in  this  matter  we  are 
trying  to  do  the  Lord's  work.  Therefore,  it  deserves,  more  than 
diligence,  more  than  skill,  more  than  dedication;  it  deserves  pas- 
sion, which  I  am  trying  to  give  it  and  so  is  the  chairman.  I  am  very 
impressed  by  your  testimony  and  it  is  extremely  useful. 

Mr.  VoRSPAN.  Thank  you.  Senator. 

[Mr.  Vorpan's  prepared  statement  follows:] 

Prepared  Statement  of  Albert  Vorspan 

Good  afternoon.  I  am  Albert  Vorspan.  With  Rabbi  David  Saperstein,  the  Director 
of  the  Religous  Action  Center  of  Reform  Judaism  and  co-chair  of  the  Religious 
Committee  on  SALT,  I  am  here  today  to  share  with  you  the  position  on  SALT  II  of 
the  Union  of  American  Hebrew  Congregations  which  I  serve  as  Vice-President.  The 
UAHC  represents  over  one  million  American  Reform  Jews  in  700  congregations 
throughout  the  country.  After  a  year  of  investigation  and  discussion,  the  Board  of 
Trustees  of  the  Union  of  American  Hebrew  Congregations  voted  unanimously  in 
favor  of  ratification  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty  explaining,  in  part,  that  "in  keeping  with 
our  mandate  to  'seek  peace  and  pursue  it,'  we  see  in  the  SALT  process  the  most 
realistic  chance  for  checking  an  insane,  wasteful  and  potentially  catastrophic  nucle- 
ar arms  race." 

A  JEWISH   imperative 

This  is  not  the  first  time  that  members  of  the  Jewish  community  have  testified 
publicly  on  behalf  of  arms  control  and  disarmament.  "They  shall  beat  their  swords 
into  plowshares  and  their  spears  into  pruning-hooks;  nation  shall  not  lift  up  sword 
against  nation,  neither  shall  they  learn  war  any  more."  These  words  of  Isaiah, 
echoing  down  through  the  centuries  have  been  eloquent  testimony  of  our  commit- 
ment to  disarmament.  To  ignore  those  words  now  is  to  impreil  humankind.  Since 
Hiroshima  the  prospect  of  warfare  has  been  raised  to  a  qualitatively  different  order 
of  risk.  We  have  always  had  warfare — but  never  the  capacity  to  destroy  human  life 
and  to  make  the  world  unliveable.  Nuclear  warfare  requires  a  moral  revolution,  a 
revolution  in  which  human  life  and  peace  must  take  precedence  over  worshipping 
the  idols  of  production,  technics,  strategic  superiorities  and  the  military-industrial- 
complex.  Because  we  address  the  issue  of  SALT  II  in  this  context,  we  have  joined 
with  26  other  national  Catholic,  Protestant  and  Jewish  groups  in  the  Religious 
Committee  on  SALT. 

We  all  share  a  sense  of  the  urgency  of  the  time.  Religious  values  must  be  given  a 
chance.  If  not  it  may  well  be  too  late.  Increasing  numbers  of  experts  maintain  that 
nuclear  war  is  likely  by  the  end  of  this  centry.  This  contention  is  supported  by  a 
number  of  political  and  military  factors  in  the  world  today  including: 

1.  The  immense  size  of  the  superpowers  arsenal — the  equivalent  of  3  tons  of  TNT 
for  every  human  being  on  Earth. 

2.  A  nuclear  club  that  is  expected  to  increase  seven-fold  by  the  year  1990,  from 
five  to  thirty-five  nations. 

3.  The  massive  resort  by  dozens  of  countries  to  nuclear  technology  as  an  energy 
source  following  the  energy  crisis  of  1973-74. 

4.  The  faltering  prospects  for  a  strong  and  stable  non-proliferation  agreement  to 
prevent  the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons  to  additional  countries. 

5.  The  mounting  prospects  of  the  utilization  by  terrorist  groups  of  stolen  fission- 
able materials  or  tactical  nuclear  weapons. 

6.  The  rising  curves  of  hostility  and  violence  in  regions  such  as  Southeast  Asia, 
the  Korean  Peninsula,  the  Persian  Gulf,  Southern  Africa  and  Latin  America,  and 
the  potential  that  the  tensions  in  these  areas  can  trigger  or  escalate  to  a  nuclear 
conflict. 

7.  The  on-going  conventional  and  nuclear  arms  race,  reaching  $400  billion  in 
military  expenditures  this  year. 

8.  The  fragility  of  United  States-U.S.S.R.  detente. 


144 

9.  The  commitment  on  both  sides  to  a  quahtative  build-up  of  increasingly  sophisti- 
cated strategic  weapons  which  go  beyond  the  reach  of  verification  and  threaten  to 
destabilize  arms  control  negotiations,  and 

10.  The  lack  of  firm  or  coherent  policies  of  security  and  disarmament  at  the 
highest  levels  of  the  governments  of  the  United  States  and  U.S.S.R. 

Thus  today,  we  are  faced  in  fact  with  precisely  the  choice  God  set  out  for  us  in 
The  Book  or  Deuteronomy,  "I  have  set  before  you  this  day,  the  blessing  and  the 
curse,  life  and  death,  good  and  evil;  therefore  choose  life  in  order  that  you  may 
live." 

Through  the  millennia,  the  Jewish  tradition  heis  psiinfully  developed  a  set  of 
values  limiting  war  which  must  serve  as  our  guide  in  evaluating  this  treaty; 

1.  The  use  of  force  is  permissible  for  self-defense.  Thus  SALT  II  must  be  evaluated 
in  terms  of  legitimate  U.S.  security  needs. 

2.  The  goal  of  humankind  is  shalom.  Shalom  is  more  than  the  cessation  of  war.  It 
is  the  opportunity  for  national  and  personal  fulfillment  and  completeness. 

3.  Any  use  of  force  must  guarantee  absolute  protection  of  non-combat  and  civilian 
populations. 

4.  Any  use  of  force  must  be  guided  by  a  concept  of  proportionality  which  insists 
that  no  more  damage  should  be  inflicted  than  is  necessary  to  pursue  the  limited 
goal  of  defense. 

The  dilemma  of  our  age  is  that  the  values  and  positions  described  above  are  now 
faced  with  a  stark  reality  of  new  and  incomparable  proportions — weapons  of  mass 
destructions  which  threaten  to  erase  distinctions  between  offense  and  defense; 
which  if  used  would  be  a  massive  violation  of  the  protection  of  noncombatants  and 
proportionality;  which  would  eliminate  the  possibility  of  shalom-indeed,  threatens 
the  very  possibility  of  all  of  God's  creation.  Since  any  use  of  nuclear  weapons 
threatens  these  values,  the  goal  of  the  American  people  must  be  first,  the  limita- 
tion; then,  the  reduction;  and  finally,  as  President  Carter  pledged  in  his  inaugural 
address,  the  elimination  of  all  nuclear  weapons.  Thus,  SALT  must  be  regarded  as  a 
process  which  transcends  SALT  II  and  in  which  lies  our  ultimate  security. 

THE  QUESTION   FOR  THE  SENATE:   ARE  WE   MORE  SECURE  WITH  SALT  II  OR  WITHOUT 

SALT  II 

Will  we  be  further  along  the  path  to  achieving  the  values  discussed  above  with 
SALT  II  or  without  SALT  II?  After  careful  and  lengthy  evaluation,  the  UAHC 
concluded  that  in  every  way  we  will  be  more  secure  when  this  treaty  is  ratified. 

If  SALT  II  should  be  rejected  by  the  Senate  it  will  be  a  serious  set-back  for  the 
cause  of  arms  limitation  and  control.  The  SALT  process  provides  the  best  hope  for 
arms  control.  It  has  been  accepted  by  the  United  States  and  U.S.S.R.  Recently,  it 
has  been  accepted  by  China.  It  is  accepted  by  the  rest  of  our  allies  who  are  members 
of  the  nuclear  club.  Indeed,  the  leaders  of  these  and  many  other  countries  have 
called  for  the  ratification  of  the  treaty.  The  General  Assembly  of  the  United 
Nations  voted  127-1  in  favor  of  SALT.  The  likelihood  of  successful  renegotiation 
with  the  U.S.S.R.  of  any  substantive  change  is  very  slim.  For  this  reason,  the  UAHC 
would  like  to  see  the  treaty  passed  in  its  present  form  with  no  amendments  or 
actions  which  would  result  in  the  need  for  renegotiation.  A  failure  to  ratify  the 
treaty  would  result  in  a  major  crisis  of  confidence  among  our  allies  and  friends.  It 
would  be  a  major  set-back  for  detente  between  the  United  States  and  U.S.S.R.  Thus 
the  failure  to  ratify  SALT  II  would  adversely  affect  American  security. 

Without  SALT  II,  United  States  and  Soviet  military  spending  will  rise  even  more 
rapidly  than  now  planned.  Each  side  will  redouble  its  efforts  to  achieve  illusory 
superiority.  Dangerous  and  provocative  weaponry  will  be  developed  and  deployed. 
Trends  toward  "limited"  nuclear  wars,  massive  civil  defense  programs  and  a  garri- 
son state  mentality  will  ensue. 

The  economic  costs  to  the  United  States  and  the  U.S.S.R.  would  be  enormous. 
Between  $30  and  $100  billion  more  would  be  spent  on  military  expenditures,  by 
1985.  Balanced  budgets  and  inflation  controls  would  be  sacrificed.  The  ability  of  the 
United  States  to  increase  its  security  by  providing  employment  and  educational 
opportunities  to  its  citizens;  decent  health  care  and  housing;  and  welfare  assistance 
which  provides  a  minimally  decent  living — all  these  would  be  sharply  undercut.  The 
result  would  be  the  development  of  an  underclass  of  Americans  who  are  out  of  jobs 
and  out  of  hope — filled  with  frustration  and  despair.  Intergroup  tensions  would  be 
greatly  exacerbated.  The  spirit  and  soul  of  America  would  be  drained  by  its  inability 
to  maintain  a  fundamentally  decent  quality  of  life  for  its  citizens.  No  country  which 
erodes  its  internal  strength  can  long  endure — no  matter  how  large  its  military 
budgets  and  how  great  its  military  forces  might  be. 

Without  SALT  II,  we  will  be  hurt  strategically,  as  all  of  the  compromises  and 
concessions  made  by  the  Soviets  in  the  negotiations  of  this  treaty  would  be  lost.  In 


145 

the  sometimes  mean  spirited  and  hawkish  tone  of  the  recent  debate  over  SALT  II, 
we  have  constantly  emphasized  the  concessions  we  made  and  ignored  the  conces- 
sions which  .he  Soviets  made.  Without  SALT  II: 

1.  The  Soviets  will  have  3-4,000  missile  launchers  rather  than  the  2,250  to  which 
they  have  agreed  (a  reduction  of  250  launchers  for  them). 

2.  We  would  have  no  common  data  base  as  opposed  to  that  to  which  the  two 
countries  agreed  under  the  treaty. 

3.  The  United  States  and  U.S.S.R.  would  have  a  number  of  new  land-based 
missiles  as  opposed  to  the  one  allowed  by  the  treaty. 

4.  We  would  face  20  to  30  warheads  on  some  Soviet  missiles  as  opposed  to  the 
limit  of  10  to  which  they  have  agreed. 

5.  There  will  be  no  production  limits  on  the  Backfire  bomber  as  promised  the 
United  States  in  an  agreement  outside  the  treaty. 

6.  The  Soviets  might  have  thousands  more  new  warheads  than  they  would  have 
with  the  treaty. 

7.  Whatever  qualms  the  United  States  might  have  on  verification,  can  any  sane 
human  being  believe  that  we  would  be  more  secure  and  more  capable  of  verifying 
what  the  Soviets  did,  if  they  had  not  accepted  our  counting  rules;  if  they  had  not 
promised  to  continue  their  policy  of  non-interference  with  our  national  technical 
means;  if  they  had  not  restricted  their  encryption  of  missile  tests? 

In  the  abysmal  ignorance  which  our  inability  to  monitor  the  Soviets  would  create, 
the  military  hardliners  in  both  countries  would  be  strengthened.  An  atmosphere  of 
intense  fear  and  mistrust  would  blanket  the  world.  Efforts  to  negotiate  further 
reductions  through  SALT  III  or  any  other  arms  control  agreement  would  be  severe- 
ly restricted.  Successful  negotiations  on  a  comprehensive  test  ban  treaty  would  be 
unimaginable.  Negotiations  aimed  at  checking  proliferation  of  nuclear  and  conven- 
tional weapons  would  likely  break  down. 

Despite  the  accusations  of  some  SALT  critics,  the  U.S.  negotiators  struck  a  fair 
bargain  in  SALT  II.  They  did  not  undermine  our  security.  The  Soviets  agreed  not  to 
limit  our  forward-based  missiles.  They  accepted  no  limitation  on  air-launched  mis- 
sile range.  They  gave  up  their  demand  for  a  non-transfer  clause.  They  gave  up  their 
demand  for  a  limit  on  ground-launched  or  sea-launched  cruise  missile  testing.  They 
permitted  an  average  28  cruise  missiles  per  bomber.  They  accepted  limitations  on 
the  upgrading  of  the  Backfire  bomber.  They  accepted  our  definition  of  what  consti- 
tuted a  "new '  missile.  While,  of  course,  as  critics  of  SALT  pointed  out,  the  United 
States  has  made  numerous  concessions  to  the  Soviets — compromise  is  the  essence  of 
a  successful  agreement.  Our  negotiators  have  successfully  embodied  the  notion  of 
nuclear  parity  in  SALT  II.  This  offers  a  real  hope  for  reduction  in  the  future. 

THE  SALT  DEBATE — SO  FAR 

Indeed,  the  debate  so  far  seems  to  have  ignored  the  basic  reality  that  the  SALT  II 
Treaty  has  balanced  the  needs  of  two  fundamentally  different  and  asymetrical 
military  forces.  The  rhetoric  of  the  debate  has  implied  that  for  each  compromise  the 
United  States  made,  the  U.S.S.R.  must  have  made  a  similar  one.  Such  a  provision 
by  provision  comparison  is  not  grounded  in  reality.  We  must  rather  measure  the 
total  effect  of  the  treaty.  It  is  the  position  of  the  UAHC  that  when  this  standard  is 
applied,  the  two  superpowers  have  reached  an  accord  which  limits  arms  growth  in  a 
way  which  protects  our  security  and  the  security  of  the  U.S.S.R. 

The  debate  has  been  particularly  distressing  in  two  other  ways.  First,  the  debate 
has  lost  sight  of  the  goal  of  arms  reduction  and  elimination.  Instead,  SALT  II  has 
been  used  as  a  political  football  by  those  who  would  seek  greater  growth  of  the  U.S. 
nuclear  arsenal;  a  higher  military  budget  or  would  seek  to  end  the  SALT  process 
altogether.  Senators  who  only  a  few  months  earlier  had  voted  reductions  in  military 
spending  now  demand,  in  banner  headlines,  a  sharp  rise  in  the  military  budget.  If 
SALT  II  is  a  bad  treaty  then  no  amount  of  spending  will  make  it  a  good  one. 

More  importantly,  new  weapons  systems  and  increased  military  spending  ought  to 
be  decided  on  their  own  merits.  For  Senators  today  to  lock  the  country  into  new 
systems,  new  weapons  and  higher  budgets  for  years  to  come  after  a  couple  of 
months  of  debate  on  the  SALT  Treaty,  does  not  appear  to  be  the  most  responsible 
way  of  dealing  with  the  real  security  and  defense  needs  of  our  country.  The  series  of 
extravagent  pay-offs  which  marked  SALT  I  should  not  be  permitted  to  plague  SALT  • 
II.  We  must  be  most  careful  to  avoid  the  technological  trade-offs  of  SALT  I.  Because 
we  led  in  certain  types  of  technology  in  the  early  seventies — MIRV  technology, 
cruise  missiles  and  large  submarines — we  exempted  limitations  on  such  arms.  As  a 
result,  the  Soviets  felt  compelled  to  undertake  a  major  "catch-up"  program.  Today, 
the  Soviets  now  are  MIRVing  their  missiles.  The  result  is  that  our  land-based 
ICBM's  may  soon  be  theoretically  vulnerable  to  destruction  on  the  ground.  Today, 
because  we  lead  in  mobile  missile  technology,  we  seek  to  set  time  limits  on  the 


146 

controls  of  mobile  missile  deployment  and  thus  risk  escalating  the  arms  race  into  a 
new  and  dangerous  stage.  We  will  soon  introduce  the  unverifiable,  destabilizing 
cruise  missUes  into  the  strategic  picture.  The  decisions  on  the  M-X  missile  and  any 
other  new  system  ought  to  be  carefully  evaluated  on  their  own  merits  with  a  full 
public  debate  after  the  SALT  Treaty  has  been  ratified. 

Perhaps  even  more  threatening  in  the  debate  has  been  the  virtually  unchallenged 
contentions  of  those  who  would  provide  the  United  States  with  the  capacity  to  fight 
a  "limited"  nuclear  war.  This  "counterforce"  theory  has  increased  its  attraction  as 
the  Soviets  develop  the  capacity  to  target  U.S.  land  based  missile  silos.  The  ability 
to  destroy  accurately  military  nuclear  targets  raises  the  theoretical  spectre  of  a 
nuclear  war  which  would  inflict  "acceptable"  damage  to  industri£il  and  human 
targets.  Various  basing  modes  of  the  proposed  mobile  missiles  seriously  raise  the 
spectre  of  a  counterforce  capacity. 

Increasingly,  the  rhetoric  of  counterforce  theory  has  been  infused  into  the  SALT 
n  debate.  While  counterforce  theory  presumes  solutions  to  strategic  and  technologi- 
cal problems  which  may  be  unsoluble  in  this  century,  as  a  religious  presence  in  this 
country  we  are  more  concerned  about  the  devastating  moral  implications  of  this 
theory.  The  counterforce  theory  creates  the  dilemma  that  by  seeking  to  give  either 
country  various  limited  strategic  options,  it  makes  the  use  of  nuclear  weapons  more 
thinkable.  Because  the  effects  of  the  use  of  limited  nuclear  strikes  appear  to  be 
selective,  discriminate  and  controllable,  strategic  planning  and  analysis  would 
accept  them  as  real  options.  If  counterforce  becomes  a  part  of  the  strategic  relation- 
ship, the  likelihood  of  nuclear  war  would  greatly  increase. 

Given  the  present  state  of  the  arms  race,  both  technologically  and  politically,  it 
seems  more  prudent  to  accept  only  those  weapons  and  strategic  doctrines  that  seek 
to  prevent  any  use  of  nuclear  weapons;  that  renders  them  "unthinkable"  in  political 
£md  moral  terms.  Only  from  this  position  is  it  possible  to  begin  reduction  of  strate- 
gic arms  in  a  reasonable,  balanced  and  prudent  manner,  bring  them  more  surely 
under  control;  and  decrease  their  significance  and  legitimacy  in  world  affairs.  This 
is  the  theory  of  SALT,  and  SALT  II  is  essential  to  its  process.  We  believe  that  the 
whole  issue  of  counterforce  theory  deserves  far  more  analysis  and  attention  than  it 
has  been  given  so  far. 

PAST  SALT  II 

Opponents  of  SALT  II  have  attempted  to  discredit  the  notion  and  the  rhetoric  of 
the  SALT  process.  We  categorically  reject  such  aspersions.  The  pursuit  of  peace  and 
the  elimination  of  nuclear  weapons  must  be  a  constant  and  continuous  effort  by  all 
of  us.  The  notion  of  a  process  is  inherent  in  SALT  and  we  must  look  past  SALT  II. 
The  UAHC  is  disappointed  in  the  modest  limitations  of  SALT  II.  We  would  have 
wished  that  this  had  been  a  treaty  embodying  real  arms  control. 

Arms  control  must  be  the  essence  of  the  next  SALT  agreement.  This  goal  should 
be  reflected  in  understandings  and  reservations  to  SALT  II  which  would  not  require 
renegotiations.  The  SALT  II  limits  must  be  regarded  as  ceilings  not  as  targets  which 
must  be  reached.  There  should  be  an  explicit  rejection  of  the  concept  of  "limited" 
nuclear  war  as  an  element  of  U.S.  foreign  or  strategic  policy.  We  should  clarify  that 
we  are  prepared  to  seek  meaningful  bilateral  reductions  even  before  the  expiration 
of  SALT  II. 

The  symbolism  of  the  Soviet  dismantling  of  missile  launchers  without  replace- 
ment, as  required  by  SALT  II,  must  not  be  lost  in  the  debate.  It  should  be  empha- 
sized as  the  tjrpe  of  action  that  will  take  on  real  meaning  in  SALT  III.  Just  this 
week  Senator  Biden,  upon  returning  from  a  series  of  meetings  with  Soviet  leaders, 
indicated  that  they  were  prepared  for  real  reductions  in  future  arms  agreements. 
The  initiative  created  by  those  meetings  must  be  seized  by  the  Senate.  The  United 
States  should  clearly  set  out  its  intentions  as  to  how  these  two  countries  will 
achieve  real  reductions  and  work  for  that  goal  as  quickly  and  effectively  as  possible. 

The  example  which  the  superpowers  sets  in  controlling  nuclear  arms  will  have  a 
significant  impact  on  future  efforts  to  control  horizontal  proliferation  of  nuclear 
weapons.  No  dynamic  in  the  1980's  so  threatens  to  destabilize  the  world  and  lead  to 
nuclear  war  as  the  numerical  growth  of  those  countries  which  will  soon  possess  a 
nuclear  capacity.  The  United  States  and  U.S.S.R.  have  succeeded  in  making  the 
possession  of  nuclear  weapons  a  "status"  symbol  of  power  and  influence  in  the 
world.  We  must  act  dramatically  to  change  that.  Ratification  of  SALT  II  is  an 
important  step  in  that  direction.  On  the  eve  of  the  Second  Non-Proliferation  Treaty 
Conference,  rejection  of  SALT  II  would  inevitably  undermine  any  hope  to  check  the 
proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons  to  other  countries. 


147 

ISRAEL  AND  SOVIET  JEWRY 

As  Jews,  we  have  a  special  concern  for  our  brothers  and  sisters  throughout  the 
world.  Repeatedly  we  have  been  asked  how  does  our  support  for  SALT  II  relate  to 
our  concern  for  Soviet  Jewry  and  progress  toward  peace  in  the  Middle  East? 
Proponents  of  linkage  argue  that  we  should  refuse  to  ratify  SALT  II  until  the 
U.S.S.R.  improves  its  human  rights  performance  and  supports  progress  toward 
peace  in  the  Middle  East.  We  reject  that  notion.  Our  support  for  SALT  II  in  no  way 
signifies  our  approval  of  Soviet  domestic  or  international  policies.  The  SALT  Treaty 
is  of  momentous  intrinsic,  moral  and  strategic  interest.  It  is  deserving  of  ratification 
on  its  own  merits.  If  the  world  goes  up  in  a  nuclear  holocaust,  our  concerns  for 
human  rights  and  peace  become  irrelevant. 

In  fact,  however,  SALT  II  can  only  help  to  improve  the  situation  of  Soviet  Jewry. 
Recently  Senator  Kennedy  put  this  problem  to  Andrei  Sakharov,  one  of  the  truly 
courageous  fighters  for  human  rights  in  the  Soviet  Union.  Senator  Kennedy  report- 
ed: "When  I  met  last  year  with  Andrei  Sakharov  in  Moscow  he  stressed  that  the 
greatest  threat  to  humanity  and  human  rights  is  the  threat  of  nuclear  war.  His  plea 
to  us  is  to  ratify  SALT:  not  only  to  reduce  the  threat  of  nuclear  war  but  also  to 
create  the  mutual  confidence  necessary  to  resolve  the  other  important  issues  be- 
tween the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United  States  *  •  •  Let  the  advocates  of  linkage 
explain  how  the  cause  of  human  rights  in  the  Soviet  Union  will  be  served  by  Senate 
refusal  to  ratify  SALT." 

To  the  extent  that  the  United  States  can  influence  Soviet  performance  on  human 
rights  it  can  do  so  best  in  an  atmosphere  of  detente  and  cooperation.  If  SALT  II  is 
defeated  it  is  unlikely  that  the  United  States  will  have  any  impact  on  U.S.S.R. 
policies  regarding  human  rights. 

The  ability  of  the  United  States  to  act  as  a  constructive  partner  in  further 
progress  towards  reaching  a  peaceful  resolution  of  Mid-East  problems  will  be 
strengthened  by  SALT  II  as  well.  First,  progress  towards  peace  requires  stability — 
stability  among  the  superpowers  and  relative  stability  among  the  parties  involved  in 
the  Mid-East  conflict.  To  the  extent  that  SALT  II  allows  for  continued  stability  on 
the  nuclear  front,  it  permits  Israel  and  its  neighbors  to  focus  on  their  regional 
concerns. 

Secondly,  the  danger  of  horizontal  nuclear  proliferation  threatens  to  engulf  the 
Middle  East  in  a  nuclear  confrontation.  Recent  evidence  indicates  that  Pakistan, 
which  may  explode  a  nuclear  device  in  a  matter  of  months,  has  been  bankrolled  in 
its  efforts  to  develop  "the  bomb"  by  Libya.  Reports  indicate  that  Pakistan  will 
supply  Libya  with  nuclear  weapons,  in  return  for  its  help.  No  leader  on  Earth  would 
so  threaten  nuclear  stability  as  would  Qaddaffi.  It  would  be  difficult  to  determine 
whether  his  weapons  would  be  aimed  first  at  Egypt  or  Israel.  Such  proliferation 
poses  a  massive  threat  to  U.S.  interests  in  the  Middle  East,  to  Israel's  survival  and, 
indeed,  to  the  survival  of  the  world. 

Finally,  the  strategic  impact  of  the  SALT  Treaty  would  have  little  effect  on  the 
ability  of  U.S.  forces  to  maintain  a  deterrence  in  the  Middle  East  to  Soviet  designs. 
Indeed,  by  diverting  limited  U.S.  budgetary  funds  from  a  senseless  and  endless 
strategic  weapons  arms  race,  we  can  better  strengthen  our  conventional  forces 
which  would  increase  our  capacity  to  help  our  friends  in  Europe  and  the  Mediterra- 
nean basin. 

Thus,  ratification  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty  will  enhance  the  ability  of  the  American 
government  to  further  both  peace  in  the  Middle  East  and  the  cause  of  human  rights 
in  the  Soviet  Union.  During  the  past  year  we  have  made  significant  progress  in  both 
these  areas.  The  peace  treaty  between  Israel  and  Egypt  and  the  unprecedented 
levels  of  Jewish  emigration  from  the  U.S.S.R.  have  been  due  in  large  measure  to  a 
sense  of  stability  in  the  relationship  of  the  global  powers.  We  cannot  continue  to 
progress  towards  peace  and  freedom  in  the  atmosphere  of  suspicion,  mistrust  and 
intense  superpower  competition  which  would  inevitably  follow  the  failure  of  the 
Senate  to  ratify  the  SALT  II  Treaty.  Rather,  the  spirit  of  cooperation  and  detente 
which  would  be  furthered  by  this  treaty  is  essential  to  such  progress  in  both  of 
these  areas. 

conclusion:  the   responsibility  of  the  SENATE 

The  United  States  has  not  yet  met  the  issue  of  arms  reduction  and  control  as 
firmly  as  the  situation  requires.  Both  the  religious  community  and  the  Senate  must 
bear  the  responsibility  for  that  failure.  The  religious  community  has  not  posed  the 
moral  challenge  of  the  arms  race  with  sufficient  clarity  and  immediacy  to  capture 
the  imagination  and  concern  of  the  American  people.  The  Senate  has  too  often 
permitted  the  SALT  II  debate  to  deteriorate  into  rhetorical  battle  of  militarism  and 
fear. 


148 

Rabbi  David  Polish  points  out  an  insightful  lesson  in  the  story  of  Samson.  Before 
he  was  born,  Samson's  mother  was  told  that  he  was  to  grow  up  as  a  mighty  savior 
of  Israel.  He  was  to  be  set  aside  as  a  Nazirite,  as  a  special  kind  of  person,  dedicated 
to  God,  forbidden  to  drink  wine  or  to  cut  his  hair.  When  he  was  born,  he  was  called 
Shimshon,  meaning  sunperson,  symbolizing  that  the  brightness  of  the  very  sun 
glowed  within  his  being.  What  great  promise  burned  within  this  man  who  grew  to 
be  a  powerful  figure  and  who,  indeed,  did  rescue  Israel  from  its  enemies.  But  this 
giant  of  a  man,  this  dazzling,  brilliant  judge  in  Israel  soon  forgot  the  source  of  his 
power  and  his  greatness.  He  was  tricked  into  having  his  hair  shorn.  He  was 
captured  by  his  enemies.  They  put  out  his  eyes.  They  set  him  to  work  in  the  prison 
yard,  grinding  grain.  Day  in,  day  out,  chained  to  a  huge  stone  wheel,  he  trod  his 
blind  course,  round  and  round  like  a  beast.  Time  passed,  and  his  hair  grew  and  his 
strength  was  restored.  On  a  festive  day,  when  the  enemies  of  Israel  were  all 
assembled  in  their  Temple,  he  made  his  way  there  with  the  aid  of  an  unsuspecting 
lad.  Planting  himself  between  two  huge  pillars,  he  pushed  mightily  agamst  them, 
and  crying,  "let  me  die  with  the  Philistines,"  he  brought  the  Temple  and  its 
celebrants  crashing  down  upon  him. 

What  do  we  know  from  this  episode?  We  learn  of  the  tragic  and  fatal  combination 
of  power  and  blindness.  Samson  was  once  the  union  of  strength  and  vision.  But  with 
vision  gone,  all  that  Samson  could  do  was  to  feed  his  renewed  strength  with  the 
venom  of  revenge,  destroying  himself  with  his  enemies. 

The  story  of  Samson  is  a  warning  to  America.  Our  nation  arose  m  this  new  world 
like  a  special  being,  blessed  and  nurtured  by  the  sun,  the  source  of  light  and  of  life. 
This  giant  of  a  nation  was  born  in  the  midst  of  a  struggle  against  tyranny  and 
consecrated  to  a  higher  order  of  political  existence  than  had  ever  been  known.  This 
nation  was  a  kind  of  Nazirite  among  the  nations,  denying  itself  the  temptations  of 
rule  by  caste  and  the  heady  wine  of  government  by  the  few.  It  was  endowed  in  its 
birth  with  the  might  of  the  continent  which  it  straddled  and  the  vision  which  it 
drew  from  its  unique  history.  But  we  stand  in  danger  of  seeing  the  eyes  of  the 
sunblessed  giant  gouged  out,  not  by  its  enemies,  but  at  its  own  hands.  Its  strength 
cannot  be  impaired,  but  its  vision  can  be  mortally  impaired.  Nothing  can  be  as 
destructive  as  the  well-meaning  power  of  a  bewildered  and  frightened  giant.  How 
well  our  prophets  understood  this  when  they  said,  "Where  there  is  no  vision  the 

people  perish."  ,  ^  ,  ,  ,        ....       t>  .l  -x     -n 

Together  we  can  ensure  that  the  United  States  does  not  lose  its  vision.  But  it  will 
be  your  decision  as  to  whether  the  debate  over  this  treaty  will  focus  attention  on 
the  necessity  of  multilateral  nuclear  disarmament.  You  alone  will  decide  what 
message  SALT  II  will  carry  beyond  its  substantive  provisions.  It  might  be  a  message 
that  this  is  but  one  stepping  stone  in  an  inevitable  escalation  of  nuclear  prolifera- 
tion. Or  the  message  of  SALT  II  can  be  a  proclamation  heard  throughout  the  world: 
That  the  joint  benefits  for  both  sides  outweight  even  deep  differences; 
That  there  are  ways  besides  strife  for  nations  to  redress  grievances  and  resolve 

disputes;  „      ,  .  .,,.  ..  v,    i.u 

That  nations  will  not  be  prisoners  of  a  bitter,  unremitting  past— we  can  be  the 

shapers  of  a  better  and  more  hopeful  future; 
That  humankind  is  not  inexorably  doomed  to  repeat  the  disasters  of  history— 

what  always  was  need  not  always  be.  ,    „  ,  ,,        j 

Just  as  the  Bible  tells  us  "the  effect  of  righteousness  shall  be  peace    so  do  we 

know— from  observation  and  intuition— that  we  who  share  this  vulnerable  planet 

can  never  come  into  our  full  human  inheritance  until  we  can  put  bloodshed  and 

war  behind  us.  SALT  II  can  help  us  achieve  this  goal. 

The  Chairman.  Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Vorspan. 
Mr.  Vorspan.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 
The  Chairman.  That  concludes  the  hearing  this  afternoon. 
[Whereupon,  at  5:24  p.m.,  the  committee  adjourned,  to  reconvene 
at  10:30  a.m.,  September  7,  1979.] 


SALT  II  TREATY 


FRIDAY,  SEPTEMBER  7,  1979 

United  States  Senate, 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations, 

Washington,  D.C. 
The  committee  met,  at  10:30  a.m.,  pursuant  to  notice,  in  room 
318,  Russell  Senate  Office  Building,  Hon.  Frank  Church  (chairman 
of  the  committee)  presiding. 
Present:  Senators  Church,  Glenn,  Stone,  Javits,  and  Percy. 
Senator  Percy  [presiding].  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

opening  statement 

We  apologize  to  our  witnesses  for  the  delay  this  morning.  Obvi- 
ously, the  events  of  the  last  few  days  have  torn  into  the  schedules 
of  many  of  our  Senators,  including  our  chairman. 

Today  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  continues  to  hear 
from  public  witnesses  on  the  SALT  II  Treaty.  This  morning  we 
have  a  panel  consisting  of  Robert  Schmidt,  vice  president  of  the 
Control  Data  Corp.,  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  American  Commit- 
tee on  East-West  Accord,  Dr.  Herbert  Scoville,  who  serves  as  co- 
chairman  of  the  New  Directions  Task  Force  on  Arms  Control  and 
Disarmament;  Peter  Baugher,  testifying  for  the  Ripon  Society;  and 
John  Carey,  appearing  for  the  American  Legion. 

Following  the  panel.  Lane  Kirkland  will  deliver  a  statement  for 
the  AFL-CIO. 

Gentlemen,  I  understand  that  you  each  have  10-minute  oral 
presentations.  Your  longer  written  statements  will  be  put  in  the 
record.  After  your  presentations,  the  committee  will  direct  its  ques- 
tions to  the  entire  panel. 

I  think  the  best  way  to  proceed  is  in  alphabetical  order.  We  will 
hear  from  the  American  Committee  first,  followed  by  the  American 
Legion,  and  so  on.  Mr.  Schmidt,  if  you  would  please  begin,  and  as 
the  Senators  pay  reasonably  good  attention  to  the  lights,  we  would 
appreciate  your  keeping  them  in  mind  as  well.  They  will  be  just  a 
friendly  warning  to  you.  I  think  when  the  yellow  light  goes  on,  you 
have  1  minute  left.  Thank  you  very  much. 

STATEMENT  OF  ROBERT  D.  SCHMIDT,  PRESIDENT,  AMERICAN 
COMMITTEE  ON  EAST-WEST  ACCORD,  WASHINGTON,  D.C.> 

Mr.  Schmidt.  Mr.  Chairman  and  members  of  the  committee,  I 
am  Robert  D.  Schmidt,  president  of  the  American  Committee  on 
East- West  Accord,  and  executive  vice  president  of  Control  Data 
Corp.  The  group  I  represent  today,  the  American  Committee  on 


See  page  153  for  Mr.  Schmidt's  prepared  statement. 

(149) 


150 

East-West  Accord,  is  a  diverse  one.  On  its  board  and  among  its 
officers  and  members  are  people  of  international  repute,  represent- 
ing academia,  industry,  the  world  of  science,  diplomacy,  private 
foundations,  labor  unions,  the  legal  and  publishing  professions,  and 
lay  people  who  believe  that  only  through  normalization  of  relations 
with  the  Soviet  Union  can  we  maintain  a  workable  and  lasting 
peace  on  this  planet. 

The  American  Committee  has  a  strong  and  continuing  interest  to 
promote  the  SALT  process.  We  have  a  strong  and  continuing  inter- 
est to  promote  United  States-Soviet  trade.  Both  are  essential.  Trade 
and  the  SALT  process  reinforce  each  other.  They  both  contribute  to 
lessening  those  international  tensions  we  know  must  be  controlled 
lest  our  acknowledged  ability  to  destroy  life  on  Earth  as  we  know  it 

■jo  ii'Til^fisriGH 

The  hearings  on  SALT  II  thiis  far  have  placed  primary  emphasis 
on  military  relations  between  the  Unites  States  and  the  U.S.S.R. 
Who  is  ahead  in  what  weapon?  Who  will  be  ahead  in  1985?  Which 
nation  is  likely  to  get  a  scientific  breakthrough  providing  a  mili- 
tary advantage?  Which  nation  is  spending  more  for  military  re- 
search and  development? 

Both  societies  put  more  effort  and  money  into  planning  for  a  war 
than  on  planning  how  to  get  along.  Both  societies  act  as  though  the 
best  way  to  preserve  peace  is  to  prepare  for  war.  There  has  been  no 
apparent  progress  from  this  kind  of  activity.  We  believe  that  the 
SALT  Treaty  represents  some  progress. 

Perhaps  the  best  way  to  preserve  peace  is  to  adopt  a  new  strat- 
egy that  depends  more  on  negotiation  than  confrontation. 

I  am  not  so  naive  as  to  believe  that  either  the  United  States  or 
the  Soviet  Union  is  about  to  summarily  transfer  research  and 
development  funds  from  military  purposes  to  peaceful  purposes. 
Nevertheless,  there  are  many  activities  we  might  carry  on  in 
tandem  with  our  potential  antagonists  which  may  lessen  the  likeli- 
hood of  military  confrontation. 

SALT  AND   UNITED   STATES-SOVIET  TRADE 

One  of  those  areas  is  trade.  I  emphasize  the  importance  of  trade 
because  the  American  Committee  believes  Senate  approval  of 
SALT  II  is  essential  to  preserve  and  promote  a  climate  in  which 
nonstrategic  trade,  joint  development  of  energy,  and  other  projects 
of  common  interest  may  be  carried  out  to  the  mutual  advantage  of 
both  societies,  economically  and  politically. 

Trade  is  a  path  to  understanding.  It  costs  us  nothing.  It  costs  the 
Russians  nothing.  Trade  is  engaged  in  only  if  both  parties  receive 
benefits  for  themselves. 

Granted  that  ill-conceived  trade  policies  can  generate  negative 
relationships  among  countries,  nevertheless,  as  Prof  Thomas 
Schelling  has  written,  "Aside  from  war  and  preparations  for 
war  *  *  *  trade  is  the  most  important  relationship  most  countries 
have  with  each  other.  Broadly  defined  *  *  *  trade  is  what  most  of 
international  relations  is  all  about." 

Accepting  the  importance  of  trade  in  international  relations,  it 
follows  that  an  even-handed,  realistic,  and  vigorously  pursued 
trade  policy  can  produce  positive  results.  Trade  can  be  a  weapon  of 
war  or  an  instrument  for  peace;  or  put  more  delicately,  trade  can 


151 

promote  confrontation  or  negotiation.  That  is  for  the  parties  to 
choose. 

If  SALT  II  is  rejected,  the  temptation  to  use  trade  as  a  weapon 
which  will  exacerbate  conflict  will  be  very  great.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  SALT  is  approved,  trade  between  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union  will  be  expanded,  and  the  ability  of  the  United 
States  to  influence  the  Soviet  Union  in  ways  which  will  serve  our 
long-term  security  will  be  enhanced. 

There  is  another  benefit  for  the  American  economy  that  will 
flow  from  a  successful  SALT  Treaty.  It  is  the  benefit  based  on  the 
common  sense  proposition  we  all  recognize,  that  both  parties  bene- 
fit from  trading.  If  we  are  moving  ahead  in  the  mutual  control  of 
strategic  weapons,  the  climate  of  United  States-Soviet  relations  will 
be  propitious  for  expanding  United  States-Soviet  trade.  Our  ad- 
verse balance  of  trade  over  the  past  few  years  demands  expansion 
of  our  export  market,  including  exports  to  the  Soviet  Union.  We  all 
know  of  the  importance  of  Soviet  purchases  of  grain  and  the  help 
that  that  has  given  to  balance  our  trade  deficit  with  the  world,  as 
well  as  to  maintain  farm  prices. 

We  have  not  done  as  well  in  the  export  of  industrial  products  to 
the  Soviet  Union.  Discrimination  against  Soviet  trade  imposed  by 
the  Jackson- Vanik  and  Stevenson  amendments  and  the  use  of 
trade  as  a  political  weapon  to  try  to  force  Soviet  emigration  policy 
into  line  with  our  concept  of  free  emigration  have  seriously  im- 
paired American  sales  to  and  purchases  from  the  Soviet  Union,  to 
the  detriment  of  our  economy  and  our  political  relations. 

Furthermore,  these  measures  have  not,  in  my  view,  been  as 
effective  as  would  have  been  the  encouragement  of  mutually  bene- 
ficial programs  in  science,  culture,  and  nonstrategic  trade. 

There  is  another  advantage  to  the  United  States  in  expanding 
trade  with  the  Soviet  Union.  It  is  that  our  system  of  free  enterprise 
is  so  much  more  efficient  than  the  Soviet  system  that  in  time  I 
believe  we  will  promote  greater  Soviet  awareness  of  western 
values.  Those  of  us  who  have  spent  substantial  periods  of  time  in 
the  Soviet  Union  over  the  past  decade  have  observed  changes, 
liberalization,  if  you  will,  which  we  would  have  thought  impossible 
a  decade  ago. 

For  example,  10  years  ago,  the  word  "profit"  did  not  seem  to 
exist  in  the  Soviet  vocabulary,  at  least  with  the  people  to  whom  I 
spoke.  Now,  it  is  commonplace  to  discuss  profit.  Five  years  ago  it 
was  not  possible  to  discuss  questions  of  joint  ventures.  Now  a 
number  of  elements  of  Soviet  society  are  exploring  ways  to  accom- 
modate joint  ventures. 

Five  years  ago  the  Soviets  never  mentioned  the  Voice  of  Amer- 
ica. Indeed,  Voice  of  America  broadcasts  were  regularly  jammed  by 
the  Soviet  Union  until  1973.  Not  so  long  ago,  in  Novosibirsk,  half- 
way around  the  world  from  my  home  office  in  Minneapolis,  Minn., 
a  Soviet  scientist  remarked  to  me  about  a  news  item  he  heard  the 
previous  evening  on  the  Voice  of  America. 

Western  views  are  beginning  to  seep  into  Soviet  society. 

SALT   AND   AMERICAN   SECURITY 

Thus  far,  I  have  emphasized  the  importance  of  SALT  to  the 
expansion  of  trade  and  U.S.  influence  in  the  Soviet  Union,  and  one 


152 

might  believe  that  I  ignore  the  effect  of  SALT  on  our  military 
strength.  In  the  words  of  Secretary  of  Defense  Brown: 

National  security  is  more  than  a  matter  of  military  strength.  It  includes  economic 
strength.  It  includes,  in  the  case  of  the  United  States,  our  enormous  agricultural 
production.  It  includes  our  technological  capabilities,  and  it  includes  also  our  self- 
confidence,  self-cohesion,  and  will. 

So  much  of  the  emphasis  in  these  hearings  has  been  on  what  I 
consider  to  be  the  exaggerated  strengths  of  the  Soviet  Union  that 
we  forget  our  own  tremendous  strengths. 

Consider,  for  example,  some  of  the  security  advantages  we  have 
over  the  Soviet  Union — borders  with  friendly  nations,  Canada  and 
Mexico.  In  contrast,  the  Soviet  Union  has  as  neighbors  China  and  a 
number  of  Eastern  European  ethnic  groups  always  threatening 
turmoil.  Consider  our  NATO  allies  in  contrast  to  the  Soviet 
Warsaw  Pact  allies.  And  consider  the  Soviet  domestic  situation  in 
contrast  to  our  own,  a  situation  well  summed  up  by  Prof.  J.  S. 
Berliner,  an  eminent  Soviet  specialist  at  Brandeis  University  and  a 
member  of  the  Harvard  Research  Center. 

Berliner  writes  that  Soviet  policy  is  in  a  shambles  and  believes 
that  they  have  lost  most  of  their  sources  of  influence  around  the 
world  that  they  had  once  hoped  to  have,  to  the  point  that  their 
economy  has  lost  its  djmamism  and  is  no  longer  a  model  for  the 
Third  World  or  anywhere  else. 

"It  is  ironic,"  Berliner  writes,  "that  they  have  only  one  major 
source  of  influence  left,  military  prowess.  That  should  be  small 
comfort  for  all  that  they  do  not  have." 

I  will  skip  some  of  my  oral  testimony  because  I  see  the  red  light 
is  on. 

The  Chairman  [presiding].  It  is  always  surprising  how  fast  10 
minutes  does  go  by.  It  comes  to  only  about  4  pages  of  written 
testimony. 

Mr.  Schmidt.  Let  us  look  at  the  assertion  that  the  one  major 
source  of  influence  left  to  the  Soviet  Union  is  military  prowess. 

In  the  last  few  weeks  we  have  heard  opponents  of  the  SALT 
Treaty  repeat  and  repeat  that  the  United  States  is  behind  the 
Soviet  Union  in  military  strength.  For  that  reason,  opponents 
argue,  the  U.S.  Senate  must  reject  SALT  II. 

This  makes  no  sense  to  me  for  the  simple  reason  that  if  there 
were  no  SALT  agreement  there  would  be  no  limitations  whatsoever 
on  the  production  of  nuclear  weapons  by  either  side.  With  SALT, 
for  the  first  time,  we  have  an  agreed  overall  limit  on  the  number 
of  strategic  nuclear  delivery  vehicles  for  each  side — 2,250. 

But  it  is  not  to  the  numbers  and  the  footnotes  of  the  SALT 
Treaty  to  which  Americans  must  look  to  determine  whether  the 
treaty  is  in  our  security  interests.  We  need,  rather,  to  apply  our 
own  commonsense. 

Is  it  reasonable  to  believe  that  for  7  years  the  Russians  have 
managed  to  out-negotiate  American  representatives  of  three  Presi- 
dents? 

Is  it  reasonable  to  believe  that  our  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  would 
recommend  the  treaty  to  the  Senate  if  they  thought  it  would 
damage  their  security  interests? 

Is  it  reasonable  to  believe  that  all  of  our  NATO  allies  would  urge 
ratification  of  SALT  if  they  did  not  mean  it? 


153 

Is  it  reasonable  to  believe  that  American  security  will  be  promot- 
ed by  a  reversion  to  the  cold  war,  that  we  are  more  secure  in  a 
world  of  confrontation  than  negotiation? 

Even  if  one  believes  the  United  States  is  behind  the  Russians  in 
some  categories  of  weapons,  or  that  we  are  inferior  militarily 
across  the  board,  which  I  do  not  accept,  the  problem  is  the  failure 
of  our  own  system  to  use  our  resources  wisely  to  achieve  a  qual- 
ity— rather  than  quantity — defensive  strategy. 

In  conclusion,  though  SALT  may  not  be  all  we  want,  we  will 
invite  a  disastrous  escalation  of  the  arms  race  if  it  is  rejected,  but 
with  the  approval  of  SALT,  I  believe  we  will  move  toward  further 
arms  reductions  which  we  and  the  Russians  want  and  need,  and 
there  will  be  a  basis  for  improvement  in  United  States-Soviet  rela- 
tions in  other  fields  as  well,  including  trade. 

Mr.  Chairman,  the  American  Committee  on  East-West  Accord 
has  recently  adopted  statements  on  SALT  II  and  on  trade,  and  I 
ask  that  they  be  included  at  the  end  of  my  remarks.  Thank  you. 

[Mr.  Schmidt's  prepared  statement  follows:] 

Prepared  Statement  of  Robert  D.  Schmidt 

Mr.  Chairman  and  members  of  the  C!ommittee:  I  am  Robert  D.  Schmidt,  President 
of  the  American  Committee  on  East- West  Accord,  and  Executive  Vice  President  of 
Control  Data  Corporation. 

The  group  I  represent  today — the  American  Committee  on  East-West  Accord — is  a 
diverse  one.  On  its  board,  and  among  its  officers  and  members,  are  people  of 
international  repute,  representing  academia,  industry,  the  world  of  science,  diplo- 
macy, private  foundations  labor  unions,  the  legal  and  publishing  professions,  and 
lay  people  who  believe  that  only  through  normalization  of  relations  with  the  Soviet 
Union  can  we  maintain  a  workable  and  lasting  peace  on  this  planet.' 

The  American  Committee  has  a  strong  and  continuing  interest  to  promote  the 
SALT  process.  We  have  a  strong  and  continuing  interest  to  promote  United  States- 
Soviet  trade.  Both  are  essential.  Trade  and  the  SALT  process  reinforce  each  other. 
They  both  contribute  to  lessening  those  international  tensions  we  know  must  be 
controlled  lest  our  acknowledged  ability  to  destroy  life  on  Earth  as  we  know  it  is 
unleashed. 

The  hearings  on  SALT  H,  thus  far,  have  placed  primary  emphasis  on  military 
relations  of  the  United  States  and  the  U.S.S.R.  Who  is  ahead  in  what  weapon?  Who 
will  be  ahead  in  1985?  Which  nation  is  likely  to  get  a  scientific  breakthrough 
providing  a  military  advantage?  Which  nation  is  spending  more  for  military  re- 
search and  development? 

Both  societies  put  more  effort  and  money  into  planning  for  a  war  than  on 
planning  on  how  to  get  along.  Both  societies  act  as  though  the  best  way  to  preserve 
peace  is  to  prepare  for  war.  There  has  been  no  apparent  progress  from  this  kind  of 
activity. 

Perhaps  the  best  way  to  preserve  peace  is  to  adopt  a  new  strategy  that  depends 
more  on  negotiations  than  confrontation. 

SALT  AND  united  STATES-SOVIET  TRADE 

I  am  not  so  naive  as  to  believe  that  either  the  United  States  or  the  Soviet  Union 
is  about  to  summarily  transfer  research  and  development  funds  from  military 
purposes  to  peaceful  purposes.  Nevertheless,  there  are  many  activities  we  might 
carry  on  in  tandem  with  our  potential  antagonist  which  may  lessen  the  likelihood  of 
military  confrontation. 

One  of  those  areas  is  trade. 


'  Officers  and  members  of  the  Board  of  the  American  Committee  are:  John  Kenneth  Gal- 
braith — Co-Chairman,  Donald  M.  Kendall — Co-Chairman,  George  F.  Kennan — Co-Chairman, 
Robert  D.  Schmidt — President,  Fred  Warner  Neal — Executive  Vice  President,  Stephen  Schloss- 
berg — Vice  President,  Carl  Marcy — Secretary-Treasurer  &  Co-Director,  William  Attwood,  Meyer 
Berger,  Tilford  Dudley,  Joseph  Filner,  Curtis  Cans,  Theodore  M.  Hesburgh,  C.S.C,  Vice  Admiral 
J.  M.  Lee,  Jeanne  V.  Mattison — Co-Director,  Stewart  R.  Mott,  Harold  B.  Scott,  Jeremy  J.  Stone, 
Kenneth  W.  Thompson,  Mrs.  James  P.  Warburg,  Jerome  B.  Wiesner. 


154 

I  emphasize  the  importance  of  trade  because  the  American  Ck)mmittee  believes 
Senate  approval  of  SALT  II  is  essential  to  preserve  and  promote  a  climate  in  which 
non-strategic  trade,  joint  development  of  energy,  and  other  projects  of  common 
interest  may  be  carried  out  to  the  mutual  advantage  of  both  societies,  economically 
and  politically. 

Trade  is  a  path  to  understanding.  It  costs  us  nothing,  it  costs  the  Russians 
nothing.  Trade  is  engaged  in  only  if  both  parties  perceive  benefits  for  themselves. 

Granted  that  ill-conceived  trade  policies  can  generate  negative  relationships 
among  countries,  nevertheless,  as  Professor  Thomas  Schelling  has  written: 

"Aside  from  war  and  preparations  for  war  .  .  .  trade  is  the  most  important 
relationship  most  countries  have  with  each  other.  Broadly  defined  .  .  .  trade  is 
what  most  of  international  relations  is  all  about." 

Accepting  the  importance  of  trade  in  international  relations,  it  follows  that  an 
even-handed,  realistic,  and  vigorously  pursued  trade  policy  can  produce  positive 
results. 

Trade  can  be  a  weapon  of  war,  or  an  instrument  for  peace;  or,  put  more  delicate- 
ly, trade  can  promote  confrontations,  or  negotiations.  That  is  for  the  parties  to 
choose. 

If  SALT  II  is  rejected,  the  temptation  to  use  trade  as  a  weapon,  which  will 
exacerbate  conflict,  will  be  very  great.  On  the  other  hand,  if  SALT  is  approved, 
trade  between  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  will  be  expanded  and  the 
ability  of  the  United  States  to  influence  the  Soviet  Union  in  ways  which  will  serve 
our  long  term  security  will  be  enhanced. 

But  there  is  another  benefit  for  the  American  economy  that  will  flow  from  a 
successful  SALT  Treaty.  It  is  the  benefit  based  on  the  common  sense  proposition  we 
all  recognize — that  both  parties  benefit  from  trading. 

If  we  are  moving  ahead  in  the  mutual  control  of  strategic  weapons,  the  climate  of 
United  States-Soviet  relations  will  be  propitious  for  expanding  United  States-Soviet 
trade.  Our  adverse  balance  of  trade  over  the  past  few  years  demands  expansion  of 
our  export  markets — including  exports  to  the  Soviet  Union. 

We  all  know  of  the  importance  of  Soviet  purchases  of  grain  and  the  help  that  has 
given  to  balance  our  trade  deficit  with  the  world,  as  well  as  to  maintain  farm  prices. 

We  have  not  done  as  well  in  the  export  of  industrial  products  to  the  Soviet  Union. 
Discrimination  against  Soviet  trade  imposed  by  the  Jackson-Vanik  and  Stevenson 
amendments  and  the  use  of  trade  as  a  political  weapon  to  try  to  force  Soviet 
emigration  policy  into  line  with  our  concepts  of  free  emigration  have  seriously 
impaired  America  sales  to,  and  purchases  from,  the  Soviet  Union — to  the  detriment 
of  our  economy  and  our  political  relations.  Furthermore,  these  measures  have  not, 
in  my  view,  been  as  effective  as  would  have  been  the  encouragement  of  mutually 
beneficial  programs  in  science,  culture,  and  non-strategic  trade. 

There  is  another  advantage  to  the  United  States  in  expanding  trade  with  the 
Soviet  Union.  It  is  that  our  system  of  free  enterprise  is  so  incomparably  more 
efficient  than  the  Soviet  system  that  in  time  I  believe  we  will  promote  greater 
Soviet  awareness  of  Western  values.  Those  of  us  who  have  spent  substantial  periods 
of  time  in  the  Soviet  Union  over  the  past  decade  have  observed  changes — liberaliza- 
tion, if  you  will — which  we  would  have  thought  impossible  a  decade  ago. 

For  example: 

Ten  years  ago,  the  word  "profit"  didn't  seem  to  exist  in  the  Soviet  vocabulary — at 
least  with  the  people  to  whom  I  spoke.  Now  it  is  commonplace  to  discuss  "profit." 

Five  years  ago,  it  was  not  possible  to  discuss  questions  of  joint  ventures.  Now,  a 
number  of  elements  of  Soviet  society  are  exploring  ways  to  accommodate  joint 
ventures. 

Five  years  ago,  the  Soviets  never  mentioned  the  Voice  of  America.  Indeed,  Voice 
of  America  broadcasts  were  regularly  jammed  by  the  Soviet  Union  until  1973.  Not 
so  long  ago,  in  Novosibirsk  (halfway  around  the  world  from  my  home  office  in 
Minneapolis,  Minnesota)  a  Soviet  scientist  remarked  to  me  about  a  news  item  he 
heard  the  previous  evening  on  the  Voice  of  America. 

Western  views  are  beginning  to  seep  into  Soviet  society. 

SALT   AND   AMERICAN   SECURITY 

Thus  far  I  have  emphasized  the  importance  of  SALT  to  the  expansion  of  trade 
and  U.S.  influence  in  the  Soviet  Union  and  one  might  believe  that  I  ignore  the 
effect  of  SALT  on  our  military  strength.  In  the  words  of  Secretary  of  Defense 
Brown,  "national  security  is  more  than  a  matter  of  military  strength.  It  includes 
economic  strength.  It  includes  in  the  case  of  the  United  States  our  enormous 
agricultural  production;  it  includes  our  technological  capabilities;  and  it  includes 
also,  our  self-confidence,  self-cohesion,  and  will." 


155 

So  much  of  the  emphasis  in  these  hearings  has  been  on  what  I  consider  to  be  the 
exaggerated  strengths  of  the  Soviet  Union  that  we  forget  our  own  tremendous 

Consider,  for  example,  some  of  the  security  advantages  we  have  over  the  Soviet 
Union— borders  with  friendly  nations,  Canada  and  Mexico.  In  contrast,  the  Soviet 
Union  has  as  neighbors  China  and  a  number  of  Eastern  European  ethnic  groups 
always  threatening  turmoil. 

Consider  our  NATO  allies,  in  contrast  to  the  Soviets'  Warsaw  Pact  allies. 

And  consider  the  Soviet  domestic  situation  in  contrast  to  our  own— a  situation 
well  summed  up  by  Professor  J.  S.  Berliner,  an  eminent  Soviet  specialist  at  Bran- 
deis  University  and  a  member  of  the  Harvard  Research  Center. 

Berliner  writes  that  Soviet  policy  is  in  a  shambles,  and  believes  that  they  have 
lost  most  of  their  sources  of  influence  around  the  world  that  they  had  once  hoped  to 
have,  to  the  point  that  their  economy  has  lost  its  dynamism  and  is  no  longer  a 
model  for  the  Third  World  or  anywhere  else. 

"It  is  ironic,"  Berliner  writes,  "that  they  have  only  one  major  source  of  influence 
left,  military  prowess.  .  .  .  That  should  be  small  comfort  for  all  that  they  do  not 
have."  (Taken  from  article  to  be  published  in  the  forthcoming  issue  of  Commentary.) 

Let  us  look  at  the  assertion  that  the  one  major  source  of  influence  left  to  the 
Soviet  Union  is  military  prowess. 

In  the  last  few  weeks  we  have  heard  opponents  of  the  SALT  Treaty  repeat  and 
repeat  that  the  United  States  is  behind  the  Soviet  Union  in  military  strength.  For 
that  reason,  opponents  argue,  the  U.S.  Senate  must  reject  SALT  II. 

This  makes  no  sense  to  me  for  the  simple  reason  that  if  there  were  no  SALT 
agreement  there  would  be  no  limitations  whatsoever  on  the  production  of  nuclear 
weapons  by  either  side.  With  SALT,  for  the  first  time,  we  have  an  agreed  overall 
limit  on  the  number  of  strategic  nuclear  delivery  vehicles  for  each  side— 2,250. 

But  it  is  not  to  the  numbers  and  the  footnotes  of  the  SALT  Treaty  to  which 
Americans  must  look  to  determine  whether  the  Treaty  is  in  our  security  interests. 
We  need  rather  to  apply  our  own  good  sense. 

Is  it  reasonable  to  believe  that  for  seven  years  the  Russians  have  managed  to  out- 
negotiate  American  representatives  of  three  Presidents? 

Is  it  reasonable  to  believe  that  our  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  would  recommend  the 
Treaty  to  the  Senate  if  they  thought  it  damaged  our  security  interests? 

Is  it  reasonable  to  believe  that  all  our  NATO  allies  would  urge  ratification  of 
SALT  if  they  didn't  mean  it? 

Is  it  reasonable  to  believe  that  American  security  will  be  promoted  by  a  reversion 
to  the  Cold  War,  that  we  are  more  secure  in  a  world  of  confrontation  than  negotia- 
tion? 

Even  if  one  believes  the  United  States  is  behind  the  Russians  m  some  categories 
of  weapons,  or  that  we  are  inferior  militarily  across  the  board— which  I  do  not 
accept— the  problem  is  the  failure  of  our  own  system  to  use  our  resources  wisely  to 
achieve  a  quality— rather  than  quantity— defense  strategy. 

In  conclusion,  though  SALT  may  not  be  all  we  want,  we  will  invite  a  disastrous 
escalation  of  the  arms  race  if  it  is  rejected.  But  with  the  approval  of  SALT,  I  believe 
we  will  move  toward  further  arms  reductions  which  we  and  the  Russians  want  and 
need,  and  there  will  be  a  basis  for  improvements  in  United  States— Soviet  relations 
in  other  fields  as  well,  including  trade. 

Mr.  Chairman,  the  American  Committee  on  East- West  Accord  has  recently  adopt- 
ed statements  on  SALT  II  and  on  trade.  I  ask  that  they  be  included  at  the  end  of  my 
remarks. 


U8-260    0-79    Pt.U    -    11 


156 


PAGE  FIVE      JUST  FOR  THE  PRESS 

AMERICAN  COMMITTEE  POLICIES 
ON  SALT,  TRADE,  AND  EDUCATIONAL  AND  CULTURAL  EXCHANGES. 

The  purpose  of  ihe  American  Commiitee  is  to  strengthen  public  understanding  of  arms  control  initiatives,  and  to  encourage 
mutually  beneficial  programs  in  science,  culture,  and  non-siraicgic  trade  beineen  the  U.S.  and  the  Soviet  Union.  The  Committee 
believes  this  course  of  action  is  the  most  effective  way  of  furthering  human  rights,  liberalized  emigration  policies,  exchange  of 
information,  and  freedom  to  travel  for  peoples  of  all  nations. 

The  Board  of  Directors  of  the  American  Commiitee  approved  the  following  statement  at  its  meeting  on  April  18.  1979: 

STATEMENT  ON  SALT 

The  Amencan  Commiitee  on  Easi-Wesi  Accord  supporis  ihe  draft  treaty  negotiated  between  ihe  United  States  and  the  USSR  on  the 
limitation  of  strategic  arms  and  sirongK  urges  ils  approval  by  the  United  Stales  Senate. 

The  stakes  are  high.  Either  we  move  ahead  with  arms  limitation  and  reduce  the  threat  of  nuclear  war.  or  we  slip  back  into  an  era  of 
confrontation  and  escalating  arms  competition.  The  dangers  of  such  a  setback  are  obvious  and  serious.  The  increasing  sophistication  of 
strategic  weapons  on  both  sides  seems  to  accord  an  advantage  to  the  side  which  stnkes  first.  Even  if.  as  we  believe,  neither  side  would 
coniemplate  such  a  step,  growing  vulnerabilities  would  be  exploited  on  both  sides  b>  those  wishing  lo  escalate  ihe  arms  race, 
■  The  proposed  ireai>  is  the  culmination  of  efforis  b\  four  US  Administrations —  two  Democratic  and  tuo  Republican  —  to  stabilize  the 
nuclear  threat  posed  b\  each  superpower  against  the  other.  These  efforis  have  won  the  increasing  support  of  the  American  pubhc;  ioda\  four 
out  of  five  approve  the  effort  to  reach  a  SALT  agreement.  Just  as  Americans  have  a  high  siake  in  the  outcome  of  ihe  Senate  vote,  so  do  our 
allies,  who  could  —  and  probably  would  —  be  destroyed  along  with  ihe  two  major  powers  b>  a  U.S. -Soviet  nuclear  conflict. 

Any  agreement  limiting  strategic  arms  must  meet  one  overriding  requirement;  it  must  enhance  the  securiu  of  the  United  States.  We  believe 
This  treaty  meets  that  requirement.  The  strategic  forces  of  the  United  States  and  the  USSR  are  nol  identical;  ihe\  differ  widel\  in  structure, 
deployment,  and  weapons  systems,  as  geography  makes  it  natural  they  should.  But  the  treaty  will  bring  these  forces  into  overall  balance.  It  will 
for  the  first  lime  cause  a  reduction  in  the  stockpiles  of  strategic  delivery  vehicles.  It  will  place  restrictions  upon  development  and  deployment 
of  certain  types  of  strategic  weapons  It  will  moderate  arms  competition  between  the  two  great  powers  and  ihus  contribute  to  the  maintenance 
of  the  present  essential  equivalence  in  strategic  nuclear  arms. 

We  regret  that  SALT  II  does  not  place  more  effective  controls  upon  improvements  in  the  nuclear  arms  permitted  under  the  treaty.  Ii  does 
not  prevent  the  development  of  a  counterforce  capability  on  either  side  and  thus  prolongs  the  danger  that  mutual  fears  and  suspicions  could 
precipitate  nuclear  »ar  in  a  critical  situation.  It  might  even  encourage  more  intense  arms  competition  m  weapon  systems  nol  limited  or 
proscribed  b\  the  treaty.  We  therefore  call  upon  both  governments  to  reexamine  their  military  concepts  and  strategies  and  to  clarify  and 
cunail  their  commitments  to  existing  and  contemplated  arms  programs. 

Despite  these  weaknesses,  SALT  II  isanindispensablesiepin  the  continuing  process  of  lifting  from  mankind  notonly  the  terrible  shadow  of 
nuclear  war  but  the  dcbiliiaiing  economic  burden  of  arms  expenditures.  The  resources  of  both  countnes  are  already  strained  by  the  need  to 
maintain  and  to  strengthen  their  militarv  establishments.  Without  further  progress  on  arms  control  be>ond  SALT  11.  both  nations  will 
increase  their  arms  ex|>enditures.  thus  diverting  human  and  material  resources  from  uses  beneficial  to  mankind,  causing  both  countries  to 
overtax  their  financial  and  material  resources  and  —  certainly  in  the  United  States  —  contributing  to  inflationar>  pressure. 

A  failure  to  ratify  SALT  II  would  not  only  undermine  the  strategic  balance  which  is  achieved  by  the  draft  treaty  but  would  scuttle  arms 
control  for  years  to  come.  The  fears  and  uncertainties  which  would  ensue  would  make  even  more  difficult  than  at  present  the  problem  of 
pursuing  a  consistent  and  effective  foreign  policy  insuppori  of  US,  interests  around  the  world  Above  all.  it  would  be  widely  interpreted  as  a 
sign  that  the  American  people  had  lost  interest  in  reducing  U.S. -Soviet  tensions  and  improving  the  prospects  for  world  peace. 

Approval  of  SALT  II  should  usher  in  a  new- era  in  U.S. -Soviet  relations.  It  will  reduce  mutual  fears  and  suspicions.  It  will  ease  the  resolution 
of  disputes  between  the  two  nations.  It  will  create  an  atmosphere  m  which  trade  and  cooperation  can  prosper.  In  such  an  atmosphere  lies  the 
greatest  chance  not  only  for  world  peace  but  for  the  sort  of  liberalization  in  Soviet  society  that  we  would  like  to  see. 

We  recognize  that  SALT  II  will  not  produce  any  sudden  or  dramatic  abatement  of  the  U.S. -Soviet  competition  for  world  influence.  But  in 
approving  the  agreement  and  in  continuation  of  the  SALT  process  lies  the  greatest  prospect  that  both  countries  will  carry  on  that  competition 
by  peaceful  means  and  reduce  their  reliance  upon  military  power. 

The  SALT  11  agreement  deserves  the  overwhelming  support  of  the  American  people  and  of  its  legislative  representatives. 

STATEMENT  ON  TRADE  j^,^.  ^  ^^-j^ 

While  welcoming  reports  that  the  Caner  Administration  is  about  to  sign  a  trade  agreement  with  China,  the  American  Committee  has  grave 
misgivings  as  to  the  agreements  impact  on  SALT  II. 

We  are  deeply  concerned  that  the  U.S,  be  even-handed  in  its  treatment  of  China  and  the  Soviet  Union  with  respect  to  extension  of 
Mosi-Favored-Nation  treatment  of  imports  from  both  nations.  We  believe  it  would  be  a  grave  mistake  ai  this  time  to  take  any  action  which 
would  be  viewed  either  in  the  US,,  China,  or  the  Soviet  Union,  as  tilting  toward  China.  Any  discrimination  in  the  treatment  of  the  two 
communist  countnes  on  matters  of  trade  could  onK  damage  prospecis  for  SALT  II. 

The  American  Committee  is  in  fa\or  of  a  Presidential  waiver,  under  ihe  authority  which  the  President  now  posesses.  to  extend 
Mosi-Favored-Naiion  treatment  to  both  countries  and  Amendments  to  the  Trade  Act  which  would  honor  U.S.  commitments  under  the  1972 
Trade  Agreement  to  extend  unconditional  and  non-di*.criminator\  MFN  tariff  treatment  and  Export-Import  Bank  credits  to  the  USSR  and 
China  simultaneous!) 

The  American  Committee  believes  such  moves  are  in  ihe  national  interest  of  the  United  States  and  also  of  importance  for  the  American 
economv. 

The  Committee  believes  these  moves  should  proceed  at  the  same  iime  as  Administration  efforts  to  obtain  approval  of  SALT  II 


157 

The  Chairman.  Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Schmidt,  for  an 
excellent  statement.  I  am  sorry  to  have  to  urge  witnesses  to  limit 
their  presentations  to  10  minutes,  but  in  order  for  the  committee  to 
remain  on  schedule  and  to  give  members  an  opportunity  to  ask 
questions,  I  think  that  is  just  going  to  be  necessary. 

Our  next  witness  is  John  Carey.  Gentlemen,  we  will  ask  for  each 
of  you  to  give  your  statements,  and  then  we  will  question  the  panel 
as  the  Senators  may  care  to  do. 

John  Carey  is  the  immediate  past  national  commander  of  the 
American  Legion. 

Mr.  Carey,  we  are  very  pleased  to  have  you  here  and  to  have  the 
benefit  of  your  testimony  this  morning. 

STATEMENT  OF  JOHN  CAREY,  PAST  NATIONAL  COMMANDER, 
THE  AMERICAN  LEGION,  WASHINGTON,  D.C.» 

Mr.  Carey.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

I  appreciate  the  opportunity  to  present  the  views  of  the  Ameri- 
can Legion  on  a  matter  of  vital  interest  to  our  organization  and  to 
the  Nation.  We  are  well  aware  of  the  situation  in  Cuba,  where  the 
Soviets  have  deployed  a  combat  brigade,  including  armor,  infantry, 
and  artillery  units  together  with  combat  support  units.  We  believe 
this  constitutes  a  violation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  We  also  believe 
that  the  presence  of  this  brigade  constitutes  a  military  base  prohib- 
ited in  the  1962  agreements  with  the  Soviets. 

The  American  Legion  3  weeks  ago  at  its  national  convention 
urged  Congress  to  take  whatever  action  is  necessary  to  oppose 
spread  of  communism  within  the  Western  Hemisphere.  This  fla- 
grant stationing  of  Soviet  troops  in  nearby  Cuba  certainly  violates 
the  unanimous  position  taken  by  our  delegates.  Accordingly,  we 
urge  this  committee  to  postpone  any  further  action  on  the  strategic 
arms  limitation  agreement  currently  pending  until  such  time  as  all 
Soviet  combat  troops  have  been  withdrawn  from  the  island  of 
Cuba. 

All  members  of  the  organization,  Mr.  Chairman,  are  veterans  of 
wartime  service,  and  many  of  us  have  personally  experienced  the 
horror  of  war.  As  veterans,  we  realize  full  well  that  if  conventional 
wars  are  horrendous,  nuclear  war  would  be  an  unspeakable  catas- 
trophe for  mankind.  Thus  it  should  not  be  surprising  that  we  have 
long  supported  the  concept  of  strategic  arms  limitation.  Our  funda- 
mental position  has  been  that  a  strategic  arms  limitation  treaty 
should  be  equitable,  should  actually  halt  the  arms  race,  should 
reduce  tensions  and  the  likelihood  of  war,  and  should  be  fully 
verifiable. 

We  have  insisted  that  such  a  treaty  should  not  place  the  United 
States  in  an  inferior  strategic  position.  We  realize  that  each  of  the 
contributions  made  by  the  treaty  is  subject  to  violations,  and  that 
many  experts  have  expressed  concern  over  what  they  consider  to 
be  our  Nation's  limited  ability  to  detect  violations. 

Our  organization,  although  likewise  concerned,  feels  that  it  can 
contribute  very  little  to  any  serious  debate  on  verification  since  we 
have  no  information  on  the  highly  classified  intelligence  gathering 
techniques  which  would  be  the  focal  points  of  any  such  debate. 


'  See  page  160  for  Mr.  Carey's  prepared  statement. 


158 

We  are  aware  that  it  was  determined  at  an  early  stage  of  the 
SALT  negotiations  that  the  total  number  of  missiles  and  warheads 
could  not  be  limited  because  of  verification  problems,  and  that 
therefore  the  criterion  becomes  the  number  of  launchers,  but  we 
strongly  recommend  that  the  United  States  not  abandon  the  princi- 
ple of  counting  all  nuclear  arms  during  the  SALT  III  negotiations, 
even  if  that  means  demanding  onsite  inspection. 

The  treaty's  prohibition  on  the  production  of  any  heavy  missiles 
is  tantamount  to  legitimizing  the  Soviet  throw-weight  advantage  in 
its  land-based  ICBM's  as  gained  through  deployment  of  the  SS-18. 
We  believe  there  should  be  a  counting  rule  adopted  under  the 
treaty  as  an  adjustment  for  the  awesome  power  of  the  SS-18.  Each 
SS-18  should  be  counted  as  more  than  one  launcher. 

This  provision  would  not  require  dismantling  any  of  the  heavy 
missiles,  but  would  necessitate  some  changes  in  the  makeup  or 
other  components  of  the  Soviet  arsenal. 

The  American  Legion  is  fully  aware  of  how  firm  Soviet  negotia- 
tors have  been  in  demanding  full  complement  of  the  SS-18.  It 
therefore  might  be  advisable  for  this  committee  to  consider  the 
adoption  of  a  new  heavy  missile  counting  rule  with  an  effective 
date  perhaps  in  1981  to  allow  the  Soviets  time  to  make  the  neces- 
sary adjustments  to  their  arsenal. 

Our  next  major  concern  over  the  pending  treaty  deals  with  the 
failure  to  include  the  Soviet  Backfire  bomber  as  a  strategic  nuclear 
delivery  vehicle  under  terms  of  the  agreement.  There  is  general 
agreement  that  the  Backfire  can  reach  targets  in  the  continental 
United  States  by  aerial  refueling  or  making  one-way  flights.  We 
have  two  recommendations  to  make  relevant  to  the  Backfire 
bomber. 

The  first  is  that  the  Soviet  Union  be  required  to  sign  and  official- 
ly acknowledge  the  letter  presented  by  Secretary  General  Brezhnev 
to  President  Carter  which  promised  the  bomber  would  not  be  de- 
ployed in  intercontinental  mode  and  that  its  production  would  not 
exceed  30  per  year. 

Our  second  recommendation  is  that  the  United  States  develop 
and  deploy  a  similar  number  of  comparable  aircraft.  Another 
aspect  of  the  treaty  that  essentially  disturbs  us  is  the  provisions 
regarding  encryption  of  telemetry  data.  The  treaty  prohibits  the 
encoding  of  radioed  missile  test  data  that  would  be  needed  to  verify 
compliance  with  the  treaty.  Each  side,  however,  is  allowed  to  deter- 
mine whether  or  not  such  data  would  be  needed  to  verify  compli- 
ance. 

Our  recommendation  is  that  both  sides  formally  agree  not  to 
encrypt  any  missile  test  data. 

We  are  also  concerned  with  the  treaty's  protocol  which  bans  the 
development  or  flight  testing  of  ICBM's  from  mobile  launchers,  and 
the  deployment  of  cruise  missiles  with  ranges  of  more  than  600 
kilometers  until  the  end  of  1981,  "will  assume  a  life  of  its  own," 
and  that  the  United  States  will  give  in  to  Soviet  demands  that  the 
protocol  remain  in  force  during  the  course  of  SALT  III  negotia- 
tions. 

We  recommend  that  the  Senate  approve  an  understanding  or 
reservation  stating  that  the  protocol  will  expire  on  schedule  unless 
this  extension  is  specifically  approved  by  the  Senate.  We  agree 


159 

with  the  critics  of  SALT  II  who  express  concern  that  the  treaty 
may  prevent  us  from  transferring  cruise  missile  or  other  technol- 
ogy to  our  NATO  allies.  We  believe  it  is  necessary  that  the  Senate 
clarify  U.S.  intentions  regarding  technology  transfer  by  adopting  a 
reservation  or  understanding.  It  is  very  clear  to  anyone  who  consid- 
ers himself  a  student  of  arms  limitation  talks  that  our  NATO  allies 
in  Western  Europe  have  more  than  a  passing  interest  in  the  pend- 
ing agreement. 

Since  the  Soviets  would  rather  the  United  States  not  assist 
NATO  in  improving  its  defenses,  especially  in  the  area  of  nuclear 
weaponry,  they  have  disputed  the  United  States'  right  to  continue 
to  exchange  nuclear  weapons  technology  with  Western  Europe.  A 
Senate  understanding  that  nothing  in  the  treaty  precludes  a  con- 
tinuation of  U.S.  technology  transfer  with  NATO  would  reaffirm 
our  commitment  to  the  alliance,  and  would  create  Soviet  uneasi- 
ness over  having  a  formidable  opposing  nuclear  strike  on  the  same 
continent. 

Mr.  Chairman,  the  American  Legion  seeks  an  adjustment  in  the 
procedure  for  reporting  treaty  violations.  The  treaty  now  provides 
that  all  actual  or  suspected  violations  be  reported  to  a  standing 
commission  for  consideration.  We  propose  a  reservation  or  under- 
standing that  would  require  a  simultaneous  reporting  of  all  such 
actual  or  suspected  violations  to  the  Senate  for  referral  to  the 
appropriate  committee. 

Such  reporting  of  violations  would  strengthen  the  United  States 
commitment  for  Soviet  compliance  with  the  agreement. 

Our  final  recommendation  to  correct  what  we  consider  to  be  a 
flaw  in  the  treaty  deals  with  the  agreed  statements  and  common 
understanding.  It  appears  as  though  these  explanations  of  treaty 
provisions  have  been  presented  as  separate  documents  and  there- 
fore are  not  subject  to  ratification  process.  If  this  is  the  case,  then 
we  demand  formal  Soviet  agreement  that  these  agreed  statements 
and  common  understandings  be  made  part  of  the  treaty  text. 

The  treaty  would  be  simply  unmanageable  without  such  an 
agreement. 

Mr.  Chairman,  we  have  called  for  several  modifications  to  the 
treaty,  some  of  which  seek  amendments  to  the  language,  and 
others  which  seek  unilateral  declarations  by  you  and  your  col- 
leagues, and  there  is  little  doubt  in  my  mind  that  the  American 
Legion  will  be  accused  by  some  of  proposing  so-called  killer  amend- 
ments and  accused  of  trying  to  sabotage  the  treaty. 

I  began  my  statement  by  saying  that  our  organization  has 
historically  endorsed  the  concept  of  limiting  strategic  arms.  I  came 
here  today  with  that  attitude,  and  presented  these  recommended 
modifications  in  that  spirit. 

In  fact,  our  organization  would  have  been  happy  if  both  sides 
were  forced  to  reduce  their  strategic  arsenals  by  50  percent  or 
more,  but  of  course  we  realize  that  such  reductions  ignore  the 
realities  of  negotiating  an  arms  agreement  in  an  environment  of 
unprecedented  weapons  production. 

I  have  asked  you  to  consider  three  amendments,  to  address  the 
ovei-whelming  Soviet  advantage  in  heavy  missiles,  to  prohibit  the 
encryption  of  telemetry,  and  to  insure  that  the  agreed  statements 
and  common  understandings  are  legally  binding.  Up  to  this  point 


160 

we  have  recommended  certain  amendments  to  the  treaty,  reserva- 
tions by  the  Senate  for  weapons  programs  to  help  compensate  for 
Soviet  strategic  advantages.  These  measures  alone,  ho^vever,  are 
insufficient  to  ensure  essential  equivalence  and  effective  deter- 
rence. 

As  I  mentioned  earlier,  our  organization  believes  that  the  time 
has  come  to  reconsider  our  fundamental  nuclear  strategy.  Again,  I 
shall  have  to  skip  in  the  interest  of  time,  sir,  and  will  say  that  we 
are  very  concerned  about  the  position  of  the  United  States  people 
and  their  apathy  toward  what  may  happen  if  a  treaty  is  signed. 

In  sum,  Mr.  Chairman,  we  believe  that  although  the  SALT  II 
Treaty,  if  it  is  adhered  to  fully  and  in  good  faith,  has  certain 
positive  features,  it  also  has  a  number  of  serious  deficiencies.  An 
even  greater  danger  than  the  deficiencies  of  the  treaty,  however,  is 
the  prospect  that  the  people  of  the  United  States  will  be  lulled  into 
a  false  sense  of  security  and  assume  that  the  treaty  will  eliminate 
the  likelihood  of  nuclear  war. 

We  must  realize  that  we  can  have  peace  only  through  strength. 
The  Soviet  Union  is  already  ahead  of  the  United  States  in  a 
number  of  strategic  areas,  and  by  all  projections  we  have  seen  that 
the  gap  will  grow  in  years  to  come.  The  American  Legion  will 
consider  support  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty  only  if  we  are  assured  that 
the  United  States  will  strengthen  its  defenses  along  the  lines  we 
have  outlined,  and  the  treaty  as  amended  and  modified  in  the 
areas  that  we  have  mentioned.  Thank  you,  sir. 

[Mr.  Carey's  prepared  statement  follows:] 

Prepared  Statement  of  John  Carey 

Thank  you  Mr.  Chairman:  I  am  Jack  Carey,  immediate  past  National  Commander 
of  The  American  Legion.  I  appreciate  the  opportunity  to  present  the  views  of  The 
American  Legion  on  a  matter  of  vital  interest  to  our  organization  and  to  the 
nation— the  limitation  of  strategic  nuclear  arms.  All  members  of  The  American 
Legion,  Mr.  Chairman,  are  veterans  of  wartime  service,  and  many  of  us  have 
personally  experienced  the  horror  of  war.  As  veterans,  we  realize  full  well  that  if 
conventional  wars  are  horrendous,  nuclear  war  would  be  an  unspeakable  catas- 
trophy  for  mankind.  Thus,  it  should  not  be  surprising  that  we  have  long  supported 
the  concept  of  strategic  arms  limitations. 

Our  fundamental  position  has  been  that  a  strategic  arms  limitation  treaty  should 
be  equitable,  should  actually  halt  the  arms  race,  should  reduce  tensions  and  the 
likelihood  of  war,  and  should  be  fully  verifiable.  We  have  insisted,  however,  that 
such  a  treaty  should  not  place  the  United  States  in  an  inferior  strategic  position. 

The  Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Treaty  now  before  the  Senate  does  not  fully  meet 
those  criteria,  but  before  we  enumerate  the  treaty's  shortcomings  let  us  acknowl- 
edge that  it  does  make  certain  positive  contributions. 

Although  both  sides— especially  the  Soviet  Union— will  continue  to  add  consider- 
ably to  their  nuclear  arsenals,  upper  limits  are  established  on  the  total  number  of 
strategic  launchers,  the  number  of  ICBM's  and  SLBM's  and  MIRVed  warheads,  and 

so  on. 

The  treaty  restricts  the  number  of  reentry  vehicles  either  country  can  install  on 
the  various  types  of  ICBM's  and  SLBM  missiles. 

The  treaty  prohibits  certain  basing  modes  for  strategic  launchers. 

The  treaty  prohibits  the  placing  in  orbit  nuclear  weapons  of  any  kind  including 
fractional  orbital  missiles.  ,      j       ,  i.    *■  j 

The  treaty  establishes  maximum  parameters  for  the  development,  testing,  and 
deployment  of  new  missile  types.  ,  . ,    . 

We  realize  that  each  of  these  provisions  is  subject  to  violations  and  that  many 
experts  have  expressed  concern  over  what  they  consider  to  be  our  nation  s  limited 
ability  to  detect  violations.  Our  organization,  although  likewise  concerned,  feels  that 
it  can  contribute  very  little  to  any  serious  debate  on  verification  since  we  have  no 
information  on  the  highly  classified  intelligence-gathering  techniques  which  would 
be  the  focal  points  of  any  such  debate. 


161 

Perhaps  the  most  serious  flaw  in  the  pending  treaty  is  that  it  covers  not  the  total 
number  of  missiles  and  warheads  possessed  by  each  side.  The  Soviet  Union  could 
legally  stockpile  an  unlimited  number  of  missiles.  Although  the  treaty  pledges  both 
sides  to  a  rather  vague  commitment  not  to  develop  a  "rapid  reload"  system,  the 
Soviets  can  launch  most  of  their  missiles  from  a  "cold  launch"  mode.  Even  without 
improving  existing  technology,  they  could  launch  a  second,  or  perhaps  third,  salvo 
from  their  silos  in  a  matter  of  hours.  Furthermore,  many  of  the  reserve  missiles 
could  be  stored  in  such  a  way  that  they  could  be  fired  in  place  within  a  short  period 
of  time.  Then,  of  course,  there  is  the  possibility  of  outright  cheating,  of  concealing 
full-fledged  launchers  in  violation  of  the  treaty.  In  the  event  of  a  war  or  a  major 
crisis,  the  existence  of  such  a  "ready  reserve"  could  give  the  U.S.S.R.  an  enormous 
strategic  advantage.  o  a  t  m  ■     • 

We  are  aware  that  it  was  determined  at  an  early  stage  of  the  SALT  negotiations 
that  the  total  number  of  missiles  and  warheads  could  not  be  limited  because  of 
verification  problems,  and  that  therefore  the  criterion  became  the  number  of 
"launchers".  But  we  strongly  recommend  that  the  United  States  not  abandon  the 
principle  of  counting  all  nuclear  arms  during  the  SALT  III  negotiations,  even  if  that 
means  demanding  on-site  inspections. 

Another  glaring  deficiency  of  the  treaty  is  that  the  Soviet  Union  is  allowed  a 
monopoly  on  heavy  missiles— the  SS-18.  As  has  been  pointed  out  numerous  times  in 
the  course  of  these  hearings,  those  missiles  will  be  sufficiently  accurate  by  the  early 
1980's  to  pose  a  significant  threat  to  our  land-based  ICBM's.  While  we  realize  that 
equivalence  does  not  necessarily  require  our  nuclear  arsenal  be  a  mirror  image  of 
the  Soviet  Union's,  we  strongly  recommend  that  the  United  States  urgently  proceed 
with  the  development,  production,  and  employment  of  the  M-X  missile,  which  will 
give  us  roughly  the  same  hard-target  capabilities  as  the  Soviet  Union  and  a  highly 
survivable  back-up  system  to  our  increasingly  vulnerable  land-based  ICBM's. 

The  treaty's  prohibition  on  the  production  of  any  heavy  missiles  is  tantamount  to 
legitimizing  the  Soviet  throw-weight  advantage  in  its  land-based  ICBM's  as  gained 
through  deployment  of  the  SS-18.  There  are  those  who  would  argue  that  U.S. 
advantages  in  SLBM  and  cruise  missile  technology  provides  an  overall  strategic 
balance.  However,  we  view  the  heavy  missile  prohibition  under  SALT  II  as  an 
inequitable  provision  and  one  which  must  be  addressed.  We  believe  that  there 
should  be  a  counting  rule  adopted  under  the  treaty  as  an  adjustment  for  the 
awesome  power  of  the  SS-18.  Each  SS-18  should  be  counted  as  more  than  one 
launcher.  This  provision  would  not  require  dismantling  any  of  the  heavy  missiles 
but  would  necessitate  some  changes  in  the  makeup  of  other  components  of  the  the 
Soviet  arsenal. 

The  American  Legion  is  fully  aware  of  how  firm  the  Soviet  negotiators  have  been 
in  demanding  a  full  compliment  of  SS-18's.  It,  therefore,  might  be  advisable  for  this 
Committee  to  consider  the  adoption  of  a  new  heavy  missile  counting  rule  with  an 
effective  date  several  years  in  the  future  to  allow  the  Soviets  ample  time  to  make 
the  necessary  adjustments  in  their  arsenal. 

The  value  of  the  SS-18  is  fully  realized  when  evaluating  the  most  often  cited 
nuclear  exchange  scenario— one  in  which  the  United  States  accepts  a  Soviet  first 
strike  from  its  land-based  ICBM  force.  With  continuing  improvements  in  Soviet 
missile  accuracy  we  could  expect  to  lose  more  than  half  of  our  retalj-^.tory  capability 
during  such  an  attack  while  the  Soviets  would  retain  as  much  as  75-80  percent  of 
their  strike  potential.  This  indeed  is  a  rather  shocking  possibility  and  one  which 
should  encourage  our  war  planners  to  reconsider  the  wisdom  of  accepting  a  Soviet 
first/  st^riiC6 

We  believe  that  one  of  the  most  effective  ways  of  countering  the  SS-18  is  to 
minimize  the  damage  inflicted  by  the  weapon  through  the  adoption  of  a  "launch  on 
warning"  policy.  It  s  rather  obvious  that  Soviet  weapons  experts  have  built  such 
explosive  power  into  the  SS-18  for  one  reason— to  give  it  a  hard  target  kill  capabili- 
ty, the  sort  of  hard  targets  found  in  and  around  U.S.  missile  silos.  If  we  adopt  a 
policy  under  which  the  S'^-18  would  strike  an  empty  silo  then  we  have  (1)  substan- 
tially reduced  the  effectiveness  of  an  otherwise  inflexible  weapons  system  and  (2) 
created  some  doubt  in  the  minds  of  Soviet  war  planners;  thereby,  reducing  their 
confidence  that  a  Soviet  victory  can  be  achieved  as  a  result  of  nuclear  exchange. 

I  will  expand  upon  our  justification  for  "launch  on  warning"  later  in  my  state- 
ment. 

Our  third  major  concern  over  the  pending  treaty  deals  with  the  failure  of  includ- 
ing the  Soviet  Backfire  bomber  as  a  strategic  nuclear  delivery  vehicle  under  terms 
of  the  agreement.  There  is  general  agreement  that  the  Backfire  can  reach  targets  in 
the  continental  United  States  by  aerial  refueling  or  by  making  one-way  flights. 
We  have  two  recommendations  to  make  relevent  to  the  Backfire  bomber.  The  first 
is  that  the  Soviet  Union  be  required  to  sign  and  officially  acknowledge  the  letter 


162 

presented  by  Secretary  General  Brezhnev  to  President  Carter  which  promised  that 
the  bomber  would  not  be  deployed  in  an  intercontinental  mode  and  that  its  produc- 
tion would  not  exceed  30  per  year.  Our  second  recommendation  is  that  the  United 
States  develop  and  deploy  a  similar  number  of  comparable  aircraft. 

Another  aspect  of  the  treaty  that  especially  disturbs  us  is  the  provision  regarding 
the  encryption  of  telemetry  data.  The  treaty  prohibits  the  encoding  of  radios  missile 
test  data  that  would  be  needed  to  verify  compliance  with  the  treaty.  Each  side, 
however,  is  allowed  to  determine  whether  or  not  such  data  would  be  needed  to 
"verify  compliance."  Our  recommendation  is  that  both  sides  formally  agree  not  to 
encrypt  any  missile  data. 

Putting  this  matter  in  its  simplest  terms,  we  know  that  the  United  States  does 
not  engage  in  the  practice  of  encrypting  telemetry  and  that  the  Soviets  have 
promised  not  to  encrypt  any  telemetry  which  would  impede  verification.  It  seems 
only  logical  that  both  sides  should  agree  to  ban  all  encryption.  Such  a  ban  would  be 
a  demonstration  of  Soviet  good  faith  as  well  as  a  commitment  by  them  to  the 
maintenance  of  a  verifiable  treaty. 

We  are  also  concerned  that  the  treaty's  Protocol,  which  bans  the  development  or 
flight  testing  of  ICBM's  from  mobile  launchers  and  the  deployment  of  cruise  mis- 
siles with  ranges  of  more  than  600  kilometers  until  the  end  of  1981  will  "assume  a 
life  of  its  own  ,  and  that  the  United  States  will  give  into  Soviet  demands  that  the 
Protocol  remain  in  force  during  the  course  of  the  SALT  III  negotiations.  We  recom- 
mend that  the  Senate  approve  an  understanding  or  reservation  stating  that  the 
Protocol  will  expire  on  schedule  unless  its  extension  is  specifically  approved  by  the 
Senate. 

There  are  those  who  argue  that  the  Senate  already  has  the  power  to  veto  an 
extension  of  this  or  any  other  treaty  protocol.  However,  our  reasons  for  seeking 
such  an  expression  by  the  Senate  is  to  put  you  and  your  colleagues  firmly  on  record 
and  to  put  the  Soviets  on  notice  that  there  will  be  no  tampering  with  the  Protocol 
termination  date. 

We  also  agree  with  critics  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty  who  express  concern  that  the 
treaty  may  prevent  us  from  transferring  cruise  missile  and  other  technology  to  our 
NATO  allies.  We  believe  it  necessary  that  the  Senate  clarify  U.S.  intentions  regard- 
ing technology  transfer  by  adopting  a  reservation  or  understanding.  It  is  very  clear 
to  anyone  who  considers  himself  a  student  of  arms  limitation  talks  that  our  NATO 
allies  in  Western  Europe  have  more  than  a  passing  interest  in  the  pending  agree- 
ment. The  Soviets  view  themselves  as  a  people  surrounded  by  enemies — a  percep- 
tion which  has  led  to  upgrading  the  armament  of  Warsaw  Pact  nations  in  Eastern 
Europe.  The  activity,  of  course,  poses  a  direct  threat  to  the  NATO  nations  and 
demands  a  realistic  response. 

Since  the  Soviets  would  rather  the  United  States  not  assist  NATO  in  improving 
its  defenses,  especially  in  the  area  of  nuclear  weaponry,  they  have  disputed  the  U.S. 
right  to  continue  to  exchange  nuclear  weapons  technology  with  Western  Euroj>e.  A 
Senate  understanding  that  nothing  in  the  treaty  precludes  a  continuation  of  U.S. 
technology  transfer  with  NATO  would  reaffirm  our  commitment  to  the  alliance  and 
would  create  Soviet  uneeisiness  over  having  a  formidable  opposing  nuclear  strike 
force  on  the  same  continent. 

We  believe  that  such  a  Senate  expression  would  provide  the  additional  service  of 
promoting  a  continental  balance  between  the  NATO  alliance  and  the  Warsaw  Pact 
nations;  thereby,  creating  a  stabilizing  factor.  Maintaining  a  viable  nuclear  strike 
force  in  Europe  also  gives  the  Soviet  war  planners  yet  another  contingency  to  be 
concerned  with,  a  fact  which  we  believe  reduces  the  threat  of  nuclear  war. 

Another  step  we  should  take  to  bolster  the  security  and  confidence  of  our  NATO 
allies  is  to  deploy  updated  theatre  nuclear  weapons  in  Europe  to  help  offset  the 
Soviet  SS-20  intermediate  range  missile,  which  was  not  covered  by  the  treaty.  By 
the  early  1980's  the  Soviets  are  expected  to  have  deployed  in  Eastern  Europe  300 
SS-20's  with  3  warheads  each. 

Mr.  Chairman,  The  American  Legion  also  seeks  an  adjustment  in  the  procedure 
for  reporting  treaty  violations.  The  treaty  now  provides  that  all  actual  or  suspected 
violations  be  reported  to  a  standing  commission  for  consideration.  We  proposed  a 
reservation  or  understanding  that  would  require  a  simultaneous  reporting  of  all 
such  actual  or  suspected  violations  to  the  Senate  for  referral  to  the  appropriate 
committee.  Such  reporting  of  violations  would  strengthen  the  U.S.  commitment  to 
force  Soviet  compliance  with  the  agreement. 

Our  final  recommendation  to  correct  what  we  consider  to  be  a  flaw  in  the  treaty 
deals  with  the  agreed  statements  and  common  understandings.  It  appears  as  though 
these  explanations  of  treaty  provisions  have  been  presented  as  separate  documents 
and,  therefore,  not  subject  to  the  ratification  process.  If  this  is  the  case— and  we 
defer  to  your  ruling  on  the  matter — then  we  demand  formal  Soviet  agreement  that 


163 

these  statements  and  understandings  be  made  part  of  the  treaty  text.  The  treaty 
would  be  simply  unmanageable  without  such  an  agreement. 

Mr.  Chairman,  we  have  called  for  several  modifications  of  the  treaty  some  of 
which  seek  amendments  to  the  language  and  others  which  seek  unilateral  declara- 
tions by  your  and  your  colleagues.  And  there  is  little  doubt  in  my  mind  that  The 
American  Legion  will  be  accused  of  proposing  so  called  "killer  amendments"  and. 
accused  of  trying  to  sabotage  the  treaty. 

I  began  my  statement  by  saying  that  our  organization  has  historically  endorsed 
the  concept  of  limiting  strategic  arms.  I  came  here  today  with  that  attitude  and 
presented  these  recommended  modifications  in  that  spirit.  In  fact,  our  organization 
would  have  been  happy  if  both  sides  were  forced  to  reduce  their  strategic  arsenals 
by  50  percent  or  more.  But,  of  course,  we  realize  that  such  reductions  ignore  the 
realities  of  negotiating  an  arms  agreement  in  an  environment  of  unprecedented 
weapons  production. 

I  have  asked  you  to  consider  three  amendments — to  address  the  overwhelming 
Soviet  advantage  in  heavy  missiles;  to  prohibit  the  encryption  of  telemetry;  and  to 
insure  that  agreed  statements  and  understandings  are  legally  binding.  The  first  of 
these  creates  obvious  negotiating  difficulties  but  the  existing  treaty  provisions 
simply  guarantee  the  Soviets  a  superior  hard  target  kill  capability  which  must  be 
addressed  in  one  of  the  ways  we've  recommended.  The  issue  of  heavy  missiles  will 
continue  to  be  a  problem  during  SALT  III  and  beyond  unless  we  stand  firm.  The 
second  and  third  recommended  amendments  do  not  seek  any  significant  changes  in 
the  terms  of  the  treaty.  They  are  honest  attempts  at  (1)  making  the  agreement  more 
verifiable  and  (2)  insuring  that  its  provisions  are  precise  enough  to  be  manageable. 

Up  to  this  point  we  have  recommended  certain  amendments  to  the  treaty,  reser- 
vations by  the  Senate,  or  weapons  programs  to  help  compensate  for  Soviet  strategic 
advantages.  These  measures  alone,  however,  are  insufficient  to  assure  "essential 
equivalence"  and  effective  deterrence.  As  I  mentioned  earlier,  our  organization 
believes  that  the  time  has  come  to  reconsider  our  fundamental  nuclear  strategy. 

Our  present  strategy  essentially  dates  back  to  the  early  1960's  when  Defense 
Secretary  McNamara  ordered  a  study  to,  for  the  first  time,  determined  the  specific 
criteria  of  effective  deterrence  to  serve  as  a  guide  for  U.S.  nuclear  war  planners.  We 
wanted  to  determine  how  much  capability  the  United  States  would  need,  after 
absorbing  a  Russian  first  strike,  to  retaliate  and  inflict  "unacceptable  damage"  on 
the  Soviet  Union.  His  planners  concluded  that  the  "unacceptable  damage"  thresh- 
hold  was  the  destruction  of  20-25  percent  of  Russia's  population  and  at  least  50 
percent  of  its  industrial  capacity.  Any  capability  beyond  that  would  be  "overkill" 
and  could  only  "rearrange  the  rubble". 

McNamara  s  "Assured  destruction"  led  to  the  concept  of  MAD  (Mutual  Assured 
Destruction)  toward  the  end  of  the  1960's,  by  which  time  the  Soviet  Union  had 
developed  a  roughly  equivalent  strategic  posture.  The  MAD  concept  denies  any 
significance  to  superiority  in  force  levels,  makes  "sufficiency"  the  standard  of  deter- 
rent capability,  and  requires  that  deterrence  be  mutual.  Professor  Richard  Pipes 
summed  up  the  MAD  concept  with  the  ironic  comment  that  "to  feel  secure  the 
United  States  actually  requires  the  Soviet  Union  to  have  the  capacity  to  destroy  it". 
To  avoid  upsetting  mutual  deterrence,  the  MAD  concept  requires  that  neither  side 
should  threaten  the  survivability  of  the  other's  retaliatory  forces. 

U.S.  nuclear  strategy  underwent  another  modification  in  1974,  when  Defense 
Secretary  James  Schlesinger,  who  continued  to  adhere  to  the  Assured  Destruction 
concept,  made  explicit  a  second  goal,  that  the  U.S.  Strategic  forces  should  be 
capable  of  limited  attacks  on  selected  economic  or  military  targets,  to  provide  the 
President  with  "limited  nuclear  options"  in  situations  short  of  an  all-out  nuclear 
strike  on  U.S.  cities. 

During  a  recent  appearance  before  this  committee,  Defense  Secretary  Brown 
stated  that,  "We  have  today  .  .  .  survivable  forces  capable  of  massive  destruction  of 
Soviet  cities  and  industry,  even  after  an  all-out  surprise  attack  on  our  forces  by  the 
Soviets.  We  also  have  both  the  forces  and  the  targeting  and  employment  policies  to 
allow  selective  use  of  nuclear  force  to  respond  to  more  limited  provocations".  Thus 
the  Carter  administration  essentially  retains  the  strategy  of  the  previous  adminis- 
tration, the  concept  of  assured  destruction  tempered  with  the  concept  of  "limited 
nuclear  options". 

It  is  evident  that  since  the  early  1960's  we  have  taken  what  is  essentially  a 
"second  strike"  posture.  We  have  indicated,  directly  and  indirectly  and  at  the 
highest  levels,  that  we  would  absorb  a  first  strike,  and  our  basic  strategy  has 
centered  around  that  assumption.  In  recent  months,  high-ranking  U.S.  officials  have 
on  several  occasions  sought  to  suggest  that  the  United  States  might  not  absorb  the 
first  blow,  but  in  each  instance  they  have  hastened  to  add"  of  course,  that  is  not  our 


164 

policy",  or  some  other  disclaimer.  If  their  intent  was  to  inject  an  element  of  doubt 
into  the  minds  of  Soviet  war  planners,  it  is  doubtful  that  they  have  succeeded. 

The  only  problem  with  the  Mutual  Assured  Destruction  thesis  is  that  it  is  not 
mutual.  Western  experts  on  Soviet  military  thought  agree  almost  unanimously  that 
Soviet  strategists  have  never  regarded  nuclear  war  as  unthinkable  or  unwinnable. 
In  the  words  of  one  American  analyst.  "The  only  Soviet  'doctrine'  is  found  in  its 
concept  of  fighting  and  winning  nuclear  wars". 

Thus  the  Soviets  refuse  to  accept  any  concept  that  would  increase  Soviet  vulner- 
ability, and  believe  that  "deterrence"  cannot  lead  to  "victory"  and  that  there  is  no 
sense  in  absorbing  an  enemy  strike  merely  to  retaliate.  During  the  SALT  I  negotia- 
tions, the  American  delegation  officially  disavowed  the  "launch  on  warning'  con- 
cept which,  it  claimed,  could  result  in  automatic  escalation  or  even  in  starting  a 
nuclear  war  by  accident.  But  efforts  to  elicit  a  statement  on  Soviet  policy  toward 
"launch  on  warning"  met  with  silence.  The  only  Soviet  response  was  that  such 
matters  went  beyond  the  proper  scope  of  the  SALT  talks. 

Soviet  military  writers  have  clearly  and  consistently  indicated  that  the  Soviet 
Union  will,  if  attacked,  "launch  on  warning".  That  policy  was  affirmed  by  Secretary 
Brezhnev  at  the  24th  Congress  of  the  CPSU:  "Any  potential  aggressor  is  well  aware 
that  any  attempt  to  launch  a  missile  attack  on  our  country  would  be  met  by 
devastating  retaliation."  This  fundamental  difference  in  strategic  outlook  helps 
explain  the  Soviet  Union's  relative  lack  of  concern  over  the  vulnerability  of  its 
ICBM  silos.  At  present,  its  land-based  ICBM's  carry  about  70  percent  of  its  strategic 
warheads,  which  account  for  more  than  80  percent  of  its  megatonnage.  In  contrast, 
U.S.  ICBM's  account  for  about  35  percent  of  our  megatonnage. 

Offensively,  the  Soviet  Union  has  increasingly  emphasized  the  deployment  of 
"hard  target  killers" — very  large  and  accurate  ICBM's  such  as  the  SS-18  s — which 
according  to  the  MAD  doctrine  are  "destabilizing".  As  has  been  pointed  out  many 
times  in  the  course  of  the  Senate  SALT  II  hearings,  by  the  early  1980's  the  Soviet 
Union,  with  the  improved  accuracy  of  its  powerful  missiles,  will  be  capable  of 
launching  a  counterforce  strike  that  could  well  destroy  90  percent  of  our  land-based 
ICBM's  (which  account  for  about  35  percent  of  our  megatonnage),  at  least  half  of 
our  B-52's  (which  carry  about  half  of  our  total  nuclear  explosive  power),  and 
perhaps  one-third  of  our  nuclear  submarines.  As  a  result,  our  total  megatonnage 
would  be  reduced  by  about  60  percent  with  the  expenditure  of  only  about  20  percent 
of  the  Soviet  nuclear  force.  The  number  of  remaining  U.S.  ICBM's,  SLBM's,  and 
bombers  that  could  reach  targets  in  the  Soviet  Union  would  be  reduced  by  normal 
systems  failures  (about  15  percent),  improved  Soviet  anti-bomber  and  anti-subma- 
rine capabilities,  and  ABM  s.  The  damage  the  United  States  could  inflict  on  the 
Soviet  Union  would  be  further  limited  by  the  Soviet  civil  defense  system,  which  is 
not  so  much  intended  to  cope  with  an  all-out  attack  on  its  urban/industrial  centers 
as  to  minimize  the  damage  that  might  result  from  U.S.  strategic  forces  that  have 
been  significantly  reduced  by  a  Soviet  first  strike  and  by  active  Soviet  defenses. 

Since  it  would,  for  example,  require  more  than  100  SLBM's  on  target  to  inflict  40 
percent  damage  on  a  city  the  size  of  Leningrad,  it  is  quite  possible  that  we  would 
not  be  capable  of  inflicting  "unacceptable  damage"  on  the  Soviet  Union  with  our 
surviving  forces,  largely  highly  vulnerable  B-52's  and  relatively  inaccurate  SLBM's. 
That  would  be  especially  true  if  we  had  to  expend  a  significant  percentage  of  our 
remaining  delivery  vehicles  on  counterforce  targets.  But  our  major  concern  is  that 
in  view  of  the  enormous  nuclear  disparity  between  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  following  a  Soviet  first  strike  our  leadership,  especially  if  the  Soviets  left 
many  major  U.S.  population  centers  untouched  as  "second  strike  hostages",  may 
decide  not  to  retaliate. 

Instead  of  opting  for  a  "surgical"  first  strike  aimed  only  at  our  strategic  nuclear 
forces,  the  Soviets  might  attempt  to  strike  a  "knock  out"  blow,  to  paralyze  the 
United  States  by  destroying  all  significant  military  targets,  communications  instal- 
lations, transportation  hubs,  airfields,  ports,  refineries,  power  plants,  governmental 
centers,  etc.  'The  prospect  that  the  Soviets  might  opt  for  more  than  our  ICBM  silos 
on  a  first  strike  was  reinforced  by  the  late  Marshal  Krylov,  Commander  of  Strategic 
Rocket  Forces,  who  in  one  of  the  most  authoritative  public  comments  on  Soviet 
targeting  strategy,  revealed  that  the  principal  targets  of  his  forces  would  be  the 
enemy's  delivery  systems  and  weapons  storage  and  manufacturing  sites,  military 
installations,  military  industries  and  centers  of  political-military  administration, 
command  and  control.  Such  a  massive  assault  by  as  many  as  10,000  warheads  (the 
Soviets  are  expected  to  have  deployed  about  14,000  warheads  by  the  early  1980's 
might  leave  us  with  little  capability  or  will  to  retaliate. 

It  should  be  pointed  out  that  the  first  half  of  the  1980's,  during  which  time  the 
Soviets  will  be  capable  of  launching  a  perhaps  decisive  counterforce  strike,  will 
precede  the  scheduled  deployment  phase  of  the  M-X  missile  system  (1986-1989).  It 


165 

will  also  coincide  with  the  period  during  which  about  half  of  the  Polaris-Poseidon 
fleet  may  have  to  be  retired  but  before  the  full  Trident  fleet  has  been  put  into 
service. 

In  our  view,  the  most  effective  way  of  countering  the  vulnerability,  of  preventing 
our  ICBM's  from  being  knocked  out,  assuring  the  maintenance  of  essential  equiv- 
alence and  effective  deterrence,  and  lessening  the  temptation  for  the  Soviet  Union 
to  launch  a  counterforce  or  nation-paralyzing  first  strike,  would  be  to  adopt  a 
"launch  on  warning"  posture.  The  adoption  of  such  a  policy  would  also  help  nullify 
any  strategic  advantages  the  Soviet  Union  might  obtain  by  violating  the  SALT  II 
Treaty^  by  concealing  more  than  the  stipulated  number  of  launchers,  by  increasing 
the  number  of  reentry  vehicles  in  MIRVed  warheads,  and  so  forth.  In  other  words, 
no  matter  what  the  Soviet  Union  did  would  be  assured  of  an  effective  deterrent. 

Those  who  oppose  the  "launch  on  warning"  policy  cite  two  principal  objections. 
One  is  the  danger  of  accidental  war,  that  our  radar  and  monitoring  systems  are  not 
sufficiently  reliable.  We  believe  that  there  is  virtually  no  chance  of  such  an  "acci- 
dent". General  James  C.  Hill,  Commander  of  NORAD/ADCOM,  recently  remarked 
that,  "We  do  have  the  capability  now  to  detect  and  assess  a  large-scale  ICBM  attack 
on  the  United  States — and  so  notify  the  President,"  although  he  warned  that  there 
are  deficiencies  if  the  objective  is  to  extend  launch  on  warning  to  flexible  response 
and  similar  kinds  of  graduated  retaliatory  actions.  Our  ICBM  warning  network 
consists  of  a  number  of  redundant  systems.  First,  there  are  the  early  warning 
satellites  which  detect  missile  firings  at  the  moment  of  launch.  Confirmation  and 
assessment  are  provided  by  the  Ballistic  Missile  Early  Warning  System  [BMEWS]. 
The  Perimeter  Acquisition  Radar  Attack  Characterization  System  (formerly  part  of 
the  Safeguard  anti-ballistic  missile  system)  has  been  integrated  into  our  ICBM 
warning  system.  In  addition,  the  PAVE  PAWS  coastal  phased  array  radar  system 
provide  radar  confirmation  and  assessment  of  SLBM  launches  to  corroborate  early 
detection  by  early  warning  satellite  systems.  We  should  give  the  highest  priority  to 
further  improving  our  monitoring  and  communications  systems,  with  the  goal  of 
eliminating,  to  the  extent  that  is  humanly  possible,  the  chance  of  accidental  war. 

The  second  major  objection  to  a  "launch  on  warning"  policy  is  that  it  would 
restrict  the  President's  ability  to  employ  limited  nuclear  options.  In  the  words  of 
Secretary  Brown,  "While  I  have  serious  doubts  about  whether  a  nuclear  war,  once 
started,  could  be  kept  limited,  it  would  be  imprudent  to  place  the  United  States  in  a 
position  in  which  uncontrolled  escalation  would  be  the  only  course  we  could  follow. 
Massive  retaliation  may  not  be  appropriate,  nor  will  its  prospect  be  sufficiently 
credible  in  all  circumstances  to  deter  the  full  range  of  actions  we  seek  to  prevent." 

We  take  issue  with  the  views  that  a  launch  on  warning  policy  is  destabilizing  or 
may  prevent  uncontrolled  escalation.  In  the  first  place,  the  Soviet  Union  now  has, 
and  has  long  had,  such  a  policy.  Second,  if  there  is  a  destabilizing  factor  in  the 
nuclear  deterrence  equation  it  is  that  Soviet  war  planners  may  be  at  least  90 
percent  certain  that,  according  to  our  present  policy,  we  would  absorb  a  first  strike 
no  matter  what  its  magnitude.  That  could  tempt  the  Soviet  Union  to  try  for  a 
"knock  out"  blow.  The  possibility  of  their  opting  for  such  a  course  would  be  greatly 
diminished  if  they  knew  that  their  missiles  would  impact  on  empty  silos. 

Furthermore,  we  believe  that  there  is  little  likelihood  that  the  Soviet  Union 
would  play  our  game  of  "limited  nuclear  options".  They  would  in  all  likelihood 
attempt  to  inflict  maximum  military-economic  damage  on  the  first  strike,  although 
perhaps  leaving  certain  population  centers  "hostage"  to  a  second  strike.  We  would 
be  left  with  shattered  military  forces,  a  shattered  economy,  and  a  bag  full  of  limited 
nuclear  options. 

In  sum,  we  believe  that  the  United  States  can  no  longer  afford  to  pursue  a 
strategic  policy  that  would  oblige  us  to  absorb  a  first  strike.  We  must  make  it  clear 
to  the  Soviet  Union  and  while  we  will  not  be  the  first  to  start  a  nuclear  war,  we  are 
prepared  to  retaliate  immediately.  This  would  decrease  the  likelihood  of  nuclear 
war,  not  increase  it. 

Although  the  adoption  of  a  "launch  on  warning"  posture  would  go  a  long  way 
toward  assuring  that  we  could  maintain  an  effective  deterrent,  we  realize  that  at 
the  crucial  moment  the  President  may  fail  to  act  or  that  there  may  be  some 
breakdown  in  the  communications  link.  We,  therefore,  believe  that  the  M-X  pro- 
gram would  be  a  good  investment.  It  would  provide  the  United  States  with  a  highly 
survivable  back-up  system  and  with  an  accurate,  powerful  hard-target  system  simi- 
lar to  that  of  the  Soviet  Union.  But  deployment  of  the  M-X  system  alone  is  not 
enough.  We  must  recommit  ourselves  to  the  modernization  of  our  strategic  Triad— 
the  concept  developed  as  the  basis  for  providing  the  President  certain  options 
during  a  crisis.  The  survivability  and  strike  capability  of  our  submarine  fleet  are 
matters  of  debate  as  the  aging  Polaris  and  Poseidon  ships  quickly  approach  their 


166 

scheduled  retirement  dates.  The  schedules  for  full  deployment  of  the  Trident 
system,  therefore,  must  be  accelerated. 

A  manned  penetrating  bomber  capable  of  delivering  cruise  missiles  close  to  Soviet 
targets  is  especially  critical  since  B-52  vulnerability  to  Soviet  air  defenses  is  almost 
a  certainty.  Our  nation's  war  planners  should  also  examine  the  feasibility  and  cost 
effectiveness  of  deploying  a  portion  of  our  current  land-based  ICBM  force  in  a 
mobile  mode  during  the  early  1980's  since  it  will  be  a  decade  before  the  M-X  system 
is  fully  deployed. 

We  are  aware  that  these  recommended  actions  to  modernize  the  strategic  Triad 
are  expensive  and  there  are  many  people  in  this  country  who  have  expressed 
concern  that  the  SALT  II  hearings  have  provided  a  marketplace  in  which  defense- 
minded  groups  and  individuals  have  presented  military  hardware  shopping  lists 
with  the  totals  being  the  costs  of  their  support  of  the  agreement.  We  present  our 
recommendations  as  necessary  expenditures,  whether  SALT  II  be  approved  or  re- 
jected. 

The  Soviet  Union  is  a  formidable  opponent  but  the  greatest  potential  danger 
facing  our  nation  today  in  terms  of  its  security  is  not  the  threat  of  any  foreign 
power  but  the  unwillingness  of  our  citizenry  to  pay  the  price  of  pursuing  peace 
through  a  position  of  strength.  Regardless  of  the  disposition  of  this  treaty,  we  will 
be  required  to  step  up  defense  spending  in  order  to  counter  improvements  in  the 
Soviet  strategic  arsenal. 

Our  final  recommendation  is  that  the  United  States  should  make  a  much  greater 
effort  in  civil  defense  preparedness.  The  Soviet  Union  has  long  realized  that  civil 
defense  is  an  integral  part  of  strategic  policy.  It  has  devoted  a  good  deal  of  effort  to 
"hardening"  key  economic  and  military  installations  and  in  developing  evacuation 
capabilities,  with  special  emphasis  on  evacuating  essential  industrial  and  political 
personnel.  An  effective  civil  defense  system  would  also  give  the  Soviets  a  strategic 
advantage  in  that  in  the  event  of  a  developing  crisis  they  could  evacuate  their  major 
population  centers,  perhaps  on  the  pretext  that  they  fear  a  U.S.  preemptive  strike, 
thus  presenting  U.S.  war  planners  with  empty  cities  while  ours  are  filled  with 
people  and  panic.  In  addition  to  matching  the  Soviet  Union  in  strategic  nuclear 
weapons,  we  must  also  endeavor  to  match  it  in  terms  of  civil  defense. 

In  sum,  Mr.  Chairman,  we  believe  that  although  the  SALT  II  Treaty,  if  it  is 
adhered  to  fully  and  in  good  faith,  has  certain  positive  features,  it  also  has  a 
number  of  serious  deficiencies.  An  even  greater  danger  than  the  deficiencies  of  the 
treaty,  however,  is  the  prospect  that  the  p>eople  of  the  United  States  will  be  lulled 
into  a  false  sense  of  security  and  assume  that  the  treaty  will  eliminate  the  likeli- 
hood of  nuclear  war.  We  must  realize  that  we  can  have  peace  only  through 
strength.  The  Soviet  Union  is  already  ahead  of  the  United  States  in  a  number  of 
strategic  areas,  and  by  all  projections  we  have  seen,  that  gap  will  grow  in  the  years 
ahead.  But  if  such  a  disparity  is  allowed  to  exist,  that  will  be  not  so  much  the  fault 
of  the  treaty  as  the  lack  of  national  will,  as  the  result  of  our  own  deliberate  policies. 
We  are  willing  to  support  the  SALT  II  Treaty  only  if  we  are  assured  that  the 
United  States  will  strengthen  its  defenses  along  the  lines  we  have  outlined  and  the 
treaty  is  modified  in  the  areas  that  we've  mentioned. 

The  Chairman.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Carey,  and  congratulations.  I  did 
not  think  you  were  going  to  manage  to  keep  your  presentation 
within  10  minutes.  You  had  a  15-page  statement,  and  you  incorpo- 
rated all  of  the  major  points  as  well. 

Mr.  Baugher  is  our  next  panelist.  Mr.  Baugher  is  the  past  chair- 
man of  the  national  governing  board  and  present  member  of  the 
national  governing  board  of  the  Ripon  Society. 

STATEMENT  OF  PETER  VINCENT  BAUGHER,  PAST  CHAIRMAN 
AND  PRESENT  MEMBER,  NATIONAL  GOVERNING  BOARD, 
RIPON  SOCIETY,  WASHINGTON,  D.C.* 

Mr.  Baugher.  Good  morning,  Mr.  Chairman. 

My  name  is  Peter  V.  Baugher.  I  am  a  Chicago  attorney,  and  past 
chairman  of  the  national  governing  board  of  the  Ripon  Society,  on 
whose  behalf  I  am  testifying  this  morning. 


'  See  page  170  for  Mr.  Baugher's  prepared  statement. 


167 

The  debate  over  the  SALT  II  treaty  has  been  vigorous  and  far- 
ranging.  We  are  mindful,  Mr.  Chairman,  of  the  serious  concerns 
expressed  by  those  who  feel  that  passage  of  this  agreement  would 
threaten  U.S.  security.  We  are  also  aware  that  the  treaty  more 
closely  resembles  a  set  of  marginal  regulations  on  the  nuclear 
weapons  buildup  already  planned  by  the  parties  than  it  does  the 
strict  arms  control  accord  we  would  have  preferred. 

These  considerations  notwithstanding,  we  believe  that  the  case 
for  ratification  remains  clear  and  convincing.  The  principal  bene- 
fits of  SALT  II  can  be  easily  summarized. 

The  treaty  places  certain  qualitative  and  quantitative  limitations 
on  the  nuclear  arms  race.  These  limitations  are  not  as  stringent  as 
we  had  hoped,  but  they  are  nonetheless  a  significant  improvement 
over  the  alternative,  which  is  to  have  no  ceilings  at  all. 

The  proposed  treaty,  moreover,  is  verifiable,  and  in  fact  will 
enhance  our  ability  to  monitor  Soviet  strategic  forces.  At  a  mini- 
mum, the  treaty's  precise  limits  should  enable  the  U.S.  and  the 
U.S.S.R.  to  avoid  building  excessive  forces  based  on  worst  case 
estimates. 

Finally,  ratification  of  SALT  II,  while  not  impairing  our  efforts 
to  maintain  strategic  equality,  can  provide  the  basis  for  further 
negotiations  with  the  Soviet  Union  out  of  which  more  substantial 
arms  control  measures,  including  real  reductions  in  the  number 
and  quality  of  atomic  weapons,  might  emerge. 

Opponents  of  SALT  II  argue  that  approval  of  the  treaty  would 
jeopardize  our  national  security.  They  are  wrong.  These  critics  take 
an  inordinately  narrow  view  of  what  elements  contribute  to  real 
security.  The  security  of  this  Nation  depends  not  only  upon  the 
status  of  our  nuclear  arsenal,  but  also  upon  the  strength  of  our 
political  institutions,  the  health  of  our  economy,  and  the  will  of  the 
American  people. 

Even  in  terms  of  military  security,  our  strategic  weapons  can 
provide  little  more  than  a  "force  de  frappe"  if  U.S.  conventional 
forces  are  inadequate. 

These  components  of  national  security,  and  the  debilitating  effect 
of  a  profligate  nuclear  arms  race  upon  them,  have  been  for  the 
most  part  ignored  by  SALT  II's  opponents. 

Contrary  to  the  fears  of  those  who  oppose  the  treaty,  SALT  II's 
effect  upon  the  strategic  balance  will  be  generally  favorable.  The 
agreement  is  based  on  the  principle  of  "equality  and  equal  secu- 
rity." The  United  States  no  longer  enjoys  nuclear  superiority  over 
the  Soviets,  but  only  an  essential  equivalence.  SALl"  II  acknowl- 
edges and  reflects  this  shift  in  power.  But  the  treaty  is  not  the 
cause  of  the  shift,  nor  will  refusing  to  ratify  the  agreement  reestab- 
lish our  nuclear  preeminence. 

Indeed,  while  SALT  II  places  a  lid  on  certain  improvements  in 
the  force  levels  of  the  two  countries,  these  limits  will  impinge  most 
immediately  on  the  Soviet  Union.  By  contrast,  the  treaty  interferes 
with  none  of  the  prospective  U.S.  nuclear  defense  programs  now 
under  consideration. 

It  is  said  that  we  should  withhold  approval  of  the  treaty  because 
of  the  Soviet  Union's  aggressive  behavior  in  the  Third  World. 
Without  a  doubt,  Soviet  conduct  has  been  disruptive  and  provoca- 
tive. Clearly,  our  attitudes  toward  the  Soviet  Union  and  our  will- 


168 

ingness  to  enter  into  agreements  with  it  are,  as  a  practical  matter, 
linked  to  what  the  Soviets  do  in  other  parts  of  the  world. 

We  do  not  negotiate  with  the  Soviet  Union,  however,  because  we 
admire  its  policies.  We  negotiate  with  the  U.S.S.R.  because  it  is  to 
our  advantage  in  the  long  run  to  compete  diplomatically,  political- 
ly, and  economically,  rather  than  just  militarily.  The  SALT  II 
agreement  must  accordingly  be  evaluated  on  its  own  merits.  It 
ought  to  be  ratified  because  it  offers  significant  benefits  to  the 
United  States,  and  not  defeated  because  our  adversary  shows  every 
sign  of  continuing  to  displease  us. 

Finally,  the  rejection  of  SALT  II  would  inevitably  heighten  ten- 
sions between  the  United  States  and  the  U.S.S.R.  The  political 
repercussions  of  such  new  tensions  could  adversely  affect  our  allies, 
as  well,  who  rely  on  us  to  manage  a  stable  East- West  relationship. 
Rejection  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty  would  also  further  undermine  the 
credibility  of  the  Carter  administration  and  its  ability  to  manage 
our  international  relations.  While  as  Republicans  we  have  fre- 
quently been  critical  of  the  administration's  foreign  policy,  as 
Americans  we  believe  that  it  is  important  to  present  a  reasonably 
unified  front  to  the  rest  of  the  world,  and  especially  to  the  Soviet 
Union. 

Secretary  of  Defense  Brown  and  General  Jones  both  testified 
that,  while  today  our  nuclear  forces  are  essentially  equivalent  to 
those  of  the  U.S.S.R.,  the  trend  is  that  the  Soviets  will  possess 
advantages  in  most  of  the  major  indicators  of  strategic  force  within 
the  next  few  years.  In  particular  our  land-based  ICBM's  are  pro- 
jected to  be  critically  vulnerable  by  the  mid-1980's. 

The  danger  of  this  deterioration  in  our  once  dominant  strategic 
position  is  not  that  the  Soviets  would  be  tempted  to  launch  a 
nuclear  first  strike  against  the  United  States.  In  view  of  the  very 
substantial  U.S.  retaliatory  capacity  that  would  survive  any  Soviet 
attack,  this  eventuality  seems  highly  unlikely. 

Rather,  as  General  Jones  suggested,  the  growing  disparity  would 
probably  be  reflected  in  a  more  confident  Soviet  leadership,  in- 
creasingly inclined  toward  adventuresome  behavior  in  areas  where 
our  interests  might  clash,  and  where  America's  ability  to  respond 
by  conventional  means  could  be  circumscribed.  This  is  not  a  devel- 
opment the  United  States  can  afford  to  permit. 

The  trend  to  which  I  refer  has  emerged  over  the  past  15  years  as 
a  consequence  of  unilateral  decisions  by  the  United  States  and  the 
U.S.S.R.  It  is  not  the  result  of  SALT,  nor  will  ratification  of  the 
proposed  agreement  in  any  way  aggravate  our  problem.  Indeed,  in 
that  it  places  limits  on  the  further  growth  of  the  parties'  atomic 
forces,  it  should  act  to  stabilize  the  arms  race  and  to  minimize 
whatever  apparent  strategic  advantage  the  Soviets  may  have 
achieved  by  the  first  half  of  the  next  decade. 

SALT  II,  however,  is  not  a  substitute  for  a  strong  defense;  nor 
are  America's  hopes  for  SALT  III  an  alternative  to  an  ongoing 
program  of  upgrading  our  strategic  forces.  This  means  that  within 
the  life  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty,  the  United  States  must  develop  and 
deploy  several  major  new  atomic  weapons  systems  and  modernize 
those  strategic  systems  already  in  existence. 

As  the  fact  of  the  Soviet  arms  buildup  has  become  more  general- 
ly known,  many  have  assumed  that  the  solution  to  our  projected 


169 

strategic  deficiencies  is  to  bolster  the  military  budget — typically  by 
3  to  5  percent,  in  real  dollars.  This  approach  misses  the  mark.  The 
new  weapons  systems  we  need  will  be  costly,  but  this  is  exactly 
why  the  multibillion  dollar  programs  now  envisioned  must  be 
judged  on  an  individual  basis,  not  as  part  of  a  mandatory  quota  for 
overall  spending.  Dollars  alone  will  not  buy  national  defense. 

In  order  to  meet  the  Soviet  challenge  and  to  maintain  strategic 
parity  we  may  be  required  to  boost  our  real  outlays  for  defense  by 
5  percent  or  more  every  year  for  the  next  5  to  10  years.  But  this  is 
a  conclusion  that  should  be  reached  after  the  relative  cost-effective- 
ness of  each  potential  new  weapons  system  has  been  carefully 
evaluated.  It  is  not  a  goal  to  be  sought  as  an  end  in  itself. 

One  way  of  meeting  the  Soviet  military  challenge  is  to  augment 
and  modernize  our  forces.  Another  is  to  challenge  the  Soviet  Union 
to  engage  in  negotiations  about  actual  reductions  of  nuclear  arma- 
ments, not  just  limitations.  We  advocate  that  these  approaches  be 
pursued  concurrently. 

It  is  ironic  that  the  SALT  debate  has  become  a  debate  on  rear- 
mament. The  problem,  unfortunately,  is  endemic  to  arms  limita- 
tion talk,  in  which  the  Soviet  Union  exhibits  little  interest  in 
curbing  the  weapons  race.  The  Soviet  military  buildup  has  been 
underway  now  for  15  years.  It  began  before  formal  SALT  negotia- 
tions were  inaugurated,  and  it  has  continued  unabated  during  the 
period  following  the  war  in  Vietnam  when  U.S.  defense  spending 
declined  markedly. 

Under  these  conditions  arms  control  talks  with  the  Soviet  Union 
have  too  frequently  served  to  ratify  and  legitimize  the  U.S.S.R.'s 
latest  plans  for  military  expansion.  There  is  no  reason  to  believe 
that  SALT  III  will  offer  any  more  meaningful  opportunity.  The 
United  States  entered  the  negotiations  for  SALT  I  with  a  pro- 
nounced superiority  in  strategic  weapons,  and  commenced  the 
SALT  II  talks  with  a  lesser  but  still  significant  advantage.  The 
likelihood  is  that  SALT  III  will  begin  with  the  Soviets  expecting 
strategic  supremacy  by  the  end  of  these  negotiations. 

In  such  circumstances,  the  promise  of  any  real  arms  reduction  is 
illusory.  Our  best  hope  is  to  obtain  agreement  for  a  SALT  III 
reduction  in  arms  now,  while  the  United  States  still  retains  the 
power  to  forestall  this  shift  in  the  strategic  balance.  If  there  are  to 
be  substantial  weapons  cutbacks  in  SALT  III,  the  mandate  for 
those  cuts  must  be  written  into  SALT  II. 

Toward  this  end.  Senator  Mojmihan  has  proposed  an  amendment 
to  the  treaty,  directing  that  the  United  States  an'^.  the  Soviet 
Union  "effect  Significant  and  substantial  reductions  in  the  num- 
bers of  strategic  offensive  arms  consistent  with  the  requirement  for 
the  maintenance  of  essential  strategic  equivalence."  If  the  parties 
were  unable  to  conclude  such  an  agr3ement  by  December  31,  1981, 
SALT  II  would  terminate  on  that  date. 

Unlike  some  other  proposals  that  have  been  made  to  force  the 
pace  of  the  SALT  III  negotiations,  such  an  amendment  would  not 
require  undoing  the  substantive  terms  of  the  present  SALT  II 
treaty.  A  less  demanding  alternative  that  could  still  improve  the 
chances  for  a  "deep  cut"  SALT  III  agreement  would  be  to  amend 
the  resolution  of  ratification  to  include  a  set  of  explicit  and  appro- 


170 

priately  ambitious  guidelines  for  the  next  round  of  negotiations. 
These  kinds  of  approaches  deserve  your  support. 

The  SALT  II  Treaty  should  be  approved  because  it  is  a  useful,  if 
modest,  step  in  the  long-range  process  of  controlling  nuclear  arma- 
ments. But  if  the  SALT  process  itself  is  to  be  preserved,  the  time 
has  come  to  face  the  real  issues  and  the  real  prospects  of  substan- 
tial arms  reductions. 

We  hope  that  your  committee  wdll  recommend  the  incorporation 
of  a  SALT  III  mandate  into  the  existing  agreement  and  urge  that 
the  Senate  give  its  advice  and  consent  to  the  treaty  as  so  amended. 

Thank  you. 

[Mr.  Baugher's  prepared  statement  follows:] 

Prepared  Statement  of  Peter  V.  Baugher 

Mr.  Chairman,  and  Members  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations:  I  appreciate 
this  opportunity  to  appear  befor  you  to  urge  that  the  Senate  give  its  advice  and 
consent  to  ratification  of  the  proposed  Treaty  on  the  Limitation  of  Strategic  Offen- 
sive Arms  (SALT  II). 

INTRODUCTION 

My  name  is  Peter  V.  Baugher.  I  am  a  Chicago  attorney  and  a  member  of  the 
Chicago  Council  on  Foreign  Relations.  I  also  serve  on  the  Republican  National 
Committee's  Advisory  Council  on  National  Security  and  International  Affairs  and 
am  past  Chairman  of  the  National  Governing  Board  of  the  Ripon  Society,  on  whose 
behalf  I  am  testifying  this  morning. 

Over  the  past  two  decades  the  Ripon  Society  has  studied  and  taken  positions  on 
many  issues  of  major  public  importance.  Few  matters  have  commanded  as  much 
attention,  or  aroused  as  much  controversy,  though,  as  has  the  debate  over  the  SALT 
II  Treaty.  The  agreement  now  before  this  Committee  bears  not  only  upon  our 
military  security  and  international  political  relations,  but  also  on  what  America's 
role  in  the  world  ought  to  be,  whether  we  are  strong  enough  to  carry  out  that  role, 
and  whether  the  American  sun  is  rising  or  setting  on  the  world  scene.  SALT  II  has 
thus  taken  on  sjrmbolic  importance  far  exceeding  its  value  as  an  agreement  to  limit 
nuclear  weapons.  In  evaluating  the  Treaty  we  are  mindful  of  the  serious  concerns 
expressed  by  those  who  believe  its  passage  would  threaten  U.S.  security.  We  are 
also  aware  that  SALT  II  more  closely  resembles  a  set  of  marginal  regulations  on  the 
nuclear  weapons  build-up  already  planned  by  the  parties  than  it  does  the  strict 
arms  control  accord  we  would  have  preferred.  These  considerations  notwithstand- 
ing, we  believe  that  the  case  for  ratification  remains  clear  and  convincing. 

the  benefits  of  salt  II 

The  testimony  on  nuclear  diplomacy  received  by  this  Committee  during  the  last 
two  months  has  been  characterized  by  a  high  level  of  sophistication  and  expertise. 
The  principal  benefits  of  SALT  II  can  nevertheless  be  easily  summarized.  The 
Treaty  places  certain  carefully  defined  quantitative  and  qualitative  limitations  on 
the  nuclear  arms  race,  which — if  permitted  to  proceed  unchecked — would  be  mili- 
tarily and  politically  hazardous,  and  which  could  impose  the  burden  of  massive 
additional  defense  spending  upon  our  citizens.  These  limitations  are  not  as  stringent 
as  we  had  hoped.  But  they  are  nonetheless  a  significant  improvement  over  the 
alternative,  which  is  to  have  no  ceilings  at  all.  The  proposed  Treaty,  moreover,  is 
verifiable,  and  in  fact  will  enhance  our  ability  to  monitor  Soviet  strategic  forces.  At 
a  minimum  the  Treaty's  precise  and  agreed  upon  limits,  reinforced  by  the  greater 
knowledge  each  side  will  have  of  the  other's  capabilities,  should  enable  the  U.S.  and 
U.S.S.R.  to  avoid  building  excessive  forces  based  on  "worst-case"  estimates.  Finally, 
ratification  of  SALT  II,  while  not  impairing  our  efforts  to  maintain  strategic  equali- 
ty, can  provide  the  basis  for  further  negotiations  with  the  Soviet  Union  out  of  which 
more  substantial  arms  control  measures,  including  real  reductions  in  the  number  of 
quality  of  atomic  weapons,  might  emerge. 

More  specifically,  the  major  advantages  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty  may  be  enumer- 
ated as  follows: 

First,  the  proposed  agreement  sets  important  quantitative  limitations  on  the 
number  of  strategic  delivery  vehicles.  Both  sides  agree  in  Article  III  of  the  Treaty  to 
the  imposition  of  a  common  aggregate  ceiling  (2,400  initially,  to  be  reduced  to  2,250 


171 

by  the  end  of  1981)  on  ICBM  (intercontinental  ballistic  missile)  launchers,  SLBM 
(submarine-launched  ballistic  missile)  launchers,  and  heavy  bombers.  This  will 
compel  the  Soviets  to  dismantle  or  destroy  over  250  of  the  missile  launchers  or 
heavy  bombers  they  now  have  deployed.  By  contrast,  because  we  are  below  the 
SALT  II  limits,  the  United  States  could  actually  increase  the  number  of  launchers 
and  heavy  bombers  it  deploys. 

Article  V  of  the  Treaty  also  places  equal  subceilings  on  specific  categories  of 
launchers.  There  is  a  limit  of  1,320  on  the  combined  total  of  MIRVed  ICBM  and 
SLBM  launchers,  together  with  heavy  bombers  equipped  to  carry  long-range,  air- 
launched  cruise  missiles  (Paragraph  1).  The  total  number  of  MIRVed  launchers 
cannot  exceed  1,200  (Paragraph  2),  and  the  number  of  MIRVed  ICBM  launchers — 
potentially  the  most  destabilizing  weapon  system — is  restricted  to  a  maximum  of 
820  (Paragraph  3). 

Second,  Article  IV  of  the  proposed  agreement  contains  a  number  of  qualitative 
restraints.  The  Treaty  freezes  the  number  of  warheads  on  existing  types  of  ICBM's 
(Paragraph  10)  and  establishes  ceilings  of  14  and  10,  respectively,  on  the  number  of 
warheads  that  can  be  placed  on  SLBM's  and  on  any  new  type  of  ICBM  (Paragraph 
11).  SALT  II,  further,  bans  new  ICBM's  and  new  SLBM's  that  are  larger  in  throw- 
weight  than  the  largest  current  light  ICBM,  the  Soviet  SS-19  (Paragraph  7).  The 
Treaty  permits  production  of  only  one  new  type  of  light  ICBM  for  each  side  (Para- 
graph 9).  Article  IV  also  limits  improvements  to  existing  t5T>es  of  ICBM's  in  such 
characteristics  as  throw-weight,  launch-weight,  number  of  warheads,  length,  diame- 
ter, and  fuel  type. 

"There  are  other  qualitative  constraints  in  the  Treaty.  SALT  II  (Paragraph  5  of 
Article  IV)  bans  rapid  missile  reload  systems  which,  if  made  workable,  could  greatly 
multiply  the  military  capabilities  of  ICBM  launchers.  To  reinforce  this  restriction, 
storage  of  excess  missiles  near  launch  sites  is  also  barred.  In  addition,  Article  IX  of 
the  Treaty  prohibits  development,  testing,  and  deplojTnent  of  seabed,  outer  space, 
and  a  variety  of  other  types  of  weapons  not  yet  deployed  by  either  side. 

Third,  under  the  terms  of  Articles  XV,  XVI,  and  XVII  of  the  proposed  agreement 
our  ability  to  monitor  Soviet  Strategic  systems  will  be  protected  and  enhanced. 
Deliberate  concealment  measures  that  impede  verification,  such  as  encryption  of  the 
telemetry  associated  with  missile  tests,  are  banned  by  SALT  II,  as  is  any  interfer- 
ence with  national  technical  means  of  verification.  The  Treaty,  moreover,  requires 
the  parties  to  exchange  information  on  the  numbers,  sizes,  and  kinds  of  their 
strategic  systems,  and  to  notify  one  another  in  advance  about  all  planned  ICBM 
launches.  Through  the  Standing  Consultative  Commission  (Article  XVII),  an  institu- 
tional mechanism  for  discussing  compliance  and  verification  problems  is  also  made 
available  to  the  parties. 

Fourth,  ratification  of  the  proposed  agreement  will  facilitate  continuation  of  the 
SALT  process.  The  talks  on  limitation  of  strategic  armaments  begun  by  President 
Nixon  in  1969,  buoyed  by  the  signing  of  the  ABM  Treaty  and  Interim  SALT 
agreement  in  1972,  and  accelerated  by  President  Ford  at  Vladivostok  in  1974,  may 
now  progress  to  a  new  level  of  negotiations — SALT  III— sustaining  the  forward 
momentum  generated  by  the  successful  conclusions  of  SALT  I  and  II. 

THE   ARGUMENTS   AGAINST  THE   TREATY 

Opponents  of  the  SALT  II  agreement  argue  that  approval  of  the  Treaty  would 
jeopardize  our  national  security.  They  are  wrong.  These  critics  take  an  inordinately 
narrow  view  of  what  elements  contribute  to  real  security.  The  security  of  this 
nation  depends  not  only  upon  the  status  of  our  nuclear  arsenal,  but  also  upon  the 
strength  of  our  political  institutions,  the  health  of  our  economy,  and  the  will  of  the 
American  people.  Even  in  terms  of  military  security,  our  strategic  weapons  can 
provide  little  more  than  a  "force  de  frappe,'  if  U.S.  conventional  forces — those  we 
are  most  likely  to  rely  upon  in  anything  short  of  a  nuclear  catastrophe — are 
inadequate.  These  components  of  national  security,  and  the  debilitating  effect  of  a 
profligate  nuclear  arms  race  upon  them,  have  for  the  most  part  been  ignored  by 
SALT  II's  opponents. 

Contrary  to  the  fears  of  those  who  oppose  the  Treaty,  SALT  II's  effect  upon  the 
strategic  balance  will  be  generally  favorable.  The  agreement  is  based  on  the  princi- 
ple of  "equality  and  equal  security"  (Preamble);  the  United  States  no  longer  enjoys 
nuclear  superiority  over  the  Soviets,  as  it  once  did,  but  only  an  "essential  equiv- 
alence". SALT  II  acknowledges  and  reflects  this  shift  in  power.  But  the  Treaty  is 
not  the  cause  of  the  shift,  nor  will  refusing  to  ratify  the  agreement  reestablish  our 
nuclear  preeminence. 

Indeed,  while  SALT  II  places  a  lid  on  certain  improvements  in  the  force  levels  of 
the  two  countries,  these  limits  will  impinge  most  immediately  on  the  Soviet  Union. 
By  contrast,  the  Treaty  interferes  with  none  of  the  prospective  U.S.  nuclear  defense 


48-260    0-79    Pt.U    -    12 


172 

programs  now  under  consideration — the  M-X  missile,  the  Trident  submarine  and 
missiles,  air,  sea,  and  ground-launched  cruise  missiles,  a  cruise  missile  carrier,  or  a 
possible  new  bomber.  Should  we  decide  to  fund  these  programs,  nothing  in  the 
Treaty  would  prevent  us  from  moving  ahead  with  them  on  schedule. 

Similarly,  nothing  in  Article  XII  of  the  Treaty  or  elsewhere  will  prevent  us  from 
continuing  nuclear  and  conventional  military  cooperation  with  our  allies.  In  partic- 
ular, SALT  II  does  not  apply  to  "Eurostrategic  weapons" — those  nuclear  forces 
deployed  in  Europe — and  we  are  free  therefore  to  implement  our  announced  plan  to 
modernize  and  upgrade  NATO's  strategic  capabilities.  For  this  reason,  among 
others,  all  of  our  European  allies  have  endorsed  the  proposed  agreement. 

It  is  said  that  we  should  withhold  approval  of  the  Treaty  because  of  the  Soviet 
Union's  aggressive  behavior  in  the  Third  World.  Without  a  doubt  Soviet  conduct  in 
Africa,  Asia,  and  the  Middle  East — and,  as  we  learned  only  this  week,  its  stationing 
of  combat  troops  in  Cuba — has  been  disruptive  and  provocative.  Clearly,  our  atti- 
tudes toward  the  Soviet  Union  and  our  willingness  to  enter  into  agreements  with  it 
are,  as  a  practical  matter,  "linked"  to  what  the  Soviets  (or  their  representatives)  do 
in  other  parts  of  the  world. 

We  do  not  negotiate  with  the  Soviet  Union,  however,  because  we  admire  its 
policies.  We  negotiate  with  the  U.S.S.R.  because  it  is  to  our  advantage,  in  the  long 
run,  to  compete  diplomatically,  politically,  and  economically,  rather  than  just  mili- 
tarily. The  SALT  II  agreement  must  accordingly  be  evaluated  on  its  own  merits.  It 
ought  to  be  ratified  because  it  offers  significant  benefits  to  the  United  States  and 
not  defeated  because  our  adversary  shows  every  sign  of  continuing  to  displease  us. 

Finally,  any  examination  of  the  consequences  of  approving  SALT  II  must  be 
accompanied  by  an  assessment  of  what  is  likely  to  happen  if  the  Senate  refuses  to 
give  its  consent  to  this  agreement.  The  defeat  of  SALT  II  would  inevitably  heighten 
tensions  between  the  United  States  and  the  U.S.S.R.,  further  eroding  whatever  may 
be  left  of  detente.  The  political  repercussions  of  such  new  tensions  could  also 
adversely  affect  our  allies,  who  rely  on  us  to  manage  a  stable  East-West  relation- 
ship. Rejection  of  the  Treaty  would  tend,  additionally,  to  reinforce  the  Soviet's 
apparent  belief  that  the  only  way  to  attain  security  is  to  act  unilaterally,  and 
belligerently,  to  improve  their  position  as  a  world  power. 

Beyond  this,  we  are  now  engaged  in  a  wide  range  of  arms  control  ventures  with 
the  Soviet  Union  and  other  nations.  Although  ratification  of  SALT  II  will  not 
guarantee  success  in  these  other  arms  control  efforts,  the  failure  of  SALT  II  would 
almost  certainly  damage  them,  perhaps  fatally.  In  addition  to  the  collapse  of  the 
SALT  process  itself,  the  most  important  casualty  of  nonratification  would  be  our 
attempt  to  halt  the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons  through  the  1968  Nonproliferation 
Treaty,  Article  VI  of  which  commits  all  parties — including  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union — "to  pursue  negotiations  in  good  faith  on  effective  measures 
relating  to  cessation  of  the  nuclear  arms  race  at  an  early  date."  Nations  now  poised 
on  the  brink  of  producing  nuclear  weapons  might  well  use  the  breakdown  of  SALT 
as  an  excuse  (or  a  reason)  to  reconsider  their  own  commitment  to  the  Nonprolifera- 
tion Treaty.  It  is  also  likely  that  rejection  by  the  United  States  of  the  SALT  II 
agreement  would  impair  our  ongoing  negotiations  with  the  Soviets  on  a  comprehen- 
sive nuclear  test  ban,  on  the  prohibition  of  antisatelli.e  weaponry,  and  on  mutual 
and  balanced  force  reductions  in  Europe. 

Defeat  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty  would  also  further  undermine  the  credibility  of  the 
Carter  Administration  and  its  ability  to  manage  our  international  relations.  While 
as  Republicans  we  have  frequently  been  critical  of  the  Administration's  foreign 
policy,  as  Americans  we  believe  that  it  is  important  to  present  a  reasonably  unified 
front  to  the  rest  of  the  world,  and  especially  to  the  Soviet  Union.  This  does  not 
mean  that  the  Senate  should  abdicate  its  constitutional  r>3sponsibility  to  pass  upon 
all  treaties  between  the  United  States  and  other  nations.  It  does  mean,  however, 
that  in  judging  such  treaties  allowance  must  be  made  for  the  President's  role  as  the 
chief  architect  and  m.anager  of  our  foreign  relations. 

CLARIFICATION   OF  TREATY   AMBIGUITIES 

Like  any  negotiated  agreement,  the  SALT  II  Treaty  is  not  without  problems.  In 
the  context  of  an  accord  supposedly  premised  upon  equality,  we  are  concerned  about 
the  Soviet  Union's  unilateral  right  to  deploy  308  modern  large  ballistic  missiles 
(MLBM),  a  carryover  from  SALT  I.  Clearly,  the  desired  result  would  have  been  a 
major  cutback  in  Soviet  MLBM's  in  order  to  have  reduced  the  U.S.S.R.'s  substantial 
throw-weight  advantage  over  the  United  States.  For  the  time  being,  limiting  the  SS- 
18  to  10  warheads  provides  a  significant  restraint  on  their  MLBM  potential,  but 
obtaining  sizeable  reductions  in  the  number  of  these  heavy  weapons  should  be  one 
of  our  major  objectives  in  future  negotiations. 


173 

Lest  there  be  any  confusion  about  U.S.  intentions  with  respect  to  certain  poten- 
tially ambiguous  provisions  of  the  Treaty,  the  Senate  should  ratify  SALT  II  subject 
to  the  following  understandings:  (1)  It  should  be  made  clear  that  the  Protocol  which, 
among  other  things,  bars  until  January  1,  1982,  the  deplo3Tnent  of  ground  and  sea- 
launched  cruise  missiles  with  ranges  of  more  than  600  kilometers,  cannot  be  ex- 
tended without  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate;  (2)  In  order  to  clarify  the 
limited  scope  of  our  obligations  under  article  XII,  the  so-called  "non-circumvention" 
clause,  the  Senate  should  state  that  nothing  in  the  Treaty  prohibits  the  United 
States  from  continuing  traditional  patterns  of  allied  defense  co-operation,  including 
the  transfer  of  cruise  missile  technology  if  it  deems  such  a  transfer  necessary;  (3) 
President  Brezhnev's  statement  delivered  to  President  Carter  at  Vienna  on  June  16, 
1979,  pledging  that  the  Soviet  Union  would  not  build  more  than  30  Backfire  bomb- 
ers a  year  and  that  it  would  not  deploy  them  for  intercontinental  missions,  should 
be  made  a  formal  part  of  the  Treaty. 

These  suggested  understandings  are  modest  and  would  not  require  renegotiation 
of  the  agreement.  They  would,  on  the  other  hand,  highlight  several  ambiguities  in 
SALT  II  which,  if  not  resolved  now,  could  conceivably  lead  to  serious  disagreements 
after  the  Treaty  has  gone  into  effect. 

MEETING   THE   SOVIET   MILITARY   CHALLENGE 

From  the  outset  of  these  hearings  it  has  been  conceded  that  the  days  of  U.S. 
nuclear  supremacy  are  past,  and  that  the  momentum  of  atomic  weapons  develop- 
ment belongs  now  to  the  Soviet  Union.  Secretary  of  Defense  Harold  Brown  and 
General  David  Jones  of  the  Joint  Chief  of  Staff  both  testified  that,  while  today  our 
nuclear  forces  are  essentially  equivalent  to  those  of  the  U.S.S.R.,  the  trend  is  that 
the  Soviets  will  possess  advantages  in  most  of  the  major  indicators  of  strategic  force 
within  the  next  few  years.  In  particular,  our  land-based  ICBM's  are  projected  to  be 
critically  vulnerable  by  the  mid-1980's. 

The  danger  of  this  deterioration  in  our  once  dominant  strategic  position  is  not 
that  the  Soviets  would  be  tempted  to  launch  a  nuclear  first  strike  against  the 
United  States.  In  view  of  the  very  substantial  U.S.  retaliatory  capacity  that  would 
survive  any  Soviet  attack,  this  eventuality  seems  highly  unlikely.  Rather,  as  Gener- 
al Jones  suggested,  the  growing  disparity  would  probably  be  reflected  in  a  more 
confident  Soviet  leadership,  increasingly  inclined  toward  adventurous  behavior  in 
areas  where  our  interests  might  clash,  and  where  America's  ability  to  respond  by 
conventional  means  could  be  circumscribed.  "Such  a  situation,"  the  General 
warned,  "would  carry  the  seeds  of  serious  miscalculation  and  run  the  risk  of 
precipitating  a  confrontation  which  neither  side  wanted  nor  intended."  Plainly,  this 
is  not  a  development  the  United  States  can  afford  to  permit. 

This  trend,  which  (if  allowed  to  continue)  will  tip  the  strategic  balance  precarious- 
ly toward  the  Soviets,  has  emerged  over  the  past  15  years  as  a  consequence  of 
unilateral  decision  by  the  United  States  and  the  U.S.S.R.  to  invest  at  sharply 
different  rates  in  the  acquisition  of  nuclear  armaments.  It  is  not  the  result  of  SALT, 
nor  will  ratification  of  the  proposed  agreement  in  any  way  aggravate  our  problem. 
Indeed,  in  that  it  places  limits  on  the  further  growth  of  the  parties'  atomic  forces,  it 
should  act  to  stabilize  the  arms  race  and  to  minimize  whatever  apparent  strategic 
advantage  the  Soviets  may  have  achieved  by  the  first  half  of  the  next  decade.  SALT 
II,  however,  is  not  a  substitute  for  a  strong  defense;  nor,  regrettably,  are  America's 
hopes  for  SALT  III  an  alternative  to  an  ongoing  program  for  the  upgrading  of  our 
strategic  forces. 

This  means  that  within  the  life  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty  the  United  States  must 
develop  and  deploy  several  major  new  atomic  weapons  systems  and  modernize  those 
strategic  systems  already  in  existence.  As  the  fact  of  the  Soviet  arms  buildup  has 
become  more  generally  known,  many  have  assumed  that  the  solution  to  our  project- 
ed strategic  deficiencies  is  to  bolster  the  military  budget — typically,  by  three  to  five 
percent  in  real  dollars.  This  approach  misses  the  mark. 

The  new  weapons  systems  we  need  will  be  costly.  But  this  is  exactly  why  the 
multi-billion  dollar  programs  now  envisioned — whether  one  is  speaking  of  the  M-X 
missile  with  its  several  competing  basing  modes  (each  more  expensive  than  the 
next),  the  Trident  submarine  or  Trident  missiles,  the  several  varieties  of  cruise 
missiles,  or  the  B-1  bomber — must  be  judged  on  an  individual  basis,  not  as  part  of  a 
mandatory  quota  for  overall  spending.  Dollars  alone  will  not  buy  national  defense. 

Congressman  Joseph  Addabbo  of  New  York,  Chairman  of  the  House  Subcommit- 
tee on  Defense  Appropriations,  commented  on  this  subject  last  month  (CJongression- 
al  Record,  August  2,  1979,  pp.  7184-7185): 

There  is  a  limit  to  what  we  can  afford  to  spend  each  year  [on  defense],  yet 
there  are  certain  levels  of  capability  that  we  must  maintain.  It  is  clear  that  we 


174 

are  spending  more  and  getting  less  for  it,  year  by  year,  and  that  the  tough 
years  lie  ahead,  not  backward. 

Budget  officers,  be  they  civilian  or  military,  tend  to  stockpile  dollars  for  a 
rainy  day.  We  just  cannot  afford  to  let  them  do  this  any  longer,  nor  can  we 
begin  a  procurement  unless  we  are  reasonably  sure  that  it  will  do  the  job  it  is 
supposed  to  do  when  it  comes  into  the  inventory,  and  unless  we  are  reasonably 
sure  it  can  be  produced  in  line  with  what  we  anticipate,  and  unless  we  are  sure 
it  is  not  low  on  the  priority  list. 

These  problems  have  been  exacerbated  by  the  failure  of  the  Department  of 
Defense  to  improve  its  weapons  program  review  capability.  Without  a  strengthened 
independent  review  effort  it  would  be  wasteful  to  increase  the  Pentagon's  budget,  no 
matter  how  unfavorable  the  balance  of  forces  might  become. 

In  order  to  meet  the  Soviet  challenge  and  to  maintain  strategic  parity  we  may  be 
required  to  boost  our  real  outlays  for  defense  by  five  percent  or  more  every  year  for 
the  next  five  to  ten  years.  But  this  is  a  conclusion  that  should  be  reached  after  the 
relative  cost-effectiveness  of  each  potential  new  weapons  system  has  been  carefully 
evaluated.  It  is  not  a  goal  to  be  sought  as  an  end  in  itself. 

CHALLENGING  THE  SOVIET  UNION 

One  way  of  meeting  the  Soviet  military  challenge  is  to  augment  and  modernize 
our  strategic  (and  conventional)  forces.  Another  is  to  challenge  the  Soviet  Union  to 
engage  in  negotiations  about  actual  reductions  in  nuclear  armaments,  not  just 
limitations.'  We  advocate  that  these  approaches  be  pursued  concurrently. 

It  is  ironic  that  the  SALT  debate  has  become  (as  Senator  Moynihan  recently 
remarked)  a  "debate  on  rearmament."  The  problem,  unfortunately,  is  endemic  to 
arms  limitation  talks  in  which  the  Soviet  Union  exhibits  little  interest  in  curbing 
the  weapons  race.  The  Soviet  military  buildup  has  been  underway  now  for  15  years. 
It  began  before  formal  SALT  negotiations  were  inaugurated  in  1969,  and  it  has 
continued  unabated  during  the  period  following  the  war  in  Vietnam  when  U.S. 
defense  spending  declined  markedly.  It  has  never  ceased  because  the  Soviets  have 
thus  far  been  unwilling  to  give  up  the  advantages  they  perceive  in  acquiring  new 
and  ever  more  powerful  weapons  systems. 

Under  these  conditions  arms  control  talks  with  the  Soviet  Union  have  too  fre- 
quently served  to  condone  and  legitimize  the  U.S.S.R.'s  latest  plans  for  military 
expansion.  The  agreements  resulting  from  these  talks  have  as  often  as  not  encour- 
aged both  sides  (and  especially  the  Soviet  Union)  to  enlarge  their  forces  to  the 
maximum  size  allowed  and  to  attempt  to  exploit  to  the  fullest  whatever  marginal 
advantages  may  be  discerned  in  the  accord. 

There  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  SALT  III  will  offer  any  more  meaningful 
opportunities.  The  United  States  entered  the  negotiations  for  SALT  I  with  a  pro- 
nounced superiority  in  strategic  weapons  and  commenced  the  SALT  II  talks  with  a 
lesser  but  still  significant  advantage.  The  likelihood  is  that  SALT  III  will  begin  with 
the  Soviets  expecting  strategic  supremacy  by  the  end  of  those  negotiations.  In  such 
circumstances,  the  promise  of  any  real  arms  reductions  is  illusory. 

Our  best  hope  is  to  obtain  agreement  for  a  SALT  III  reduction  in  arms  now,  while 
the  United  States  still  retains  the  power  to  forestall  this  shift  in  the  strategic 
balance.  If  there  are  to  be  substantial  weapons  cutbacks  in  SALT  III,  the  mandate 
for  those  cuts  must  be  written  into  SALT  II. 

Toward  this  end.  Senator  Daniel  Patrick  Moynihan  of  New  York  has  proposed  an 
amendment  to  the  Treaty  that  would  add  a  new  Paragraph  4  to  Article  XIX  of  the 
test: 

The  Parties  shall  conclude,  by  December  31,  1981,  an  agreement  which  shall, 
as  a  result  of  the  negotiations  undertaken  in  accordance  with  the  Joint  State- 
ment of  Principles  and  Guidelines  for  Subsequent  Negotiations  on  the  Limita- 
tion of  Strategic  Arms  agreed  upon  at  Vienna  on  June  18,  1979,  effect  signifi- 
cant and  substantial  reductions  in  the  numbers  of  strategic  offensive  arms, 
consistent  with  the  requirement  for  the  maintenance  of  essential  strategic  equiv- 
alence. This  agreement  shall  enter  into  effect  immediately  upon  the  expiration 
of  the  present  Treaty  or  sooner,  as  the  Parties  shall  decide.  If  the  Parties  are 
unable  to  conclude  such  an  agreement  by  December  SI,  1981,  the  present  Treaty 
shall  terminate  on  that  date.  (Emphasis  added.) 


'The  agenda  for  future  negotiations  must  also  include  (1)  tighter  limits  on  the  testing  and 
development  of  new  weapons,  (2)  some  kind  of  answer  to  the  concern  the  MIRVed  Soviet  ICBM's 
will  jeopardize  the  survivabihty  of  U.S.  ICBM's,  (3)  mutual  reductions  in  European  theatre 
nuclear  weapons  systems,  and  (4)  a  plan  for  regular  on-site  inspection  of  atomic  arms  facilities. 


175 

This  kind  of  approach  deserves  your  support.  Unlike  some  other  proposals  that 
have  been  made  to  force  the  pace  of  the  SALT  III  negotiations,  such  an  amendment 
would  not  require  undoing  the  substantive  terms  of  the  present  SALT  II  Treaty.  A 
less  demanding  alternative  that  could  still  improve  the  chances  for  a  "deep  cut" 
SALT  III  agreement  of  the  kind  we  seek  would  be  to  amend  the  resolution  of 
ratification  to  include  a  set  of  explicit  guidelines  for  the  next  round  of  negotiations. 
This  list  of  objectives  would  operate  similarly  to  the  amendment  to  SALT  I  which 
required  that  future  weapons  limitations  impose  equal  aggregate  ceilings  on  both 
countries. 

As  Senator  Moynihan  noted  in  advancing  his  proposal: 

This  much  is  certain:  Our  margin  for  error  in  SALT  has  disappeared.  We 
must  rescue  the  "process"  from  itself;  otherwise,  it  will  present  us  with  ever 
more  unappealing  choices.  We  must  recover  for  SALT  the  possibility  of  arms 
limitation  and  genuine  arms  reductions.  This,  so  it  seems  to  me,  is  the  major 
contribution  the  Senate  can  make  to  preservation  of  the  SALT  process  that  the 
President,  and  others,  seek.  We  must  at  least  make  the  effort. 

This  is  a  challenge,  Mr.  Chairman,  worthy  of  the  United  States.  The  SALT  II 
Treaty  should  be  approved  because  it  is  a  useful,  if  modest,  step  in  the  long-range 
process  of  controlling  nuclear  armaments.  But  if  the  SALT  process  itself  is  to  be 
preserved,  the  time  has  come  to  face  the  real  issues  and  the  real  prospects  of 
substantial  arms  reductions.  We  hope  that  your  Committee  will  recommend  the 
incorporation  of  a  SALT  III  mandate  into  the  existing  agreement  and  urge  that  the 
Senate  give  its  advice  and  consent  to  the  Treaty  as  so  amended. 

DESCRIPTION  OF  THE   RIPON   SOCIETY 

Founded  in  1962,  the  Ripon  Society  is  a  national  Republican  research  and  policy 
organization  that  takes  its  name  from  Ripon,  Wisconsin,  the  birthplace  of  the  GOP. 
It  has  chapters  in  cities  across  the  country  and  members  in  all  50  States.  The 
Society  encourages  young  men  and  women  to  participate  actively  in  public  affairs. 
Ripon  also  works  to  formulate  the  kind  of  sound  programs  that  will  enable  our 
Party  to  better  fulfill  its  potential  for  constructive  political  leadership.  We  believe 
that  we  can  assist  the  GOP  in  identifying  and  claiming  the  issues  of  the  future;  that 
we  can  help  Republicans  to  raise  the  questions  others  will  not  ask  and  to  grasp 
ideas  whose  times  are  yet  to  come.  Above  all,  the  Ripon  Society  seeks  to  serve  as  a 
spokesman  for  the  progressive  Republican  tradition  whose  integrity  and  vision  have 
inspired  the  GOP  throughout  its  history. 

The  Society  maintains  its  national  headquarters  at  800  Eighteenth  Street,  N.W., 
Washington,  D.C.  20006  (202-347-6477). 

BIOGRAPHICAL   INFORMATION   ON    PETER   VINCENT   BAUGHER 

Peter  Vincent  Baugher  is  an  attorney  at  Schiff  Hardin  &  Waite  law  firm  in 
Chicago,  Illinois.  He  was  Law  Clerk  to  Judge  Philip  W.  Tone,  United  States  Court  of 
Appeals  for  the  Seventh  Circuit,  in  1973-74. 

Born  in  Chicago  in  1948,  Baugher  received  his  legal  training  at  Yale  Law  School 
(J.D.  1973),  and  his  undergraduate  education  at  Princeton  University  (A.B.  1970), 
where  he  studied  in  the  Woodrow  Wilson  School  of  Public  and  International  Affairs. 

Baugher  is  past  Chairman  of  the  National  Governing  Board  of  the  Ripon  Society 
and  serves  on  the  Republican  National  Committee's  Advisory  Council  on  National 
Security  and  International  Affairs.  He  is  a  member  of  the  Chicago  Council  on 
Foreign  Relations,  the  American  Council  on  Germany,  the  Economic  Club  of  Chica- 
go, and  a  variety  of  other  professional,  civic,  and  community  associations. 

Baugher  serves  on  several  boards  of  directors,  including  those  of  the  Chicago 
Educational  Television  Association  (WTTW/Chicago  Public  Television),  WFMT,  Inc. 
(which  owns  and  operates  WFMT-FM  radio  and  Chicago  Magazine),  and  the  Prince- 
ton Club  of  Chicago. 

Baugher  is  married  to  the  former  Robin  Stickney  of  Pacific  Palisades,  California. 
They  live  at  816  Monticello  Place  in  Evanston,  Illinois. 

The  Chairman.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Baugher,  for  your  statement. 
Our  next  and  final  member  of  the  panel  is  Mr.  Herbert  Scoville,  a 
member  of  the  governing  board  of  New  Directions,  of  Washington, 
D.C. 


176 

STATEMENT  OF  HERBERT  J.  SCOVILLE,  JR.,  MEMBER, 
GOVERNING  BOARD,  NEW  DIRECTIONS,  WASHINGTON,  D.C.* 

Mr.  ScoviLLE.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman.  I  appreciate  very  much 
this  opportunity  to  appear  before  this  committee  and  testify  on  the 
SALT  II  Treaty  on  behalf  of  New  Directions.  New  Directions  is  a 
citizens'  lobby  for  world  security  whose  fuUtime  president  is  former 
Congressman  Charles  W.  Whalen,  Jr. 

I,  Herbert  Scoville,  cochair  the  New  Directions  Task  Force  on 
Arms  Control  and  Disarmament  with  Betty  Goetz  Lall. 

New  Directions  supports  the  SALT  II  Treaty  and  urges  that  it  be 
ratified  without  amendment.  We  believe  that  SALT  II  improves  the 
United  States-Soviet  strategic  balance,  takes  important  first  steps 
in  controlling  the  offensive  strategic  arms  race,  and  will  improve 
our  knowledge  of  Soviet  military  programs,  and  thereby  reduce  the 
need  to  procure  unnecessary  weapons  in  order  to  deal  with  an 
uncertain  and  unlimited  Soviet  threat. 

We  believe  that  a  failure  to  ratify  the  treaty  can  only  result  in 
increased  tensions,  in  a  less  secure  and  more  unstable  strategic 
balance,  in  accelerated  arms  buildups,  and  in  increased  and  unnec- 
essary military  expenditures.  In  such  a  world,  the  real  security  of 
the  United  States  will  be  lower,  and  the  Nation  will  be  less  able  to 
deal  with  the  critical  economic  and  political  problems  facing  it. 

Too  often  in  the  debate  over  the  SALT  II  Treaty  there  has  been  a 
tendency  to  focus  on  what  the  treaty  does  not  do  and  to  pay  little 
attention  to  its  positive  benefits.  This,  in  our  view,  has  led  to  a 
distorted  picture  of  the  contribution  that  this  treaty  will  make  to 
our  national  security.  We  believe  that  it  would  be  most  useful  to 
consider  the  treaty  as  a  glass  that  is  half  full  rather  than  half 
empty. 

In  my  written  text,  I  have  summarized  some  of  the  important 
benefits  of  SALT,  but  I  believe  the  committee  has  heard  these 
points  from  many  sources  already,  and  in  the  interest  of  saving 
time,  I  will  not  repeat  them  this  morning,  but  I  would  like  to 
address  a  couple  of  other  points  which  have  received  less  attention. 

While  we  strongly  support  the  ratification  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty, 
we  are  increasingly  concerned  with  a  tendency  during  the  debate 
to  turn  the  SALT  II  Treaty  into  a  Christmas  tree  loaded  with 
presents  to  be  exchanged  for  SALT  support.  We  have  already  seen 
President  Carter's  decision  only  a  week  before  he  signed  the  SALT 
II  Treaty  in  Vienna  to  proceed  with  a  full-scale  development  of  a 
new,  large  model  M-X  missile. 

We,  too,  are  concerned  about  the  theoretical  vulnerability  of  the 
Minuteman  ICBM,  but  it  is  not  clear  that  the  weapons  procure- 
ment rather  than  the  weapons  limitation  approach  is  the  best  way 
of  solving  this  problem.  In  SALT  I,  the  United  States  opted  to 
continue  the  arms  race  in  MIRVed  missiles.  Then  the  United 
States  was  more  than  5  years  ahead,  since  the  Soviet  Union  had 
not  yet  carried  out  its  first  test  of  such  a  missile  system.  Now  the 
United  States  is  paying  the  price  for  its  failure  to  deal  with  this 
problem  through  arms  control.  Quite  predictably,  the  Soviets  have 
followed  along  behind  the  United  States,  and  will  now  in  the  1980's 


See  page  178  for  Mr.  Scoville's  prepared  statement. 


177 

have  sufficient  numbers  of  accurate  MIRVed  warheads  at  least  to 
threaten  our  entire  ICBM  force. 

Now  it  appears  that  the  United  States  may  be  repeating  this 
failure  of  the  early  1970's  by  not  exploring  vigorously  enough  possi- 
ble arms  control  solutions  to  ICBM  vulnerability.  Instead  of  adopt- 
ing with  the  M-X  the  new  weapons  route,  which  in  the  long  run 
may  not  work  and  would  cost  many  tens  of  billions  of  dollars,  we 
should  be  exploring  every  effort  to  seek  an  arms  control  solution  to 
this  problem  and  make  sure  that  no  doors  are  shut  that  would 
foreclose  such  an  option  in  the  future. 

The  most  obvious  approach  is  to  establish  much  stricter  mutual 
limitations  on  the  total  number  of  MIRV  missiles  and  their  war- 
heads. 

We  have  also  seen  explicit  linkage  of  a  5-percent  increase  in  the 
total  military  budget  as  a  price  for  supporting  SALT  ratification.  A 
decision  to  increase  the  military  budget  is  of  paramount  national 
importance,  not  only  because  of  its  effect  on  our  military  posture, 
but  also  because  of  its  effect  on  the  economy  of  the  country. 

Dollars  wasted  on  unnecessary  strategic  weapons  means  less 
money  for  conventional  forces.  Dollars  spent  for  the  military 
means  less  money  available  for  other  pressing  national  needs.  Dol- 
lars spent  for  the  military  means  increased  inflationary  pressures. 
Dollars  spent  for  the  military  means  fewer  people  employed.  All 
these  facts  must  be  taken  into  consideration,  and  the  decision  on 
what  funds  to  spend  on  nonstrategic  weapons  should  not  be  tied  to 
support  for  SALT. 

Furthermore,  since  in  1985  the  relative  United  States-Soviet  stra- 
tegic balance  will  be  more  favorable  to  the  United  States  with  the 
SALT  Treaty  than  without,  logic  would  say  that  there  is  less  need 
for  increased  military  spending  if  SALT  were  ratified  than  if  it 
were  not.  Thus  a  more  appropriate  linkage  with  SALT  would  be  an 
increased  military  budget  if  SALT  is  not  ratified  and  a  decreased 
budget  if  it  were. 

Tying  SALT  support  to  an  increased  military  budget  is  a  mind- 
less connection. 

Finally,  it  would  be  wrong  to  leave  the  discussion  of  SALT  II 
Treaty  ratification  without  voicing  the  view  that  the  entire  climate 
of  the  ratification  debate  in  the  United  States  is  based  on  a  funda- 
mental misconception  that  somehow  our  Nation  has  become  or  is 
rapidly  becoming  inferior  to  the  Soviet  Union  and  subject  to  mili- 
tary coercion  and  blackmail. 

Those  who  urge  boosting  military  spending  above  the  very  high 
levels  projected  for  the  coming  years  assume  that  the  Soviet  Union 
is  gradually  becoming  dominant  on  the  world  scene  and  that  the 
United  States  has  been  standing  still  militarily.  They  ignore  three 
factors:  one,  U.S.  strategic  programs  and  strength,  two,  Soviet 
weaknesses,  and  three,  the  unlikelihood  of  translating  nuclear  ar- 
senals into  political  advantage. 

Let  me  comment  briefly  on  these  points.  The  United  States  has  a 
secure  deterrent  force  composed  of  a  triad  of  SLBM's,  ICBM's,  and 
long-range  bombers.  The  Soviet  Union,  on  the  other  hand,  has  a 
less  secure  force,  of  which  75  percent  are  fixed  land-based  ICBM's 
which  will  become  increasingly  vulnerable  in  the  1980's. 


178 

Furthermore,  contrary  to  the  popular  impression,  the  United 
States  has  not  been  standing  still.  We  have  been  developing  and 
deploying  new  strategic  weapons  in  vast  numbers  in  the  last  10 
years.  In  the  past  decade,  the  United  States  has  increased  the 
number  of  its  strategic  force  loadings,  warheads  and  bombs  by 
5,250,  to  nearly  10,000;  the  Soviets,  by  3,590,  to  only  slightly  more 
than  5,000. 

The  Soviet  Union  is  a  military  superpower,  and  there  is  no  way 
to  prevent  it  from  having  nuclear  weapons  that  can  devastate  the 
United  States,  but  it,  too,  cannot  prevent  catastrophic  devastation 
by  the  United  States.  Furthermore,  it  has  major  economic  and 
political  weaknesses.  The  inefficient  Soviet  economy  requires  its 
leadership  to  import  grain  and  technology  from  the  west.  Accord- 
ing to  CIA  estimates,  this  dependence  will  increase  as  the  growth 
rate  of  the  Soviet  economy  dips  below  1  percent  in  the  mid-1980's. 

After  six  decades  in  power,  the  Soviet  leadership  has  no  big 
power  ally.  It  is  bordered  by  a  hostile  China  and  restive  eastern 
European  countries.  Compare  this  situation  with  the  close  ties  the 
United  States  has  with  its  NATO  partners  and  with  Japan. 

Three,  the  Soviet  Union  has  been  unable  to  use  its  nuclear 
weapons  for  political  advantage  or  even  prevent  a  number  of  devel- 
opments that  are  inimical  to  Soviet  power.  This  situation  will 
continue  into  the  future  unless  the  United  States  talks  itself  into  a 
position  of  weakness.  Despite  their  5,000  strategic  warheads,  the 
Soviets  were  unable  to  prevent  Pope  John  Paul  from  speaking  to 
millions  in  Poland  and  were  unable  to  require  Romanian  accept- 
ance of  the  military  budget  increased  by  the  Warsaw  Pact. 

In  conclusion,  as  the  United  States  faces  the  decision  to  ratify  or 
not  to  ratify  the  SALT  II  Treaty,  it  must  recognize  its  real  strength 
and  stop  exaggerating  its  weaknesses.  Poormouthing  military  capa- 
bilities can  only  create  self-fulfilling  prophecies.  Statements  that 
the  United  States  would  not  retaliate  even  after  a  Soviet  attack 
that  killed  tens  of  millions  of  Americans  do  more  to  undercut  the 
deterrent  than  all  the  Soviet  heavy  missiles. 

Implying  that  the  President  would  have  no  choice  but  to  retali- 
ate against  Soviet  cities  is  dangerously  misleading,  when  our  capa- 
bility and  strategy  have  long  been  to  attack  military  targets  and 
the  industries  supporting  the  military. 

In  conclusion.  New  Directions  believes  that  security  lies  not  in 
supporting  a  self-defeating  arms  race,  but  in  taking  all  the  steps  to 
end  it.  The  ratification  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty  is  such  a  step. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

[Mr.  Scoville's  prepared  statement  follows:] 

Prepared  Statement  of  Herbert  J.  Scoville,  Jr. 

Mr.  Chairman,  members  of  the  committee,  I  appreciate  very  much  this  opportuni- 
ty to  appear  before  this  Committee  and  testify  on  the  SALT  II  Treaty  in  behalf  of 
New  Directions.  New  Directions  is  a  citizens'  lobby  for  world  security  whose  full- 
time  president  is  former  Congressman  Charles  W.  Whalen,  Jr.  I  co-chair  the  New 
Directions  Task  Force  on  Arms  Control  and  Disarmament  with  Betty  Goetz  Lall. 

New  Directions  supports  the  SALT  II  Treaty  and  urges  that  it  be  ratified  without 
amendment.  We  believe  SALT  II  improves  the  United  States-Soviet  strategic  bal- 
ance, takes  important  first  steps  in  controlling  the  offensive  strategic  arms  race, 
and  will  improve  our  knowledge  of  Soviet  military  programs  and  thereby  reduce  the 
need  to  procure  unnecessary  weapons  in  order  to  deal  with  an  uncertain  and 
unlimited  Soviet  threat.  We  believe  that  a  failure  to  ratify  the  Treaty  can  only 
result  in  increased  tensions,  in  a  less  secure  and  more  unstable  strategic  balance,  in 


179 

accelerated  arms  buildups,  and  in  increased  and  unnecessary  military  expenditures. 
In  such  a  world  the  real  security  of  the  United  States  will  be  lower  and  the  nation 
will  be  less  able  to  deal  with  the  critical  economic  and  political  problems  facing  it. 

New  Directions  believes  that  a  strong  case  can  be  made  that  with  the  Treaty  our 
security  will  be  significantly  enhanced  and  the  dangerous  arms  race  provided  with 
important  brakes.  Too  often  in  the  debate  over  the  SALT  II  Treaty,  there  has  been  a 
tendency  to  focus  on  what  the  Treaty  does  not  do  and  to  pay  little  attention  to  its 
positive  benefits.  This,  in  our  view,  has  led  to  a  distorted  picture  of  the  contribution 
that  this  treaty  will  make  to  our  national  security.  We  believe  that  it  would  be 
useful  to  consider  the  Treaty  as  a  glass  that  is  half  full  rather  than  half  empty. 

It  was  never  practical  to  expect  that  the  SALT  II  Treaty  would  solve  all  our 
strategic  policy  problems  nor  lead  directly  to  the  end  of  the  arms  race.  Negotiated 
arnis  control  agreements  are  only  one  means  of  ensuring  that  our  security  is 
maintained  and  of  reducing  the  burden  of  continued  weapons  procurement.  Nation- 
al decisions  are  equally  important  if  we  are  to  prevent  new  weapons  from  increasing 
the  risks  that  we  will  be  embroiled  in  a  nuclear  conflict  which  can  only  lead  to 
catastrophic  devastation  of  the  United  States  and  most  of  the  world. 

It  is,  of  course,  impossible  to  list  in  this  testimony  all  of  the  benefits  which  the 
SALT  II  agreements  provide,  but  it  might  be  useful  to  summarize  some  of  the  more 
important  elements. 

1.  The  Treaty  establishes  ceilings  on  all  t)^es  of  offensive  strategic  weapons, 
heavy  bombers  as  well  as  ballistic  and  cruise  missiles.  These  ceilings  are  low  enough 
to  require  the  Soviet  Union  to  dismantle  without  replacement  about  250  relatively 
modern  operational  strategic  delivery  systems;  therefore  it  establishes  the  precedent 
of  reducing  weapons  stockpiles  rather  than  allowing  continued  buildups.  Although 
this  cutback  is  only  10  percent  of  the  Soviet  strategic  force,  the  direction  of  the 
change  is  of  prime  importance.  Furthermore,  since  this  ceiling  primarily  affects  the 
U.S.S.R.  and  only  marginally  affects  the  United  States,  it  will  improve  the  relative 
United  States-Soviet  strategic  balance.  Without  this  ceiling  the  Soviets  could  during 
the  lifetime  of  the  Treaty  increase  substantially  their  lead  in  numbers  of  strategic 
delivery  vehicles. 

2.  The  Treaty  for  the  first  time  places  an  upper  limit  on  the  total  number  of 
missile  warheads  that  each  side  can  have  by  setting  ceilings  on  the  number  of 
MIRVed  missiles  and  the  number  of  warheads  each  type  of  missile  can  carry.  While 
these  limits  are  much  higher  than  would  have  been  desired,  they  will  at  least  place 
an  upper  range  on  the  number  of  warheads,  make  finite  the  maximum  threat  to 
U.S.  land-based  ICBM's  and  limit  the  potential  advantage  of  the  larger  throw- 
weight  of  Soviet  ICBM's.  They  will  provide  a  fixed  base  for  possible  future  negotia- 
tions to  reduce  the  number  of  warheads  on  both  sides  to  less  threatening  levels. 

3.  The  Treaty  will  prevent  the  Soviets  from  deploying  their  potentially  mobile  SS- 
16  ICBM,  and  the  Protocol  will  ban  the  deployment  of  any  mobile  ICBM's  by  either 
nation  until  1982.  The  failure  to  include  this  prohibition  in  the  Treaty  lasting  until 
1985  is  a  result  of  the  U.S.  desire  to  keep  the  option  open  for  the  M-X  mobile 
deployment,  but  in  the  long  run  this  loophole  may  prove  to  the  U.S.  security 
disadvantage  since  deceptive  mobile  basing  schemes,  such  as  multiple  launch  point 
systems,  may  be  of  greater  advantage  to  the  Soviet  Union  than  to  the  United  States. 
Verification  of  future  limits  on  ICBM's  and  warheads  may  prove  very  difficult,  and 
this  could  lead  to  a  future  breakdown  in  the  ability  to  control  the  size  of  Soviet 
strategic  arsenals. 

4.  The  Treaty  includes  air-launched  cruise  missile  carriers  within  the  1,320  MIRV 
delivery  vehicle  ceiling,  and  thus  controls  for  the  first  time  this  new  type  of 
strategic  weapon.  Without  such  provisions  the  way  would  be  open  for  an  uncon- 
trolled race  in  this  alternative  to  ballistic  missiles.  Long  range  ground-  and  sea- 
launched  cruise  missiles  cannot  be  deployed  for  the  duration  of  the  Protocol,  but 
their  testing  is  permitted.  This  loophole  could  produce  a  difficult  if  not  insoluble 
problem  in  controlling  such  weapons  after  1982.  Although  this  option  was  kept  open 
in  order  to  permit  U.S.  deployment  of  such  weapons  in  the  future,  it  could  prove  in 
the  long  run  to  work  to  our  detriment  by  preventing  the  achievement  of  verifiable 
controls  on  this  class  of  weapons. 

5.  The  Treaty  limits  each  side  to  the  testing  and  deployment  of  only  one  new  type 
of  ICBM.  For  many  characteristics,  modernization  of  existing  types  will  now  be 
strictly  limited  so  that  any  allowed  changes  would  have  little  military  significance. 
For  example,  the  launch-weight  and  throw-weight  of  current  ICBM's  cannot  be 
changed  by  more  than  5  percent;  such  a  change  would  make  little  military  differ- 
ence, particularly  since  the  number  of  warheads  a  missile  can  carry  cannot  be 
increased.  However,  for  other  characteristics,  such  as  accuracy,  no  verifiable  limita- 
tions could  be  agreed  upon.  This  loophole  could  not  be  closed,  unfortunately,  with- 
out relaxation  of  U.S.  standards  for  verifying  compliance. 


180 

6.  The  Treaty  contains  many  provisions  that  will  improve  the  information  on 
Soviet  strategic  forces,  without  which  major  uncertainties  could  develop  on  the  size 
and  nature  of  the  Soviet  strategic  threat.  Without  the  bans  on  deliberate  conceal- 
ment against  national  technical  means  of  verification,  the  Soviets  would  be  in  a 
position  to  adopt  many  techniques  for  denying  intelligence  on  strategic  weapons 
developments  to  the  United  States.  Without  this  intelligence  the  United  States 
would  be  forced  to  rely  on  worst  case  estimates,  which  could  only  lead  to  excessive 
force  buildups. 

While  we  strongly  supj)ort  the  ratification  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty,  we  are  increas- 
ingly concerned  with  the  tendency  during  the  debate  to  turn  the  SALT  II  Treaty 
into  a  Christmas  tree  loaded  with  presents  to  be  exchanged  for  SALT  support.  We 
have  already  seen  President  Carter's  decision,  only  a  week  before  he  signed  the 
SALT  II  Treaty  in  Vienna,  to  proceed  with  the  full-scale  development  of  the  new 
large-model  M-X  missile.  We,  too,  are  concerned  about  the  theoretical  vulnerability 
of  the  Minuteman  ICBM.  But  it  is  not  clear  that  the  weapons-procurement  rather 
than  the  weapons-limitation  approach  is  the  best  way  of  solving  this  problem.  In 
SALT  I  the  United  States  opted  to  continue  the  arms  race  in  MIRVed  missiles  when 
the  United  States  was  more  than  5  years  ahead,  since  the  Soviet  Union  had  not  yet 
carried  out  a  first  test  of  such  a  missile  system.  Now  the  United  States  is  paying  the 
price  for  its  failure  to  deal  with  this  problem  through  arms  control;  quite  predict- 
ably, the  Soviets  have  followed  along  behind  the  United  States  and  will  now  some 
time  in  the  1980's  have  sufficient  numbers  of  accurate  MIRV  warheads  at  least  to 
threaten  our  entire  ICBM  force.  Now  it  appears  that  the  United  States  is  repeating 
this  failure  of  the  early  1970's  by  not  exploring  vigorously  enough  possible  arms 
control  solutions  to  ICBM  vulnerability.  Instead,  it  is  adopting  the  new-weapons 
route,  which  in  the  long  run  may  not  work  and  would  cost  many  tens  of  billions  of 
dollars. 

Furthermore,  the  decision  by  President  Carter  in  June  to  procure  the  largest  of 
the  candidate  M-X  missile  models  for  full-scale  development  cannot  be  justified  as  a 
solution  to  the  ICBM  vulnerability  problem.  Because  of  its  large  size,  the  missile 
will  be  harder  to  make  invulnerable  than  would  smaller  designs.  In  fact,  the 
characteristics  of  the  new  missile  can  only  increase  the  potential  vulnerability  of 
land-based  ICBM's,  since  this  M-X  missile  is  designed  to  have  a  counter-silo  capabil- 
ity against  Soviet  ICBM's.  Such  a  program  can  only  force  the  Soviets,  who  rely  on 
fixed  land-based  ICBM's  for  75  percent  of  their  deterrent  force,  to  take  one  or  more 
of  the  following  alternative  actions:  (1)  They  could  in  time  of  crisis  launch  a 
preemptive  strike;  (2)  place  all  of  their  missiles  on  launch-on-warning,  thus  increas- 
ing the  risk  of  an  accidental  nuclear  conflict,  or  (3)  adopt  a  mobile  basing  scheme, 
making  it  impossible  for  the  United  States  to  verify  the  number  and  type  of  missiles 
which  the  Soviets  had  deployed.  Each  of  these  hurt  U.S.  security. 

So  far  the  Administration  has  not  yet  determined  the  exact  basing  scheme  that  it 
will  use  for  the  new  M-X  missile,  but  it  appears  likely  that  it  will  involve  some  sort 
of  multiple-launch-point  system.  It  is  conceivable  that  a  U.S.  system  could  be  de- 
signed in  some  Rube  Goldberg  way  so  that  the  Soviets  could  verify  the  number  of 
U.S.  ICBM's  actually  deployed.  But  the  problem  for  the  United  States  is  not  Soviet 
verification  of  U.S.  compliance,  but  instead.  United  States  verification  of  Soviet 
compliance.  The  Soviets  may  not  find  it  so  easy  with  their  liquid-fueled  missiles  to 
adopt  a  mobile  system,  a  ceiling  on  which  would  be  verifiable  by  U.S.  intelligence. 
Since  they  will  feel  threatened  by  the  counter-silo  capability  of  the  United  States 
M-X,  tliey  may  be  forced  to  adopt  such  an  unverifiable  basing  scheme  even  if  it 
were  to  lead  to  a  breakdown  of  the  entire  SALT  process.  Yet,  without  SALT 
limitation  on  the  number  of  Soviet  warheads  the  effectiveness  of  the  multiple- 
launch-point  system  for  obtaining  invulnerability  for  U.S.  ICBM's  is  lost.  There  is 
no  easy  solution  to  the  ICBM  vulnerability  problem,  and  the  United  States  should 
not  rush  into  \/eap>ons  programs  in  order  to  solicit  support  for  the  SALT  II  Treaty 
when  these  programs  could  well  lead  to  a  collapse  in  the  efforts  to  establish  long- 
term  controls  on  strategic  nuclear  weapons. 

Instead,  the  United  States  should  be  exploring  every  effort  to  seek  an  arms 
control  solution  to  this  problem  and  make  sure  that  no  doors  are  shut  that  would 
foreclose  such  an  option  in  the  future.  The  most  obvious  approach  is  to  establish 
much  stricter  mutual  limitations  on  the  total  number  of  MIRVed  missiles  and  their 
warhea<^.  This  should  be  the  highest  priority  issue  to  be  dealt  with  in  the  after- 
math of  SAL"!  II.  To  be  successful  in  controlling  the  theoretical  threat  to  land-based 
ICBM's,  both  negotiated  agreements  and  difficult  national  decisions  by  the  United 
States  and  the  U.S.S.R.  will  be  required  in  the  near  future. 

To  date  no  other  specific  weapons  programs  have  been  directly  tied  to  SALT 
ratification,  but  such  linkages  could  implicitly  or  explicitly  develop  at  any  time.  One 
can  visualize  attempts  to  get  commitments  for  future  deployment  of  ground-  and 


181 

sea-launched  strategic  cruise  missiles  in  exchange  for  SALT  support.  Decisions  on 
these  weapons  are  very  complicated  and  intimately  related  to  the  military  and 
political  relationships  with  our  NATO  allies.  They  should  not  be  taken  hastily 
during  the  SALT  debate.  The  reason  that  provisions  relating  to  these  weapons  were 
placed  in  the  Protocol,  which  expires  in  1981,  was  to  provide  time  to  make  these 
decisions.  One  should  not,  in  the  heat  of  the  SALT  debate,  preclude  such  careful 
consideration. 

There  may  also  be  pressures  to  add  a  new  manned  bomber  to  the  SALT  Christmas 
tree.  President  Carter  made  the  decision  in  1977  against  the  B-1  and  in  favor  of  air- 
launched  cruise  missiles  on  purely  military-effectiveness  grounds,  not  on  arms- 
control  considerations.  It  would  be  a  travesty  if  now  a  hasty  decision  were  made  to 
proceed  with  a  new  manned  bomber  as  well  as  cruise  missiles  to  generate  support 
for  an  arms  control  agreement. 

We  have  already  seen  explicit  linkage  of  a  5  percent  increase  in  the  total  military 
budget  as  a  price  for  supporting  SALT  ratification.  A  decision  to  increase  the 
military  budget  is  of  paramount  national  importance  not  only  because  of  its  effect 
on  our  military  posture  but  also  of  its  effect  on  the  economy  of  the  country. 

Dollars  wasted  on  unnecessary  strategic  weapons  means  less  money  for  conven- 
tional forces. 

Dollars  spent  for  the  military  means  less  money  available  for  other  pressing 
national  needs. 

Dollars  spent  for  the  military  means  increased  inflationary  pressures. 

Dollars  spent  for  the  military  means  fewer  people  employed. 

All  of  these  facts  must  be  taken  into  consideration,  and  the  decision  on  what 
funds  to  spend  on  non-strategic  weapons  should  not  be  tied  to  support  for  SALT. 
Furthermore,  since  in  1985  the  relative  United  States-Soviet  strategic  balance  will 
be  more  favorable  to  the  United  States  with  the  SALT  Treaty  than  without,  logic 
would  say  that  there  is  less  need  for  increased  military  spending  if  SALT  were 
ratified  than  it  it  were  not.  Thus  a  more  appropriate  linkage  with  SALT  would  be 
an  increased  military  budget  if  SALT  is  not  ratified  and  a  decreased  budget  if  it 
were.  Tying  SALT  support  to  an  increased  military  budget  is  a  mindless  connection. 

Finally,  it  would  be  wrong  to  leave  the  discussion  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty  ratifica- 
tion without  voicing  the  view  that  the  entire  climate  of  the  ratification  debate  in 
the  United  States  is  based  on  a  fundamental  misconception — that  somehow  our 
nation  has  become  or  is  rapidly  becoming  inferior  to  the  Soviet  Union  and  subject  to 
military  coercion  or  blackmail.  Yet  Secretary  of  Defense  Harold  Brown  said  in  his 
January  25,  1979  Annual  Report: 

"National  Security  has  always  been  comprised  of  a  number  of  factors  and  has 
always  required  a  number  of  strengths — non-military  as  well  as  military.  The 
United  States  fortunately  is  by  most  measures  the  strongest  nation  in  the  world.  No 
other  country — certainly  not  the  Soviet  Union — can  compete  with  us  in  economic 
power,  political  stability  and  cohesion,  technological  capability,  national  will,  or 
appeal  as  to  way  of  life  and  international  policies." 

Those  who  urge  boosting  military  spending  above  the  very  high  levels  projected 
for  the  coming  years  assume  that  the  Soviet  Union  is  gradually  becoming  dominant 
on  the  world  scene  and  that  the  United  States  has  been  standing  still  militarily. 
They  ignore  three  factors:  (1)  U.S.  strategic  programs  and  strengths;  (2)  Soviet 
weaknesses;  and  (3)  the  unlikelihood  of  translating  nuclear  arsenals  into  political 
advantage. 

Let  me  comment  briefly  on  each  of  these  points. 

1.  The  United  States  has  a  secure  deterrent  force  composed  of  a  triad  of  SLBM's, 
ICBM's,  and  long-range  bombers;  the  Soviet  Union  has  a  less  secure  force  of  which 
75  percent  are  fixed  land-based  ICBM's  which  will  become  increasingly  vulnerable 
in  the  1980's.  In  the  past  decade  the  United  States  has  increased  the  number  of  its 
strategic  force  loadings  (warheads  and  bombs)  by  5,250  to  nearly  10,000;  the  Soviets 
by  3,590  to  only  slightly  more  than  5,000.  As  Dr.  Kissinger  once  said  when  he 
worked  in  the  government,  it  is  warheads,  not  delivery  vehicles,  that  kill  people  and 
destroy  targets.  Moreover,  during  the  same  period  the  United  States  deployed 
hundreds  of  new  Minuteman  III  ICBM's;  upgraded  its  existing  missiles  by  adding 
new  guidance  systems  and  more  powerful  warheads;  hardened  the  Minuteman  silos; 
deployed  a  thousand  SRAM  air-to-surface  missiles;  developed  the  highly  accurate 
air-launched  cruise  missiles,  which  will  virtually  nullify  the  large,  extremely  costly 
Soviet  Air  Defense  system;  made  major  modifications  in  the  B-52  bomber;  deployed 
hundreds  of  Poseidon  MIRVed  SLBM's,  and  developed  the  quieter  "Trident  subma- 
rine and  longer-range  Trident  I  missile.  The  United  States  has  not  been  standing 
still.  The  United  States  has  and  will  continue  to  have  a  balanced,  enormously 
destructive  strategic  deterrent,  capable  of  retaliating  after  any  Soviet  attack  and 
destro3ring  thousands  of  Soviet  military  and  industrial  targets. 


182 

2.  The  Soviet  Union  is  a  military  superpower,  and  there  is  no  way  to  prevent  it 
from  having  nuclear  weapons  that  can  devastate  the  United  States.  But  it,  too, 
cannot  prevent  catastrophic  devastation  by  the  United  States.  Furthermore,  it  has 
major  economic  and  political  weaknesses.  The  inefficient  Soviet  economy  requires 
its  leadership  to  import  grain  and  technology  from  the  West.  According  to  CIA 
estimates,  this  dependence  will  increase  as  the  growth  rate  of  the  Soviet  economy 
dips  below  1  percent  in  the  mid-1980's.  After  six  decades  in  power,  the  Soviet 
leadership  has  no  big-power  allies.  It  is  bordered  by  a  hostile  China  and  restive  East 
European  countries.  Compare  this  situation  with  the  close  U.S.  ties  to  its  NATO 
partners  and  to  Japan. 

3.  The  Soviet  Union  has  been  unable  to  use  its  nuclear  weapons  for  political 
advantage,  or  even  to  prevent  a  number  of  developments  that  were  inimical  to 
Soviet  power.  This  situation  will  continue  into  the  future  unless  the  United  States 
talks  itself  into  a  position  of  weakness.  Despite  their  5,000  strategic  warheads,  the 
Soviets  were  unable  to  prevent  Pope  John  Paul  II  from  speaking  to  millions  in 
Poland,  unable  to  prevent  Hua  Kuo-feng  from  visiting  Eastern  Europe,  unable  to 
require  Romanian  acceptance  of  a  military  budget  increase  voted  by  the  Warsaw 
Pact,  unable  to  exert  its  influence  in  the  Middle  East,  and  unable  to  dissuade  the 
Japanese  from  signing  a  peace  treaty  with  China.  In  a  world  of  two  nuclear-armed 
superpowers,  there  is  no  known  way  for  one  of  them  to  use  weapons  of  mass 
destruction  for  limited  political  gains. 

In  conclusion,  as  the  United  States  faces  the  decision  to  ratify  or  not  to  ratify  the 
SALT  II  Treaty,  it  must  recognize  its  real  strength  and  stop  exaggerating  its 
weaknesses.  Poor-mouthing  military  capabilities  can  only  create  self-fulfilling 
prophecies.  Statements  that  the  United  States  would  not  retaliate,  even  after  a 
Soviet  attack  that  killed  tens  of  millions  of  Americans,  do  more  to  undercut  the 
deterrent  than  all  the  Soviet  heavy  missiles.  Impljdng  that  the  President  would 
have  no  choice  but  to  retaliate  against  Soviet  cities  is  dangerously  misleading  when 
our  capability  and  strategy  have  long  been  to  attack  military  targets  and  the 
industry  supporting  the  military. 

The  SALT  II  agreements  must  be  understood  as  useful  and  important  steps,  not 
end  points,  toward  improved  security  and  toward  controlling  and  reversing  the 
dangerous  nuclear  arms  race.  To  this  end  we  urge  prompt  ratification  of  the  Treaty 
without  amendment.  SALT  II  must  not  be  asked  to  bear  the  burden  of  all  the 
complex  problems  of  foreign  relations.  Neither  must  the  ratification  process  be  used 
to  adorn  the  SALT  Christmas  tree  with  all  manner  of  new  weapons  programs,  many 
of  which  in  the  long  run  could  not  only  decrease  security  but  also  make  future 
agreements  to  limit  nuclear  weapons  more  difficult,  if  not  impossible.  The  United 
States  should  make  decisions  on  future  military  programs  on  the  basis  of  its  true 
security  needs  in  the  light  of  the  limitations  that  the  SALT  II  Treaty  provides,  and 
not  in  the  light  of  whether  they  will  provide  increased  support  for  its  ratification. 

New  Directions  believes  that  U.S.  security  between  now  and  the  expiration  of  the 
SALT  II  Treaty  would  be  greatly  enhanced  by  taking  further  steps  to  end  the 
United  States-Soviet  competition  in  arms  and  to  curb  the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons 
to  additional  countries.  Among  the  steps  that  should  be  vigorously  pursued  during 
this  period  are  a  Comprehensive  Test  Ban,  an  agreement  banning  anti-satellite 
weapons,  a  first-step  accord  on  mutual  reductions  in  conventional  forces  in  Europe, 
and  some  partial  agreements  in  SALT  III  that  can  be  added  as  protocols  to  SALT  II. 
New  Directions  is  most  interested  in  securing  deep  cuts  in  MIRVed  missiles  in  order 
to  allay  fears  of  surprise  attack.  In  addition,  the  first  accords  on  medium-range 
nuclear  weapons  could  be  achieved  during  this  time  frame. 

Security  lies  not  in  pursuing  a  self-defeating  arms  race,  but  in  taking  all  neces- 
sary steps  to  end  it. 

The  Chairman.  Thank  you  very  much  for  your  testimony,  Mr. 
Scoville.  I  again  want  to  thank  the  panel  for  its  cooperation. 

CONTRIBUTION   OF  TRADE  TO   PRESERVATION   OF  PEACE 

I  would  like  to  go  back  first  to  Mr.  Schmidt's  testimony  and  its 
emphasis  upon  the  importance  of  the  growth  of  trade  and  the 
contribution  that  trade  itself  can  make  to  stability  in  our  relations 
with  the  Soviet  Union  and  in  the  preservation  of  peace.  I  agree 
with  that,  and  I  think  that  the  long  period  of  time  when  we 
engaged  in  no  trade  with  the  Soviet  Union  because  we  disapproved 
of  its  society  was  typical  of  that  tendency  in  our  foreign  policy,  to 


183 

try  and  isolate  countries  that  we  dislike  for  one  reason  or  another, 
even  though  such  a  policy  is  almost  always  self-defeating. 

I  happen  to  think  that  our  policy  toward  Cuba  through  the  years 
has  been  self-defeating.  We  have  minimized  our  influence  in  that 
country  by  refusing  to  trade  with  it  for  so  many  years  having  no 
representation  there,  and  we  can  see  the  end  result  in  the  most 
recent  developments  in  that  country. 

It  has  been  an  unproductive,  indeed,  a  counterproductive  policy 
for  the  United  States.  I  think  we  finally  came  to  understand  that 
the  same  was  true  for  the  Soviet  Union,  and  fortunately  we  did 
commence  some  years  ago  to  expand  our  trade  with  the  Soviet 
Union.  I  think  that  has  been  a  very  important  step. 

My  question  to  you,  Mr.  Schmidt,  is  this.  Don't  you  feel  that  one 
of  the  most  important  benefits  that  could  flow  from  the  Senate's 
ratification  of  the  SALT  treaty  would  be  an  improvement  in  the 
general  climate  that  could  lead  to  further  expansion  of  trade  and 
other  peaceful  contacts  with  the  Soviet  Union,  and  that  this  would 
be  stabilizing  and  beneficial  to  the  prospects  for  continued  peace, 
that  this  indeed  could  help  lay  the  basis  for  substantial  reductions 
in  these  arms  that  we  must  never  fire  except  in  the  act  of  commit- 
ting national  suicide? 

Aren't  these  collateral  benefits  that  could  and  should  flow  from 
the  Senate's  ratification  of  the  treaty? 

Mr.  Schmidt.  Yes,  sir.  I  believe  you  have  very  accurately  stated 
those  extra  benefits  that  we  would  receive  were  the  Senate  to 
ratify  the  SALT  II  Treaty.  The  Soviets  are  great  immitators  of  the 
United  States.  You  see  them  imitate  the  United  States  in  a  mili- 
tary environment.  You  see  them  imitate  the  United  States  in  our 
industrialization  process,  and  if  we  were  to  ratify  SALT  II  and 
stabilize  our  trade  with  them,  I  think  you  would  see  a  greater 
emphasis  on  their  part  to  imitate  the  United  States  in  our  mutual- 
ly beneficial  trade  relationships.  They  believe  that  the  United 
States  is  large  areas  of  production,  and  industrialization,  and 
maybe  we  should  be  given  credit  for  that. 

The  Chairman.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Schmidt.  I  personally  concur  in 
your  position. 

Mr.  Carey,  as  a  long-time  member  of  the  American  Legion  I 
want  to  say,  first  of  all,  that  the  Legion's  position  favoring  limita- 
tion of  nuclear  arms  has  always  in  my  judgment  been  a  very 
enlightened  position;  for  a  veterans'  organization,  I  think  it  has 
been  a  courageous  position. 

Your  statement  today  raising,  as  it  does,  certain  recommenda- 
tions for  reservations,  understandings,  and  modifications  in  this 
treaty,  is  one  that  this  committee  will  carefully  weigh.  I  would  like 
to  call  your  attention  to  certain  reservations  and  understandings 
that  have  been  proposed  by  Senator  Javits  and  myself  and  receive 
your  response  and  what  you  think  the  response  of  the  Legion 
would  be  to  those  proposals. 

Since  I  cannot  find  them  at  the  moment,  let  me  briefly  describe 
them  to  you.  We  will  supply  you  with  a  text  of  these  proposals. 

RESERVATION   ON   BACKFIRE   STATUS   IN   TREATY 

The  first  is  a  reservation.  You  mentioned  in  your  testimony  your 
concern  about  the  Backfire  bomber  because  it  does  have  a  capabili- 


184 

ty,  even  though  it  may  be  primarily  designed  as  a  theater  weapon, 
in  extremis  to  reach  the  United  States  with  a  refueUng  in  flight.  In 
your  testimony  you  have  dealt  with  the  commitments  that  Mr. 
Brezhnev  made  to  President  Carter  in  the  unsigned  statement, 
offering  the  suggestion  that  we  require  the  statement  be  signed  by 
Brezhnev. 

Our  reservation  seeks  to  accomplish  the  same  thing  by  making 
the  consent  of  the  Senate  conditional  upon  the  reservation  that  the 
commitments  contained  in  the  Soviet  written  statement,  that  is  the 
unsigned  statement,  and  in  his  oral  assurance  that  the  production 
of  these  bombers  would  not  exceed  30  per  year  are  essential,  in  the 
words  of  the  reservation,  to  the  obligations  assumed  under  the 
treaty.  These  commitments  are  legally  binding  on  the  Soviet 
Union,  and  their  violation  would  give  the  United  States  the  right 
to  withdraw  from  the  treaty. 

In  other  words,  the  reservation  would  in  effect  incorporate  by 
reference  these  gissurances,  elevate  them  to  the  status  of  the  treaty, 
and  provide  that  the  violation  of  those  commitments  would  be  the 
same  as  the  violation  of  any  provision  of  the  treaty,  and  thus 
grounds  for  withdrawal. 

I  take  it  the  Legion  would  support  such  a  reservation. 

Mr.  Carey.  Yes,  sir.  I  believe  from  the  discussions  we  had  from 
our  special  committee's  hours  and  days  spent  on  this,  it  would  be 
acceptable  to  the  organization. 

RESERVATION  ON  COMMON   UNDERSTANDINGS  AND  AGREED 

STATEMENTS 

The  Chairman.  A  second  recommendation  you  made  had  to  do 
with  the  common  understandings  and  the  agreed  statements. 
Again,  we  have  proposed  a  reservation  to  the  effect  that  the  agreed 
statements  and  common  understandings  regarding  the  treaty  and 
the  protocol  transmitted  by  the  President  on  June  22,  1979,  with 
the  treaty  are  of  the  same  force  and  effect  as  are  the  provisions  of 
the  treaty  itself. 

The  intent  here  is  to  make  the  Senate's  consent  conditional  upon 
an  acceptance  by  both  parties  that  the  agreed  statements  and 
common  understandings  are  to  be  treated  as  though  they  were  part 
of  the  text  of  the  treaty  itself. 

I  take  it  that  the  Legion  would  also  endorse  that  position. 

Mr.  Carey.  Well,  we  definitely  would  like  to  see  it  a  part  of  the 
treaty.  If  you  are  saying  that,  Senator,  I  think  we  will  have  that. 

The  Chairman.  This  will  have  the  same  effect,  because  the  con- 
sent would  be  made  conditional  upon  both  parties  treating  these 
agreed  statements  and  common  understandings  as  though  they 
were  part  of  the  treaty  itself. 

Mr.  Carey.  If  I  could  say  one  thing,  referring  to  the  Backfire 
bomber.  Senator,  it  has  bothered  us  very  greatly.  It  bothers  us  as  to 
why — why  do  they  have  to  say  that  they  are  going  to  continue  to 
build  30  Backfire  bombers  a  year?  Why  do  they  need  them  if  we 
are  supposed  to  have  this  peace  and  live  with  this  peace?  That  is 
the  thing  that  h£is  bothered  us.  We  are  recognizing  that  they  can 
go  ahead  and  continue  to  build  30  Backfire  bombers  a  year. 

Again,  in  part  of  my  statement  that  I  was  not  able  to  make,  and 
in  part  of  the  statement  which  is  on  file,  I  know  we  want  to  limit 


185 

spending  and  we  want  to  limit  the  whole  situation,  but  if  we  are 
recognizing  and  allowing  them  even  to  consider  building  that  type 
of  thing,  and  we  recognize  that  in  this  treaty  of  30  per  year,  we 
have  to  have  a  defense  to  go  against  that  in  this  country,  we  had 
better  have  something  that  can  counteract  it  as  far  as  that  is 
concerned. 

That  bothers  us. 

The  Chairman.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Carey.  I  see  that  my  time  is  up. 
I  want  to  come  back  to  a  second  round  in  order  to  address  a  couple 
of  questions  to  the  other  members  of  the  panel,  but  under  the  10- 
minute  rule  I  will  turn  now  to  Senator  Percy. 

Senator  Percy.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  Carey,  along  with  Senator  Church,  I  have  been  a  member  of 
the  American  Legion  for  a  long  time.  I  think  my  membership  is  in 
its  34th  year.  I  was  very  impressed  with  the  statement  you  made 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  Legion, 
and  I  applaud  your  long-term  support  for  strategic  arms  limita- 
tions. 

FULLY   VERIFIABLE   IN   AREAS   AFFECTING   NATIONAL  SECURITY 

I  would  like  to  ask  for  clarification  on  your  position  on  verifica- 
tion. The  more  we  have  looked  into  verifications,  the  more  I  have 
come  to  the  conclusion  that  it  would  be  unrealistic  to  look  for  100- 
percent  verifiability,  but  that  if  the  treaty  is  sufficiently  verifiable 
so  that  we  can  have  enough  advanced  notice  to  void  the  treaty  or 
withdraw  from  it  and  take  action,  that  would  be  acceptable. 

Would  you  accept  the  statement  that  it  should  be  verifiable  in 
areas  that  affect  the  national  security  interests  of  the  United 
States  and  its  allies?  Is  that  the  crux  of  what  you  are  after? 

Mr.  Carey.  That  is,  sir.  As  I  said  in  the  statement,  this  concerns 
a  lot  of  classified  intelligence  gathering  information.  Therefore,  we 
have  to  depend  upon  those  people  who  have  that  information. 
What  you  are  saying  is  the  fact  that  the  statement  would  be  for 
those  people  who  have  that  information  and  not  available  to  the 
general  public  have  to  be  fully  satisfied  and  concerned  with  this, 
and  that  we  would  accept  that. 

AFFECT   OF   CUBAN   SITUATION   ON   SALT   NEGOTIATIONS 

Senator  Percy.  The  support  the  American  Legion  has  given  to 
the  treaty  understandings  some  of  us  have  proposed,  including  our 
chairman  and  ranking  member.  Senator  Javits,  has  been  very  help- 
ful indeed,  and  we  are  appreciative.  In  your  opening  comments, 
you  spoke  about  the  Cuban  troop  situation.  What  was  your  recom- 
mendation with  respect  to  carrying  on  these  negotiations  with  the 
Soviets  regarding  the  troops  in  Cuba? 

Mr.  Carey.  We  talked  about  the  particular  fact.  Senator,  that  we 
feel  this  is  a  violation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  second,  we 
believe  that  the  presence  of  that  brigade  constitutes  a  military  base 
which  was  prohibited  in  the  1962  agreements  with  the  Soviets  in 
Cuba. 

Our  recommendation  was  that  we  urged  the  committee  to  post- 
pone any  further  action,  not  hearings,  but  any  further  action  on 
the  strategic  arms  limitation  agreement  currently  pending  until 


186 

such  time  as  all  Soviet  combat  troops  have  been  withdrawn  from 
the  island  of  Cuba. 

Senator  Percy.  In  other  words,  you  feel  we  should  continue  with 
the  process  of  ratification,  but  not  take  final  action  until  such  time 
as  this  is  clarified? 

Mr.  Carey.  That  is  right,  until  some  understanding  comes  out  of 
that  particular  situation. 

Senator  Percy.  I  think  you  and  I  then  both  disagree  with  the 
State  Department  as  to  whether  or  not  this  violates  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  I  happen  to  think  it  does.  Department  officials  feel  that 
only  the  spirit  of  the  doctrine  is  violated,  but  I  am  with  you  in  that 
I  think  it  really  does  violate  the  doctrine.  The  Soviets  in  their 
sophisticated  knowledge  of  our  system  must  really  understand  that 
this  is  a  fundamental  thing  that  we  cannot  permit. 

Mr.  Carey.  There  are  a  lot  of  spirits  floating  around  this  coun- 
try, Senator,  and  a  lot  of  types  of  spirits  that  we  can  talk  about, 
too.  [General  laughter.] 

Senator  Percy.  I  would  welcome  warmly  Mr.  Peter  Baugher,  a 
valued  constituent.  I  commend  him  for  the  contributions  he  has 
made  through  the  years. 

USE  OF  nuclear   WEAPONS  TO   DEFEND   EUROPE 

Mr.  Baugher,  you  made  a  very  good  point  when  you  argued  that 
national  strength  is  more  than  just  military  strength,  that  really  it 
is  the  whole  composite.  You  mentioned  the  word  "will."  It  is  the 
will  that  is  important.  Do  you  have  any  doubt  that  if  there  were  an 
invasion  of  Western  Europe  by  the  Warsaw  Pact  countries  and  our 
conventional  weaponry  appeared  inadequate  to  defend  our  allies, 
we  would  use  strategic  nuclear  weapons?  Should  the  Soviet  Union 
be  on  notice  that  we  would  have  the  national  will  to  use  them  on 
those  without  hesitation  in  the  case  of  that  kind  of  provocation? 

Mr.  Baugher.  My  own  view  is  that  we  do  have  the  national  will 
to  protect  the  security  of  Europe  with  the  defense  umbrella  of  the 
United  States,  and  this  would  include  the  use  of  nuclear  weapons. 
The  more  difficult  question  is  whether  our  NATO  allies  and  the 
Soviet  Union  are  persuaded  of  that  point.  The  decline  in  recent 
years  of  our  military  position  relative  to  that  of  the  Soviets,  not 
only  in  Europe  but  in  the  rest  of  the  world  as  well,  has  made  some 
people  doubt  that  we  would  ever  use  our  nuclear  weapons.  But  I 
think  that  if  we  go  forward  with  a  sensible  plan  to  strengthen  both 
our  conventional  and  our  strategic  armaments,  we  will  be  able  to 
quiet  those  doubts. 

Senator  Percy.  I  agree  with  Mr.  Carey  about  the  horrible  nature 
of  nuclear  war  and  our  abhorrence  of  it,  but  we  have  placed  these 
weapons  there  as  a  deterrent  and  they  do  not  act  as  a  deterrent, 
we  have  to  have  the  will  to  use  them.  There  should  be  no  ambigu- 
ity or  misunderstanding  about  that. 

When  the  Ripon  Society,  not  known  for  its  right-wing  positions 
through  the  years,  can  state  through  it  representative  that  we  have 
the  will  to  use  those  weapons  if  it  becomes  necessary,  then  there 
cannot  be  any  ambiguity  about  it  or  any  misunderstanding.  I  think 
we  all  stand  together  on  that — the  Congress  and  the  executive 
branch.  You  also  mentioned  that  our  national  strength  reflects. 


187 

among   other   factors    our   economic    strength.    Here   we    face   a 
dilemma. 

As  you  well  know,  I  am  totally  committed  to  balancing  this 
budget.  I  am  spending  a  tremendous  amount  of  time  and  effort  to 
accomplish  that.  I  think  the  strength  of  the  dollar  and  the  strength 
of  our  whole  economic  situation  is  factor  which  is  very  important 
and  something  that  the  Soviet  Union  fully  respects.  It  is  our  eco- 
nomic strength  that  would  give  us  the  ability  to  sustain  an  arms 
race  if  that  is  what  the  Soviets  want  to  continue  to  engage  in. 

BALANCING  THE   BUDGET   AND   FUTURE   MIUTARY   EXPENDITURES 

What  do  we  do  if  we  get  to  the  point  where  the  increase  in 
military  spending  is  such  that  we  cannot  balance  the  budget?  I 
think  we  will  have  to  cut  some  social  spending  but  we  still  may  not 
be  able  to  balance  the  budget  with  large  defense  increases.  What 
do  we  do  then?  After  all,  we  are  committed  as  a  nation  to  try  to 
balance  our  budget  beginning  October  1  of  next  year. 

Mr.  Baugher.  That  is  correct.  Senator.  I  think  the  commitment 
to  balance  the  budget  is  very  important.  In  fact,  it  is  essential  to 
our  national  security  to  try  to  get  America's  economic  house  in 
order.  If  I  were  to  list  present  threats  to  the  United  States,  the 
possible  defeat  of  the  SALT  Treaty  or  the  nuclear  arms  race  gener- 
ally, would  not  be  the  first  items  on  my  list.  The  first  item  on  my 
list  would  be  the  serious  economic  straits  in  which  we  now  find 
ourselves.  The  combination  of  inflation  and  recession  is  a  problem 
that  we  are  going  to  have  to  cope  with  if  we  want  to  remain  strong 
in  the  world. 

Now,  as  to  how  one  makes  the  tradeoffs  between  boosting  de- 
fense spending  and  maintaining  a  ceiling  on  the  overall  budget, 
this  is  something  that  I  think  has  to  be  done  on  a  program  by 
program  basis.  That  is  why  we  are  critical  of  those  who  say,  let's 
just  increase  the  defense  budget  by  5  or  more  percent.  That  is  the 
wrong  way  of  going  about  the  process.  What  we  have  to  do  is  to 
decide:  Do  we  want  to  be  spending  our  discretionary  tax  dollars  on 
the  M-X  missile  system  in  1979,  or  should  we  be  spending  that 
money  on  social  programs?  Should  we  be  devoting  our  limited 
resources  to  new  weaponry,  whether  strategic  or  conventional,  or 
should  we  be  reducing  the  burden  of  taxation  on  our  citizens? 

Senator  Percy.  Thank  you.  Thank  you  very  much. 

AFFECT  OF  TRADE  ON  U.S.  STRENGTH 

Mr.  Schmidt,  I  have  a  quick  question  for  you.  You  have  linked 
the  passage  of  SALT  to  continued  U.S.  trade  with  the  Soviets. 
There  are  those  who  would  say  there  should  be  no  trading  with  the 
Soviets.  Anything  we  trade  to  them  somehow  adds  to  their  strength 
and  ability  to  be  an  adversary. 

I  have  faith  in  trade.  The  Yankee  trader  certainly  might  not 
always  be  getting  the  best  of  the  deal,  but  we  certainly  should  not 
get  the  worst  of  the  deal  time  after  time. 

Do  you  have  confidence  that  trade  can  be  carried  on  in  such  a 
way  that  it  does  not  weaken  the  United  States  but  in  fact  actually 
strengthens  us  economically? 


48-260    0-79    Pt . 4    -    13 


188 

Mr.  Schmidt.  I  would  certainly  agree  with  the  statement  that 
trade  with  them  does  strengthen  us  economically,  but  it  also 
strengthens  them  economically.  As  many  people  argue  trade  also 
strengthens  them  militarily.  I  always  have  been  of  the  opinion  that 
we  can  wipe  the  floor  with  the  Soviets  militarily,  economically,  and 
politically  any  time  we  decide  we  are  going  to  exercise  our  will  to 
do  so. 

The  Soviet  Union  cannot  and  will  not  get  the  best  of  us  economi- 
cally. You  only  need  to  observe  that  system  for  a  little  while  to 
observe  that  there  is  so  much  inefficiency  in  it,  so  much  bureaucra- 
cy that  they  cannot  possibly  compete  with  us,  so  it  just  makes 
sense  to  me  that  we  ought  to  strengthen  our  position  more  and 
more  with  trade. 

One  of  the  things  you  do  in  business,  and  I  am  sure  you  may 
know  better  than  many  without  business  experience,  is  the  follow- 
ing. When  there  is  a  competitive  situation  in  business,  the  first 
thing  one  does  is  to  get  close  to  your  adversary.  You  want  to  know 
exactly  what  he  is  going  to  do  next.  You  want  to  know  as  much 
about  him  as  possible.  You  want  to  know  about  his  people.  You 
want  to  know  about  his  sales  force.  You  have  to  get  next  to  him 
before  you  can  adequately  determine  what  his  strengths  and  v/eak- 
nesses  are. 

Senator  Percy.  Thank  you.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman,  Thank  you.  Senator  Percy. 

Senator  Stone  is  next. 

Senator  Stone.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

AMERICAN   legion's  POSITION  TOWARD  SOVIET  TROOP  SITUATION 

Commander  Carey,  does  the  American  Legion  take  a  position  on 
what  it  feels  would  be  acceptable  in  this  Soviet  troop  situation? 
Specifically,  would  the  American  Legion  consider  that  it  would  be 
acceptable  if  the  Soviets  left  their  forces  there,  but  assured  the 
United  States  that  they  would  not  be  used  in  an  offensive  mode,  or 
would  it  be  acceptable  to  the  Legion  if  most  but  not  all  of  the 
combat  union  were  withdrawn  so  that  a  combat  union  presence 
much  reduced  would  be  left  there  or  anything  short  of  total  remov- 
al of  the  combat  union? 

Mr.  Carey.  Sir,  what  we  take  and  what  we  look  at  are  the  people 
we  have  dealt  with  for  years.  I  realize  we  need  all  the  trade  and 
everything  else  that  we  need.  We  also  take  what  I  looked  at  in  my 
year  of  travel  all  over  the  world,  the  pincers  movement  that  I  see 
and  the  involvement  that  I  see  in  Africa,  the  Middle  East,  the  Far 
East,  and  so  on  where  the  Soviets'  hands  are  in.  You  want  to  take 
a  look  at  the  isolationism,  what  is  happening  to  the  United  States 
as  far  as  the  Soviet  Union  is  concerned. 

Our  feelings  at  the  present  time,  are  that  we  feel  that  that  whole 
group  must  be  removed  just  like  they  did  in  1962  when  they  took 
the  missiles  and  the  missile  launchers  that  they  were  bringing  m, 
they  put  them  back  on  the  ships,  and  took  them  out  of  there.  They 
have  no  reason  to  be  there,  and  we  are  still  of  the  stand  that  they 
should  all  come  out  of  there  before  we  continue  to  actually  make  a 
final  decision  on  SALT  IL 

Senator  Stone.  So  the  Legion's  position  is,  it  is  appropriate  to 
continue  these  hearings,  to  continue  our  work,  but  not  to  take  any 


189 

definitive  action  on  this  treaty  pending  the  total  removal  of  the 
total  combat  unit.  Is  that  right? 

Mr.  Carey.  That  is  right,  sir. 

Let  me  make  a  statement  to  you  that  gets  us  possibly  off  the 
hook.  I  have  made  it  all  year  long  on  public  television  and  in  other 
fora.  We  are  a  group  of  war  veterans  who  have  seen  action.  We 
take  care  of  those  who  are  in  the  hospital  and  the  families  of  those 
who  are  killed.  We  never  want  to  see  war  again,  but  we  believe,  as 
history  shows  us,  that  peace  through  preparedness  keeps  the  wolf 
away  from  the  door. 

I  think  unless  this  country  comes  forth  and  sets  forth,  such  as 
the  example  in  Cuba  right  now,  and  shows  that  we  are  the  No.  1 
free  nation  of  the  world,  and  we  want  the  rest  to  look  to  us,  that 
we  have  to  take  this  type  of  stand.  We  don't  want  to  see  another 
war.  We  have  seen  war.  But  we  also  feel  that  there  has  to  be  peace 
through  preparedness,  and  through  particularly  not  allowing  their 
actions  to  infringe  on  us.  They  are  coming  closer  and  closer  to  our 
shores,  and  we  do  not  feel  they  should  be  there. 

Senator  Stone.  Thank  you.  Commander  Carey. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Thank  you.  Senator  Stone. 

Senator  Glenn,  do  you  have  any  questions  of  this  panel? 

Senator  Glenn.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

CAPABIUTIES  OF  SS-18 

Gentlemen,   I  regret  that  I  was  not  able  to  be  here  earlier. 

Commander  Carey,  I  was  going  through  your  statement,  and  I 
have  only  one  comment  at  this  time,  and  it  is  your  particular 
concern  about  the  SS-18  and  its  capabilities.  I  share  your  concerns 
about  that.  My  main  concerns  have  been  expressed  in  the  possibil- 
ity that  they  could  do  additional  testing,  have  additional  warheads 
on  that  booster,  and  that  they  could  theoretically  come  up  with 
some  6,000  to  8,000  additional  warheads  at  least. 

I  know  the  intelligence  community  is  doing  its  very  best  to  try  to 
recoup  the  monitoring  capability  that  we  at  one  time  had  on  the 
SS-18  out  of  Iran,  but  which  still,  at  least  as  of  today,  is  probably 
not  a  replacement  for  that  monitoring  capability  that  we  want 
American  security  to  rely  on  in  the  future. 

I  just  wanted  to  make  that  comment.  It  is  not  in  the  form  of  a 
question,  really.  It  would  give  them  the  potential  for  a  breakout 
capability  later  on  resulting  in  a  huge  preponderance  of  available 
weaponry  opposed  to  the  balance  that  we  are  trying  to  set,  moni- 
tor, maintain,  and  verify  in  the  whole  SALT  II  process.  I  was  glad 
to  see  that  brought  out  in  your  statement.  I  think  it  is  a  very  key 
part  of  this  whole  thing. 

We  have  to  be  able  to  monitor,  as  I  see  it,  or  we  don't  know  what 
is  happening  with  the  launch-weights,  the  throw-weights,  and  the 
additional  warheads  that  you  talk  about  in  your  statement,  which  I 
think  we  absolutely  must  be  able  to  monitor.  We  want  to  have  this 
so  that  we  can  get  on  with  SALT  III,  IV,  V,  and  VI.  We  want  to 
scale  down  the  nuclear  weaponry  arsenals  throughout  the  world, 
but  it  seems  to  me  that  we  will  only  do  that  if  we  get  enough 
confidence  in  the  Soviets  living  up  to  their  agreements  to  warrant 
going  on  with  this. 


190 

Certainly,  the  Cuban  situation  ties  into  this.  If  we  are  building 
confidence  in  each  other  or  trying  to,  it  sure  isn't  done  by  moving 
troops  into  Cuba.  No  one  is  concerned  that  2,000  or  3,000  troops 
will  attack  Washington,  D.C.,  Key  West,  or  New  Orleans,  or  any- 
where else  over  here,  but  when  we  see  the  pattern  of  worldwide 
expansionism  going  on,  whether  it  be  in  Afghanistan,  the  Persian 
Gulf,  in  Yemen  or  in  Africa,  where  there  are  Cuban  surrogates,  we 
see  a  big  pattern.  We  see  Cuba  involved  throughout  the  Third 
World.  We  see  MIG-23's  coming  into  Cuba. 

Well,  I  don't  think  that  the  MIG-23  is  a  big  offensive  nuclear 
delivery  system,  but  it  is  one  more  bit  of  a  pattern  where  we  are 
being  bit  and  piecemealed  to  death.  We  cannot  ignore  it  and  say  it 
has  no  relationship  to  SALT  II.  Of  course,  no  one  wants  to  start 
World  War  III  over  this,  but  I  share  your  concern  about  the 
break-out  capability  and  the  SS-18  monitoring  and  various  other 
points.  I  just  wanted  to  make  that  comment.  I  would,  of  course, 
welcome  any  comment  you  wish  to  make  at  this  time. 

Mr.  Carey.  Thank  you,  sir.  I  prefer  to  leave  your  statement  as  it 
stands.  We  do  think  there  should  be  a  new  counting  system  which 
is  basically  what  I  believe  you  suggest. 

Senator  Glenn.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  make  one  other  com- 
ment. When  it  was  stated  that  the  negotiations  perhaps  should 
have  included  some  other  things  in  SALT  II,  I  basically  agree  with 
that,  but  perhaps  when  SALT  II  was  started  so  many  years  ago,  I 
do  not  believe  anyone  could  have  foreseen  at  that  time  the  extent 
to  which  MIRVing  would  take  place,  and  the  numbers  of  additional 
warheads  that  we  could  put  on  these  boosters. 

With  the  throw-weight  that  they  have  on  the  SS-18,  they  could 
theoretically  deliver  between  25  and  40  warheads.  Although  they 
are  limited  to  10  now,  we  have  already  monitored  them  testing 
beyond  the  10  they  are  allowed  by  simulating  a  couple  of  additional 

RV's. 

It  seems  to  me  therefore  they  have  already  indicated  what  their 
intention  is  if  they  can  get  away  with  it.  That  is  the  reason  why  I 
put  so  much  emphasis  on  our  monitoring  capability.  I  am  willing  to 
sign  a  treaty  with  the  Russians.  I  am  willing  to  approve  a  treaty 
and  see  it  ratified,  but  only  if  we  have  high  confidence  in  our 
intelligence  system,  so  that  we  will  know  what  they  are  doing, 
know  whether  they  are  living  up  to  the  treaty,  just  as  they  already 
know  through  the  open  literature  and  easy  monitoring  of  us  that 
we  will  live  up  to  it. 

It  is  on  that  basis  that  we  will  go  on  to  SALT  III,  SALT  IV,  and 
SALT  V.  If  we  don't  do  it  on  that  basis,  it  seems  to  me  we  are  just 
playing  russian  roulette,  and  I  don't  mean  to  make  a  horrible  pun. 
We  are  playing  russian  roulette  with  American  security  for  the 
future,  and  I  don't  want  to  see  us  do  that.  I  still  think  the  Senate's 
action  should  hinge  in  large  measure  on  the  monitoring  which  you 
stress,  particularly  regarding  the  SS-18  and  the  other  missiles 
which  they  have  tested  from  their  southern  site,  the  site  we  used  to 
monitor  from  Iran. 

Thank  you. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Gentlemen,  time  seems  to  be  slipping  away,  so  I 
would  thank  you  all  for  your  help  today. 


191 

Senator  Percy.  May  I  have  one  additional  minute,  please? 
The  Chairman.  Of  course,  Senator  Percy. 

NEW   DIRECTIONS   SUPPORT   FOR   SENATE   UNDERSTANDINGS 

Senator  Percy.  Mr.  Scoville,  you  say  you  support  this  treaty  and 
hope  the  Senate  will  not  amend  it  in  any  way.  Does  New  Direc- 
tions support  the  understandings  that  the  chairman  has  read? 

Mr.  Scoville.  Yes,  it  does. 

Senator  Percy.  Fine.  Thank  you. 

TELEVISED  COVERAGE  OF  SALT  FLOOR  DEBATE 

I  would  appreciate  a  one-word  answer  from  each  of  the  panel  on 
this  question.  Do  you  think  it  would  help  public  understanding  if 
we  were  technically  able  to  work  it  out  so  that  we  had  television 
and  radio  coverage  of  the  debate  on  the  Senate  floor,  that  is,  the 
SALT  debate? 

Mr.  Scoville.  Yes. 

Mr.  Carey.  Yes. 

Mr.  Schmidt.  Yes. 

Mr.  Baugher.  Yes. 

Senator  Percy.  Thank  you  very  much.  I  appreciate  all  four  ac- 
ceptances on  that. 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Percy,  you  have  unanimous  support,  it 
appears.  That  is  an  enviable  political  position. 

Gentlemen,  thank  you  very  much.  I  want  to  acknowledge  the 
presence  here  of  Carl  Marcy,  who  is  now  the  executive  secretary 
for  the  American  Committee  on  East-West  Accord,  and  for  many 
years  has  served  this  committee  with  ability  and  distinction  as  the 
staff  director  of  the  committee. 

Carl,  it  is  nice  to  see  you  back  again.  We  appreciate  very  much 
your  continued  activities  in  a  good  cause. 

Gentlemen,  we  thank  you  all  very  much. 

[Whereupon,  a  brief  recess  was  taken.] 

The  Chairman.  Our  next  witness  is  Mr.  Lane  Kirkland,  Secre- 
tary-Treasurer of  the  AFL-CIO  [American  Federation  of  Labor- 
Congress  of  Industrial  Organizations].  Mr.  Kirkland,  the  committee 
is  very  happy  to  welcome  you  today.  We  look  forward  to  your 
testimony. 

STATEMENT  OF  LANE  KIRKLAND,  SECRETARY-TREASURER, 
AFL-CIO,  WASHINGTON,  D.C.> 

Mr.  Kirkland.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

My  name  is  Lane  Kirkland.  I  am  Secretary-Treasurer  of  the 
AFL-CIO.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  appreciate  very  much  the  opportunity 
to  appear  before  the  committee  to  advance  the  views  of  the  AFL- 
CIO  on  the  SALT  II  Treaty  which  now  awaits  the  advice  and 
consent  of  the  Senate.  The  AFL-CIO  has  consistently  supported  a 
strong  national  defense,  not  as  a  source  of  jobs,  but  as  insurance  of 
our  freedoms  in  a  very  dangerous  world  of  continued  social  and 
economic  progress,  and  of  the  democratic  values  that  we  prize, 
including  free  trade  unions. 


'  See  page  193  for  the  prepared  statement  of  the  AFL-CIO  Executive  Council. 


192 

We  do  not  subscribe  to  the  notion  of  inherent  conflict  between 
the  equally  vital  imperatives  of  necessary  defense  expenditures  and 
domestic  programs  and  progress.  The  Constitution  defines  the  duty 
of  government  as  to  provide  for  the  common  defense  and  to  pro- 
mote the  general  welfare.  It  does  not  say  to  provide  for  the 
common  defense  or  to  promote  the  general  welfare.  It  is  scarcely 
prudent  to  finance  one's  household  improvements  by  neglecting  to 
pay  one's  fire  and  insurance  premiums. 

Such  a  folly  holds  the  prospect  that  all  may  well  be  lost.  Defense 
goals  must,  of  course,  be  gaged  and  judged  as  relative  to  the  threat 
that  one  perceives.  We  perceive  the  threat  presented  by  the  rate  of 
expansion  and  improvement  of  Soviet  strategic  nuclear  arms  as 
real  and  as  growing  and  as  not  seriously  deterred  by  this  treaty  or 
by  public  need  or  opinion  in  that  country,  or  by  any  benign  inten- 
tions on  the  part  of  the  leaders  of  that  power,  present  or  future. 

We  believe  that  the  security  of  our  Nation  and  its  allies,  which  is 
the  real  issue  here,  can  be  enhanced  by  either  or  both  of  two 
methods,  stronger  defenses  or  genuine  significant  and  mutual  arms 
reduction  agreements  with  our  potential  adversaries.  We  certainly 
prefer  the  latter  course,  but  we  cannot  assume  it,  and  SALT  II  by 
its  terms  does  not  assure  us  that  it  is  yet  more  than  a  hope. 

We  do,  however,  support  the  proposition  that  that  hope  should  be 
kept  alive  long  enough,  at  least,  to  test  it  once  more,  rather  than  to 
abandon  it  now  by  rejecting  the  treaty.  But  that  test  should  be  an 
urgent,  real,  and  searching  one,  and  we  should  be  fully  prepared  to 
live  with  the  conclusion  revealed  by  its  success  or  failure.  Nor 
should  we  meanwhile  permit  that  process  to  anchor  us  further 
behind  the  defense  posture  that  we  ought  to  be  in  if  the  result  is 
failure. 

We  would  welcome  a  treaty  that  would  require  and  warrant 
drastic  dismantling  on  our  part  as  well  as  that  of  the  U.S.S.R.,  and 
we  would  not  mourn  or  grieve  over  or  regard  as  wasted  money  the 
expenditures  negated  by  that  happy  event. 

Limits  to  be  obtained  by  dismantling  only  across  the  board  ought 
in  fact  to  be  the  goal  rather  than,  as  in  the  present  treaty,  limits 
well  above  levels  currently  in  place  in  critical  categories  of  weapon- 
ry, establishing  virtual  goals  and  time  tables  for  the  further  escala- 
tion of  an  already  staggering  array  of  instruments  of  doom. 

We  must  in  the  meanwhile  do  what  is  necessary  to  pursue  parity 
as  well  as  security  from  the  threat  that  will  emerge  under  the 
terms  of  the  treaty  before  you  rather  than  engage,  through  unilat- 
eral restraint  or  attrition  by  neglect,  in  premature,  preemptive 
compliance  with  a  treaty  that  does  not  yet  exist,  and  may  never 
come  to  pass. 

We  are  conscious  that  despite  the  administration's  assurances  of 
prudent  intent,  there  are  many  voices  in  and  outside  the  Congress 
that  will  ardently  press  for  the  consent  of  the  Senate  to  SALT  II 
but  that  will,  after  the  fact,  just  as  ardently  oppose  the  measures 
necessary  to  maintain  parity  and  security  under  the  terms  of  the 
treaty. 

Such  a  posture,  it  seems  to  me,  is  far  more  dangerous  to  peace 
and  stability  and  destructive  of  the  arms  control  process,  if  it 
should  prevail,  than  is  any  criticism  of  the  treaty  itself.  That  is 
why  we  have  conditioned  our  support  of  SALT  II  on  a  strong 


193 

expression  in  the  instrument  of  advice  and  consent  of  the  principle 
that  parity  requires  that  we  continue  to  modernize  and  develop  our 
forces  and  a  further  strong  expression  of  a  proposition  that  says,  in 
effect,  that  we  shall  not  continue  to  pursue  the  beguiling  phantom 
of  a  process  that  produces  nothing  of  consequence  but  dangerous 
illusions.  Those  are  the  broad  considerations  that  underly  the 
statement  of  policy  on  SALT  II  recently  adopted  by  the  AFL-CIO 
executive  council  which  has  been  previously  provided  to  the  Com- 
mittee and  which  is  our  essential  statement. 

I  ask  at  this  point  that  the  council's  statement  be  made  part  of 
the  record,  and  I  am  ready  to  respond  to  any  questions  you  may 
have. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Kirkland,  your  statement  will  appear  at  this 
point  as  part  of  the  record. 

[The  AFL-CIO  executive  council's  statement  of  policy  on  SALT  II 
follows:] 

Prepared  Statement  of  the  AFL-CIO  Executive  Council 

The  Strategic  Arms  Limitation  negotiations,  begun  ten  years  ago,  have  so  far 
failed  either  to  curb  the  nuclear  arms  race  or  to  stabilize  the  strategic  balance  of 
power.  Whatever  restraint  we  have  been  has  been  in  the  form  of  unilateral  U.S. 
decisions  to  cancel  or  delay  new  weapons  systems,  while  the  Soviet  Union  has 
engaged  in  the  most  massive  military  buildup  in  peacetime  history.  The  facts  are  no 
longer  contested. 

Whether  SALT  II,  by  contrast,  will  serve  as  a  significant  step  toward  arms  control 
depends  on  what  the  U.S.  government  does  within  its  terms.  Inaction  on  the  part  of 
the  United  States  while  the  Soviets  build  up  to  the  high  limits  allowed  in  the  treaty, 
would  lead  the  U.S.  into  a  position  of  gross  inequality,  from  which  this  nation  could 
offer  the  Soviets  no  effective  inducements  to  accept  real  arms  reductions.  The  arms 
race  would  continue. 

The  AFL-CIO  will  support  SALT  II  if  the  following  steps  are  taken  both  to 
remedy  the  emerging  strategic  imbalance  and  to  move  toward  genuine  strategic 
arms  control: 

(1)  In  its  resolution  of  advice  and  consent  to  the  ratification  of  SALT  II,  the 
Senate  should  stipulate  that  under  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  parity  requires  the 
modernization  and  development  of  U.S.  strategic  forces — including,  and  most  par- 
ticularly, the  MX  missile  based  in  such  a  mode  as  to  survive  a  first  strike  by  Soviet 
missiles. 

Without  the  MX,  the  U.S.  will  be  restricted  to  3  warheads  on  its  Minutemen 
ICBMs'  compared  with  10,  6,  and  4  on  the  Soviet's  SS-18,  SS-19,  and  SS-17.  The 
only  way  to  protect  U.S.  ICBM's  from  a  Soviet  first-strike  would  then  be  to  rely  on 
the  most  dangerous  of  all  strategies:  The  launch-on-warning  of  hair-trigger  missiles 
that  virtually  fire  themselves.  If  instead  the  U.S.  is  to  maintain  multiple  presiden- 
tial options  in  a  crisis,  this  country  must  proceed  to  develop  the  MX  in  a  survivable 
basing  mode  so  as  to  remove  the  temptation  of  a  first  strike. 

(2)  The  way  to  reduce  strategic  arms  expenditures  is  not  to  stand  pat  on  inferior 
or  vulnerable  systems  but  to  proceed  forthwith  to  real  and  dramatic  mutual  arms 
reductions. 

The  Senate,  therefore,  should  further  stipulate  in  its  instrument  of  advice  and 
consent  more  stringent  and  specific  directives  to  U.S.  negotiators  than  the  vague 
and  general  language  now  contained  in  the  Statement  of  Principles  for  SALT  III,  so 
as  to  assure  that  SALT  III  negotiations  will  constitute  a  genuine,  early  and  search- 
ing test  of  whether  or  not  the  SALT  process  will,  in  fact,  lead  to  significant  and 
continuing  reductions  in  strategic  arms.  A  time  limit  for  a  final  response  and 
evaluation,  such  as  the  termination  date  of  the  protocol  (December  1981),  should  be 
set  forth  so  as  to  assure  urgency  and  to  avoid  the  endless  protraction  of  negotiations 
while  the  build-up  continues  beyond  the  point  of  no  return. 

The  stipulation  should  also  call  for  limits  not  only  on  launchers  but  on  warheads- 
which  are  the  real  instruments  of  destruction  and  which  SALT  II  permits  to 
increase  dramatically  in  numbers  and  accuracy. 

The  Senate  should  stipulate  that  U.S.  negotiators  in  SALT  III  insist  on  limits 
which  would  require  the  dismantling  of  warheads  to  a  level  of  parity  significantly 


194 

(at  least  30  percent)  below  the  existing  level  of  the  higher  party  in  each  leg  of  the 
triad  (air,  sea  and  land-based  strategic  nuclear  forces).  Once  these  limits  are  set,  the 
basis  will  then  exist  for  further  annual  across-the-board  percentage  reductions. 

The  general,  unchecked  growth  of  warheads,  combined  with  the  acquisition  of 
counterforce  capability,  exposes  the  inadequacy  of  Mutual  Assured  Destruction 
(MAD)  as  a  deterrence  theory.  To  compel  an  American  President,  in  the  wake  of  a 
SoAdet  first  strike,  to  choose  between  negotiating  terms  of  surrender  or  launching  an 
annihilative  retaliatory  attack  on  Soviet  civilians  is  both  morally  unacceptable  and 
lacking  in  the  chief  prerequisite  of  deterrence:  credibility.  The  U.S.  must  move  from 
MAD  to  Mutual  Assured  Non-destruction  (MAN).  That  is,  these  negotiations  must 
seek  to  create  conditions  which  make  it  impossible  for  either  side  to  destroy  the 
other  as  a  viable  society  through  a  nuclear  attack,  or  to  believe  that  it  can. 

Only  then  can  we  begin  to  look  forward  with  optimism  to  the  ultimate  goal  of 
total  nuclear  disarmament. 

The  Chairman.  I  commend  you  upon  the  clarity  and  precision 
with  which  you  summarized  the  statement  of  the  AFL-CIO  in  an 
extemporaneous  way.  I  see  that  you  are  speaking  from  notes.  I 
always  appreciate  that,  because  it  contributes  to  the  brevity  of  the 
presentation,  and  thus  enables  us  to  move  ahead  with  questions. 

Senator  Percy  has  told  me  that  he  has  a  time  problem.  Senator 
Javits  has  graciously  agreed  to  permit  Senator  Percy  to  open  the 
questioning. 

Senator  Percy.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  thank  you  very  much  indeed. 
Senator  Javits,  thank  you.  I  very  much  appreciate  this. 

AFL-CIO  COSPONSORSHIP  OF  NEGATIVE  FILM  ON  SALT 

Mr.  Kirkland,  I  think  the  position  taken  by  the  AFL-CIO  is  a 
very,  responsible  position,  and  a  very  powerful  voice  has  spoken 
out  on  this  matter.  I  have  no  doubt  that  the  direction  in  which  you 
have  indicated  this  Nation  should  go  is  probably  the  direction  in 
which  it  will  go. 

There  was  a  film  produced  within  the  past  year,  I  believe,  by  the 
American  Security  Council.  It  was  stated  that  the  film  was  pro- 
duced in  cooperation  with  the  AFL-CIO.  It  was  a  very  negative 
film  on  the  whole  United  States-Soviet  military  balance  and  it  had 
implications  for  SALT  process.  Could  you  clarify  whether  the  AFL- 
CIO  did  sponsor  that  film,  or  was  that  a  misimpression? 

Mr.  Kirkland.  Not  to  my  knowledge,  sir. 

TELEVISED  COVERAGE  OF  FLOOR  DEBATE 

Senator  Percy.  Not  to  your  knowledge.  Could  you  tell  us  what 
your  reaction  might  be  to  having  the  Senate  floor  debate  opened  to 
radio  and  television  to  permit  a  better  understanding  of  this  whole 
process  by  the  American  people?  Do  you  think  it  is  essential  and 
important  that  the  American  people  follow  more  closely  this  debate 
and  argument  and  have  a  better  understanding  of  what  the  signifi- 
cance of  this  treaty  is? 

Mr.  Kirkland.  I  think  it  would  be  useful,  sir. 

UNKAGE  BETWEEN  SALT  AND  SOVIET  TROOPS  IN  CUBA 

Senator  Percy.  Do  you  believe  the  presence  of  Soviet  combat 
troops  in  Cuba  should  be  linked  in  any  way  with  the  SALT  debate, 
and  if  so,  in  what  way?  What  position  would  you  as  an  individual 
or  would  the  AFL-CIO  take  in  this  matter? 


195 

Mr.  KiRKLAND.  Well,  sir,  that  was  not,  of  course,  before  the 
council  at  the  time  we  considered  SALT  II,  so  the  council  did  not 
act  with  the  benefit  of  the  information  that  is  now  generally  avail- 
able. I  can,  therefore,  only  speak  for  myself.  I  think  it  is  an 
exceedingly  serious  matter  that  we  should  press  as  an  issue  with  or 
without  SALT.  I  find  it  rather  difficult  to  see  how  the  issue  of 
SALT  alone  will  necessarily  resolve  it. 

I  think  the  important  thing  is  to  resolve  the  question.  To  put  it 
in  another  way,  I  think  it  ought  to  be  looked  at  in  terms  of  its 
proper  context.  In  the  broad  range  and  scale  of  Soviet  adventures 
that  have  been  taking  place  in  recent  years  this  is  simply  another 
episode.  It  calls  into  question  two  elements  that  I  think  are  very 
important  in  our  consideration  of  arms  control  negotiations  with 
the  Soviets.  Those  are  the  questions  of  intentions,  and  the  question 
of  our  prudence  in  relying  on  their  observation  of  any  agreements 
that  we  make.  But  there  are  abundant  reasons  in  recent  history  to 
have  those  questions  in  our  minds  before  this.  I  suspect  that  the 
existence  of  those  questions  has  far  more  to  do  with  what  misgiv- 
ings there  may  be  in  the  public  mind  about  arms  control  negotia- 
tions than  anything  else,  than  any  appraisal  of  the  particular 
balance  of  forces  in  the  treaty,  the  general  suspicion  and  lack  of 
confidence  in  the  Soviet  Union  as  a  negotiating  partner,  but  I  still 
believe  that  should  be  tested  and  explored  to  its  limits  because  of 
the  importance  of  the  issues. 

With  respect  to  the  Soviet  troops  in  Cuba,  I  personally  have 
always  regarded  Cuba,  since  the  advent  of  Mr.  Castro,  as  a  Soviet 
colony.  I  think  so  far  as  it  relates  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the 
colonization  of  the  Caribbean  and  that  part  of  the  Caribbean  by  the 
Soviet  Empire  is  for  all  practical  purposes  as  much  a  matter  of 
concern  as  anything  that  has  followed.  I  regard  all  troops  in  Cuba 
as  soldiers  of  the  Soviet  Empire,  whether  they  are  Cuban  or  Rus- 
sian. I  am  somewhat  more  concerned  with  the  presence  of  Soviet 
troops  in  Cuba  as  it  is  related  to  the  broader  question,  about  the 
soldiers  of  the  Soviet  Empire  who  happen  to  be  Cuban,  who  are 
operating  widely  in  Africa,  in  an  active  mode,  than  I  am  with  2,000 
or  3,000  Soviet  troops  under  the  same  general  command  and  serv- 
ing the  same  general  purpose  in  Cuba  in  thus  far  a  passive  mode. 

AFFECT  OF  SALT  DEFEAT  ON   NATO  ALUANCE 

Senator  Percy.  Thank  you  very  much.  My  last  question  is  this. 
Let's  assume  that  the  conditions  the  council  has  laid  down  are  met 
by  the  Congress  and  the  President,  and  yet  either  crippling  amend- 
ments are  adopted  by  the  Senate  such  that  it  is  impossible  for  the 
Soviet  Union  to  accept  the  treaty  modified  in  that  way  or  it  is  just 
flatly  turned  down  by  the  Senate. 

How  do  you  feel  a  defeat  of  SALT  II  under  such  conditions  would 
affect  our  relationships  throughout  the  world  with  our  NATO 
allies?  What  do  you  think  would  be  the  reaction  of  the  American 
people? 

Mr.  KiRKLAND.  Well,  sir,  with  respect  to  the  question  of  amend- 
ments which  would  require  the  renegotiation  of  SALT  II  or  which 
look  to  the  prospect  that  the  Soviet  Union  will  return  to  the 
negotiating  table  and  deal  with  those  issues  that  we  raised  through 
amendments,  I  have  thought  about  that  very  carefully.  I  have 


196 

reached  the  conclusion  that  I  would  prefer  to  see  us  press  forward 
with  a  genuine  and  real  test  for  SALT  III  to  see  whether  it  is 
productive  and  mate  that  the  acid  test  of  our  future  view  of  the 
strategic  arms  control  negotiations  with  the  Soviet  Union. 

If  we  seek  a  return  to  the  table  on  certain  elements  of  SALT  II 
through  amendments  looking  to  renegotiation,  I  am  somewhat  ap- 
prehensive that  it  might  delay  us  and  hold  out  some  false  hopes.  It 
would  delay  us  from  taking  the  prudent  steps  in  terms  of  our  own 
forces  that  we  need  to  do  in  the  hope  that  we  might  accomplish 
something  through  those  renegotiations.  It  would  also  delay  what  I 
would  like  to  see  as  an  early  and  severe  and  searching  test  of 
whether  we  can  achieve  really  genuine  and  severe  drastic  arms 
reductions  as  early  as  possible.  That  is  why  you  will  note  in  the 
statement  of  the  council  that  the  negotiations  should  be  time 
urgent  and  there  should  be  a  deadline  for  us  to  evaluate  their 
response,  which  would  be  coterminous  with  the  expiration  of  the 
protocol.  I  think  we  ought  to  be  prepared  to  make  that  judgment. 
There  is  some  reason  to  say,  I  suppose,  in  SALT  II  that  it  was  a 
follow-on  of  Vladivostok  and  should  have  run  its  course  in  those 
terms,  and  that  these  matters  such  as  a  search  for  more  severe 
cuts  ought  to  be  scheduled  for  the  SALT  III  talks. 

But  let's  get  on  with  that,  and  get  on  with  it  quickly,  and  make  a 
judgment  fast  before  we  get  led  further  down  this  path. 

Senator  Percy.  Thank  you  very  much,  indeed,  Mr.  Kirkland.  We 
appreciate  your  appearance.  And  I  thank  my  colleagues  for  jdeld- 
ing  to  me. 

The  Chairman.  Thank  you.  Senator  Percy.  Senator  Glenn? 

Senator  Glenn.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

AFL-CIO'S  POSITION  ON  ABIUTY  TO  MONITOR  AND  VERIFY 

Mr.  Kirkland,  I  was  just  rereading  the  statement  by  the  Execu- 
tive Council  that  was  adopted  in  Chicago  on  August  7  which  you 
asked  be  entered  into  the  record.  I  think  as  a  statement  of  the 
objectives  toward  which  we  should  be  striving,  it  is  an  excellent 
statement. 

My  question  would  be  mainly  on  how  we  implement  such  a  thing 
and  still  know  what  the  Soviets  are  doing  in  a  secret  society.  Our 
ability  to  monitor  is  not  addressed  in  that  statement — our  ability  to 
verify.  I  think  that  is  the  key  to  whether  we  are  willing  to  go  these 
extra  steps  which  I  agree  with  you  completely  should  be  our  objec- 
tives for  future  negotiations,  and  we  all  regret  we  are  not  part  of 
these  negotiations. 

How  we  implement  those  and  still  know  what  is  going  on  in  a 
secret  society  and  know,  for  instance,  that  this  30-percent  reduction 
called  for  in  the  statement  is  being  carried  out,  is  a  very  difficult 
situation,  and  especially  post-Iran,  where  we  are  not  going  to  have 
quite  as  good  a  handle  on  their  testing  program,  and  we  only  know 
what  has  happened,  perhaps,  after  the  fact,  after  the  weapons 
system  is  deployed.  Then  we  can  measure  things  to  a  fine  accuracy. 

But  did  the  AFL-CIO  executive  council  consider  this  area  of 
monitoring  and  of  verification  and  what  their  assessment  of  it 
would  be  in  getting  on  to  these  very  laudible  steps  that  are  out- 
lined in  the  statement? 


197 

Mr.  KiRKLAND.  Certainly,  Senator,  we  were  aware  of  the  issues 
raised  with  regard  to  verification  in  our  consideration.  But  the 
statement  does  not  specifically  address  verification.  Obviously,  it 
assumes  at  least  some  adequate  capacity  to  verify  the  critical  ele- 
ments of  an  arms  control  agreement.  My  own  view  on  verification 
as  it  has  affected  negotiations  in  the  past  is  that  it  has  been 
somewhat  ambivalent,  a  sort  of  two-edged  sword. 

To  some  extent,  I  think  it  may  have  led  us  into  the  measurement 
of  the  less  relevant  factors  in  the  nuclear  strategic  arms  balance. 
The  things  that  are  simplest  to  verify — there  is  a  temptation  to 
count  those,  even  though  they  are  far  less  important.  Launchers, 
for  example,  have  been  made  largely  irrelevant  as  a  measure  by 
technology.  To  reduce  launchers  while  letting  other  aspects  of 
weaponry  run  free,  warheads  specifically,  is  equivalent  to  sort  of 
replacing  a  muzzle-loaded  rifle  with  an  Ouzi  or  a  Kalachnikov  or 
an  Armalite,  and  I  don't  regard  that  as  arms  control.  That  is 
productivity. 

The  SALT  II  agreement  does  for  the  first  time  create  an  obliga- 
tion and  a  promise  that  warheads  must  now  be  brought  within  the 
purview  of  our  capacity  to  verify  by  at  least  imposing  limits  on  the 
number  of  warheads  that  can  be  launched  with  a  particular  con- 
figuration of  a  missile.  That  implies  to  me  that  we  must  undertake 
the  responsibility  of  counting  warheads  and  knowing  how  to  count 
warheads. 

I  have  had  some  exposure  to  verification  techniques  in  connec- 
tion with  my  service  on  a  number  of  presidential  committees  and 
commissions.  I  have  been  generally  impressed  with  our  ability  to 
monitor.  There  are,  of  course,  as  you  very  well  know,  further  steps 
in  ultimate  verification.  It  is  evaluating  what  you  monitor  and 
being  willing  to  face  the  results  of  that  judgment. 

I  guess,  in  the  last  analysis,  I  think  that  during  the  term  of  the 
treaty,  and  this  perhaps  bears  on  the  question  of  the  loss  of  the 
stations  in  Iran,  the  monitoring  stations  there,  and  the  time  that  it 
will  take  to  recover  what  we  lost,  the  levels  that  are  permitted  are 
so  staggering  in  real  weaponry,  in  warheads  particularly,  that  a 
modest  infraction  is  of  no  great  consequence.  If  you  add  another 
100  when  you  cheat  and  produce  another  100  or  150  warheads, 
when  you  are  up  to  the  9,000  or  10,000  level  is  not  of  earth-shaking 
consequence  as  affecting  the  real  utility  of  these  forces. 

I  do  think  that  if  we  succeed  and  were  to  get  an  agreement  that 
significantly  reduces  these  levels,  and  that  looks  to  further  and 
further  reductions  as  we  would  hope  and  as  we  would  regard  as 
necessary  to  say  that  this  process  is  productive,  as  you  get  lower,  I 
think  the  issue  of  verification  increases  in  importance.  But  I  think 
at  these  levels  I  tend  to  agree  with  the  administration  that  verifi- 
cation is  probably  adequate  for  all  practical  purposes. 

Senator  Glenn.  I  think  both  sides  have  a  tremendous  overkill 
capability  right  now.  What  we  are  trjdng  to  establish,  of  course,  is 
this  balance.  I  thnk  we  all  regret  that  we  did  not  make  warheads 
the  subject  of  the  negotiation  early  on  in  SALT  II.  I  think  the 
whole  process,  however,  is  a  step  forward  if  we  can  work  out 
sufficient  monitoring  and  verification  capability  to  approve  the 
treaty  as  it  is. 


198 

At  least  it  is  a  step  forward  in  placing  some  limit  where  no  limit 
previously  existed,  even  though  it  is  preposterously  high.  It  is 
generally  recognized  that  we  have  some  10,000  deliverable  war- 
heads available  right  now.  The  Soviets  have  about  five.  Under 
SALT  II,  you  can  set  up  a  scenario  of  different  missiles  and  num- 
bers of  warheads  permitted  that  would  permit  them  to  triple  their 
five  and  for  us  to  go  up  by  50  percent  on  ours,  so  we  would  come  up 
at  around  15,000  on  each  side. 

Although  it  is  a  little  hard  for  me  to  accept  that  as  much 
progress  in  arms  limitation  and  arms  control,  at  least  it  is  some 
limit  where  none  previously  existed,  and  it  is  a  base  for  getting  on 
to  stressing  warhead  reduction  in  SALT  III,  IV,  V,  and  VI. 

Mr.  KiRKLAND.  I  look  at  it  as  a  way  station  on  to  some  real  test 
of  whether  we  are  ever  going  to  start  turning  that  curve  around. 
The  curve  is  still  going  up  and  that  concerns  me  very  deeply. 

You  mentioned  that  within  this  treaty  the  Soviet  Union  can 
increase  its  warheads  by  a  factor  of  three.  I  think  it  is  somewhat 
worse  than  that.  They  can  and  will  increase  their  accuracy,  I  think 
from  something  like  1,200  feet  to  600  or  700  feet,  which,  as  I  am 
told,  makes  a  factor  of  four.  It  is  not  just  the  doubling,  since  there 
is  a  geometric  ratio.  You  multiply  the  factor  of  four  on  accuracy  by 
the  factor  of  three  on  the  number  of  warheads,  and  you  have  a 
factor  of  escalation  on  their  side  of  12,  1200  percent,  which  is  a  far 
cry  from  the  kind  of  arms  control  that  we  would  hope  for  if  this 
were  the  end  of  the  line,  these  levels  of  real  redundancy — I  ques- 
tion whether  it  would  be  of  any  great  consequence  to  us  whether 
they  added  further  than  that,  whether  it  would  be  cost  effective 
expenditure  and  of  great  concern  to  us. 

But  as  I  said,  our  final  judgment  tells  us,  OK,  we  will  pass  this 
marker  and  move  to  the  next,  and  let  the  next  one  be  a  real  test 
from  which  we  ought  to  be  willing  to  hold  a  position  and  walk 
away  from  the  table  if  necessary  without  continually  bargaining 
with  ourselves  to  formulate  a  new  position  and  another  new 
position. 

Senator  Glenn.  My  time  is  up.  Thank  you.  I  agree  that  we 
should  move  on  to  that  next  step.  I  think  we  can  only  move  on  to 
that  next  step,  however,  if  we  build  enough  confidence  each  step 
along  the  way  by  knowing  what  they  are  doing  so  that  we  are 
willing  to  move  on  to  that  next  step.  We  are  not  willing  to  buy  just 
a  pig  in  a  poke  and  just  assume  they  are  living  up  to  these  things. 
We  have  seen  too  many  activities  in  other  areas  of  the  world  where 
we  do  not  trust  them  to  act  in  our  best  interest,  to  put  it  very 
mildly. 

I  think  I  agree  with  your  emphasis  on  warheads  completely. 
Unless  SALT  III  is  to  have  as  its  basis  the  limitation  of  deliverable 
nuclear  warheads,  I  would  be  prepared  to  vote  against  SALT  II  and 
the  whole  works  right  now  because  it  is  a  sham,  a  charade.  We 
should  not  go  any  further  with  it  unless  subsequent  negotiations 
are  to  bear  on  the  subject  of  deliverable  nuclear  warheads.  That  is 
what  the  big  bang  comes  from.  You  are  absolutely  right  on  that. 

Mr.  KiRKLAND.  I  agree  with  that  completely,  sir. 

Senator  Glenn.  I  think  that  should  be  the  absolute  basis  for  any 
future  negotiation,  and  we  not  continue  our  emphasis  on  launch- 
ers. Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 


199 

Mr.  KiRKLAND.  In  fact,  I  have  heard  some  students  of  this  issue 
argue  that  it  is  far  more  stabilizing  to  count  warheads  and  let 
launchers  run  free  than  the  other  way  around. 

Senator  Glenn.  That  might  give  them  a  little  additional  flexibil- 
ity that  we  might  not  prefer. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Javits? 

Senator  Javits.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

ATTITUDE  OF  AMERICANS  TOWARD  RISKTAKING 

Mr.  Kirkland,  we  welcome  you  here  very  much,  first  as  an  old 
friend,  and  second,  because  you  speak  for  such  a  vast  constituency 
of  those  who  fight  wars  and  make  the  things  with  which  we  fight 
wars.  One  thing  that  has  bedevilled  Washington  policymakers  on 
which  I  would  greatly  value  your  view  is  this.  After  Vietnam,  after 
Angola,  and  after  Watergate,  what  is  the  attitude  of  the  American 
people  toward  the  risktaking  which  is  implied  in  your  statement? 

That  is,  we  have  certain  stopping  points,  and  we  go  so  far  and  no 
further,  and  then  we  will  face  whatever  the  issue  is.  We  don't 
know.  That  may  be  a  very  portentious  decision.  The  way  the  Krem- 
lin works,  as  we  see  it  demonstrated  in  from  Cuba,  in  this  highly 
surreptitious  way,  is  that  you  don't  know  what  they  are  liable  to 
spring,  and  you  are  always  confronted,  therefore,  with  the  worst 
case  hypothesis. 

As  you  reflect  so  ably,  as  you  always  do,  the  views  of  the  Execu- 
tive Council  of  the  AFL-CIO  for  us  today  by  their  designation, 
which  is  critically  important,  could  you  also  reflect  to  us  how  you 
feel  the  rank  and  file  AFL-CIO  members,  feel  about  this  issue?  Do 
you  think  notwithstanding  the  disillusionment  of  Watergate  and 
the  reversals  of  Vietnam  and  the  frustrations  which  we  have  suf- 
fered, that  they  are  nonetheless  in  the  great  tradition  of  this 
country  ready  to  face  whatever  it  is,  putting  freedom  even  above 
these  dangers? 

Mr.  Kirkland.  I  am  confident  of  that,  Senator.  I  think  that  our 
statement  and  our  other  statements — we  had  a  parallel  statement 
on  which  the  Council  acted  at  the  same  time  which  addressed  the 
so-called  transfer  amendment  with  which  I  am  sure  you  are  all 
familiar,  that  puts  the  proposition  to  you  that  the  price  of  social 
progress  and  domestic  progress  has  to  come  out  of  defense  expendi- 
tures. 

We  oppose  that.  I  think  in  my  opening  statement  I  refer  to  a 
view  of  that  principle.  I  am  confident  that  that  view  reflects  the 
general  view  of  the  membership  of  the  trade  union  movement.  As 
you  very  well  know,  we  have  a  constant  system  of  meetings,  con- 
ventions, conferences,  board  meetings,  and  so  forth  where  these 
things  emerge  and  come  to  our  attention.  The  executive  council 
represents  a  pretty  good  cross  section  of  the  leadership  of  the 
American  trade  union  movement,  and  that  leadership  reflects,  I 
think,  quite  accurately  their  perception  of  the  attitudes  of  the 
members,  or  they  wouldn't  survive  too  long. 

I  think  the  problem  with  any  democracy  is  that  we  tend  to  relax 
and  hope  for  the  best  in  between  perceived  crises.  When  we  see  a 
crisis,  when  we  see  a  gun  at  our  head,  we  pull  ourselves  together 
and  do  remarkable  things.  The  challenge  of  leadership  is  how  to  do 


200 

those  remarkable  things  when  you  are  not  looking  down  that  gun 
barrel,  but  the  crisis  is  a  little  more  vague  and  a  little  more 
nebulous. 

That  places  a  great  burden  on  leadership,  but  I  think  it  is  a 
burden  that  has  to  be  assumed  day  in  and  day  out,  and  not  just  at 
crisis  time,  if  we  are  going  to  meet  the  sort  of  challenge  presented 
by  a  totalitarian  society,  which  doesn't  really  count,  and  manipu- 
lates the  public  attitudes  or  the  public  role. 

Senator  Javits.  Mr.  Kirkland,  that  is  tremendously  heartening 
to  me.  I  think  it  should  be  to  the  policymakers  in  addition  to  those 
of  us  who  are  here.  I  think  these  are  words  the  President  should 
hear  and  listen  to  and  pay  attention  to.  It  is  tremendously  hearten- 
ing to  the  country  and  a  great  tribute  to  the  labor  movement. 

I  personally  agree  with  the  two  conditions  that  you  set,  that  is, 
tragic  as  it  is,  as  you  have  just  said,  we  are  going  to  have  to 
continue  to  work  to  maintain  parity.  It  is  compelled  upon  us.  I 
agree  with  you  that  SALT  III  is  the  watershed,  that  our  negotia- 
tors of  SALT  III  have  to  be  told  that  we  will  reject  SALT  III  if  they 
bring  it  back,  without  making  substantial  arms  reduction. 

Beyond  that,  from  what  you  say,  I  am  deeply  heartened  that  our 
people  are  willing.  We  must  be  alert  about  becoming  ensnared  time 
and  again  in  any  euphoria  which  has  been  talked  about  so  much 
which,  after  another  SALT.  We  are  told  it  will  put  us  to  sleep,  will 
put  us  even  further  behind  in  negotiating  power,  and  only  bring  us 
to  a  day  which  could  mean  surrender,  a  word  which  we  hate  to 
utter,  let  alone  think  about,  but  which  the  way  this  world  is  run, 
we  cannot  simply  forget. 

I  am  very  hopeful  that  the  desires  of  the  AFL-CIO  will  be 
realized  through  the  reservations  we  consider  respecting  this 
treaty. 

Mr.  Kirkland.  Senator,  if  I  may  just  say  a  word  and  get  back  a 
little  bit  to  an  observation  of  Senator  Glenn's.  I  think  it  is  true 
there  is  some  marginal  value  in  a  treaty  which  in  effect  sort  of 
administers  and  exchanges  information  and  marginal  assurances 
on  the  tremendously  continuing  high  level  of  weaponry.  It  is  sort  of 
a  gross  redundant  administration  procedure.  I  just  doubt  whether 
that  sort  of  aim  or  object  warrants  a  treaty,  a  treaty  labeled  arms 
limitations,  and  surrounded  by  the  hopes  and  expectations  that  we 
are  going  to  reduce  in  any  genuine  way. 

The  real  treaty  ought  to  have  more  substance  than  that.  If  we 
are  just  going  to  administer  redundancy  on  a  mutual  basis  with  the 
Soviet  Union,  I  think  there  are  other  procedures  that  would  not 
carry  with  it  the  expectations  and  promises  that  a  treaty  does.  In 
that  case,  I  would  far  prefer  to  see  us  set  up  a  bilateral  permanent 
administrative  committee  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  let  it  sink 
into  the  backwater  that  mutual  and  balanced  force  reduction  has 
been  in  for  years. 

Senator  Javits.  Isn't  the  difficulty,  however,  that  considering 
where  we  are  and  where  we  came  from  and  the  necessity  for  catch- 
up, that  you  cannot  just  practically  do  that?  It  would  put  us  in  a 
tailspin  that  would  indicate  a  condition  of  instability  in  the  world 
which  would  make  it  impossible  to  do  exactly  what  you  want  done. 

If  we  had  come  from  there,  I  would  be  inclined  to  agree  with  you, 
but  we  have  not,  so  it  seems  to  me  that  in  view  of  the  situation 


201 

which  we  face,  your  resolution  makes  the  best  of  a  realistic  exist- 
ing situation,  to  wit,  go  ahead  with  SALT  II  with  these  caveats. 

Mr.  KiRKLAND.  I  believe  so. 

Senator  Javits.  I  thank  you. 

The  Chairman.  Thank  you,  Senator  Javits. 

REDUCTIONS   IN   SALT   III    IF   PARITY    IS   NOT   ACHIEVED 

I  fear  we  will  have  to  cut  this  meeting  short,  because  Senator 
Javits  and  I  have  been  asked  to  go  to  the  White  House,  so  I  will 
just  ask  one  question,  Mr.  Kirkland,  and  with  this  question  I  also 
want  to  express  my  thanks  for  your  testimony.  If  parity  is  not 
maintained  during  the  period  of  the  treaty,  then  it  is  really  not 
realistic  to  expect  that  we  could  ever  secure  substantial  reductions 
in  nuclear  arms  in  SALT  III.  Do  you  agree  with  that? 

Mr.  Kirkland.  I  agree  with  that  completely,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  what  has  led  me  to  believe  that  these 
other  weapons  systems  which  have  been  proposed  will  be  neces- 
sary, because  I  share  with  you  the  goal  that  we  must  bring  down 
these  hideous  levels,  and  SALT  III  will  be  the  test.  Without  parity 
in  our  position  there  is  no  prospect  that  those  reductions  could  be 
achieved. 

It  is  a  price  we  have  to  pay,  but  it  is  the  necessary  price. 

Mr.  Kirkland.  That  is  a  major  consideration  to  us,  sir.  The 
position  we  are  in  in  the  ongoing  negotiations  and  their  perception 
of  our  will  and  our  x'esolve  and  our  capacity  plus,  until  we  have  a 
SALT  III  in  hand  that  tells  us  that  it  is  worth  the  candle,  we  have 
to  operate  on  the  assumption  that  this  treaty  defines  the  levels  we 
are  going  to  have  to  live  with,  at  least  for  its  term,  and  establishes 
the  base,  if  the  process  fails  us  in  the  future. 

The  Chairman.  Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Kirkland,  for  your 
testimony. 

This  afternoon,  the  committee  will  resume  its  hearings  on  the 
SALT  II  Treaty  at  2  o'clock.  Senator  Stone  will  chair  the  afternoon 
hearing,  and  Senator  Zorinsky  after  him.  Phyllis  Schlafly  will  be  a 
witness.  Edward  Teller  and  Philip  A.  Carver  are  the  other  wit- 
nesses on  the  agenda  for  this  afternoon.  The  hearing  for  this  morn- 
ing is  adjourned. 

[Whereupon,  at  12:30  p.m.,  the  hearing  was  adjourned,  to  recon- 
vene at  2  p.m.  the  same  day.] 


202 

Afternoon  Session 

The  committee  met,  at  2:10  p.m.,  in  room  318,  Russell  Senate 
Office  Building,  Hon.  Richard  Stone  presiding. 

Present:  Senators  Stone,  Javits,  Percy,  Helms,  Hayakawa,  and 
Zorinsky. 

OPENING  STATEMENT 

Senator  Stone.  This  afternoon  we  will  continue  taking  testimony 
from  public  witnesses  on  their  views  on  the  SALT  II  Treaty. 

Our  first  witness  is  Mrs.  Phyllis  Schlafly,  representing  the 
American  Conservative  Union.  Mrs.  Schlafly  is  an  analyst  and 
author  with  interests  in  national  defense,  nuclear  strategy  and 
weaponry. 

The  American  Conservative  Union  [ACU]  is  the  first  organiza- 
tion we  will  hear  from  today.  Following  the  ACU,  we  will  hear 
from  Dr.  Edward  Teller,  a  world-renowned  physicist,  who  will  give 
us  his  view  as  a  scientist.  Dr.  Teller  has  spent  much  of  his  career 
working  on  nuclear  weapons  and  has  often  been  termed  the  father 
of  the  hydrogen  bomb. 

Our  last  witness  this  afternoon  will  be  Mr.  Phillip  Karber,  an 
expert  on  the  European  military  balance,  both  conventional  and 
nuclear. 

Because  the  overall  military  balance  in  addition  to  the  strategic 
nuclear  balance  is  important  to  our  SALT  deliberations,  we  believe 
it  important  to  review  the  European  balance. 

Mrs.  Schlafly,  we  welcome  you  to  the  committee  and  ask  you  to 
proceed  with  your  statement. 

STATEMENT  OF  PHYLLIS  SCHLAFLY,^  AMERICAN  CONSERVA- 
TIVE UNION,  ACCOMPANIED  BY  YVONNE  CHICOINE  AND 
SUSIE  BLOSSER 

Mrs.  Schlafly.  Thank  you,  Senator  Stone  and  members  of  the 
committee.  I  appreciate  your  courtesy  in  being  willing  to  hear  me 
today. 

My  name  is  Phyllis  Schlafly,  of  Alton,  111.  I  am  an  author,  a 
journalist  and  a  member  of  the  Illinois  Bar.  I  appear  here  as  a 
representative  of  the  American  Conservative  Union,  of  which  I  am 
a  member  of  the  board  of  directors.  I  am  accompanied  by  several 
members  of  their  staff,  including  Yvonne  Chicoine,  on  my  right, 
and  Susie  Blosser,  on  my  left. 

For  the  past  15  years,  my  major  field  of  research  and  writing  has 
been  strategy.  I  am  the  coauthor  of  five  books  on  nuclear  strategy, 
books  which  made  a  series  of  remarkable  predictions  which,  unfor- 
tunately, have  all  come  true. 

At  a  time  when  others  were  discounting  Soviet  intentions  and 
capabilities,  my  books  predicted  that  the  Soviets  would  keep  build- 
ing nuclear  weapons  until  they  achieved  decisive  strategic  superior- 
ity, while  the  United  States  was  opting  out  of  the  arms  race  by  a 
self-imposed  freeze  on  the  building  of  additional  strategic  weapons. 

It  is  now  obvious  that  this  is  exactly  what  has  happened. 


'  See  page  219  for  Mrs.  Schlafly's  prepared  statement. 


203 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  ask  that  my  full  statement  be  printed  in  the 
record  and,  in  the  interest  of  time,  I  be  permitted  to  summarize  it. 

Senator  Stone.  Your  full  statement  will  appear  in  the  record  at 
the  appropriate  point.  Please  proceed. 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  Thank  you. 

My  testimony  shows  that  SALT  II  will  deliver  to  the  Soviet 
Union  three  powerful  political  and  economic  weapons  against 
which  we  will  have  no  defense.  First,  the  oil  weapon,  the  power  to 
cut  off  U.S.  imported  oil.  Second,  the  dollar  weapon,  the  power  to 
destroy  our  U.S.  dollar  by  denying  us  the  importation  of  strategic 
materials  and  thereby  unsettling  our  economy.  And  third,  the  Cuba 
weapon,  the  power  to  put  missiles  and  troops  and  bombers  in  Cuba. 

We  have  already  had  a  taste  of  what  these  weapons  can  mean.  In 
1973,  we  had  oil  embargo  I  when  the  Soviet  Union  openly  and 
flagrantly  encouraged  the  oil-producing  nations  of  the  Middle  East 
to  use  their  oil  weapon  against  the  West. 

We  all  know  that  after  an  embargo  of  5  months,  they  jacked  up 
the  price  fivefold.  That  was  followed  by  tremendous  inflation  in  our 
own  country,  following  which  we  have  lost  about  one-half  the  value 
of  our  dollar. 

We  all  know  about  the  troops  in  Cuba  today.  In  my  statement  I 
show  several  scenarios  of  what  oil  embargo  II  and  Cuba  crisis  II 
might  mean  to  the  United  States  if  initiated  by  the  Soviet  Union. 
Of  course,  these  are  just  examples  of  what  the  Soviets  might  do. 
There  are  any  number  of  variations. 

They  could  proceed  by  the  salami  technique  instead  of  all  at 
once,  say,  cut  off  our  oil  5  percent  at  a  time.  We  already  know 
what  that  means  after  the  cutoff  of  oil  by  the  loss  of  Iran. 

The  point  is  that  SALT  II  gives  to  the  Soviets  sufficient  superior- 
ity of  nuclear  weapons  so  that  they  can  use  the  political  and 
economic  weapons  with  impunity.  Some  people  think  that  dropping 
bombs  is  the  only  utility  of  nuclear  weapons,  but  superiority  would 
give  to  the  Soviets  such  economic  and  political  weapons  that  they 
could,  in  effect,  tremendously  upset  our  way  of  life. 

I  brought  with  me  a  map  which  shows  how  these  political  and 
economic  weapons  are  interrelated  to  Soviet  strategic  superiority 
and  how  the  Soviets  and  Cubans  are  already  getting  ready  in 
position  to  use  them.  The  red  countries  are  these  where  Cuba  has 
stationed  troops  in  Africa.  Cuba  has  about  50,000  troops  there  and, 
of  course,  they  are  using  Soviet  weapons. 

The  red  anchors  show  where  the  Soviets  have,  in  effect,  bases  for 
their  fleet.  They  have  three  in  the  Mediterranean,  two  around 
where  Saudi  Arabia  and  Kuwait  send  out  their  oil,  three  on  the 
eastern  side  of  Africa.  In  addition  to  that,  they  have  a  bunkering 
area  in  the  Indian  Ocean,  and  they  have  a  great  presence  through 
those  vessels  which  are  called  fishing  vessels  stationed  all  around 
the  coast  of  Africa. 

The  red  stars  are  friendly  ports  where  the  Soviets  can  bring 
their  navy  in.  We,  of  course,  have  no  such  ports  on  the  continent  of 
Africa. 

The  big  green  stream  shows  the  flow  of  oil  from  the  Middle  East 
to  Western  Europe  and  to  the  United  States,  and  the  brown  stream 
is  the  flow  of  oil  from  Africa  to  western  Europe  and  the  United 
States.  I  think  the  map  makes  it  very  clear  how  easy  it  would  be 


U8-260    0-79    Pt.i+    -    14 


204 

for  the  Soviets  to  use  either  their  naval  superiority  or  their  strate- 
gic superiority  through  nuclear  blackmail  in  order  to  cut  off  the 
flow  of  oil  to  the  West. 

It  is  obviously  a  much  easier  job  to  interrupt  that  flow  than  it  is 
to  keep  the  sea  lanes  open.  The  Soviets  will  have  sufficient  superi- 
ority through  SALT  II  in  addition  to  their  tremendous  naval 
power. 

We  all  know  what  the  gas  lines  were  in  June  when  we  lost  5 
percent  of  our  oil.  I  would  suggest  that,  if  you  liked  waiting  in 
gasoline  lines  in  June,  you  will  love  SALT  II.  Half  of  our  oil  comes 
from  imports  at  the  present  time,  and  59  percent  of  our  imported 
oil  comes  from  Africa  and  the  Middle  East.  How  in  the  world  dare 
we  give  to  the  Soviet  Union  the  power  to  cut  off  that  oil,  to  cause 
the  economic  dislocations  that  that  would  mean,  with  the  resulting 
effects  in  inflation,  in  the  closing  of  plants,  in  unemployment,  and 
in  all  such  disruption  to  the  economic  life  of  our  country? 

I  believe  that  this  map  shows  that  the  linkage  between  SALT 
and  oil  and  the  dollar  is  tremendous.  SALT  II,  in  effect,  would  pour 
salt  into  the  gasoline  tank  of  the  free  world.  Translated  into  plain 
English,  SALT  II  equals  Soviet  superiority  in  nuclear  weapons, 
equals  Soviet  ability  to  wage  political  and  economic  blackmail  in 
the  Middle  East  and  in  Africa,  and  equals  more  gasoline  shortages 
in  America. 

We  have  at  stake  not  only  our  gasoline  but  the  stability  of  our 
U.S.  dollar.  The  Soviets  could  even  unsettle  it  by  delays,  by  harass- 
ments,  or  by  cut-offs  of  that  stream  of  gasoline  flowing  to  our 
country. 

The  map  also  shows  the  linkage  between  the  Soviet  strategic 
superiority  and  Russian  troops  in  Cuba  and  Cuban  troops  in  Africa. 
They  are  all  tied  in  together.  If  we  no  longer  have  strategic  superi- 
ority, how  are  we  going  to  make  the  Russians  pull  their  troops  out 
of  Cuba? 

We  can  ask  them.  The  President  can  say,  please  take  them  out. 
Mr.  Vance  can  call  up  and  say,  do  you  realize  this  is  a  very  serious 
matter,  as  he  said  the  other  day.  The  Soviets  must  know  it  is  a 
serious  matter.  They  must  have  thought  seriously  about  it  before 
they  sent  their  troops  into  Cuba. 

But  the  point  is,  can  we  make  them?  SALT  II  not  only  allows  the 
Soviets  to  have  the  power,  but  also  the  perception  of  power.  It  is 
obvious  that  SALT  is  so  unequal,  so  unfair,  so  humiliating  to  the 
United  States.  It  gives  so  many  advantages  to  the  Soviet  Union 
that  I  don't  know  how  the  Kremlin  could  have  anything  but  con- 
tempt for  a  country  which  would  acquiesce  in  such  an  unequal, 
unfair  deal. 

SALT  allows  the  Soviets  to  have  308  heavy  missiles  and  doesn't 
allow  us  to  have  even  one.  It  allows  them  to  have  four  times  the 
number  of  land-based  MIRV's  that  we  have,  MIRV's  which  will 
have  26  times  the  power  of  our  land-based  MIRV's.  It  limits  the 
range  of  our  cruise  missiles  but  it  allows  their  submarines  to  prowl 
our  coasts  within  range  of  our  cities. 

It  does  not  allow  us  to  have  a  mobile  missile  until  1982,  but 
allows  the  Soviets  to  have  hundreds  of  mobile  missiles  today.  It 
forbids  us  to  catch  up  with  the  Soviets  in  numbers  of  ICBM's,  in 


205 

megatonnage,  in  throw-weight  or  in  any  meaningful  measure  of 
what  strategic  superiority  is  all  about. 

And  above  all,  SALT  II  gives  to  the  Soviet  Union  the  power  to 
use  the  political  and  economic  weapons,  the  power  to  cut  off  our 
oil,  to  destroy  our  dollar,  and  to  use  Cuba  as  a  base. 

If  we  ratify  SALT  II,  that  is  what  it  means.  If  we  reject  SALT  II, 
on  the  other  hand,  we  can  be  masters  of  our  own  destiny.  We  can 
build  the  weapons  that  we  need  to  defend  the  independence  of  our 
country  and  its  economic  stability.  Rejection  of  SALT  II  would 
show  that  we  are  not  going  to  let  the  Soviets  have  the  power  to  cut 
off  our  gasoline  at  the  pump,  to  cut  the  value  of  our  dollar  to  10 
cents,  or  to  put  troops,  missiles  or  submarines  or  bombers  in  Cuba. 

So  the  specter  of  gasoline  lines  and  closed  plants  and  unemploy- 
ment hangs  over  SALT  II.  The  linkage  is  complete.  I  believe  that 
our  Nation  is  hungry  for  Senate  leadership  to  say  that  the  United 
States  will  rebuild  our  strategic  power  so  that  we  can  assure  the 
political  and  economic  independence  of  the  United  States. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Senator  Stone.  Thank  you,  Mrs.  Schlafly. 

Senator  Helms. 

Senator  Helms.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mrs.  Schlafly,  we  appreciate  your  coming  before  the  committee 
today.  You  are  a  distinguished  American  and  I  congratulate  our 
colleague  from  Illinois  for  having  such  a  constituent  as  Mrs. 
Schlafly. 

Senator  Percy.  We  haven't  always  seen  eye  to  eye,  but  I  have 
always  admired  her  many  qualities,  her  tenacity,  perseverence,  and 
her  power  of  expression.  It  is  one  of  the  best  testimonies  I  have 
heard.  I  am  sorry  I  was  tied  up  and  could  not  hear  it  from  the 
start. 

Mrs.  Schlafly.  Thank  you.  Senator. 

Senator  Helms.  The  Chairman  and  I  were  just  remarking  that 
there  are  very  few  witnesses  who,  while  delivering  testimony,  could 
get  up  and  walk  over  to  a  map,  describe  it,  come  back  and  sit  down 
without  missing  a  syllable.  [Laughter.] 

IMMORALITY   OF   MUTUAL   ASSURED   DESTRUCTION 

Mrs.  Schlafly,  I  had  an  opportunity  to  read  your  statement  in 
advance.  In  your  statement,  you  refer  to  the  doctrine  of  mutual 
assured  destruction,  or  MAD.  Now,  Henry  Kissinger  was  recently 
quoted  in  the  Washington  Star,  I  believe  on  September  2  of  this 
year,  in  reference  to  MAD. 

In  that  article.  Dr.  Kissinger  described  mutual  assured  destruc- 
tion as,  and  I  quote:  "a  bloodthirsty  doctrine  which  is  immoral, 
senseless,  demoralizing."  A  moral  issue  is  raised  because  the  doc- 
trine rests  upon  the  idea  that  we  shall  use  nuclear  retaliation 
against  a  civilian  population. 

Now,  on  the  other  end  of  the  extreme  of  those  who  would  target 
civilian  populations  are  those  who  wish  to  have  the  U.S.  disarm 
itself  unilaterally.  Their  moral  position  appears  to  be  that  all  kill- 
ing is  immoral;  therefore,  we  should  not  even  have  arms  to  defend 
ourselves  since  defense  implies  killing. 


206 

POUCY   OF   CHRISTIAN   NATION   IN   WAR-TORN   WORLD 

Somewhere,  Mrs.  Schlafly,  between  those  two  extremes  must  lie 
a  rational  explanation  of  how  a  Christian  nation  can  conduct  itself 
in  a  war-torn  world  without  losing  its  moral  values.  This  is  the 
first  question  I  would  like  to  ask. 

Do  you  agree  with  Dr.  Kissinger  that  the  MAD  doctrine  is  im- 
moral? 

Mrs.  Schlafly.  Senator,  I  think  the  MAD  doctrine  is  the  most 
immoral  doctrine  that  anyone  ever  devised.  The  MAD  doctrine  is 
based  upon  the  proposition  that  if  there  is  a  war,  we  must  kill  the 
maximum  number  of  civilians  it  is  possible  to  kill.  That  is  what 
mutual  assured  destruction  means. 

It  is  based  on  the  doctrine  that  we  keep  all  of  our  cities  like 
sitting  ducks,  open  to  any  incoming  missiles  from  any  nation,  while 
we  do  nothing  whatsoever  to  protect  them.  And  if  deterrence  fails, 
we  have  no  alternative  except  surrender.  But  at  that  point  we  then 
launch  our  missiles  and  kill  millions  of  Russians  who  had  nothing 
to  do  with  participation  in  the  decision  to  make  the  launch. 

I  really  don't  know  how  anyone  could  support  that  theory,  but  it 
is  the  basic  theory  of  SALT  II.  As  a  matter  of  fact.  Secretary 
Brown  testified  before  this  committee  that  the  MAD  doctrine  is  the 
bedrock  of  our  policy  and  the  bedrock  of  SALT  II.  Yet  it  is  based  on 
killing  people  instead  of  keeping  people  alive. 

I  do  not  see  what  good  millions  of  dead  Russians  will  possibly  do 
for  the  United  States  if  our  cities  have  been  hit.  We  should  direct 
our  attention  toward  keeping  Americans  alive  rather  than  killing 
Russians. 

On  the  whole  moral  issue,  I  think  one  of  the  most  immoral 
things  I  can  think  of  is  the  absolute  abandonment  and  default  of 
the  United  States  in  retaining  the  great  gift  of  strategic  superiority 
that  we  had.  Nuclear  weapons  in  themselves  are  neither  good  nor 
evil.  They  are  instruments  of  power.  In  1945,  our  country  was  so 
fortunate  that  God  allowed  the  great  atomic  weapon  to  be  devel- 
oped by  the  United  States  instead  of  by  Hitler  or  Stalin.  One  can 
speculate  on  what  the  world  would  have  been  like  had  the  Nazis  or 
Russians  gotten  it. 

But  we  got  it  and  we  built  up  that  nuclear  superiority  to  where 
it  peaked  at  8  to  1  in  1962,  at  the  time  of  the  Cuban  missile  crisis. 
What  happened?  We  don't  have  the  superiority  any  more.  The 
Joint  Chiefs  have  said  that  even  essential  equivalence  will  be  lost 
in  the  early  1980's.  Our  superiority  is  gone.  We  have  defaulted  on 
our  responsibility  to  maintain  the  peace  of  Western  civilization. 

We  proved,  from  1945  to  1967  or  1972,  that,  when  possessed  by 
the  United  States,  nuclear  power  is  the  greatest  instrument  for 
peace  anyone  developed.  But  in  the  hands  of  the  Soviet  Union,  it  is 
not  that  at  all.  It  is  an  instrument  of  aggression. 

The  Gospel  of  St.  Luke  tells  us  that,  when  a  strong  man  armed 
keepeth  his  palace,  his  goods  are  in  peace.  That  is  really  the  best 
prescription  for  peace.  Our  large,  wonderful,  productive  country, 
has  moral  responsibility  to  defend  our  people  and  to  defend  the 
whole  of  Western  civilization,  and  not  to  default  and  give  away  this 
great  talent  we  were  given  in  the  nuclear  weapon. 


207 

CONSTITUTIONAL   DUTY   PARALLEL  TO   MORAL   DUTY 

Senator  Helms.  Well,  the  constitutional  duty  of  this  Government 
to  provide  for  the  common  defense,  I  judge  you  are  sajdng,  is 
parallel  to  a  moral  duty,  for  this  Government  to  protect  American 
citizens  from  war.  Is  that  essentially  what  you  are  saying  to  me? 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  Yes.  To  provide  for  the  common  defense  is  the 
first  constitutional  duty  of  our  Government.  But  I  would  add  to 
that  the  moral  duty  to  defend  this  great  country,  the  lives  of  our 
people  and,  in  fact.  Western  civilization  against  an  enemy,  the 
Soviet  Union,  which  h£is  built  the  most  tremendous  military  arse- 
nal in  the  history  of  the  world  and  has  never  abandoned  its  goal  to 
use  every  weapon  it  has  to  achieve  world  conquest. 

CONFUCT   BETWEEN   MORAL   DUTY   AND   IMMORAL  KILLING 

Senator  Helms.  How  does  this  moral  duty  to  protect  American 
citizens  at  war  square  with  the  immorality  of  killing  in  the  context 
of  your  first  eloquent  answer? 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  We  proved  when  we  had  nuclear  superiority 
from  1945  through  1967  that  there  was  nuclear  peace.  There  was 
peace  between  the  nuclear  superpowers.  And  if  the  United  States 
has  nuclear  superiority,  there  will  be  no  nuclear  war.  That  is  the 
surest  way  to  peace. 

As  George  Washington  said:  "To  secure  the  peace  it  must  be 
known  that  we  are  at  all  times  prepared  for  war."  And  nuclear 
superiority  in  the  hands  of  the  United  States  is  the  surest,  best 
means  of  peace.  We  proved  that  when  we  had  it. 

The  only  reason  we  are  nervous  today  and  worried  is  because  we 
no  longer  have  it.  Decisions  were  made  which  allowed  that  great 
superiority  to  shift  to  the  Soviet  Union. 

SALT  II  PREVENTS   UNITED  STATES  FROM   MEETING  MORAL 

OBLIGATIONS 

Senator  Helms.  In  view  of  the  acknowledged  essential  equiv- 
alence by  the  early  eighties,  I  take  it  you  believe  the  SALT  II 
Treaty  will  not  allow  the  United  States  to  meet  its  moral  obliga- 
tions. 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  That  is  correct,  because  SALT  II  prohibits  us 
from  catching  up  with  the  Russians.  It  is  that  simple.  SALT  II 
permits  the  Soviet  Union  to  have  all  the  weapons  they  need  to 
control  the  world.  It  enables  them  to  have  decisive  military  superi- 
ority and  it  forbids  us  to  catch  up.  It  forbids  us  to  increase  our 
numbers  of  missiles.  It  forbids  us  all  across  the  board  to  catch  up 
with  the  Soviets  in  throw-weight,  in  megatonnage,  in  MIRV's,  in 
missiles  and  so  forth  on  down  the  line. 

SALT  II  means  that,  if  it  is  ratified,  we  will  be  humbly  accepting 
a  position  of  inferiority  to  the  Soviet  Union.  What  is  our  recourse 
after  that?  After  that,  we  can  say  please,  Mr.  Brezhnev,  be  nice  to 
us,  but  we  will  not  have  the  power  to  force  him  to  do  it. 

When  Khrushchev  put  his  missiles  in  Cuba  in  1962,  our  great 
Strategic  Air  Command  went  on  airborne  alert  and  could  drop 
50,000  megatons  of  nuclear  striking  power  then.  That  is  why  we 


208 

were  safe  and  there  wasn't  any  war.  We  can't  do  that  today.  We 
can't  even  make  a  credible  threat  of  that  today. 

Senator  Helms.  And  we  will  be  even  worse  off. 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  With  each  succeeding  year,  we  will  be  worse  off. 

Senator  Helms.  Right.  My  time  is  up.  Thank  you,  Mrs.  Schlafly. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Senator  Stone.  Senator  Hayakawa. 

Senator  Hayakawa.  Senator  Percy,  would  you  like  to  question 
now? 

Senator  Percy.  No,  please  go  ahead.  I  have  time. 

SOVIET   STOPPAGE   OF   WORLD   OIL   FLOW 

Senator  Hayakawa.  Thank  you,  Mrs.  Schlafly,  for  your  able  and 
eloquent  presentation.  I  would  like  further  explanation  of  that 
map,  Mrs.  Schlafly.  There  is  that  heavy  green  line  of  Middle  East- 
ern oil  going  around  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  up  through  Europe 
and  the  United  States. 

This  shipment  can  be  interdicted,  interrupted,  or  stopped,  you 
are  saying,  by  the  Soviet  Navy?  Or  what  are  the  ways  in  which 
this  flow  of  oil  can  be  stopped?  What  are  the  ways  in  which  it  is 
likely  to  be  stopped,  given  Soviet  power  and,  as  you  say,  Soviet 
superiority  in  nuclear  weapons? 

Mrs.  Schlafly.  Once  they  have  the  strategic  superiority,  they 
can  stop  it  in  any  one  of  a  variety  of  different  ways.  For  example, 
they  could  do  it  like  oil  embargo  I  in  1973.  They  could  simply  tell 
the  Middle  East  and  African  nations,  we  want  you  to  embargo  oil 
for  the  next  5  months,  and  don't  worry,  you  can  recoup  your  losses 
after  that  by  jacking  up  the  price  10  times. 

The  Soviets  will  have  the  power  to  do  what  they  want.  With 
their  great  naval  superiority,  they  could  simply  impose  a  blockade. 
"They  could  harass  our  shipping  line.  They  could  cut  it  off  at  some 
of  those  narrow  points  where  the  oil  comes  through.  There  are  any 
number  of  options.  When  you  have  the  power,  you  can  deal  any 
card  in  the  deck, 

AFRICAN   seaports   FRIENDLY  TO  SOVIET  NAVY 

Senator  Hayakawa.  What  are  the  seaports  on  the  east  coast  of 
Africa  which  would  be  friendly  to  and  therefore  probably  usable  by 
the  Soviet  Navy? 

Mrs.  Schlafly.  They  have  several  ports  there  at  the  present 
time,  and  they  have  that  bunkering  facility  where  there  is  the 
break  in  the  green  line. 

Senator  Hayakawa.  Yes.  What  is  that  bunkering  facility? 

Mrs.  Schlafly.  A  major  place  where  they  can  come  in  for  re- 
pairs and  do  an5rthing  they  want. 

Senator  Hayakawa.  What  island  is  that? 

Mrs.  Schlafly.  Senator,  the  technical  information  for  this  is 
from  a  congressional  source  and  some  of  the  strategic  authorities, 
and  I  will  be  happy  to  submit  the  name  of  that  island  to  you.  I 
don't  have  it  right  now. 

Senator  Hayakawa.  I  should  know  these  things. 

Senator  Stone.  It  will  be  accepted  into  the  record  when  it  is 
submitted. 


209 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  Thank  you. 

[The  information  referred  to  follows:] 

The  name  of  the  island  is  Mauritius.  Data  for  the  map  was  obtained  from  a  House 
Committee  on  International  Relations  publication  of  the  95th  Congress,  dated  May 
8,  1977  and  entitled  "The  Soviet  Union  and  the  Thi-d  World." 

Senator  Hayakawa.  But  there  are  seaports  along  the  east  coast 
which  the  Soviet  Navy  could  use,  would  be  welcome  at,  and  there 
are  some  on  the  west  coast  as  well? 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  Yes,  they  have  many  friendly  ports  in  Africa — 
any  place  where  there  is  a  country  with  Cuban  troops  with  Russian 
arms. 

Senator  Hayakawa.  Like  Angola? 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  Ycs,  Angola  will  allow  the  Soviet  Navy  to  come 
in.  It  is  my  understanding  that  all  up  and  down  the  coasts  of  both 
sides  of  Africa,  they  have  friendly  ports  where  they  can  put  in  for 
repairs,  and  supplies,  and  so  forth. 

Senator  Hayakawa.  They  wouldn't  have  friendly  ports  in  the 
former  French  colonies  like  Gabon,  the  Ivory  Coast,  would  they? 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  The  French  have  been  doing  a  great  job  of  main- 
taining some  very  key  spots,  especially  that  one  where  the  oil 
comes  out  of  Saudi  Arabia.  The  Soviets  wouldn't  need  every  coun- 
try. But  as  you  can  see  by  the  map,  they  have  plenty  of  countries 
with  plenty  of  ports. 

Senator  Hayakawa.  So  one  of  the  very  real  dangers,  given  nucle- 
ar superiority  on  the  part  of  the  Soviets,  would  be  their  power  to 
cut  off  oil  altogether  to  us  at  any  time  they  wanted  to. 

Mrs.  Schlafly.  Yes.  And  I  think  it  is  very  important  to  face  up 
to  the  fact  that  it  is  not  true  that  dropping  bombs  is  the  only 
utility  of  nuclear  weapons.  You  can  use  them  to  threaten,  to  black- 
mail, to  achieve  political  and  economic  objectives. 

U.S.   STRATEGIC   SITUATION   NOT   RESULT   OF   SALT   I 

Senator  Hayakawa.  Isn't  it  a  fact  that  our  strategic  situation  is 
not  so  much  the  result  of  SALT  I  but  a  self-inflicted  condition  of 
weakness? 

Mrs.  Schlafly.  That  is  true.  The  original  decisions  were  made  in 
the  mid  and  early  1960's. 

Senator  Hayakawa.  But  after  the  passage  of  SALT  I,  after  the 
ratification  of  SALT  I. 

Mrs.  Schlafly.  No.  The  original  decisions  were  made  when  the 
self-imposed  freeze  began,  and  that  began  right  after  the  Cuban 
missile  crisis.  1967  was  the  last  year  when  the  United  States  added 
a  single  strategic  weapon. 

Senator  Hayakawa.  I  see.  So  that  SALT  I  really  reaffirmed  that 
which  we  were  already  doing  insofar  as  arms  limitation  is  con- 
cerned. 

Mrs.  Schlafly.  Yes;  and  it  made  public  and  official  the  second- 
rate  status  of  the  United  States,  which  I  believe  destroyed  the 
credibility  of  our  nuclear  umbrella  and  thereby  led  directly  to  oil 
embargo  I. 

Senator  Hayakawa.  If  the  ratification,  then,  of  SALT  I  didn't 
matter  one  way  or  the  other,  in  effect 

Mrs.  Schlafly.  Oh,  I  wouldn't  agree  with  that.  I  think  SALT  I 
was  a  dreadful  mistake.  SALT  I  was  a  mistake  because,  in  the  first 


210 

place,  we  gave  up  our  right  to  defend  ourselves  against  incoming 
missiles  based  upon  the  mutual-eissured-destruction  rationale. 

Second,  we  accepted  inferiority  in  numbers  at  the  ratio  of  3  to  2. 
That  is,  for  every  three  ICBM's  the  Soviets  were  permitted  to  have 
under  SALT  I,  we  said  we  will  have  only  two.  And  for  every  three 
missile-firing  nuclear  submarines  the  Soviets  had,  we  permitted 
ourselves  to  have  only  two. 

What  SALT  I  did  was  to  codify  and  legitimize  the  self-imposed 
freeze  that  started  in  the  mid-1960's.  The  Soviets  kept  us  negotiat- 
ing until  they  had  that  advantage,  and  then  they  nailed  it  down  in 
SALT  L 

But  time  has  gone  on  and  the  situation  gets  worse  because  the 
Soviets  keep  building  and  we  remain  in  at  a  freeze. 

Senator  Hayakawa.  And  we  maintain  a  self-imposed  reticence 
about  increasing  our  Armed  Forces,  our  defenses. 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  Yes.  I  think  it  would  come  home  to  people  if  they 
would  realize  that  the  numbers  of  our  strategic  weapons  that 
defend  our  country  today,  namely,  1,054  ICBM  s  and  41  Polaris 
Poseidon  submarines,  and  a  shrinking  number  of  B-52  bombers, 
were  the  numbers  that  were  set  and  established  in  the  Eisenhower 
administration  before  Eisenhower  went  out  of  office  as  the  force  we 
needed  to  defend  our  country  then. 

Although  some  of  those  weapons  kept  coming  in  the  pipelines  up 
to  1967,  their  numbers  have  never  been  changed.  And  certainly  the 
danger  to  us  is  infinitely  greater  than  it  was  when  Eisenhower  was 
in  the  White  House. 

Senator  Hayakawa.  So,  if  we  continue  in  the  next  10  years  to 
behave  as  we  have  in  the  last  10  years  insofar  as  defense  is  con- 
cerned, will  not  the  nonsigning  of  SALT  II  be  the  solution? 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  The  rejection  of  SALT  II  will  enable  us  to  go 
ahead  and  do  what  we  need  to  defend  our  country.  The  ratification 
of  SALT  II  would  deprive  us  of  that  right. 

Senator  Hayakawa.  Of  course,  I  am  very  nervous  about  our 
determination  to  go  ahead  in  any  case. 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  I  am  nervous  about  that,  too,  Senator,  but  in  any 
event,  with  SALT  II  our  hands  would  be  so  tied  that  we  would  put 
ourselves  in  a  legal  bind  as  well  as  other  kinds  of  binds. 

RATIFICATION  TIED  TO  INCREASE  DEFENSE  SPENDING 

Senator  Hayakawa.  So  when  people  like  Senator  Nunn  and  Dr. 
Kissinger  say  that  they  would  vote  for  the  ratification  of  SALT  II  if 
we  expended  x  billion  dollars  a  year  for  the  improvement  of  our 
weaponry,  would  you  agree  with  that? 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  Senator,  I  would  not  put  it  in  terms  of  a  percent- 
age of  the  defense  budget.  Over  the  past  few  years,  as  we  all  know, 
the  defense  budget  has  gone  up  every  year  but  we  have  not  gotten 
more  strategic  weapons.  The  strategic  weapons  are  only  a  small 
part  of  the  defense  budget,  but  they  are  the  part  that  makes  the 
difference. 

I  think  we  must  build  mobile  missiles.  I  think  we  must  build  the 
B-1  bomber.  I  think  we  must  build  whatever  mix  and  readiness  of 
weapons  we  need  to  defend  ourselves.  But  we  put  ourselves  in  a 
legal  bind  with  SALT  II. 

Senator  Hayakawa.  Thank  you  very  much,  Mrs.  Schlafly. 


211 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  Thank  you,  Senator. 

Senator  Stone.  Thank  you,  Senator  Hayakawa. 

Senator  Percy. 

SOVIET   PRESSURE   IN    1973    OIL   EMBARGO 

Senator  Percy.  Mrs.  Schlafly,  we  welcome  you  once  again.  I  have 
just  a  few  questions  about  your  testimony  first  and  then  a  couple  of 
other  substantive  questions  that  I  would  like  to  put  to  you.  In  a  few 
of  the  cases  you  cite  in  your  testimony  I  view  history  a  little  bit 
differently  than  you  do.  I  would  like  to  have  your  amplified 
thoughts  on  some  of  these  cases. 

You  state:  "In  October  1973,  the  Kremlin  openly,  brazenly,  and 
defiantly  goaded  the  Middle  East  oil  producers  to  use  their  oil 
weapon  against  the  West."  I  hope  there  is  no  implication  on  your 
part  that  the  Soviets  should  take  credit  for  that  oil  embargo.  That, 
as  I  saw  it,  and  I  was  out  there  at  the  time  in  the  Middle  East,  was 
entirely  motivated  by  Middle  Eastern  events. 

I  think  such  anti-Soviet  countries  as  Saudi  Arabia  and  Oman 
would  be  highly  incensed  at  the  thought  that  they  were  just  a  tool 
of  the  Soviet  Union  in  this  regard.  They  were  working  entirely 
from  the  standpoint  of  their  own  political  interests  in  the  Middle 
East. 

Could  you  document  for  us  any  evidence  you  have  that  they 
"openly,  brazenly  and  defiantly  goaded  the  Middle  East  oil  produc- 
ers" and  had  any  effect  whatsoever? 

Mrs.  Schlafly.  Yes;  they  did  openly  and  brazenly  do  it  through 
their  radio  broadcasts  and  through  their  newspapers,  through 
every  means  of  communication.  That  is  the  documentation  of  that. 

Now,  with  regard  to  the  motivation  of  the  Arabs,  of  course  there 
are  other  factors  and  controversies  in  the  Middle  East.  But  I  think 
it  is  important  to  remember  that  in  the  Middle  East,  the  Arabs  and 
the  Israelis  had  fought,  I  believe,  three  previous  wars,  and  our 
policy  was  always  to  help  Israel. 

But  before  1973,  the  Arabs  didn't  use  their  oil  weapon  against  us, 
and  I  think  that  is  the  big  difference.  In  the  previous  controversies 
they  may  have  been  unhappy  about  what  we  did.  They  may  not 
have  liked  our  siding  with  Israel.  But  they  did  not  use  their  oil 
weapon. 

And  what  was  it  that  was  different  in  1973?  It  was  that  the 
American  nuclear  umbrella  had  been  replaced  by  the  Soviet  um- 
brella, and  no  longer  could  the  Arabs  be  in  fear  that  we  would  send 
the  Marines  in  as  Eisenhower  sent  the  Marines  into  Lebanon  in 
1958,  in  a  nice  clean  operation.  We  prevented  the  threatened  coup. 
No  one  got  killed.  It  was  a  show  of  strength  that  everyone  respect- 
ed. But  in  1973,  the  Arabs  didn't  need  to  worry  that  we  were  going 
to  send  the  marines  in. 

Senator  Percy.  I  respectfully  disassociate  myself  from  that  anal- 
ysis. I  think  the  Mideastern  powers,  the  OPEC  countries,  acted 
strictly  in  their  own  political  interests  there.  I  wouldn't  want  to 
give  the  Soviets  credit  for  that  devastating  economic  blow  against 
us. 


212 

SALT   I   AND   II   PREVENT   BUILDING   OF   ICBM's 

In  your  statement  you  say  our  technique  of  keeping  SALT  I  and 
II  negotiations  pending  for  12  years  kept  the  United  States  from 
building  up  any  additional  ICBM  submarines  or  bombers.  We  have 
been  building  submarines.  John  Glenn  just  dedicated  the  U.S.S. 
Ohio,  the  first  Trident  submarine,  and  we  have  a  full-scale  pro- 
gram underway  to  continue  that. 

We  have  the  ability  to  build  more  ICBM's.  We  have  just  chosen 
not  to.  SALT  I  has  not  inhibited  us.  We  also  have  the  right  under 
SALT  I  or  II  to  build  a  B-1  bomber  if  we  want. 

Is  that  statement  correct,  that  SALT  I  and  II  keeps  us  from 
building  any  more  ICBM's,  submarines,  or  bombers? 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  Well,  it  is  a  fact  that  that  is  the  way  it  has 
happened. 

Senator  Percy.  That  is  what  happened  but  it  is  not  because  of 
SALT  I  or  II. 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  But  all  those  years  of  the  negotiation  of  SALT  I, 
from  1967  to  1972,  we  were  all  told  no,  we  don't  need  to  build  any 
more  weapons  because  we  are  going  to  have  an  arms  control  agree- 
ment. And  during  that  period,  the  Soviets  were  digging  holes  like 
mad  so  they  would  have  1,618  by  the  time  SALT  I  was  signed. 

So  I  think  the  SALT  negotiations  were  a  tactic  of  the  Soviets  to 
inhibit  our  adding  additional  weapons. 

Now,  you  mentioned  the  submarine.  Of  course,  that  Trident  that 
Senator  Glenn  christened  is  not  going  to  be  in  the  water  for  an- 
other year  or  two.  But  the  U.S.  plan  for  the  Tridents  that  we  are 
supposedly  building  is  to  take  out  and  throw  away  a  Polaris  for 
every  Trident  built.  The  number  41  has  never  changed  since  1967 
and  it  is  not  planned  to  change. 

That  is  the  shocking  thing  that  has  happened  to  this  country. 
While  we  have  built  some  new  weapons,  some  new  missiles,  some 
new  submarines,  we  have  destroyed  one  for  every  one  that  was 
built.  As  I  pointed  out  in  my  testimony,  one  of  the  really  shocking 
things  is  that  when  we  built  550  Minutemen  Ill's,  we  could  have 
had  550  additional  missiles  for  the  puny  additional  expenditure  of 
$110  million. 

Instead  of  that,  it  was  the  policy  of  this  country  to  destroy  a 
Minuteman  I  or  II  for  every  Minuteman  III  that  was  built.  So  the 
total  figures  remained  the  same.  The  SALT  negotiations  kept  us 
from  ever  changing  the  figures  of  1,054  ICBM's  and  41  submarines. 

Senator  Percy.  From  all  the  testimony  we  have  had  from  the 
Department  of  Defense,  the  decision  not  to  go  ahead  with  certain 
weapon  systems,  the  B-1,  accelerating  the  Trident  program,  et 
cetera,  were  all  based  on  questions  of  cost,  need,  and  effectiveness 
rather  than  on  SALT  restrictions.  We  have,  after  all,  in  the  last 
decade  doubled  the  number  of  warheads  we  have.  There  was  no 
inhibition  in  SAL'S"  I  or  II  from  our  going  ahead  with  that  particu- 
lar program,  and  we  did. 

Mainly,  canceling  the  B-1  was  a  decision  reached  by  the  Penta-. 
gon,  the  administration,  and  backed  by  the  Congress,  although 
some  Members  disagreed  strongly  and  probably  were  right  that  we 
have  cut  back  too  much.  But  I  don't  think  we  can  attribute  that  to 
SALT  I. 


213 

As  you  know,  you  and  I  did  disagree  on  SALT  I.  We  had  the 
power  under  SALT  I  to  go  ahead  with  a  second  ABM  site.  We 
voluntarily  chose  not  to  go  ahead  with  it,  and  you  cannot  really 
find  any  defenders  of  an  ABM  system  today  who  feel  that  that 
expenditure  would  have  been  cost-effective. 

So  whether  it  was  right  or  wrong  is  immaterial.  We  voluntarily 
decided  not  to  do  certain  things. 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  Senator,  may  I  say  something  to  that?  I  did  not 
say 

Senator  Percy.  My  time  is  terribly  short  and  I  have  a  couple  of 
other  points  to  cover  with  you. 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  I  did  not  say  SALT  I  prevented  us  from  doing 
that.  I  said  the  tactic  of  keeping  the  negotiations  pending  kept  us 
from  doing  it.  And  you  are  right,  those  decisions  were  made  by  this 
country.  But  I  think  they  were  wrong  decisions. 

Senator  Percy.  You  mention  a  scenario,  which  is  an  interesting 
scenario,  of  oil  embargo  No.  2 — and  you  are  quoting,  I  think,  the 
Soviet  Union's  presumed  speech — "the  oil  embargo  II  will  enable 
our  Middle  East  friends  to  become  richer  and  richer  at  the  expense 
of  the  capitalist  imperialist  nations." 

I  would  hate  for  any  of  those  nations  to  get  the  feeling  that  they 
could  somehow  become  richer  by  embargoing  us  again.  They  have 
made  all  their  investments  here.  I  don't  know  of  any  investments 
any  OPEC  countries  have  made  in  the  Communist  world.  They 
have  put  all  their  chips  here. 

Every  bit  of  inflation  we  have  here  erodes  their  base.  Every  time 
prices  get  higher,  everything  we  build  in  Saudi  Arabia  gets  more 
expensive.  And  they  have  their  money  scattered  all  over  our  banks 
and  our  bonds  and  everjrthing  else. 

Anything  they  do  to  undercut  us — and  Saudi  Arabia  has  made 
this  very  clear  to  other  OPEC  countries — undercuts  them  because 
they  have  invested  so  heavily  here. 

DECUNE   OF   U.S.    DOLLAR   TIED   TO   SOVIET   SUPERIORITY 

You  also  indicate  that  the  rapid  decline  of  the  U.S.  dollar  has 
exactly  tracked  the  world's  perception  of  the  fact  that  the  Soviet 
Union  is  building  toward  a  decisive  military  superiority.  I  agree 
with  the  feeling  the  world  has  that  they  are  building  toward  it  has 
eroded  America's  position  and  we  must  find  a  way  to  correct  that. 

But  wouldn't  you  agree  that  the  thing  that  has  really  cut  the 
dollar  is  not  that  perception  but  low  productivity  in  this  country 
and  an  unwillingness  to  work  harder  and  smarter  and  better?  Our 
balance  of  pajonents  is  way  out  of  balance.  Ruinous  inflation  and 
an  excess  of  Federal  spending,  excess  budgets  year  after  year  are 
the  things  that  have  really  eroded  the  dollar.  It  is  not  military 
superiority  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

Do  we  agree  on  that? 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  Those  are  all  factors.  Senator,  but  I  would  sug- 
gest that  the  No.  1,  most  important  factor  was  the  5-month  oil 
embargo  in  1973  followed  by  the  fivefold  increase  in  oil  prices 
which  unsettled  everjrthing  and  was  the  start  of  the  tremendous 
inflation  and  other  economic  changes  that  resulted. 


214 

And  again,  I  suggest  that  oil  embargo  I  was  the  direct  result  of 
the  perception  of  who  has  strategic  superiority,  as  explained  by  the 
SALT  I  statistics. 

Senator  Percy.  Thank  you  very  much.  My  time  is  up  and  I  have 
a  few  more  questions. 

Senator  Stone.  Would  you  like  to  take  an  extra  2  or  3  minutes 
out  of  my  time,  Senator  Percy? 

Senator  Percy.  I  would  be  happy  to. 

Senator  Stone.  Go  right  ahead. 

NECESSARY  EXPENDITURE  TO  SAFEGUARD  U.S.   SECURITY 

Senator  Percy.  Very  quickly.  We  have  a  tremendous  debate  now 
in  the  Congress  as  to  whether  our  defense  spending  should  be 
increased  by  5  percent,  3  percent,  some  lower  figure,  or  some 
higher  figure.  Could  you,  because  of  the  amount  of  time,  Mrs. 
Schlafly,  you  spend  on  these  matters,  give  us  your  judgment  of 
what  expenditure  would  be  necessary  to  really  safeguard  America's 
security? 

Mrs.  Schlafly.  As  I  mentioned  earlier,  I  think  it  is  the  spending 
on  strategic  weapons  rather  than  the  overall  defense  budget  that 
makes  the  difference.  I  believe  that  whoever  has  strategic  superior- 
ity will  determine  whether  we  can  survive  as  a  free  nation.  There 
isn't  anything  that  government  does  that  is  as  important  as  that. 

So  I  think  the  first  thing  is  to  decide  what  strategic  weapons  we 
need  and  then  go  after  that  rather  than  saying  that  it  should  be  a 
2-  or  5-percent  increase  in  overall  spending.  It  is  not  the  overall 
budget.  The  budget  has  been  big  and  growing.  It  is  the  strategic 
weapons  that  really  matter. 

I  pointed  out  in  my  statement  about  how,  for  just  a  pitiful 
expenditure,  we  could  have  increased  our  ICBM  force  by  50  percent 
by  simply  digging  550  more  holes.  Exactly  the  same  thing  is  true 
when  the  Poseidons  were  built.  We  destroyed  a  Polaris  for  every 
Poseidon  that  we  built.  For  a  minimal  expense,  we  could  have  had 
31  additional  submarines  instead  of  31  Polaris-retrofitted-Poseidon 
submarines. 

Senator  Percy.  Could  you  give  us  some  sort  of  a  figure,  though? 
When  we  work  with  the  concurrent  budget  resolution  coming  up 
on  the  floor,  we  must  work  with  specific  figures.  Do  you  have  any 
ideas  you  can  give  us  as  to  how  much  you  think  we  need  to  develop 
to  increase  our  overall  spending  to  accommodate  the  program  you 
are  talking  about? 

Mrs.  Schlafly.  If  you  defeat  SALT  II,  I  will  come  back  and  give 
you  those  figures.  [Laughter.] 

But  I  don't  think  a  specific  budget  is  necessary  in  order  to  defeat 
the  treaty. 

BALANCED   BUDGET   AS   IT   RELATES   TO   NATIONAL   SECURITY 

Senator  Percy.  A  witness  this  morning  said  to  us  that  the 
strength  of  our  country,  and  I  agreed  with  him,  is  not  just  our 
military  superiority  but  it  is  also  the  will  to  use  our  weapons  at  the 
right  time  and  the  right  place.  It  is  also  our  economic  strength 
which  has  to  be  dominant. 


215 

Now,  when  we  are  faced  with  problems  like  budget  balancing, 
and  the  second  concurrent  resolution  is  coming  up,  we  are  going  to 
be  faced  with  some  tough  decisions.  I  think  we  have  to  cut  back 
some  social  programs.  I  have  outlined  a  number  of  them  which  I 
think  are  outrageous  for  this  Nation  at  this  time  to  be  spending 
money  on. 

We  must  cut  some  back,  and  I  think  we  have  to  increase  some- 
what our  Federal  defense  spending.  But  how  important  do  you 
think  it  is  for  this  Nation  to  stick  with  its  resolve  now  to  balance 
the  budget  and,  as  we  are  now  projecting,  have  a  surplus  in  the 
fiscal  year  beginning  October  1,  1981. 

How  important  is  that  insofar  as  the  perception  of  America's 
strength,  its  will,  its  ability  to  manage  its  fiscal  affairs  in  a  sound 
and  prudent  way?  How  much  importance  do  you  attach  to  that  for 
sustaining  the  image  of  this  country  as  a  powerful,  strong,  leading 
nation? 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  There  is  no  question  but  that  our  country  and 
our  Government  has  certain  image,  credibility,  and  confidence 
problems  at  the  present  time.  And  one  of  the  big  areas  is  money. 
But  I  do  think  that  if  we  don't  rebuild  our  strategic  superiority,  the 
effect  on  the  dollar  will  be  more  disastrous  than  anjrthing  else. 

I  really  think,  as  I  pointed  out  in  my  statement,  that  the  whole 
matter  of  cost  as  related  to  strategic  weapons  is  a  phony  issue.  It  is 
such  a  small  part  of  the  budget  that  it  does  not  really  even  figure 
in  the  overall  total.  But  I  am  glad  to  hear  you  say  that  you  are 
going  to  cut  back  some  other  programs  in  order  to  build  defense, 
because  I  do  believe  that  that  is  the  first  duty  of  government. 

Senator  Percy,  I  think  we  simply  have  to.  I  think  we  can  find  a 
way  to  do  it  and  keep  our  objectives.  I  hope  we  do  agree  on  an 
objective  to  keep  that  budget  balanced.  It  is  a  very,  very  high 
priority  as  it  relates  to  our  national  security  and  our  strength  as  a 
nation.  Economic  strength  is  just  as  important  as  military 
strength.  That  shows  our  ability  in  the  long  run. 

If  they  want  to  pursue  an  arms  race  and  keep  at  it,  we  could 
beat  them  hands  down  on  that  any  time  we  decide  we  want  to  do 
that. 

The  last  question,  Mr.  Chairman,  if  you  will  indulge  me  with  one 
more. 

Senator  Stone.  Go  right  ahead. 

USE   OF   NUCLEAR   WEAPONS   IF   EUROPE   IS   THREATENED 

Senator  Percy.  It  is  a  question  that  I  put  to  the  Ripon  Society, 
and  there  couldn't  be  a  group  of  Republicans  more  on  two  ends  of 
the  spectrum  than  the  Ripon  Society  and  the  Conservative  Union. 
But  I  was  pleased  that  the  representative  of  the  Ripon  Society  from 
Evanston,  111.,  answered  the  question  I  put  to  him  because  our  will 
to  use  our  weaponry  has  been  questioned  in  Europe  in  recent  days, 
as  you  well  know,  and  I  think  many  wars  come  about  as  a  result  of 
miscalculation  by  one  of  the  adversaries  as  to  the  intention  and 
will  of  the  other. 

Is  there  any  question  in  your  mind  that  if,  for  instance,  the 
Warsaw  Pact  powers  in  the  Soviet  Union  moved  in  with  conven- 
tional weaponry  to  threaten  Western  Europe,  that  we  would  and 
should,  if  Western  Europe  was  in  danger,  use  our  ultimate  weapon, 


216 

which  none  of  us  want  to  use  but  which  we  have  there  as  a 
deterrent?  Will  it  ever  be  a  deterrent  if  we  don't  use  it  under  those 
circumstances? 

Would  you  agree  with  the  Ripon  Society,  who,  I  was  pleased,  said 
yes?  He  thinks  the  country  would  have  the  will,  as  he  knows  it. 
There  are  very  few  people  who  get  around  the  country  more  than 
you  do  and  know  more  people.  From  the  standpoint  of  conserva- 
tives in  the  country,  do  you  feel  they  would  support  the  will  to  use 
those  weapons  and  that  Russia  should  never  miscalculate  our  first 
line  of  defense  being  NATO  and  Europe? 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  I  believe  the  country  has  the  will.  But  it  is  not 
the  American  people  who  have  their  finger  on  the  button;  it  is  the 
President.  And  I  must  tell  you  truthfully  that  I  don't  believe  the 
President  has  the  will  to  use  it.  And  he  is  the  only  one  who  will 
decide. 

When  Secretary  Brown  went  on  "Meet  the  Press,"  he  was  asked 
the  question:  What  are  we  going  to  do  if  the  Soviets  fire  their 
missiles  at  our  Minutemen?  And  he  refused  to  say  that  we  would 
launch  them  before  the  Soviet  missiles  arrived.  He  is  going  to  sit 
there  and  let  them  be  sitting  ducks. 

If  they  would  simply  say,  out  in  public  for  everyone  to  see,  that  if 
we  get  verified  word  of  a  Soviet  launch,  the  "birds"  will  fly  and 
there  will  be  nothing  but  empty  holes  for  the  Soviets  to  hit,  that  in 
itself  would  be  a  tremendous  deterrent.  But  when  the  Secretary  of 
Defense  leaves  it  unsure,  uncertain,  then  I  don't  believe  he  would 
push  the  button  and  I  don't  believe  the  President  would.  And  it 
will  not  matter  what  the  American  people  want  because  they  are 
not  the  ones  who  will  make  the  decision. 

Senator  Percy.  I  will  let  others  speak  for  the  President.  I  don't 
feel  I  can  or  should  in  this  particular  case.  But  whatever  reason 
Secretary  Brown  might  have  had  for  not  enunciating  what  he 
would  do,  I  have  known  him  for  many,  many  years  and  I  think  he 
is  a  man  of  a  very  strong  will  and  a  man  who  would  recognize  that 
the  potential  use  of  a  deterrent  must  always  be  present  if  it  is  to  be 
a  deterrent. 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  But  if  I  am  not  sure,  how  are  the  Soviets  to  be 
sure?  The  important  thing  is  to  let  them  know  in  advance.  It 
makes  no  sense  to  say  that  after  they  hit  us,  we  will  pause  and 
then  we  will  think  about  it,  and  then  we  don't  know  what  to  do  or 
not,  so  we  will  have  a  conference  in  the  situation  room  in  the 
White  House. 

It  should  be  known  in  advance. 

Senator  Percy.  Well,  I  feel  very  strongly  that  we  should  leave  no 
doubt  in  the  minds  of  the  Soviets  where  we  would  draw  the  line.  I 
have  tried  to  draw  that  line  with  China  on  Formosa,  and  I  have 
tried  to  draw  that  line  on  Western  Europe  with  the  Soviet  Union. 
And  I  don't  think  the  American  people  would  tolerate  the  Govern- 
ment which  would  not  stand  up  for  what  we  believe  in  and  the 
avowed  pledge  that  we  have  to  protect  Europe. 

I  cannot  conceive  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  not 
having  the  will  to  carry  that  out,  whether  he  be  Democrat  or 
Republican. 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  But  the  real  issue  is  not  whether  we  will  or  not, 
but  it  is  what  the  men  in  the  Kremlin  think  we  will  do. 


217 

Senator  Percy.  That  is  right. 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  And  if  I  am  unsure,  you  must  admit  that  perhaps 
they  are  unsure,  too. 

Senator  Percy.  That  is  why  I  wanted  then  and  always  to  con- 
stantly repeat,  so  that  they  at  least  know  how  one  Senator  feels 
and  interprets  the  will  of  the  country  and  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  so  that  tney  never  underestimate  our 
ability  just  because  of  Vietnam. 

This  is  a  different  matter.  Vietnam  was  never  a  matter  of  our 
total  national  security.  Our  national  security  does  depend  upon 
NATO  countries.  I  think  they  know  it  and  I  think  the  Kremlin 
knows  it. 

Thank  you  very  much. 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  But  the  best  way  to  send  the  message  is  to  defeat 
SALT  II.  That  would  send  a  big  message. 

Senator  Percy.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  appreciate  very  much  your 
yielding  some  of  your  time  to  me.  I  thank  you  very  much  and  my 
colleagues. 

Senator  Stone.  Since  I  yielded  my  time  to  Senator  Percy,  I  would 
offer  Senator  Hayakawa  and  Senator  Helms  a  second  round,  and 
then  I  will  do  mine. 

Senator  Helms.  No,  you  go  right  ahead. 

[Senator  Hayakawa  indicating.] 

Senator  Stone.  Thank  you. 

difference  between  soviet  numbers  and  united  states 

NUMBERS 

Mrs.  Schlafly,  early  in  your  testimony,  you  provided  quite  a 
remarkable  summary,  which  is,  I  think,  probably  the  most  lucid 
that  I  have  heard,  of  the  difference  between  Soviet  numbers  and 
the  American  numbers  as  limited  by  SALT  II.  Would  you  repeat 
that  briefly? 

You  were  talking  about  their  heavy  weapons  as  opposed  to  ours. 
And  in  about  2  minutes  you  summarized  the  strategic  numerical 
differences  at  the  very  least  in  this  treaty.  Would  you  repeat  that? 

Mrs.  Schlafly.  SALT  II  allows  the  Soviets  to  have  308  heavy 
missiles.  It  does  not  allow  us  to  have  a  single  one.  SALT  II  allows 
the  Soviets  to  have — well,  they  did  have  1,618  ICBM's.  I  think  they 
are  claiming  they  have  only  about  1,500  now.  But  it  allows  us  to 
have  only  1,054. 

SALT  II  allows  them  to  have  almost  4  times  as  many  MIRV's  on 
their  land-based  ICBM's  as  we  have,  and  it  allows  those  Soviet 
MIRV's  to  be  26  times  more  powerful  than  our  land-based  MIRV's. 

SALT  II  allows  the  Soviets  to  have  their  submarines  prowling 
our  coast  with  weapons  that  can  reach  all  of  our  major  cities.  But 
we  are  prohibited  from  building  a  cruise  missile  that  will  reach 
Soviet  territory.  It  allows  them  to  build  all  the  Backfire  bombers 
they  want,  but  we  are  strictly  limited  on  our  bombers  and,  in 
effect,  are  very  handicapped  in  building  the  B-1  bomber  if  we 
choose  to  build  it. 

Nobody  knows  how  many  mobile  missiles  they  have.  Of  course, 
mobiles  were  the  big  loophole  in  SALT  I.  They  had  the  legal  right 
and  the  capability  to  build  a  couple  of  thousand  mobile  missiles 
under  SALT  I.  We  don't  know  how  many  they  have  built  and 


I  218 

hidden.  But  under  SALT  II  we  would  be  prohibited  from  deploying 
a  mobile  missile  until  1982. 

The  disparities  are  so  tremendous  that  the  whole  thing  is  humil- 
iating to  us.  In  addition  to  the  actual  differences  in  power  and 
numbers  and  throw-weight  and  megatonnage,  there  is  the  percep- 
tion of  power.  Again,  I  don't  see  how  they  could  respect  us  for 
signing  such  an  unequal  agreement. 

QUAUTY   EDGE   VERSUS   QUANTITY   EDGE 

Senator  Stone.  Mrs.  Schlafly,  the  administration  argues  that  we 
have  a  quality  edge,  while  the  Soviets  under  the  treaty  have  a 
quantity  edge.  What  is  your  understanding  of  that  quality  edge  in 
the  strategic  missiles  and  other  strategic  weapons  included  in  this 
treaty? 

Mrs.  Schlafly.  We  did  have  a  quality  or  accuracy  edge,  but  I 
think  most  people  believe  that  most  or  all  of  that  is  gone  now. 
Recent  tests  show  that  the  Soviet  ICBM's  are  very  accurate,  possi- 
bly as  accurate  as  ours.  The  whole  rationale  originally  for  saying 
that  we  would  not  build  heavy  missiles  was  a  kind  of  pride  that  our 
missiles  were  more  accurate  so  we  didn't  need  heavy  missiles. 

But  now  that  their  missiles  are  almost  as  accurate  as  ours,  our 
advantage  is  gone.  It  is  like  the  old  saying  that  a  good  big  man  can 
always  beat  a  good  little  man.  If  missiles  are  bigger  and  accurate, 
they  are  going  to  be  tremendously  more  powerful  than  smaller  and 
accurate  missiles. 

WINDOW   OF   vulnerability   OF   ICBM's 

Senator  Stone.  Mrs.  Schlafly,  witnesses  in  opposition  to  the 
treaty  have  expressed  their  military  opposition,  their  prime  mili- 
tary opposition  in  regard  to  the  window  of  vulnerability  of  our 
land-based  missiles,  our  current  Minutemen  III  missiles,  during  the 
mid  life  of  this  treaty,  roughly  from  1981  through  1984,  maybe  as 
late  as  1985,  until  the  M-X  mobile  missile  is  deployed  in  sufficient 
quantity. 

Those  opposition  witnesses  have  advanced  the  thought  that  the 
quickest  way  to  even  this  out  so  that  the  vulnerability  of  our  land- 
based  missiles  would  be  reduced  substantially  would  be  to  permit 
by  specific  provision  in  this  treaty  multiple  protective  shelters, 
vertical  shelters  or  some  other  form  of  mobile  basing.  What  do  you 
think  about  that? 

Mrs.  Schlafly.  I  think  the  window  is  very  serious.  Secretary 
Brown  talks  about  it  as  starting  in  the  early  1980's,  and  that  is 
only  about  4  or  5  months  from  now.  I  think  the  quickest  way,  the 
easiest  way,  as  I  mentioned  in  my  testimony,  is  to  adopt  a  launch 
on  verification  of  warning  strategy.  In  other  words,  the  President 
should  proclaim  that,  if  we  pick  up  word  that  the  Soviets  have 
launched,  then  our  Minutemen  fly;  so  the  Soviet  missiles  would  hit 
nothing  but  empty  holes. 

That  would  give  immediate  invulnerability  to  the  Minuteman 
missile  force. 

I  do  agree  that  the  next  move  should  be  the  mobile  basing. 


219 

INITIATION   OF  COUNTERFORCE  STRATEGY 

Senator  Stone.  Now,  in  regard  to  them  flying,  the  way  they  are 
targeted  now,  most  people  think,  is  against  civiHan  populations, 
mainly;  some  hardened  military  targets,  but  mainly,  because  of  the 
doctrine  of  mutual  assured  destruction,  they  are  targeted  against 
the  Soviet  civilian  populations. 

Others,  mainly  those  in  opposition  to  this  treaty,  have  advocated 
a  counterforce  approach  in  which,  as  soon  as  we  can,  we  would 
target  the  force,  against  the  strategic  missiles,  of  the  Soviet  Union, 
What  is  your  view  about  that? 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  Of  course  we  should  have  a  counterforce  strat- 
egy. The  question  is  do  we  have  the  weapons  that  can  do  it?  It  is 
not  believed  that  our  Minuteman  missiles  are  sufficiently  powerful 
to  knock  out  Soviet  missiles  in  their  hardened  silos. 

Senator  Stone.  That  is  part  of  this  window  of  vulnerability  until 
we  get  a  larger  M-X  missile,  isn't  that  right? 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  That  is  correct.  And  that  is  the  reason  why 
SALT  is  so  unfair  in  not  permitting  us  to  have  heavy  missiles, 
because  that  is  the  value  of  a  heavy  missile.  It  can  knock  out  a 
missile  in  its  hardened  silo. 

need  for  heavy  missile  during  ufe  of  salt 

Senator  Stone.  And  you  are  saying  we  need  a  heavy  missile  and 
we  need  it  during  the  life  of  this  treaty;  is  that  right? 

Mrs.  ScHLAFLY.  I  think  we  need  everything,  a  mix,  and  readiness. 
I  think  we  need  whatever  it  takes  to  stay  ahead  of  the  Soviet 
Union.  We  have  a  nation  that  will  support  it.  We  have  an  economy 
that  will  support  it.  We  are  blessed  with  a  GNP  twice  that  of  the 
Soviet  Union.  And  I  am  convinced  that  the  American  people  will 
support  it. 

And  if  they  find  that  some  months  hence  we  are  all  sitting  in 
gasoline  lines  because  half  of  our  gasoline  has  been  cut  off,  and  if 
they  find  that  we  are  absolutely  unable  to  do  anything  about 
Soviet  troops  or  bombers  or  missiles  in  Cuba,  I  think  they  are  going 
to  come  right  back  and  say:  how  did  that  happen? 

ACU'S  acceptance  of  resolution   of  CUBAN   SITUATION 

Senator  Stone.  Mrs.  Schlafly,  speaking  of  that  Cuban  situation, 
would  you  or  would  you  think  the  American  Conservative  Union 
would  accept  a  resolution  of  this  problem  at  less  than  the  full 
withdrawal  of  the  combat  unit? 

Mrs.  Schlafly.  No,  we  want  them  out.  It  is  a  real  test  and  it  is 
only  the  harbinger  of  things  to  come. 

Senator  Stone.  Thank  you,  Mrs.  Schlafly. 

Mrs.  Schlafly.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

[Mrs.  Schlafly's  prepared  statement  follows:] 

Prepared  Statement  of  Mrs.  Phylus  Schlafly 

My  name  is  Phyllis  Schlafly  of  Alton,  Illinois.  I  am  an  author,  a  journalist,  and  a 
member  of  the  Illinois  Bar.  I  appear  here  as  a  representative  of  the  American 
Conservative  Union,  of  which  I  am  a  member  of  the  board  of  directors. 

For  the  past  15  years,  my  major  field  of  research  and  writing  has  been  strategy.  I 
am  the  co-author  of  five  books  on  nuclear  strategy,  which  have  sold  in  the  hundreds 
of  thousands  of  copies.  Beginning  in  1964,  these  books  made  a  series  of  remarkable 


48-260    0-79    Pt.4    -    15 


220 

predictions  which,  unfortunately,  have  all  come  true.  At  a  time  when  others  were 
discounting  Soviet  intentions  and  capabilities,  my  books  predicted  that  the  Soviets 
would  keep  building  nuclear  weapons  until  they  achieve  decisive  strategic  superior- 
ity, while  the  United  States  was  opting  out  of  the  arms  race  by  a  self-imposed  freeze 
on  the  building  of  additional  strategic  weapons.  It  is  now  obvious  that  this  is  what 
happ)ened. 

Strategy  is  the  science  of  planning  and  using  your  assets  to  achieve  your  objec- 
tive. Many  people  seem  to  assume  that  the  only  utility  of  nuclear  weapons  is  to  kill 
millions  of  people.  Nothing  could  be  further  from  the  truth,  and  nothing  could  be  a 
more  dangerous  assumption.  Today  I  ask  you  to  consider  the  other  uses  of  nuclear 
weapons,  and  how  ratification  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty  would  allow  the  Soviet  Union 
to  have  powerful  political  and  economic  weapons  against  which  we  would  have  no 
defense. 

Ratification  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty  would  deliver  to  the  Soviet  Union:  (1)  the 
power  to  cut  off  U.S.  imported  oil,  (2)  the  power  to  destroy  the  U.S.  dollar,  and  (3) 
the  power  to  use  Cuba  as  a  Soviet  base.  Ratification  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty  will 
prevent  the  United  States  from  effectively  interfering  with  or  stopping  the  Soviet 
exercise  of  the  Oil  Weapon,  the  Dollar  Weapon,  or  the  Cuba  Weapon. 

Rejection  of  SALT  II,  on  the  other  hand,  will  not  give  the  Soviet  Union  any 
additional  power  which  is  realistically  usable,  but  it  will  permit  the  United  States  to 
control  our  own  destiny,  politically  and  economically. 

I.   THE   OIL   WEAPON 

The  great  American  industrial  nation,  a  people  on  wheels  to  whom  gasoline  is 
almost  as  much  an  essential  of  life  as  water,  is  now  facing  the  prospect  of  gasoline 
rationing.  What  is  it  that  has  brought  us  to  the  point  of  accepting  rationing? 
President  Carter  says  he  needs  standby  power  to  cope  with  a  sudden,  massive  oil 
shortage.  Obviously,  all  the  oil  wells  in  the  United  States  will  not  dry  up  at  the 
same  time.  The  very  request  for  rationing  power  reveals  our  humiliating  depend- 
ence on  the  whim  of  the  OPEC  nations  thousands  of  miles  away,  in  the  shadow  of 
the  Soviet  Union. 

In  October  1973,  the  Kremlin  openly,  brazenly,  and  defiantly  goaded  the  Middle 
East  oil  producers  to  use  their  oil  weapon"  against  the  West.  Use  of  the  "oil 
weapon"  was  so  very  simple:  just  embargo  oil  to  the  West  for  five  months,  and  then 
jack  up  the  price  fivefold.  It  cost  the  Soviets  nothing.  With  the  higher  prices,  the 
Arabs  quickly  recouped  their  temporary  losses.  And  the  United  States  was  exposed 
as  an  impotent  giant  who  could  do  nothing,  absolutely  nothing,  to  force  the  Arabs  to 
respect  U.S.  property  and  contracts. 

We  have  had  six  years  since  Oil  Embargo  I  to  prepare  and  defend  our  nation 
against  the  contingency  of  Oil  Embargo  II.  Instead  of  improving  our  situation,  we 
have  become  dependent  on  imported  oil  for  an  even  larger  percentage  of  our 
consumption.  Nobody  likes  to  talk  about  it  publicly,  but  the  only  reason  there  is  the 
slightest  need  for  gasoline  rationing  is  the  clear  and  present  danger  from  the  threat 
of  Oil  Embargo  II.  Dr.  Ghazi  A.  Algossibi,  Saudi  Arabia's  Minister  of  Industry  and 
Electricity,  said  in  a  July  speech  in  Los  Angeles:  Your  industrial  way  of  life  for  the 
coming  decades  will  collapse  without  Arab  oil.  The  independence  of  the  Arab 
countries  in  the  face  of  expanding  Communism  cannot  be  maintained  without  your 
strength  and  resolve.  No  interdependence  could  be  more  complete." 

Translated  into  plain  English,  SALT  11  =  Soviet  superiority  in  nuclear 
arms = Soviet  ability  to  wage  political  nuclear  blackmail  in  the  Middle  East = more 
gasoline  shortages  in  America.  So,  let's  consider  a  possible  scenario  of  what  Oil 
Embargo  II  might  mean  to  America. 

scenario:  oil  embargo  ii 

Time:  Early  1980.  Scene:  The  Kremlin,  Moscow.  Members  of  the  Politburo  are 
hosting  a  meeting  of  the  chiefs  of  the  Middle  East  oil-producing  states.  Brezhnev  (or 
his  successor)  is  doing  all  the  talking. 

"Comrades  of  the  Middle  East,  we  all  have  a  common  interest  in  world  peace  and 
prosperity.  Although  we  have  been  enjoying  apparent  peace,  our  great  leader  Lenin 
warned  us  that,  so  long  as  Capitalist  Imperialism  exists,  war  is  a  constant  danger. 
Our  courageous  intelligence  agents  have  uncovered  a  massive  plot  by  the  Capitalist 
Imperialist  Warmongers  to  launch  a  new  world  war.  This  would  bring  death  and 
destruction  such  as  the  world  has  never  seen  before.  This  would  be  bad  for  your 
business.  Your  good  customers,  the  United  States  and  Western  Europe,  would  be 
destroyed  by  our  necessary  retaliation.  Since  your  economies  are  based  on  continu- 
ing revenues  from  your  great  oil  resources,  you  have  a  vital  interest  in  preventing 
such  a  senseless  Armageddon. 


221 

"Fortunately,  there  is  a  peaceful  way  to  avert  this  nuclear  destruction,  and  that  is 
why  I  have  invited  you  to  Moscow.  I  want  you  all  to  agree  to  impose  immediately  a 
total  embargo  on  sales  of  oil  to  the  warmongering  United  States  and  her  NATO 
allies.  Within  a  few  weeks,  hardly  a  wheel  will  be  turning  in  Western  factories. 
They  will  have  little  electricity.  They  will  be  on  their  knees  to  you,  pleading  for  oil 
on  any  terms.  Then  you  and  the  great  peace-loving  U.S.S.R.  will  impose  our  joint 
terms.  The  Western  democracies  will  pay  any  price  you  set  for  your  oil  and  you  can 
easily  recover  tenfold  the  revenues  you  lost  during  the  embargo. 

"For  our  part  in  the  settlement,  the  Soviet  Union  will  demand  that  the  Capitalist 
Imperalist  Warmongers  surrender  all  their  nuclear  and  conventional  weapons  to 
the  United  Nations.  And,  since  most  UN  members  do  not  possess  the  technology  to 
handle  the  takeover  of  nuclear  weapons,  the  U.S.S.R.  will  gladly  take  custody  for 
the  UN. 

"Do  you  want  to  know  what  the  United  States  will  do  to  pressure  you  into 
terminating  your  embargo?  The  answer  is  NOTHING.  Just  remember  back  to  your 
first  courageous  and  innovative  use  of  your  oil  weapon  back  in  1973.  What  did  the 
United  States  and  Western  Europe  do  then?  Nothing!  They  meekly  agreed  to  pay 
you  a  fivefold  increase  in  the  price  of  oil,  even  though  that  increase  disrupted  the 
stability  of  their  economies.  It  was  your  courageous  action  in  1973  which  brought 
about  so  much  costly  inflation  and  unemployrnent  in  the  Western  nations. 

"The  United  States  had  far  more  conventional  military  power  than  any  of  the 
Middle  East  nations.  Yet  the  United  States  did  not  dare  to  use  its  conventional 
military  power  because  the  great  peace-loving  Soviet  Union  gave  you  the  protection 
of  our  strategic  nuclear  umbrella. 

"The  United  States  will  never  again  dare  to  send  in  the  Marines  as  President 
Eisenhower  did  to  avert  a  threatened  coup  in  Lebanon  in  1958. 

"Our  technique  of  keeping  SALT  I  and  II  negotiations  pending  for  12  years  kept 
the  United  States  from  building  up  any  additional  ICBM's,  submarines,  or  bombers, 
whUe  we  built  up  continuously  and  massively.  The  Soviet  nuclear  umbrella  is  now 
three  times  more  powerful  than  it  was  in  1973.  During  the  last  six  years,  we  have 
tripled  the  throw-weight  of  our  strategic  forces.  We  have  replaced  a  thousand  of  our 
older  ICBM's  with  advanced  models  many  times  more  powerful  and  more  accurate. 
We  have  deployed  29  of  our  huge  Delta-class  missile-firing  submarines  and  hundreds 
of  new  strategic  bombers. 

"Thus,  Oil  Embargo  II  will  enable  our  Middle  East  friends  to  become  richer  and 
richer  at  the  expense  of  the  Capitalist  Imperialist  nations,  and  it  will  give  the  great 
Soviet  Union  the  power  to  enforce  world  peace,  on  our  terms  of  course.  The  massive 
nuclear  power  we  were  allowed  to  retain  under  the  terms  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty  has 
made  all  this  possible.  SALT  II  prevented  the  United  States  from  building  any 
weapons  to  challenge  our  use  of  the  Oil  Weapon. 

"We  realize  that  Saudi  Arabia  recently  established  a  friendly  relationship  with 
the  United  States,  selling  them  oil  at  less  than  world  prices  and  increasing  produc- 
tion to  help  them  alleviate  their  shortages.  However,  in  view  of  the  massive  shift  in 
the  world's  strategic  balance,  it  would  be  very  foolish  of  the  Saudis  to  remain 
friends  with  the  Capitalist  Imperialists.  We  can  stop  the  flow  of  oil  with  our  naval 
superiority  alone.  It  is  in  your  own  best  interests  to  cooperate  with  our  plan  for 
world  peace." 

II.   THE  DOLLAR  WEAPON 

The  second  power  that  the  SALT  II  Treaty,  if  ratified,  would  accord  to  the  Soviet 
Union  is  the  power  to  destroy  the  U.S.  dollar.  The  value  of  a  nation's  paper 
currency  is  based  directly  on  that  nation's  promise-to-pay  credibility  and  on  the 
public's  perception  of  the  government's  ability  to  survive  and  redeem  its  paper- 
money  promises.  "The  rapid  decline  of  the  value  of  the  U.S.  dollar  in  the  last  few 
years  exactly  tracks  the  world's  perception  of  the  fact  that  the  Soviet  Union  is 
building  toward  a  decisive  military  superiority  which  will  soon  be  able  to  dictate  the 
terms  of  surrender-or-survival  to  the  United  States. 

From  1945  to  1967,  the  United  States  had  clear  and  undisputed  nuclear  superior- 
ity which  peaked  at  the  ratio  of  8-to-l.  During  those  years  of  undisputed  U.S. 
nuclear  superiority  (which  were  disparagingly  known  as  the  Cold  War),  we  had  hard 
currencies,  a  stable  dollar,  and  inflation  only  in  that  controllable  degree  which 
accompanies  an  increase  in  the  Gross  National  Product.  The  U.S.  nuclear  umbrella 
was  the  basis  for  the  stability  of  relationships  in  the  Western  world,  not  only  for 
political  freedom,  but  for  trade  relationships  and  agreements,  for  the  stability  of  the 
flow  of  raw  materials  in  and  finished  products  out,  and  for  the  availability  of  oil  and 
other  energy  sources  at  reasonable  prices. 

"The  year  1967  was  the  last  year  in  which  the  United  States  added  a  single 
strategic  weapon  (ICBM,  nuclear  missile-firing  submarine,  or  strategic  bomber)  to 


222 

our  forces.  Many  of  us  knew  that  the  United  States  that  year  opted  out  of  the  arms 
race  at  a  time  when  the  Soviets  were  building  toward  a  first-strike  capability,  but 
most  Americans  refused  to  believe  it.  The  U.S.  nuclear  umbrella  remained  credible, 
and  therefore  effective,  for  another  five  years  because  of  the  lag  in  international 
perception  that  the  strategic  balance  was  shifting  in  favor  of  the  Soviets. 

The  SALT  I  Agreements  signed  in  Moscow  on  May  26,  1972,  made  it  officially  and 
publicly  apparent  that  the  United  States  had  voluntarily  and  unilaterally  put 
ourselves  in  a  nuclear-weapons  freeze  and  abandoned  our  once-overwhelming  strate- 
gic superiority.  Under  the  SALT  I  Treaty  (on  defensive  weapons),  the  United  States 
gave  up  our  right  to  defend  our  population  against  incoming  nuclear  missiles,  and 
under  the  SALT  I  Interim  Agreement  (on  offensive  weapons),  we  agreed  that,  for 
every  three  ICMB's  and  every  three  nuclear  missile-firing  submarines  the  Soviets 
build,  we  will  limit  the  United  States  to  only  two,  respectively. 

Publication  of  the  SALT  I  statistics  in  Alay  1972  destroyed  the  credibility  of  the 
U.S.  strategic  umbrella.  The  newly  credible  Soviet  strategic  umbrella  protected  the 
Arabs  in  their  effective  use  of  the  oil  weapon  against  the  great  oil-consuming 
Western  nations.  Although  the  conventional  military  power  of  the  Western  nations 
overshadowed  that  of  the  Arabs  by  a  factor  of  about  1,000-to-l,  that  was  no  help 
whatsoever  in  the  face  of  the  soviet  nuclear  umbrella. 

Thus,  mere  possession  by  the  Soviets  of  nuclear  weapons  of  sufficient  numbers 
and  power  rendered  impotent  all  other  forms  of  American  power,  including  conven- 
tional military  power,  industrial  power,  financial  power,  technological  power,  popu- 
lation power,  and  even  food  power.  All  those  other  factors,  however  mighty  in 
themselves,  even  in  combination  are  not  enough  to  challenge  Soviet  nuclear  power. 

It  is  not  even  necessary  to  discuss  the  point  of  whether  the  3-to-2  numbers 
superiority  in  ICBM's  and  nuclear  missile-firing  submarines  did  or  did  not  give  the 
Soviets  an  across-the-board  strategic  superiority.  The  fact  is  that  the  SALT  I  gave 
the  Soviets  a  worldwide  perception  of  nuclear  superiority,  and  it  gave  the  Soviets  a 
sufficiency  of  nuclear  power  to  use  the  Oil  Weapon  and  the  Dollar  Weapon. 

THE   FINANCIAL  COST   OF  SALT   I 

When  we  plot  on  a  graph  what  has  happened  to  the  U.S.  dollar,  it  is  clear  that 
our  runaway  inflation  started  with  the  signing  of  SALT  I  in  1972.  If  our  leaders 
don't  learn  the  lesson  of  the  financial  cost  of  SALT  I,  we  will  find  to  our  sorrow  that 
the  cost  of  SALT  II  is  far  higher. 

The  (Consumer  Price  Index  is  based  on  the  1967  dollar  (the  last  year  the  United 
States  acquired  an  additional  strategic  weapon).  The  Consumer  Price  Index,  which 
stood  at  100  in  1967,  had  risen  only  to  125  by  1972  (the  year  of  SALT  I).  However, 
subsequent  to  SALT  I  and  Oil  Embargo  I,  we  slid  into  double-digit  inflation.  By  1979 
the  Consumer  Price  Index  had  shot  up  to  217,  and  inflation  is  now  running  at  13.4 

gercent  a  year.  It  now  takes  $2.17  to  buy  what  $1.00  would  buy  the  year  the  United 
tates  stopped  building  nuclear  weapons.  This  means  that  more  than  half  of  all  our 
savings  in  bank  accounts,  savings  and  loan  companies,  life  insurance,  pensions,  and 
other  money  investments  has  been  stolen  from  us  by  those  who  changed  American 
strategic  policy  from  superiority  to  inferiority. 

According  to  conventional  wisdom,  stocks  are  supposed  to  be  a  good  hedge  against 
inflation.  From  1950  to  1968,  stocks  did  as  expected,  rising  436  percent  during  a 
period  of  relatively  low  inflation.  But  since  1968,  while  consumer  prices  have  more 
than  doubled,  stocks  have  fluctuated  widely  and  the  1979  average  is  a  pitiful  two 
percent  higher  than  in  1968.  This  means  that  stocks  in  1979  have  really  lost  half 
their  1968  value,  because  the  dollars  they  are  worth  will  buy  only  half  as  much. 

And  the  price  of  gold  rose  from  $60  in  the  year  of  SALT  I  to  $329  in  the  year  of 
SALT  II. 

American  history  provides  a  tragic  lesson  of  what  happens  to  paper  money  when 
the  government  which  issues  it  lacks  the  military  weapons  necessary  to  maintain 
itself  as  an  independent  nation.  In  the  South,  children  of  the  second  generation 
after  the  War  Between  the  States  in  impoverished  households  had  a  unique  toy. 
Instead  of  play  money,  they  had  quite  literally  scores  of  thousands  of  dollars  in 
genuine  American  currency.  Thousands  of  southern  patriots  had  turned  in  their 
gold  for  this  currency  in  order  to  buy  essential  food  and  war  materials  from  abroad. 
The  first  postwar  generation  still  treasured  this  paper,  hoping  that  some  day  it 
might  be  redeemed.  They  finally  learned  the  bitter  lesson  that  the  paper-money 
promises  of  a  government  which  has  been  militarily  destroyed  will  never  again  be 
honored. 

However,  Confederate  paper  money  did  not  lose  its  value  overnight.  When  it  was 
first  issued,  it  was  accepted  at  face  value  in  the  South.  Progressively,  as  it  became 
apparent  that  the  industrial  North  was  building  toward  decisive  military  superior- 
ity, the  credibility  of  the  Confederate  Government's  promise-to-pay  began  to  deterio- 


223 

rate.  As  it  was  perceived  that  the  North's  power  would  soon  become  overwhelming, 
C!onfederate  currency  began  its  slide  down  to  nothingness. 

This  is  what  is  happening  to  the  American  dollar  as  the  power  centers  of  the 
world  progressively  grasp  the  fact  that  the  Soviet  Union  is  building  toward  decisive 
military  superiority.  The  progressive  attainment  by  the  Soviet  Union  of  the  military 
power  which  will  enable  it  to  fulfill  what  it  has  openly  declared  to  be  its  "historic" 
mission  (to  destroy  the  Western  capitalist  nations)  hgis  resulted  in  a  growing  loss  of 
confidence  in  the  U.S.  dollar. 

SALT  I  and  Oil  Embargo  I  which  resulted  cut  the  value  of  the  U.S.  dollar  in  half. 
SALT  II  and  any  resulting  Oil  Embargo  II  will  complete  the  destruction  of  the  U.S. 
dollar. 

ra.   THE  CUBA  WEAPON 

The  recent  relevation  that  there  are  thousands  of  Russian  combat  troops  in  Cuba 
is  only  the  tip  of  the  iceberg  of  what  a  Cuban  Crisis  II  could  mean  to  the  United 
States.  What  will  we  do  if  the  Soviets  send  200  Backfire  bombers  or  225  SS-20 
missiles  to  Cuba? 

At  the  time  of  Cuban  Crisis  I  (the  Cuban  Missile  Crisis  of  1962),  the  United  States 
was  able  to  face  down  Khrushchev  because  our  Strategic  Air  Command  put  our 
then-new  and  impressive  B-52  fleet  on  airborne  alert.  This  constituted  a  credible 
threat  that  we  could  deliver  up  to  50,000  megatons  of  nuclear  striking  power  on 
Soviet  territory. 

No  U.S.  President  could  make  that  threat  today.  It  would  not  be  credible  to  the 
Soviets  or  to  anyone  else.  So  what  will  our  President  do  if  the  Soviets  send  Backfire 
bombers  or  nuclear  missiles  into  Cuba?  Plead  with  them  to  take  them  out?  Humbly 
appeal  to  their  good  faith?  Tell  them  we  will  denounce  them  in  the  UN  or  the  OAS? 
Is  that  what  the  great  United  States  is  reduced  to  when  it  comes  to  the  supreme 
matter  of  protecting  the  lives  and  property  of  our  own  citizens? 

First,  let's  consider  a  scenario  of  the  Soviets  sending  200  Backfire  bombers  to 
Cuba.  Basing  Backfire  bombers  in  Cuba  would  give  the  Soviets  a  dramatic  option  to 
exercise  their  strategic  power  without  the  launching  of  a  single  missile  or  the 
dropping  of  a  single  bomb. 

"rhe  Kremlin  could  send  a  flight  of  200  Backfire  bombers  to  overfly  New  York, 
Boston,  Philadelphia,  Baltimore,  Washington,  Pittsburgh,  Detroit,  Cleveland,  Chica- 
go, St.  Louis,  Atlanta,  and  any  other  cities  convenient  to  a  plan  of  concentrating  on 
areas  of  dense  population.  The  flight  could  be  timed  to  arrive  over  the  cities  during 
late-afternoon  rush  hours.  No  bombs  would  be  dropped,  but  they  would  be  on  board. 

The  force  of  200  could  be  divided  into  flights  of  10  Backfires  each,  and  they  could 
sweep  in  low  over  our  great  cities  at,  say,  ten-minute  intervals;  each  flight  could 
make  two  sweeps  over  each  city.  The  Backfires  are  large  and  impressive,  and  they 
fly  at  mach  2.2.  Sonic  booms  would  break  windows  by  the  thousands.  Motorists  on 
the  freeways  would  abandon  their  cars,  attempting  to  find  shelter  from  what  they 
would  think  was  a  bombing  attack.  No  wheels  would  be  moving  because  of  the 
massive  traffic  jams.  Telephone  systems  would  be  swamped  by  the  volume  of  calls 
from  frightened  people  trying  to  find  out  where  to  go  and  what  to  do. 

What  would  our  President  do?  Get  on  the  Hot  Line  and  ask  the  Kremlin,  please 
not  to  drop  any  bombs?  Or  please,  order  the  bombers  home?  There  is  no  way  we 
could  stop  the  overflights  because  our  policy  for  years  has  been  one  of  zero  defense 
against  bombers. 

This  use  of  the  Backfires  to  create  Cuban  Crisis  II  would  be  in  exquisite  technical 
compliance  with  the  SALT  II  Protocol  which  allegedly  (though  not  directly)  prohib- 
its the  Backfire  bombers  from  "operating  at  intercontinental  distances"  or  from  "in- 
flight refueling"  or  from  a  production  rate  of  not  more  than  30  per  year.  Of  course 
the  Backfires  would  not  run  out  of  gasoline  on  this  overflight  mission;  they  could  all 
return  to  their  bases  in  Cuba. 

Second,  let's  consider  the  scenario  of  the  Soviets'  sending  350  SS-20s  into  Cuba. 
The  SS-20  is  a  compact,  land-mobile  missile  launcher  having  three  MIRV  warheads. 
The  350  SS-20s  would  give  the  Soviets  a  total  of  1,050  warheads,  or  about  one 
warhead  for  each  of  our  1,000  Minuteman  missiles  and  54  Titan  II  missiles.  It  is 
reasonable  to  suppose  that  U.S.  intelligence  will  be  just  as  slow  in  discovering  SS- 
20s  in  Cuba  as  it  was  in  discovering  offensive  missiles  in  Cuba  in  1962  and  in 
discovering  thousands  of  Russian  troops  in  1979;  so  the  Soviets  could  expect  to  get 
them  all  deployed  before  a  U.S.  President  recognized  the  threat. 

The  strategic  power  which  350  SS-20s  in  Cuba  would  give  to  the  Soviets  is  almost 
incalculable.  The  Soviets  would  know  that,  even  if  we  had  instantaneous  warning  of 
a  launch  from  Cuba,  it  would  require  10  to  12  minutes  time  to  launch  our  ICBMs. 
But  missiles  launched  from  Cuba  would  require  only  8  or  9  minutes  travel  time  to 


224 

reach  most  of  our  Minuteman  bases.  So  the  SS-20s  could  reach  our  ICBMs  before 
they  could  be  launched. 

The  Soviets  would  not  have  to  violate  SALT  II  to  carry  out  this  SS-20  scenario. 
The  SS-20  is  not  an  ICBM,  is  not  fixed-based,  and  is  not  a  "heavy"  missile,  so  is  not 
covered  by  SALT  II. 

Again,  the  question  remains,  what  would  the  United  States  do?  What  could  the 
United  States  do?  We  would  be  reduced  to  doing  nothing  at  all  except  pleading  on 
the  Hot  Line  for  the  Kremlin  to  show  compassion,  mercy,  and  good  faith.  Ask 
Alexander  Solzhenitsyn  how  much  compassion  the  Kremlin  bosses  show  when  there 
is  no  force  able  to  make  them  act  in  a  civilized  manner.  If  our  State  Department 
couldn't  even  make  the  Soviets  accede  to  our  request  to  let  Russian  ballerina 
Vlasova  be  interviewed  on  American  soil  without  the  intimidating  presence  of  12 
KGB  Iddnappers,  how  can  we  make  the  Soviets  respect  our  demands  about  Cuba? 

RATIFICATION   V.   REJECTION  RISKS 

What  are  the  risks  of  SALT  II  Treaty  ratification  versus  rejection?  If  the  Treaty 
is  rejected,  we  risk  a  tantrum  by  Kremlin  officials.  If  the  Treaty  is  ratified,  we  risk 
Soviet  use  of  the  Oil  Weapon,  the  Dollar  Weapon,  and  the  Cuba  Weapon.  Is  it  worth 
the  risk?  I  think  not. 

If  SALT  II  is  ratified,  the  Soviets  will  be  given  both  the  power  and  the  perception 
of  power  to  use  the  Oil  Weapon,  the  Dollar  Weapon,  and  the  Cuban  Weapon.  If 
SALT  II  is  rejected,  the  Soviets  will  have  substantially  the  same  power,  but  the 
worldwide  perception  of  that  power  will  be  diminished  because  of  new  respect  for 
the  United  States  in  rejecting  such  an  unequal  deal.  Everywhere  in  the  world, 
people  will  have  a  new  respect  for  the  determination  of  the  United  States  to  control 
its  own  destiny. 

The  perception  of  power  can  be  just  £is  important  as  the  power  itself.  Neither 
idealism  nor  semantics  can  conceal  the  fact  that  SALT  II  is  an  unequal  bargain  for 
the  United  States.  The  Treaty  does  not  limit  the  carrying  capacity  of  either  individ- 
ual weapons  or  the  total  weapons  forces  of  the  two  superpowers. 

The  alleged  "equality"  of  SALT  II  is  like  saying  that  two  intercontinental  freight- 
moving  firms  are  equal  when  each  one  has  2,250  "delivery  vehicles,"  even  though 
one  firm  has  all  50-ton  tractor-trailers  and  the  other  has  only  one-ton  pickup  trucks. 
Our  principal  ICBM,  the  Minuteman,  has  a  "carrying  capacity"  of  one  megaton;  the 
308  Soviet  SS-18  ICBMs  have  a  "carrying  capacity"  of  50  megatons  each. 

The  humiliating  inequality  of  SALT  II  is  also  shown  by  the  comparison  of  what 
the  Treaty  allows  each  side  in  the  most  powerful  category  of  nuclear  weapons:  land- 
based  ICBM  MIRVs.  Article  V  allows  each  side  to  have  820  land-based  ICBMs  which 
can  be  MIRVed.  The  Soviets  have  308  heavy  SS-18  ICBMs.  Article  IV,  Section  10, 
allows  each  SS-18  to  have  ten  MIRVs.  That  leaves  512  (820  minus  308)  other  land- 
based  launchers  of  ICBMs  which  the  Treaty  allows  the  Soviets  to  equip  with  MIRVs. 
Since  the  Treaty  allows  the  Soviets  to  MIRV  any  mix  of  ICBMs  they  choose,  and 
since  neither  the  Soviets  nor  the  Pentagon  will  say  how  many  SS-17s  and  SS-18s 
the  Soviets  have,  they  can  choose  to  deploy  512  SS-19s  with  MIRVs.  Article  IV 
permits  six  MIRVs  on  each  SS-19.  The  Treaty  thus  permits  the  Soviets  to  have 
3,080  (308  times  10)  MIRVs  on  their  SS-18  force,  and  3,072  (512  times  6)  MIRVs  on 
their  SS-19  force;  making  a  total  of  6,152  Soviet  MIRVs  on  their  land-based 
MIRVed  ICBM  force  alone. 

The  United  States  has  no  heavy  ICBMs  at  all.  We  have  550  Minuteman  Ills,  our 
only  ICBMs  capable  of  being  MIRVed,  and  the  Treaty  does  not  permit  us  to  add  any 
more.  The  "Common  Understanding"  of  Article  FV  prohibits  the  United  States  from 
flight-testing  or  deplojang  the  Minuteman  III  "with  more  than  three  reentry  vehi- 
cles." Therefore,  the  United  States  is  effectively  limited  to  only  1,650  (550  times  3) 
MIRVs  on  our  land-based  missile  force. 

The  Treaty,  therefore,  allows  the  Soviets  to  build  almost  four  times  as  many 
MIRVs  on  land-based  ICBM's  as  it  allows  the  United  States  to  build:  6,162  to  1,650. 

But  that's  not  all.  The  treaty  places  no  limit  whatsoever  on  the  power  of  MIRVed 
warheads.  The  Soviet  SS-18  and  SS-19  MIRVs  are  estimated  at  a  power  of  1.2 
megatons  each.  Multiplying  1.2  megatons  by  6,152  MIRVs  gives  the  Soviets  at  least 
7,382.4  megatons  (7  billion,  382  million,  400  thousand  tons)  of  TNT  explosive-equiva- 
lent in  our  land-based  MIRVed  missile  force. 

The  U.S.  Minuteman  III  MIRVs  are  only  0.17  megaton  each.  Multiplying  0.17 
megaton  by  1,650  U.S.  MIRVs  gives  us  280.5  megatons  (280  million,  500  thousand 
tons)  of  TNT  explosive-equivalent  in  our  land-based  MIRVed  missile  force. 

The  Treaty  thus  allows  the  Soviets  to  have  land-based  ICBM  MIRVs  with  explo- 
sive f>ower  more  than  26  times  that  of  ours.  The  power  centers  of  the  world  will  not 
be  fooled  by  calling  this  fantastic  disparity  "equality."  With  SALT  II,  the  Soviets 


225 

will  not  only  have  the  power,  but  just  as  important,  they  will  have  the  worldwide 
perception  of  power. 

Defense  Secretary  Harold  Brown  argues  that,  without  SALT  II,  the  Soviets  could 
build  even